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Preface 
This book is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be 
given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call 
it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, 
epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that 
it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt 
to provide a better alternative in these pages. 
The inferentialist proposal holds that experiential content is necessarily 
underpinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the 
continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at 
certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which 
such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are 
degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for 
the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential 
features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and 
deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that 
remains.  
The book is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two 
traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my 
continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience 
and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and 
experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand 
experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. 
In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned 
with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 
considers Kant‟s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz‟s reading 
of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal 
experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 
reviews Fodor‟s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the 
view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical 
data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well 
with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant‟s taxonomy. 
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Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I 
assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul 
Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the 
importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry.  
Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In 
Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars‟s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 
confronts Paul Churchland‟s treatment of „folk psychology‟ while Chapter 12 
isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I 
offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel‟s work in this chapter and claim that his 
position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I 
am developing. I conclude the book in the usual fashion with a summary of the 
central claims.  
  6 
Introduction 
 ‘Frankly, I do not understand even now how you unravelled this case.’  
Holmes leaned back in his chair and put his fingertips together. 
‘My dear fellow, there was no great difficulty in the problem. The facts 
were obvious enough, but the delicacy of the matter lay in the need that 
the murderer himself should confirm them by some overt act. 
Circumstantial evidence is the bane of the trained reasoner.’ 
‘I have observed nothing.’ 
‘You have observed everything, but failed to reason.’ 
 
‘The Adventure of the Sealed Room’ 
The Exploits of Sherlock Holmes 
A.Conan-Doyle and J. D.Carr 
 
 
Introducing the problem  
 
In Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein distinguishes 
„purely optical‟ aspects of experiences from those „mainly determined by 
thoughts and associations.‟ 1  The reference occurs in the context of his 
discussion on „seeing as‟ but, as is customary with Wittgenstein‟s work, the 
passage is not developed in detail. Regardless, the remark may be of historical 
importance as an early statement of an issue which now runs orthogonally 
through much of the contemporary writing and problems central to the 
philosophy of science, perception and cognition. 
 The issue is whether experiential content is, in any full-blooded sense, 
inferential, and thus, dependent on high-level theories, concepts and 
background knowledge („associations‟, as Wittgenstein would have it), or 
whether such content is non-inferential, coming entirely from input on the sense 
                                                 
1 L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, §960-1017. 
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organs (Wittgenstein‟s „purely optical‟ aspects).  
 Given the differences in the experiences of Sherlock Holmes and Watson, it 
would seem obvious that the content of an experience cannot simply be 
obtained from the latter source: to make meaningful observations it is not 
sufficient to receive purely optical inputs; it is also essential that one be trained 
to form appropriate associations, and this seems to require inferential abilities. 
This is, in fact, the orthodox philosophical line on such an issue. The routine 
ability to perceive, according to most current views, seems to rely on perception 
being fully informed by reason.  
 However, there are aspects of perception that this strongly inferential line 
misses out on: it seems true to say, for instance, that experiences have some 
content even when not completely informed in this manner. Watson did 
experience something, though admittedly, not as much as his more astute 
friend. Doubtlessly, he perceived material relevant to the case in question even 
without complex inferential abilities. But it also seems true to say that 
completely uninformed experiences have content too. They must have content 
because some organisms (dogs, cats, conceptually unsophisticated infants) do 
not seem to possess the kind of reasoning that is required in order to make 
complex perceptual judgements. It is to this kind of underdeveloped content, 
perhaps, that appellations like the „purely optical‟ apply.  
 If one inclines to each and all of these views, however, one is faced with an 
uninviting philosophical dilemma: how can individuals perceive anything if 
they fail to form associations of any kind? But equally, how can the forming of 
such associations alone be necessary and sufficient for seeing?  
 Neither of the traditional perspectives on this issue are very comforting. On 
the one hand, the content of reasoned perception must consist of inferential 
abilities drawing upon various degrees of theory (it was this ability that 
Holmes‟s partner seemed to lack). On the other hand, the content of 
uninfluenced perception must consist, not in the possession of networks of 
complex theoretical associations, but in information derived from a 
non-inferential source. Thus, one view insists that all experiences are highly 
epistemic; the other emphasises what are allegedly non-epistemic features. One 
view leads to a highly propositional and representational view of perceptual 
content; the other turns to proximal information that impinges on the sense 
receptors. Both approaches traditionally admit of hidden agendas, and both 
approaches seem too extreme. For this reason alone it seems likely that neither 
account in its current form will do. (Interestingly, Wittgenstein‟s qualification, 
„mainly‟, may offer a solution here which has not been noticed by philosophers 
when considering this issue.)  
 The preoccupation with the structure of perceptual content has historical 
affinities to Kant‟s work in epistemology. The issue has also been informed by 
sense data theories of perception advanced in the early twentieth century. The 
tradition stemming from Kant argues that the sensation/inference threshold 
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collapses with inference taking the dominant organisational role. The opposing 
view, stemming from positivism and the sense-data theories, claims that the 
reverse is the case. Articulated in these terms, the issue is firmly in the domain 
of the epistemologist and the philosopher of perception. And, articulated in 
these terms, the issue generally leads to a philosophical stalemate - a 
polarisation of opinion between views which eschew the importance of 
inference entirely and those which take the importance of inferential abilities to 
extraordinary lengths. As mentioned, the present consensus of opinion in 
philosophy is broadly in the latter camp.  
 There are, however, more contemporary ways of approaching the matter of 
experience and content than simply along these traditional philosophical lines. 
One of these ways even claims to provide a principled way of resolving the 
matter of the extent to which inference affects experiences. 
 Recent discussions concerning perceptual content have looked at the 
processing capabilities of the perceptual apparatus and has drawn upon 
psychological data on perceptual illusion and cognitive responses to ambiguous 
stimuli. Some theorists, notably Fodor, have suggested a multi-level conception 
of perceptual structure, where only some content is (properly) inferential, and 
other content is not, due to the operation of relatively autonomous, locally 
responsive, perceptual sub-systems, operating incidentally to higher-level 
cognitive mechanisms.2 Perceptual content, on Fodor‟s account, is modular and 
available to the influence of inferential abilities only at certain levels. This work 
has been influential in support of functional theories of the mind, but is not 
without interest in other areas of inquiry.  
 In this book, the modular view will be modified substantially and 
accommodated within a multi-level philosophical theory of experience that has 
not been considered before. A multi-level view of perception will provide a way 
of adjudicating between traditionally rival positions on the issue of experience 
and content.  
 There are several reasons to be optimistic about employing the results of 
investigations in the visual sciences. The modularity hypothesis, unlike 
standard philosophical theories of perception, is an empirical theory and is thus 
open to empirical confirmation or rejection. With modifications, it is also a 
means of having our inferential cake and eating it too. As shall be argued, it 
suggests a way of reaching a decision about how inference affects experience 
without compromising the integrity of the more traditional approaches which 
either ignore inference entirely or take its influence to absurd lengths. The view 
that there might be limits to the extent to which cognitive processing influences 
experience inspires a philosophical theory of content which shall be called the 
continuum theory.   
                                                 
2 J. A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind; „Observation Reconsidered,‟ Philosophy of Science, 51 
(1984): pp. 23-43. 
  9 
 But there is also a more general reason for taking heed of such strategies. The 
reason is that the problem seems to require a compatabilist solution. It seems 
likely that the prima facie separate approaches of Kant, the sense data theorists, 
and Fodor, have more in common than has otherwise been accorded by 
philosophers. It is plausible to suppose, for instance, that the 
observational-inference dispute is not only a metaphysical, but also an 
empirical problem. A fully adequate account thus must take account of both 
philosophical speculation and the experimental and psychological facts about 
the perceptual system. Neither approach on its own is intrinsically very 
satisfying in the long term. And it is important to bring these considerations 
together because the two approaches are obviously complementary, and are, in 
any case, often interdependent: one often gives rise to new considerations about 
the other. For example, what Kant‟s a priori views in epistemology did for 
perceptual theories in the 18th century and developmental psychology much 
later were as important as what experimental work in perception is doing for 
epistemology now. It is clear that there should be no boundaries on approaches 
to this issue. Both speculative and empirical considerations must be addressed. 
And, as shall be shown later, by taking such an approach to the problem, these 
very different ways of looking at the issue can usefully inform each other.  
 I want to consider how these very different approaches might overlap in this 
book. The issue is the bearing of inference upon experience, and the extent to 
which experiential content is explained in such terms. The central focus of the 
attack will be various forms of, what shall be called, inferentialist views, which 
stress not only the primacy of inference over sensation, but the redundancy of 
the latter. The price of these inferentialist views has traditionally been to rule 
out of court sensational properties of experiences. This consequence arises out 
of current theories of perception because content is seen exclusively in terms of 
inferential abilities with no allowance for features which cannot be captured in 
inferential terms. On current views, all that is needed to capture the content of 
perception is to specify the various inferential associations that perceivers 
routinely perform. However, it can be shown that this stress on the reasoning 
abilities of perceivers has been to the detriment of other kinds of content which 
cannot be captured in such terms.  
 The kind of content that might escape the inferential net is what philosophers 
sometimes call qualia: the „felt‟ aspect of mental states - the redness of a 
colour, the loudness of a sound and so on. Capturing the quale of an experience 
is important to any adequate story about the evolution of perceptual systems. It 
shall be argued that qualia typically have a causal role in perception and do 
some important epistemic work. It is thus essential that any view of experiential 
content must give some account of them. The continuum account developed in 
this book is designed to accommodate such features of perceptual content. 
 By contrast, there are many important contemporary views which ignore or 
reject the importance of sensational properties of experiences altogether. The 
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work of Churchland and Sellars are explicit in their rejection of all but an 
inferential content to perception; the work of Feyerabend is quite covert in this 
regard but offers a similar view. Philosophers as varied as Hanson, Armstrong, 
Harman and Davidson have been sympathetic to an inferential view of content 
at some stage in their philosophical development. There has certainly been no 
lack of opposition to the idea that experience possesses non-inferential, 
qualitative aspects. The voices against this view can also be traced to the 
important philosophical influence of Descartes and Kant who left enduring 
legacies to this tradition. Each of the philosophers mentioned have ignored or 
refused to admit content which cannot be captured in inferential terms - thus, 
they have been largely responsible for an inferentialist theory of experience and 
the consequences that flow from such a view.  
 The present work will chart some of these „consequences‟. It will also 
examine the consequences of rejecting the inferentialist story. The book will 
suggest that, in large measure, the full-blooded inferentialist picture of content 
is false - good intentions and long traditions notwithstanding. I shall examine 
the implications of the inferentialist view and highlight its problems. But a 
negative critique is not the only outcome - a positive account is also attempted. 
In rejecting inferentialism, I suggest we should end up with a continuum 
account which legitimates several kinds of non-exclusive content. Unlike 
inferentialist views, the continuum account allows that at some levels there is 
more to content than proximal stimulations, though rather less than a fully 
inference-based account allows. The position proposed in this book is that 
experiences might well be „determined by thoughts and associations‟ to some 
important degree, but, as Wittgenstein would have it, the operative word here is 
„mainly‟; there are also other kinds of content to consider which have 
non-inferential and sensory aspects. The continuum view is thus an attempt at 
bringing together the various kinds of views mentioned, empirical and 
speculative, into some sort of integrated approach. It is this attempt at an 
integrated approach that is largely the aim of this book. Another aim, however, 
is to come to some conclusions regarding the importance of experience in the 
context of some of the wider issues in contemporary thought. Some of these 
issues shall now be outlined.  
 The bearing of perceptual content on issues in contemporary philosophy has 
a number of levels of focus which need to be looked at. As already mentioned, it 
certainly features in how philosophers stand on the important issue of qualia; 
the (supposedly) irreducible and immediate qualitative „rawness‟ of 
phenomenal states experienced while undergoing acts of perception. This is an 
issue in which philosophers fall clearly into two distinct groups: the „qualia 
freaks‟ and those that „quine‟ them (as Dennett would have it) by denying that 
there is anything which could amount to irreducible „felt‟ properties of such 
states which cannot be „explained away‟ by inference, elimination or 
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reduction.3 This dispute has created imaginative points of interest, with Thomas 
Nagel arguing that no amount of physical information about the constitution of 
bats and their experiential states will tell us „what it is like‟ to be one, and Frank 
Jackson arguing that an omniscient neurophysiologist of colour vision confined 
to a black and white room can‟t ever know how colours look.4 The burden of 
such examples is supposed to suggest that physicalism, reductionism and 
eliminativism are simply false when it comes to the content of experiences.  
  This is an issue which is importantly tied to the question at hand, since only if 
such contents are not fully inferential, can there be any room for argument over 
what other kinds of content there might be. (And „qualia freaks‟ being, for the 
most part, anti-inferentialists tend to regard this extra content as being 
ineluctably experiential in some sense.) Alternatively, Churchland, Sellars, and 
others, argue that there is no such additional content to speak of, for there are no 
perceptual qualia in a view of experiential content shot through with inference. 
The problem of perceptual content is thus firmly bound up with one principal 
divisive issue in the philosophy of mind today: the existence and nature of 
experiential qualia. The suggestion here will be that, because there are genuine 
problems with the inferentialist view of experience and content, and because 
low-level content seems to have a genuine causal role, there are reasons for 
taking the qualia theorists seriously. It is true, I shall argue, that not all features 
of experiences can be captured in inferential terms. However, this does not 
mean that the opposing position which eschews the importance of inference 
altogether is correct. Rather, the view proposed in this book is that experiences 
possess two broad kinds of content: one which can be captured in inferential 
terms and one which cannot. Within the context of the philosophy of mind, my 
position shall be that an interactionist property dualism is still a serious option; 
indeed, much of the thesis that follows can be read as a sustained argument in 
support of this form of property dualism. In defence of this, I shall also endorse 
an argument which avoids the counterintuitive consequences of 
epiphenomenalism as an account of experience and content. The legitimation of 
a property dualist theory of mind is an important consequence of the rejection of 
inferentialism.  
 The issue of experience in the philosophy of science is also central to this 
book. The point of most interest is the recent discussion of whether 
observations are theory dependent. Does theory-dependence provide a 
inferentially neutral basis for scientific observations in the context of theory 
change? This issue has ramifications far beyond the inferential nature of 
                                                 
3 See D. C. Dennett, „Quining Qualia,‟ Consciousness in Contemporary Science; Rpt. in Lycan, 
Mind and Cognition: A Reader, pp. 519-545. See also: „Qualia Disqualified‟, in Consciousness 
Explained. 
4 Thomas Nagel, „What is it like to be a Bat?‟, Philosophical Review 83, (1974): pp. 435-50; 
Rpt. in Nagel, Mortal Questions; Frank Jackson, „What Mary Didn‟t Know‟, Journal of 
Philosophy 83, (1986): pp. 291-5. 
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experience to the nature of science itself: whether, for instance, the scientific 
enterprise is so thoroughly embedded in theory that it might proceed 
unencumbered by the need for making any observations at all. Paul Feyerabend 
seems to think that it is likely and desirable to have a „science without 
experience‟, and Fodor has recently claimed that having experiences is but only 
one way whereby scientists can achieve „cognitive self-management.‟5 The 
issues here are, of course, central to the methodological procedures of scientific 
inquiry, but they intersect too with any adequate account of perceptual 
experience generally, quite independently of the implications they have for the 
nature of paradigms, theory change and incommensurability. Any approach to 
the very general issue of experiential content will have to say something about 
how it bears on the parallel issue in the philosophy of science. As will be 
shown, there is much confusion on this matter, and this leads to a heavy-handed 
emphasis on inferential abilities. The claim here will be that, for similar reasons 
to those enunciated in relation to the philosophy of mind, science needs at least 
two broad levels of experiential content - that which is captured by inferential 
abilities and that which isn‟t. The inferentialist view, I shall argue, is as 
unsatisfactory as an account of the mechanics of science as it is as an account of 
the ontology of mind. 
 There is, then, a single theme to this book and two main foci. The theme is a 
rejection of inferentialism and a statement of a continuum theory of experiential 
content. The foci are experience as it features in the philosophy of mind and in 
the philosophy of science. The aim of the book is to develop a theory of content 
which considers the influence of stock philosophical views and current 
empirical work as contributing features to understanding the nature of 
perceptual experience. 
 The issues mentioned are linked in more ways than one as this book will 
show. The inference/non-inference dichotomy is one way of measuring the 
dispute, but there are others. Implications for an account of animal and infant 
cognitive development is another, quite different, yardstick. Inferentialism with 
respect to perceptual content, qualia, the theory dependence of observation, and 
so on, goes alongside any account of cognition which is sophisticated and 
epistemically high-level. Hence, we have Feyerabend ruling out the possibility 
of observations without theory in any „sensing subject‟, and Davidson and Stich 
arguing that animals, in effect, can‟t have cognitive content if they can‟t use a 
language, or, at least, have cognitive states which can‟t be fully isomorphically 
matched by those of language users.6 Many other recent theorists, including 
                                                 
5 See: P. K. Feyerabend, „Science without Experience‟, in Realism, Rationalism and Scientific 
Method; J. A. Fodor, „The Dogma that didn‟t Bark (A Fragment of a Naturalised 
Epistemology)‟, Mind, 100 (1991): pp. 201-230. 
6 Donald Davidson, „Thought and Talk‟, in S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, pp. 7-23; 
Stephen P. Stich, „Do Animals have Beliefs?‟, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, (1979): 
pp. 15-28. 
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Geach, Malcolm and Bishop, have taken a similar (essentially Cartesian) line 
about animal cognition. 
 It shall be argued that views which have such consequences are examples of 
inferentialism running wild. The importance of inference to cognitive content 
should be divorced from such claims. Language, of course, presupposes a 
highly permeable network of relatively accessible cognitive information of a 
symbolic nature, and is indisputably inferential in a complex sense. However, it 
is not clear that it is the only influence on content. It is plausible to suppose that 
though there might be significant causal penetration of the sensory aspects of 
experience by language and theory, this does not mean that there is no sensory 
content without language and theory. As has been stated recently: „sensory 
information has a certain priority over theory ... denying the obvious when it 
has an immediate sensory impact on one is a recipe for a short life.‟7 Clearly 
one should be able to keep the importance of inference without subscribing to a 
fully inferentialist view, and one must do this if one wants to preserve the 
intuition that animals and pre-linguistic infants have experiential content in 
some important sense. The trick, however, is to work out a way of keeping the 
intuitively plausible idea that experience requires inferential abilities without 
buying into such deeply counterintuitive views as those mentioned above. I 
resolve this problem simply by admitting qualia as part of the experiential 
continuum. 
 The treatment of the above issue in this book blends well with the modular 
view of perception mentioned earlier. This view argues that low-level structural 
sub-systems might be just as important to cognition as the higher level systems. 
Not enough blending of these very different approaches to the problem is 
attempted in the literature. This book will attempt to do just that. The continuum 
account advanced here is an attempt to reconcile the tensions between some of 
these very different approaches to the issue of experience and content. The 
application of mechanisms of inference to animal and infant experience is one 
such source of tension. The approach given will be to reject inferentialist views 
and to allow different levels of content to feature in the experiences of 
differentially sophisticated organisms. The attempt to reconcile the two kinds of 
influence along naturalist grounds, thus leads to a strongly evolutionary line on 
the development and the nature of perceptual systems.  
 Philosophical theories and concepts must be kept within the constraints of 
evolutionary theory. I do not conceal my biases on this point. Metaphysical 
speculation must ultimately be in keeping with the Darwinian model of the 
conditions for species selection and phylogenetic similarity and divergence. 
This, at least, will be an unargued assumption in this book. Any model of 
perceptual content should thus be broadly in keeping with such principles and 
not run against them. As I will try to show, however, the important relation 
                                                 
7 C. Mortensen and G. Nerlich, Aspects of Metaphysics, p. 7. 
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between high-level content (incorporating such inference-based abilities as 
language) and the selective importance of low-level, non-inferential content has 
often been ignored in keeping to the letter and spirit of what I have called 
„inferentialism‟. But there is a good case for keeping a low-level experiential 
content for basically phylogenetic reasons: reasons which are parsimonious and 
plausible in evolutionary terms. Such naturalist grounds are consistent with a 
philosophical theory of content which allows for low-level sensory content as 
well as high-level inferential content. 
 The inferential/non-inferential dispute should not, like other staid 
philosophical dichotomies, be seen in terms of mutually exclusive influences. 
At least, that is what shall be argued here. Instead, the emphasis should be on a 
continuum account of content: inferential influences at one extreme and 
non-inferential influences at the other extreme - with all sorts of graded 
possibilities in between. It will be argued that this is entirely consistent with an 
evolutionary approach. The point to be noted about the move away from the 
dichotomised to a continuum view of content is that the whole issue of 
experience has been hamstrung by something of a false option: a choice 
between inference and non-inference. I want to say, by contrast, that there are 
both inferential aspects and non-inferential aspects to such contents. I also want 
to suggest that the idea that either influence alone explains the nature of 
experiential content is an error. Both the inferentialist approach and the 
sense-data approach tend to suggest this, but ultimately neither view is 
satisfactory on its own. This book, instead, will try to charter a position which 
includes both inferential and non-inferential aspects without falling into the 
extreme views mentioned. Each approach has insights to offer, but that they fail 
to integrate these insights into a satisfactory overall account, which I think my 
view supplies.  
 I will be drawn to suggest a multi-level structure to experience, and hence, 
side with the qualia theorists to the extent that there must be some 
perceptual/sensational content which is „extra‟ to that explained through 
mechanisms of inference. I shall also be endorsing a view of modular cognitive 
processes. Kant‟s views will also be compared favourably with the modularity 
story. The empirical evidence for modularity is impressive in any case, quite 
independently of the argumentative supports philosophers offer for it. And, I 
think all of these claims can be sustained as complementary attitudes in 
evolutionary terms. By adopting the continuum view of experiential content, 
the merits of each of these approaches can be satisfactorily combined and the 
counterintuitive implications the inferentialist proposal has for low-level 
animal and infant experiences can be successfully avoided.  
 Claiming that there are contents to experience which are low-level and 
non-inferential is not to claim that there is no room for defending the 
importance of inference in any adequate view of experiential content and 
structure. There obviously is a role needed for inference in any account of 
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experience. The point is that only if one assumes an already dichotomised 
conception of inference/non-inference is there a case for saying that these 
influences are mutually exclusive. I won‟t be asserting such a view, and I shall 
be explicitly arguing against the sense data theories, which insist that 
non-inferential sense data can be held alongside the claim that they are 
epistemically structured. As Sellars has pointed out, this view involves a 
substantial confusion. The position to be taken in this book will be that 
low-level experiences can have content too, a content in a low-level sense - a 
sense which is significantly deficient in such things as high-level beliefs, 
theories and background knowledge, but which is nonetheless, by strength of 
reasons, not entirely empty. This is a tautological claim, but I think an 
informative one, because the view to be attacked does not admit of a 
non-exclusive way of treating the issue. 
 To summarise: this book endorses a continuum account of experiential 
content, and rejects a fully inferentialist view. The arguments advanced to 
support this draw upon several different approaches to the relationship between 
inference and sensation, both empirical and speculative, in both the philosophy 
of science and the philosophy of mind. The account also considers the 
unsophisticated experiences of animals and infants and keeps the issues in 
check with the constraints of evolutionary theory. The major claim is that all of 
these considerations and the various approaches to the problem can be sustained 
as complementary attitudes if one adopts the continuum account suggested. But 
if one does this, then by necessity one forfeits a heavily inferentialist view in 
which experience depends on the imposition of the content of theories, concepts 
and background knowledge. However, as it is advocated that a 
non-dichotomous relationship is in order here, this does not mean that we 
thereby have to abandon the importance of inference entirely. I suggest that 
there is certainly a place for inference in experience, both within the philosophy 
of mind and the philosophy of science, but that inferentialism is actually false. 
There is still a place for „purely optical‟ aspects in a content which may be 
„mainly‟ determined by thoughts and associations. 
  
 16 
1 Observations and 
 inferences 
We may not have prayers in public schools, but by G-d we will have a 
distinction between observation and inference - Fodor‟s Granny.8  
Preliminaries: setting up a view 
 
Experience and knowledge 
This book is about experiential content, so let‟s consider the following case 
study. Sherlock Holmes, Private Investigator, enters a room and experiences the 
following scene: Before him lies a body on a blood-stained carpet and near the 
body lies a cigar-band. A moment‟s reflection has Holmes realise that a murder 
has been committed, correctly identify the perpetrator of the crime, the weapon 
used, and the approximate time of the victim Jones‟s death. 
 A first consideration about such an experience might be this: Holmes did not 
extract all these details from the visual scene before him; he inferred most of it, 
cleverly, from available perceptual information. Nonetheless, he did 
immediately and reliably identify certain objects and relations in the world - a 
dead body, a cigar-band, a relation of „nearness‟ etc., despite not having come 
across them in exactly the same way before. That he could have done this must 
indicate that he had prior knowledge of what constituted such things as a dead 
body, a cigar-band, etc. Such things were already concepts for Holmes before 
he arrived on the murder scene. 
 Experiences are related in some important sense to concepts and, in 
particular, to knowledge states as they usually occur within the context of 
knowledge claims (one often identifies an experience of something by 
identifying an object of purported knowledge or belief). But then again, when 
we experience something for the first time it is not obvious that full knowledge 
                                                 
8 J.A. Fodor, „Observation Reconsidered,‟ Philosophy of Science, 51 (1984): p. 23. 
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is involved, though of course we bring to bear epistemic concepts (in the form 
of background knowledge) on new experiences to make sense of them. 
(Suppose, for instance, that Holmes recognised a stray cylindrical paper object 
that he inferred was a cigar-band on the basis of what he knew about the habits 
of the suspected perpetrator who smoked cigars.) In any event, whether a first 
time experience for Holmes or not, it seems true to say that he would have had 
to identify some known object or other on the basis of prior concepts, so it does 
seem as if experiences are saturated by background information in some sense. 
 There is a traditional view of perceptual content which takes this „saturation‟ 
thesis very seriously. On this view, it is necessarily true that Holmes must have 
brought to bear some fairly sophisticated background knowledge to have the 
experience he did: He must have known that the object in question was made of 
paper, he knew a suspect that smoked cigars, he had the concept of a cigar, a 
dead body, a murder, and so on. To have the full experience he did, he would 
have even had to have made an inferential link between the cigar-band and the 
suspected perpetrator of the crime. On this view, we might even say that he 
needed a theory that linked the cigar-band to the suspect. So, even though a 
„first time‟ experience for Holmes, it was not an experience without the very 
substantial influence of background knowledge, concepts and theories. On this 
view, Holmes could not have had the experience he did have without carrying 
out this explicit or implicit reasoning. These sophisticated background 
influences shall be called the „high-level‟ influences on experiences. On the 
view being examined, high-level epistemic information penetrates through 
experiential content, and experiences can be characterised in terms of inference 
from such background information.  
 It is clear that the high-level influences of background knowledge and 
concepts are linked to an adequate understanding of experiences. That there is 
more to perception than meets the eye is rather old news. But what constitutes 
„high-level‟ influences, and what kinds of experiences are in question here?  
 In Immanuel Kant‟s opinion, experiences are only possible if concepts like 
permanence, identity, relation, space and time are in place, so epistemic 
categories are crucial to experiences on his account. Kant assumed that the 
imposition of high-level influences was a necessary condition of having 
experiences, and he took this claim to its extremes. On one reading of Kant, 
even an implicit knowledge of Euclidean geometry was a priori relevant to 
experiential content. On this account, the nature of high-level influences were 
very sophisticated, and applied to all cases of experiences; intuitions without 
sophisticated concepts, according to Kant, are blind. Taking these two doctrines 
together - the „background knowledge‟ story and the Kantian approach - the 
traditional view to be examined holds that sophisticated high-level concepts, 
theories, background knowledge as well as an implicit imposition of spatiality, 
temporality and relation, are necessary features of experiential content. Just as 
Kant argued space, time, permanence, identity and relation made experiences 
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possible so too do concepts, theories and inference from background 
knowledge.  
 Yet it is clear that not all experiences are like the ones Kant discusses. 
Specifically, it is not clear that for experiences to have content, they must be 
informed by sophisticated high-level influences. A simple example brings out 
this point. If a dog entered the same room at the same time as Sherlock Holmes 
and experienced the same visual scene, it is unlikely that it could have „picked 
out‟ the same perceptual information. The dog might have brought to bear some 
background information to his experience, yet it is clear that it would not have 
been very complex information: certainly not Euclidean geometry, and perhaps 
not even concepts like „cigar-band‟ or „murderous event‟. The experience of the 
dog would have been very unlike the experience of Sherlock Holmes in some 
sense. If it involved high-level features at all, then they could not be of the kind 
that Sherlock Holmes brought to bear on his experience, for, compared to 
Holmes, the dog is a conceptually unsophisticated creature. 
 In fact, dogs, cats and other animals (and very young babies for that matter) 
can‟t be said to possess conceptual knowledge in the sense that Holmes does - 
or, if they do, they are very primitive concepts (i.e., not „high-level‟ ones). Yet, 
these creatures clearly have experiences of the world in some sense, even if they 
are simply aware of certain aspects of their environment: colours, shapes and so 
on. Perhaps it is true to say that animals and infants bring some high-level 
factors to bear on experiences - such as spatiality, temporality and relation - but 
not much more. (The dog might have perceived the cigar-band near Jones‟s 
body, even if it had none of the appropriate concepts to identify those objects.) 
Indeed, the main influence on animal experiences might not be just „high-level‟ 
factors, but instead, purely visual or optical features of the observational 
situation, such as properties of colour, light and hue - along with some 
high-level features, such as spatiality, temporality and so forth. We can say then 
that some experiential content arises as an awareness through action on the 
senses as well as through the influence of background knowledge, concepts and 
theories. 
 The above case seems genuinely different from the Sherlock Holmes 
example but does it raise a problem for the general account under 
consideration?  
 One thing is clear: the view mentioned does seem too blunt to allow for such 
distinctions. It tends to lump all experiential content as being influenced by 
such high-level factors ne plus ultra. However, the case of unsophisticated 
animal and infant experiences does not seem to fit with such a story. In such 
cases, there is a clear sense in which experiential content depends on features of 
the observational situation rather than the various features of high-level 
inference.  
 This book claims that there is a confusion as to the degree to which high-level 
influences are brought to bear on experiences. Instead of holding that all 
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experiences can be understood only in terms of high-level features, it is argued 
that there might be degrees to which such considerations influence content. The 
first aim is to describe a view which emphasises only high-level features and 
then compare it to another kind of view which emphasises only observational 
features. The second aim is to contrast it with the alternative account developed 
in this book. In the process, several different accounts of experiential content 
which mostly emphasise only high-level features will be examined and 
criticised.  
Belief fixation and the inferentialist proposal 
There is more to seeing than meets the eyeball.9 
Experiences are importantly connected to the notion of a belief. Experiences 
tend to fix beliefs of various kinds. (Seeing the cigar-band or a red spot often 
seems tantamount to believing that there is a cigar-band or a red spot that one 
sees.) There is, on some views of perceptual content, even the temptation to 
define experiences in terms of high-level belief acquisition.10  
 The view I have been discussing here could likewise be put in terms of how 
experiences fix beliefs. Some questions to be asked here are: are beliefs about 
things (say, some object being a cigar-band) fixed via inference from concepts 
and knowledge previously held, even guided by them; or, as in the case of 
Kant‟s categories, made possible by them? Or are beliefs fixed mainly by 
observation? 
 There are clear reasons for adopting the first view in preference to the second. 
The belief-by-knowledge case will clearly support the puzzling case of how 
experiences can originate at all given that they are always underdetermined by 
sensory arrays - where any number of observations can be compatible with a 
wide variety of perceptual causes. In this case, background knowledge is 
essential for sorting the many possible observations from the relevant ones. So, 
Sherlock Holmes can infer the criminal from the stray cigar-band and from 
knowledge he has about his suspects. By background knowledge, idle 
observations come to be fixed into beliefs about the criminal from a lot of 
peripheral information.11 This is one good reason why high-level influences are 
relevant to the fixation of beliefs and why experiences must, at least partly, 
originate with prior knowledge. If Holmes brought no background knowledge 
to the murder scene, (not even some general knowledge about objects and 
relationships between them) it is doubtful whether he could have experienced 
anything at all. If one continues with this line of argument, one ends up with the 
„high-level‟ account of experiential content I have been presenting. 
 There are simple reasons why this is a plausible attitude. For supposing that 
                                                 
9 N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 4. 
10 D. M. Armstrong has one such view. It will be presented in Chapter 4. 
11 I owe this example to Fodor, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
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experiences originate with observations and there is nothing theoretical or 
conceptual involved in seeing an object, makes it hard to see how we can fix our 
beliefs about an experience in this manner. It seems we can‟t do this at all, for it 
is unclear, for a start, how we can say that we are acquainted with any sort of 
object, if we rule out the influence of high-level considerations altogether. H. I. 
Brown has spelt out this point clearly:  
 
Consider a relatively common, everyday instance of perception such as my 
seeing my typewriter. Now, in order to see that this object is a typewriter it is 
not sufficient that I just look at it; it is necessary that I already know what a 
typewriter is. Simply glancing at objects with normal eyesight will 
undoubtedly stimulate my retina, initiate complex electro-chemical processes 
in my brain and nervous system, and perhaps even result in some conscious 
experience, but it will not supply me with meaningful information about the 
world around me. In order to derive information from perception it is 
necessary that I be able to identify the objects that I encounter, and in order to 
identify them it is necessary that I already have available a relevant body of 
information.12 
 
„Relevant body of information‟ and „meaningful information‟ surely means 
certain sophisticated concepts (in this case „typewriter‟). Only if one is already 
possessed of such high-level background information of the sort of thing a 
typewriter is, can one say that a certain thing in one‟s visual field is a 
typewriter. But the need for sophisticated recognitional abilities in the process 
of belief fixation goes even further than this. For, the act of recognising the 
typewriter as an object distinct from its surroundings, itself presupposes 
high-level abilities. One surely needs to be able to recognise a certain object, 
but - even more fundamentally - one first needs to distinguish one thing from 
another in one‟s visual field. Basic conceptual information such as „object‟ thus 
needs to be already a part of one‟s conceptual repertoire before one can even get 
going. It is probable that because we are so familiar with such objects as 
typewriters that we fail to acknowledge that seeing a typewriter is not a brute 
fact of observation; rather, it is an experience which involves high-level 
influences. For one thing, a typewriter is represented in a certain way as a 
certain object; for another thing, it is conceptualised and linked with a good 
deal of background theory. As shall be pointed out later, because one usually 
labels the content of an experience with a word or phrase, there is even a case 
for saying that in every experiential act a perceived object or event has a certain 
tokened, expressible form in a mental language. „High-level‟ influences are 
clearly important features of everyday experiences if any or all of the above 
claims are true. Even ordinary experiences, it seems, involve very sophisticated 
forms of reasoning. 
 To neglect such influences, moreover, is to neglect Kant‟s important insight 
                                                 
12 H. I. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment, pp. 81-2. 
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that concepts beget categorisation, and a categorisation scheme, in his view, is 
necessary to spot anything at all. And, at the very least, we need to „distinguish 
delivery trucks from fire trucks and paper towels from napkins.‟13 So there is 
more to experiencing anything than simply opening one‟s eyes; experience also 
involves what will later be called (in deference to Kant) theoretical, 
representational and linguistic-propositional judgments. These terms shall be 
defined later. 
 Kant‟s idea that a conceptual base was fundamental to having experiences, it 
seems, leads naturally to the idea that making distinctions in experiences is not 
possible without a background of high-level influences. Such influences are 
also fairly sophisticated features. They include not just concepts, but also 
background knowledge and theories and possibly even language. Moreover, 
they seem to occur together: saying that an experience captures certain features 
which can be described in some way, say, as a „typewriter‟, already assumes 
that the rest of the high-level features are in motion, filtering, organising and 
labelling the experience. (One cannot describe an experience unless one sees an 
object corresponding to the description; one knows what a typewriter is; one 
represents a certain object gestalt, and so on.) It seems once some high-level 
features are seen to be involved, the rest follow naturally. Moreover, the 
high-level features seem to be not just central to experiences but necessary for 
them.  
 Could we learn these sorts of distinctions between objects without such 
features? Hardly. It is not clear how, without the various features of high-level 
inference, we could make the fundamental divisions first. This seems, 
moreover, to be as much a case for ordinary run-of-the-mill kinds of experience 
involving concepts as cases in the laboratory involving scientific theories. 
Perhaps even more so in the latter case. For just as one cannot identify things 
like „scientist‟, „laboratory‟ or „experiment‟ unless one possesses the 
appropriate background concepts, so one cannot see what is going on when a 
scientist conducts an experiment unless one is familiar with their specialist 
knowledge. That is, even if we can get over the first problem and observe that 
something is going on, we can‟t see what the scientist is doing unless we 
understand the theories behind the practice. One can‟t, for instance, make the 
jump from (i) measuring the oscillations of a piece of iron with a mirror to (ii) 
measuring the electrical resistance of a coil unless one knows a bit about 
electrical theory. 14  On this view, high-level influences are bound up as 
necessary conditions for observational experience in rather the same way that a 
problem is necessary for a solution. Sellars isolates something like this kind of 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 82. 
14 Hence Hanson‟s remarks: „The visitor [to the laboratory] must learn some physics before he 
sees what the physicist sees.‟ op. cit., p. 17. Learning some physics, of course, amounts to 
learning concepts and terms in the appropriate technical language.  
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response to the issue when he says: 
 
[I]f the ability to recognize that x looks green presupposes the concept of 
being green, and if this in turn involves knowing in what circumstances to 
view an object to ascertain its colour, then, since one can scarcely determine 
what the circumstances are without noticing that certain objects have certain 
perceptible characteristics - including colours - it would seem that one could 
not form the concept being green, and, by parity of reasoning, of the other 
colours, unless he already had them.15 
 
Of course, „knowing what circumstances in which to view an object to ascertain 
its colour‟ presupposes that (a) one represents an object, (b) one knows what it 
is, i.e., that it is conceptualised in some way, (c) the object is linked with large- 
scale epistemic connections, (for instance, that medium-sized objects are 
generally coloured), and (d) the object can be described as a (coloured) thing 
and named accordingly. So the influence of various high-level features are 
tacitly assumed even in this simple example.  
 The central point is that, on the story being outlined, we need some sort of 
high-level conceptual ability to make anything out of our sensations at all. To 
experience anything like a typewriter or green or the electrical resistance of a 
coil, one needs to bring to bear fairly sophisticated background knowledge, 
concepts and theories. And, to apply such information assumes that experiences 
are already invested with high-level content.  
 There is a point of emphasis to be noted here. The kind of view presented so 
far holds that all the various features of high-level inference are necessary for 
experiential content. Kant‟s view is an extreme version of this position with the 
imposition of the entire range of sophisticated a priori categories of cognition. 
However, even simple examples such as experiencing a coloured object or a 
typewriter seem to involve all the high-level features mentioned as well. 
 There is a second point of emphasis to be noted here. It is one thing to say that 
experiences mostly originate with such high-level influences; it is another to 
say that they must originate with them. Again: the more radical idea being 
considered claims that sophisticated background knowledge, concepts and 
theories are necessary conditions for having experiences. On this view, there is 
no sense in which we can have experiences unless we can conceptually filter out 
some things, and this depends on inference from background knowledge and 
high-level concepts and theories. As mentioned, Kant had something like this 
kind of story to tell with his famous categories of the understanding: 
experiences are only possible if one can identify relationships, causality and so 
on. „Appearances‟ are underdetermined by the „manifold of intuition‟ but the 
                                                 
15 W. Sellars, „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,‟ in Science, Perception and Reality, p. 
147. 
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„categories‟ of cognition somehow sort all this out. 16  A similar view has 
recently been expressed in terms of the „theory ladenness of observation‟ thesis 
in the philosophy of science. It is probably time now to put a label on this view. 
I shall call this radical form of the belief-by-knowledge case - where inference 
from sophisticated high-level knowledge is necessary for the having of 
experiences - the inferentialist proposal.  
 There is a third point of emphasis to be noted here which sharpens the issue 
even further. In the hands of Kant, the inferentialist proposal says that 
high-level features are necessary for experiential content. However, in the 
hands of some contemporary theorists, the inferentialist proposal amounts to an 
even stronger thesis: namely, that high-level features are both necessary and 
sufficient for experiential content. Unlike Kant‟s view, where a sensory 
manifold and high-level input was required for experience (but where the 
high-level categories were necessary for the organisation of the manifold), 
some recent theorists claim that there is no need to speak of a sensory manifold 
at all - for them, the only thing of importance for experiential content is 
high-level input: theories, concepts and background knowledge. The 
differences in emphasis here shall be addressed later. It should be noted here 
that both views, strictly speaking, are examples of what has been called the 
inferentialist proposal. Both are radical doctrines - one only sightly more 
radical than the other - and both have been endemic in recent philosophical 
thought. Moreover, both of them hold that all the high-level features are crucial 
for experiential content.  
 I have set up this position - the inferentialist proposal - because I want to 
reject it in place of a better account of experiential content. We have already 
seen one problem with this view. If what has already been said is true, then 
there is a serious confusion in the terms of the inferentialist proposal. A dog 
might bring to bear some high-level factors, like spatiality, temporality and 
identity, yet not possess concepts such as „cigar-band‟, „dead body‟ and 
„murderous event‟ - let alone a theory which connects them. So it seems not all 
high-level influences fix appropriate experiential beliefs. Moreover, some 
experiences do not seem to require the various high-level features by necessity: 
Animal and infant experiences simply do not seem to contain some of the 
high-level features stipulated by the inferentialist proposal. The way 
unsophisticated animals and infants experience things is not like the way clever 
private investigators like Holmes experience things. Yet, for reasons mentioned 
earlier, it seems plausible to say that for most experiences, some kind of 
recognitional ability is required: experiences must be organised in some sense 
and not conceptually empty. There is a sense in which even a dog must bring 
some kind of high-level organisational schema to his experiences, even if not a 
                                                 
16 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, passim. At least this is the orthodox view of Kant‟s work. A 
rather different account shall be presented in Chapter 6. 
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sophisticated one. How can these claims be reconciled?  
An alternative view: the observational account 
Clearly there must be more to the story of how experiences originate than the 
inferentialist proposal allows. The view just described seems to be deficient in 
some respects. Beliefs seem to be fixed not just by the imposition of high-level 
background concepts etc., but by mere observation in the case of animals and 
infants, and there are very good reasons for our beliefs to be fixed in this 
manner as well. As Fodor has noted: 
 
For one thing, observationally fixed beliefs tend, by and large, to be more 
reliable than inferentially fixed beliefs. This is primarily because the 
etiological route from the fact that P to the belief that P is metaphorically - 
and maybe literally - shorter in observation than in inference: less is likely to 
go wrong because there‟s less that can go wrong ... our rational confidence in 
our knowledge claims depends very largely on their ability to survive 
observational assessment. 
Second, the observational fixation of beliefs plays a special role in the 
adjudication and resolution of clashes of opinion. When observation is not 
appealed to, attempts to settle disputes often take the form of a search for 
premises that disputants share. ... [and] [s]ince observation is not a process in 
which new beliefs are inferred from old ones, the use of observation to 
resolve disputes does not depend on a prior consensus as to what premises 
may be assumed. The moral, children, is approximately Baconian. Don‟t 
think; look. Try not to argue.17 
The sort of „observationally fixed beliefs‟ that Fodor refers to are expressed in 
predicates like „is red‟ or „occupies more of the visual field.‟ That these sorts of 
low-level experiences are not inferred from previous beliefs but „directly‟ 
somehow seem „homely truths‟18 but the idea that seeing must come from 
knowing has been traditionally sufficient to dampen enthusiasm for any 
observationally-based alternative to how experiences originate at all. The view 
which holds that only the observational situation is relevant to how experiences 
originate will arise in a different context in later pages. To contrast it with the 
inferentialist proposal, I shall call it the observational account.  
 There are essentially two elements to Fodor‟s remark in support of some kind 
of observational account:  
 Firstly, there is the implicit suggestion that evolutionary considerations may 
be important in the fixation of certain beliefs. Some perceptions have to be 
quick and reliable. Such, presumably, would be the case for low-level 
experiences like „red‟ and „occupies more of the visual field.‟ (In these cases, 
the identification of features of complicated things like objects may not 
necessarily be involved.) Cases in point would perhaps be the kinds of 
                                                 
17 Fodor, op. cit., p. 24. 
18 Loc. cit.  
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experiences that simple animals and conceptually unsophisticated infants have, 
which don‟t seem to be accounted for on the terms of the inferentialist proposal; 
here high-level influences are simply not needed.  
 Secondly, there is the point that the inferentialist proposal may lead to an 
overly conservative view of theoretical progress. On both points, 
non-inferential „looks‟ (as opposed to high-level inference) should not depend 
in any necessary way on background knowledge and theories. For one thing, 
this is because some basis must be available for sorting out how and where 
beliefs and theories differ, and for another thing, because evolution requires that 
some experiential beliefs simply do not need or require the input of high-level 
inferential mechanisms. Belief fixation, it is suggested, might go on at both 
levels. Despite the good sense of such considerations, however, the 
inferentialist proposal, not the observational account, has traditionally loomed 
large in discussions about experience and content. 
 Observationally-fixed beliefs clearly have some value where animal and 
infant experiences are concerned because they seem to capture aspects of 
experiential content in a way which the inferentialist proposal cannot do. 
However, can experiential content be understood without the significant 
imposition of high-level influences at all? And, what does a commitment to the 
observational view mean for an account of experience and content?  
 A brief digression: What has been called „the observational account,‟ of 
course, has a familiar history. Particularly, the doctrine has its roots in the views 
of the empiricists and the logical positivists. The former held an 
epistemological thesis, that knowledge was derived from sense-data or 
„impressions‟ which were direct and unmediated; the latter held a 
methodological thesis in the philosophy of science - that there was a 
fundamental distinction between observational evidence and theories and that 
science was built up from a non-theoretical, empirical foundation. Brute 
features of observation - colours, shapes, and so on - were supposed to be a 
means of providing inductive support and verification for theoretical 
propositions, and, in at least one view, the propositions had to „mirror‟ these 
features of observation not only if they were to claim any support at all, but also 
if they were to be in any way meaningful.  
 Observational facts, on such views, were highly specific: the observational 
fact that „there is red at a certain place and time‟ could be expressed in a single 
specific predicate, and the whole of scientific theorising had ultimately to be 
pinned on such „factual‟ foundations. To a similar degree, sense-data theorists 
(equally taken with brute, unmediated observations, though less interested in 
providing foundations for factual and meaningful, scientific propositions), used 
the idea to substantiate the belief that empirical support could give a basis for 
knowledge through sensation. Observations, after all, involved sensations, and 
if anything seemed non-theoretical, unmediated, non-inferential and direct, 
then sensation was surely a serious candidate.  
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 Sensation, of course, was mostly taken to mean sense-data here. History has 
interpreted the observational account as expressing the view that experiential 
content is fixed by sense-data. On this version, there were qualities of „red‟ 
perceived which were not wave-lengths or actual red objects, just as the sense 
datum of a bent stick in water was not the actual stick. A sense-datum was 
something directly perceived „in between‟ the object and physical impression 
on the sense organs. It was a particular; a quasi-object of appearance. This was 
an odd notion, but it at least avoided the matter of inference in determining the 
content of perceptual structure.19 There were, however, several severe problems 
with this kind of observational account. 
 Wilfred Sellars, for one, roundly rejected the observational approach of the 
sense-data theory for good reason. He declared that the sense-data theorists 
confused the idea of non-inferential particulars being sensed with inferential 
knowledge, giving the impression that sensing sense-data made 
„epistemological knowledge rest on a „foundation‟ of non-inferential matters of 
fact.‟20 This, however, was a „mongrel‟ view, and could not be sustained. A 
„particular‟ was not, by definition, inferential and could not be an item of 
knowledge; and knowledge of a „fact‟ involved inference - the sense-data 
theorist wanted to have a bit both ways. Sellars also pointed out, somewhat 
more contentiously, that saying something looked red amounted to saying that 
something was red, specifically: „knowing in what circumstances to place an 
object if one wishes to ascertain its colour by looking at it.‟21 This, in his view, 
amounted to already having „a whole battery of concepts‟22 about such an 
object such that the looks relation made sense. He further claimed that any looks 
relation could be captured in terms of propositional content of a sentence which 
was true or false. Sellars‟s view was that „seeing,‟ to some important extent, 
presupposes „knowing.‟ So, Sellars attacked the sense-data view on the 
sophisticated „high-level‟ terms of the inferentialist proposal. Sellars advances 
a complicated argument to this conclusion, which shall be dealt with in Chapter 
10. Suffice to say for now that such criticisms slowly strangled the notion of 
sense-data historically, though the notion of observationality - that experience 
was in some important sense concept-free and „given‟ remained. 
 There is an exegetical point to make here. It is clear that though it may have 
influenced the tradition of the observational account, the sense-data theory does 
not fully characterise it. This is a reason for distinguishing these doctrines by 
                                                 
19 Hence, Harman‟s summary of the innovation here: „Many philosophers ... [say that such] 
data are about how things look, sound, taste, smell, feel and so on .... [they] go on to say that in 
ordinary cases of (visual) perception one does not infer that something is there, one simply sees 
that it is there ... there is no conscious reasoning in ordinary perception.‟ G. Harman, 
„Epistemology‟, in E. C. Carterette and M. P. Friedman, Handbook of Perception, p. 53. 
20 Sellars, op. cit., p. 128.  
21 Ibid., p. 146. 
22 Ibid., p. 148. 
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name. One can legitimately hold the view that some aspects of experiences are 
observationally fixed in some sense without holding that all observations have 
to be characterised by sense-data. The claims are, at least, logically separable. 
In the chapter on Sellars‟s inferentialist critique of the sense-data view much 
shall be made of this point. Let it be said for the time being that though 
positivism and the sense-data theory were historical antecedents of the 
observational account, there may be ways of keeping the idea that experiences 
are observationally fixed in some sense without simultaneously being 
committed to either view.  
 The observational account has been also closely allied thematically with 
foundationalism, though it need not have been. The reason for this association 
was mainly the stress that logical positivism and, particularly, the sense-data 
theory gave to the idea that knowledge was inevitably grounded on information 
derived from the senses. Sellars‟s attack was directed at this consequence of the 
observational account. 
 Another important point to be made here is that just as the observational 
account need not be taken together with the sense-data theory, likewise it need 
not logically embrace foundationalism. To say that experience is direct and not 
dependent in any necessary and sufficient way on the features of „high-level‟ 
inference, is not to say that the senses provide the foundation of knowledge. It is 
entirely conceivable to claim that there is a sense in which experiential content 
is observationally fixed, without saying that knowledge is so fixed. Later 
discussion will bring out the importance of this point. Later discussion will also 
require a distinction to be made between different levels of knowledge 
corresponding to different levels of informational content. 
 The idea that experience is observational and not dependent on the various 
features of high-level inference can be seen to have a basis in these sorts of 
positivist and empiricist supports. And, Sellars‟s rejection of sense-data 
theories notwithstanding, the idea fits somewhat with intuitions too: for there 
doesn‟t seem to be anything sophisticated involved in one‟s seeing that an 
object looks red or looks longer than another. It wasn‟t obvious then, and it is 
still not obvious now. As mentioned previously, it seems even less obvious 
when unsophisticated animal and infant experiences are considered, because it 
seems hard to say that animals make conscious inferences from high-level 
background beliefs, concepts and theories etc., in the sense required. High-level 
features just do not seem to capture the kinds of contentful experiences had by 
such creatures. Rather, it seemed intuitive to refer to low-level animal and 
infant experiences as simply sensational experiences. Whether the 
observational account is true or not, Fodor‟s remarks about the value of 
observationally-fixed beliefs seemed to capture an important insight.  
 However, the terms of the inferentialist proposal push our intuitions in the 
opposite direction. For it is hard, on reflection, to see how observations or 
sensations could provide a basis for how experiences originate unless they 
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involved inference from high-level features such as concepts and background 
knowledge. Sellars, and others, had an important point as well. The now 
orthodox view that experience needs high-level inference has been expressed in 
somewhat defiant terms: 
 
Knowledge of the world is based on inference. If there is knowledge of the 
world in perception, then there is inference in perception. If one is not 
conscious of the inference, then there is unconscious inference. If it would 
have to have been instantaneous, then inference takes no time. If one was not 
aware of the premises, then one can make inferences without being aware of 
the premises of those inferences.23 
 
Of course, such a claim does not stipulate that all the previously mentioned 
high-level features are necessary for perception. However, as shown earlier, 
once some of the high-level features are embraced the rest follow naturally. The 
point for now is that the issue of the nature of experiential content seems to 
come down to a choice: either adopt the observational account with its 
unfortunate historical stress on positivism, the sense-data theory and 
foundationalism, or adopt the inferentialist proposal with its historically heavy 
stress on the importance of high-level influences as necessary and sufficient 
conditions of experiential content.  
 Which story is true: the observational account or the inferentialist proposal? 
Given that there are good prima facie reasons for adopting an observational 
account, and given that there are cases which do not seem to fit the inferentialist 
analysis, it seems natural to adopt an observational account of experiential 
content. Yet there did seem to be good reasons for keeping the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal as well. If - on the observational account - no high-level 
influences are needed, it is hard to see how Sherlock Holmes could have 
experienced anything meaningful at all. However, perhaps we don‟t need to 
make a choice: perhaps neither view is true and something else entirely is the 
best means of explaining experiential content. Perhaps it is best to try and have 
our cake and eat it too on this issue. It shall later be argued that there are more 
plausible reasons for adopting a third kind of view which combines the insights 
of both accounts.  
 It will be suggested later that there may be high-level and low-level aspects to 
experiential content, and that full-blooded knowledge and mechanisms of 
high-level inference etc., arise at only one level. Experience might be best 
understood in terms of an amalgamof several levels of observationally-fixed 
and inferentially-fixed content. In the passage above, Fodor seems to argue for 
experiential belief fixation going on at both levels. My question here is: why 
can‟t this be true of experiential content generally? Why, indeed, can‟t elements 
of both the inferentialist proposal and the observational account be true? 
                                                 
23 Harman, op. cit., p. 54. 
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Experience and propositional content  
We should be clear about the commitments of the inferentialist proposal at this 
point. As it turns out, there is more than a passing interest in this view: its 
commitments are many; its history is long and distinguished. It also implies 
more in the way of high-level features than has been mentioned up until now.  
 I have given the case for observationally and inferentially fixed beliefs. On 
the inferentialist proposal, inferential belief fixation involves more than just 
background knowledge. Beliefs, if not fixed by observation, must be fixed by 
various degrees of theory. Theory, in turn, presupposes propositional content 
which theories can be true of, and about which parties may claim agreement. 
Experiences, on this view, have contents which can be true or false. Thus, 
perceptual experience can be said to be inexorably propositional; or, at least, 
minimally theoretical in the required sense, where „the required sense‟ amounts 
to involving semantic as well as epistemic features. Millar‟s treatment of 
perception being analogous with belief states is a useful statement of this view: 
 
The relation between experience and perception is in some ways analogous to 
that between belief and knowledge ... One can believe that p without knowing 
that p and so also one can have an experience of a ø without perceiving a ø ... 
In view of these analogies, it is tempting to regard experiences as being, like 
beliefs, intentional states, that is, states which have a representational content 
specifiable by means of propositional clauses. To say that a subject has an 
experience of a ø before him is to say that it seems or appears to the subject 
that there is a ø before him.24  
 
Experiential content is certainly representational in some sense. Objects, like 
cigar-bands, are discriminated as being in certain spatial relationships to other 
objects; being a certain shape, going fast or, otherwise, being stationary. 
Experiences are „gestalt-like‟ constructions of the world. But what of the 
alleged intentional or propositional features that experiences possess? 
 Experiences can be said to involve intentional states because one can undergo 
experiential states in the absence of the thing in question. Thus, according to 
some theorists, just as it makes sense to say that one can happen to believe that 
Beijing is in China while lacking all information about China, so it makes sense 
to say that one can seem to experience a ø while being absent from a ø. This 
situation would arise, for instance, in circumstances of perceptual mistakes or 
hallucinations; one can be convinced that one is experiencing a ø (it might seem 
to the subject that there is a ø before him) even if such a thing was not actually 
in one‟s field of view. Nevertheless, there still might be some sense in which 
one‟s experiential state in this case can be true or false even if one was not 
experiencing the thing in question. It is this sort of argument that provides 
reason for thinking that experiential content, like the content of beliefs, is 
                                                 
24 A. Millar, „What‟s in a Look?,‟ pp. 83-4. 
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actually propositional in some sense.  
 There is even a reason for saying that experiences might necessarily involve 
such propositional features, just as they are said to necessarily involve 
background knowledge and concepts. The reason is that just as several people 
might believe the same thing, they might also undergo an experience of the 
same logical type. So there must always be some common feature of beliefs 
(and experiences) by virtue of which a particular belief (and experience) could 
be commonly true or false. The intentional features of the belief (experience) 
must therefore „point‟ to some recognisable or distinguishable state. David 
Armstrong has expressed this argument in the following way: 
 
Suppose, for instance, that nine men believe that the earth is flat. We have 
nine different beliefs. There is A‟s belief, B‟s belief, C‟s belief ... there are 
nine numerically different states .... In the case of the nine men, what is 
thought is the same thing in each case: that the earth is flat. It is just such a 
case that philosophers, at any rate, describe by saying that what the nine men 
think or entertain is the same proposition.25 
 
Admittedly, Armstrong does not refer to experiential content here, but, for 
reasons mentioned earlier, if the argument goes through for the content of 
beliefs, it will go through for the content of experiences. On this argument, and 
on the inferentialist proposal, to be capable of a common response, experiences 
must be characterised by having some kind of intrinsic propositional content, 
just like that of the content of commonly held beliefs. Armstrong is actually one 
of those who thinks that the intentional content of experiences can be equated 
and defined in terms of beliefs. As he puts it: „the intentionality of perception 
reduces to the intentionality of the beliefs acquired.‟26 So, on this view, to 
experience p is just to have a high-level belief about p. On Armstrong‟s version 
of the inferentialist proposal, high-level beliefs are both necessary and 
sufficient to capture experiential content. Armstrong‟s views shall be discussed 
later. The point made here is simply that if experiential states are said to be like 
belief states, then there is reason to think that they are, likewise, propositional. 
 Propositional contents are, of course, usually understood in terms of a 
language.27 For something to seem ø is for it to be represented in ø terms - as a 
clause that such-and-such seems ø. That experiences can have tokenings in a 
language makes it possible for experiences to be true or false when a subject is 
not, in fact, perceiving the thing in question. So even if Holmes was under the 
influence of some potent hallucinogenic drug, he still might have had the 
                                                 
25 D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, pp. 38-9. 
26 D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, p. 211. 
27 As Armstrong notes: „The etymology of „proposition‟ suggests that it is fundamentally a 
linguistic notion. It is something proposed, something put forward, and so something asserted.‟ 
(1973) op. cit., p. 42.  
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experience of a cigar-band near Jones‟s body, because things might have been 
represented in some propositional way which he could express with language. 
One might say, in response to this kind of argument, of course, that there is a 
confusion between experience and language here; indeed, this is what shall be 
argued later on. It shall be argued that there is a confusion in the application of 
sophisticated „high-level‟ features to experiential content generally. Objections 
aside for now, the point of this kind of move on the inferentialist view is simply 
to preserve the idea that if experience is propositional in some sense, it is also 
closely allied with the notion of a language.  
 There is, then, implicitly more to the inferentialist proposal than simply 
high-level knowledge and inference from high-level beliefs, concepts, theory, 
etc. As well as involving such things, experience requires representational 
features and this involves notions like propositions which can be expressed in 
the predicates of a language. So we might say that all experiences require 
elements of a language: an experience of a ø necessitates the concept of a ø, 
attendant background beliefs about ø and so on, as well as clauses in a language 
which represent ø when it seems to the subject that ø is the case. This is clearly 
a complicated addition to the inferentialist proposal but, on the above view, it is 
a necessary addition if it is to capture the similarities in the relations between 
experience and knowledge. For, on this view, experiential states, like 
knowledge states, clearly represent some expressible state of affairs the content 
of which is invariably fixed into sentences. The following kind of claim is 
symptomatic of this whole approach to the content of experiences, where 
high-level factors, especially the propositional content of language, are isolated 
as the bearers of experiential content: 
 
Let me ... call attention to the fact that the experience of having something 
look green to one at a certain time is, in so far as it is an experience, 
obviously very much like that of seeing something to be green, in so far as the 
latter is an experience. But the latter, of course, is not just an experience. And 
this is the heart of the matter. For to say that a certain experience is a seeing 
that something is the case, is to do more than describe the experience. It is to 
characterize it as, so to speak, making an assertion or claim, and - which is the 
point I wish to stress - to endorse that claim. As a matter of fact ... it is much 
more easy to see that the statement „Jones sees that the tree is green‟ ascribes 
a propositional claim to Jones‟s experience and endorses it, than to specify 
how the statement describes Jones‟s experience.28 
 
We can see now how the terms of the inferentialist proposal can gain a firm 
foothold on experiential content. If the high-level features are taken to be 
                                                 
28 W. Sellars, op. cit., p. 144. See M. Pendlebury for a contemporary defence of the experience 
as proposition view. „Sense Experiences and their Contents: A Defence of the Propositional 
Account,‟ pp. 215-230. For a recent reaction to this view, see: W. Bechtel and A. Abrahamsen, 
„Beyond the Exclusively Propositional Era,‟ in Epistemology and Cognition. 
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necessary features of experiences (or both necessary and sufficient features), 
then there is little resistance to the move of conflating experiential content with 
things which are demonstrably unlike experiences (e.g., language). Much shall 
be made of this conflation in Chapter 3. As we shall also see later, just as Sellars 
equates experience with the propositional content of a language - the process of 
„making an assertion or claim‟ - so other theorists equate experience with 
theories and representational or epistemic states; „high-level‟ features rather 
than low-level sensations. We have seen how Armstrong conflates experiential 
content with belief states. We shall see later how Churchland and Feyerabend 
closely align experiences with theory-ladenness. Indeed, a good number of 
recent materialist philosophers insist on claiming that the imposition of 
high-level features of one kind or another is both necessary and sufficient to 
capture contentful experiences. By „capturing‟ contentful experiences, they 
mean that there is no observational or experiential residue beyond the 
imposition of high-level features.  
 In the passage just quoted, of course, it happens to be the propositional 
content of language which is seen as important to experiences, not how the 
experience is described as looking. As we shall see in Chapter 10, there is, on 
Sellars‟s view, nothing „residual‟ which remains of such an experience beyond 
how the propositional content of a sentence is endorsed. The view that 
high-level features are the only features of interest in experiential content will 
be disputed in this book. 
Itemising and distinguishing the features of experiential content  
Several threads of the inferentialist proposal has been distinguished so far. On 
this view, experiential content is characterised by the possession of high-level 
factors: concepts, theories, background knowledge. Such contents can be 
characterised in other terms too: notably, by being representational states and 
language-like propositional states. On the terms of the inferentialist proposal, 
all these things are necessary features of experiential content. 
 It is worthwhile itemising them briefly, from lesser to greater degrees of 
sophistication:  
 (i) Representational content: Objects and events have a certain projected, 
gestalt-like focus. We can discriminate objects because they do not (normally) 
merge with their surroundings, they reflect light, are stable, permanent features, 
spatio-temporally located and so on. This is as much a part of experiential 
content as our knowledge or interest in it. We can localise epistemic features of 
interest because our experiences have a certain representational content. 
Moreover, a content can be representational without being recognised as an 
object of a certain informationally specifiable sort. One can, for instance, 
vaguely recognise an object in the corner of a room qua object, but not be able 
to say exactly what that object might be.  
 (ii) Background knowledge: Experience needs background knowledge on the 
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terms of the inferentialist proposal because experiences are underdetermined by 
available sensory information. To discriminate any perceptual scene one needs 
to localise features of epistemic interest, not just their representational features. 
(To Sherlock Holmes, it was the interest in evidence at the murder scene, not 
the colour of the walls or the ash in the fireplace - though these could have been 
of epistemic interest if Holmes had been inclined to note them. If Holmes did 
not bring to bear certain background knowledge to his experience, he might 
have non-selectively noted everything about the visual scene, which would 
mean that he would, in effect, have noted nothing of importance at all.)  
 (iii) Concepts: Perceived objects and events are mostly identified as things of 
certain kinds and labelled accordingly. Concepts allow experiences to be 
determined as objects of certain specifiable sorts. The cigar-band near Jones‟s 
body was identified and described (thought of) as a certain object. Concepts are 
means of applying descriptive meanings to certain features of the world. (More 
will be made of this in Chapter 2.) Because we see the world as being 
represented in a certain way, and we know what such-and-such is, we can label 
our experience as an experience of a ø. Holmes needed to bring some 
conceptual information to bear on his experience simply to (say) identify this 
represented object as being a dead body, etc. (Concepts obviously form part of 
background knowledge, though not an exclusive part. It is possible to bring to 
bear background knowledge to an experience, without being able to identify 
certain features of an experience conceptually - this is the phenomenon of 
learning new things. It is not possible, asymmetrically, to identify a thing 
conceptually and not bring background knowledge to bear on experience.) 
 (iv) Theories: Concepts and background knowledge are linked implicitly by 
theory and theories have the role of relating such items internally by means of 
inference. (The cigar-band was linked to the smoking habits of the assassin 
Holmes remembered who had been arguing with Jones prior to the murder 
scene, seen by an informant to be carrying a large ice-pick, etc.) Of course, 
theories also involve external relations - contingent laws and their implications. 
But in the sense relevant to this example, they have a distinct importance in 
making and utilising large scale epistemic connections which are useful for the 
fixation of experiential content. 
 (v) Intentional/Propositional content: Experiences are states of the mind in 
some sense and can be undergone in the absence of the thing experienced. 
According to some theorists, this intentional quality is propositional, and since 
propositions are often associated with language, experiential states are 
language-like in some sense. This implicit feature of the inferentialist proposal 
was outlined in the previous section. A more detailed and refined taxonomy of 
all these features will be outlined in the next chapter. 
 There are other features which influence experiential content which have not 
yet been mentioned but which deserve brief comment here. A main feature is 
what Sibley refers to as focus of attention. This is to be distinguished on his 
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view from the physical condition when the eye muscles are in a certain state of 
optical focus on a certain object. As he notes, it is possible to experience 
something differently when what is optically out of focus is then experienced 
by attending to that thing. It is also possible to be optically focussed on 
something and not attend (and hence not „see‟) it at all. This gives reason to 
think that, over and above the high-level influences on experiential content 
mentioned and the physical fact that one is focussed on and looking at an object, 
there is also the fact of attentiveness which can substantially affect how things 
are seen: 
 
Direction and focus [in perception] normally shift with shifts of attention; if 
attention is taken by something near and to one side while one is focusing on 
something distant and ahead, the eyes are likely to turn to the new object of 
attention and refocus on it. But with effort, we can, to some extent prevent 
this coordination of direction and/or focus with attention. We can deliberately 
attend to objects towards the periphery of our vision (and to how they look, 
blurry, of uniform colour, etc.) without turning our eyes; or, while focusing 
on the distant trees through the window, attend, without refocussing, to the 
(blurry) appearance of a scratch on the window pane. ... If we are physically 
focused on the trees a hundred feet off, we will ordinarily not notice scratches 
on the window through which we are looking, even though they are certainly 
visible to us at that focus. ... there are [also] cases where attention, even to 
whatever is in perfect optical focus, ... diminishes or is entirely absent. While 
listening intently, concentrating on a problem, or daydreaming, our attention 
may be partly or wholly engaged elsewhere, or engaged nowhere.29  
 
Such cases are an important consideration for any account of experiential 
content. Something can look different (e.g., scratches on a window) depending 
on whether we are attending to it or not. But, as shall be argued much later, they 
do not support an inferentialist story, but rather, something far more subtle.  
 I have been trying to paint a certain picture of experiential content - the view 
of the inferentialist proposal. From what has been said so far, experience can be 
characterised in terms of the strictly high-level features discussed. Such 
features are linked to experiences as necessary and sufficient conditions, and it 
is not possible to speak of experiential content without implicitly employing 
features such as the above. As we have seen, „high-level‟ features can include 
background knowledge, concepts and theories, representational and 
propositional states, and even the notion of a language.  
 Of course, the various high-level elements of the inferentialist proposal can 
be distinguished and separated. It is plausible, for instance, that while inference 
from background knowledge may be necessary for an experience, there need 
not be a propositional content in any sense requiring clauses in a language. 
There might be such features in some circumstances, but equally, there need not 
                                                 
29 F. N. Sibley, Perception: A Philosophical Symposium, pp. 93-95. 
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be. A dog, for instance, clearly perceives things in terms of their spatial 
location, though one would be hard-pressed to say that a dog‟s experience 
involves language-like propositional features. In the sense in which 
„proposition‟ was used in Sellars‟s claim previously, the word seems closely 
allied with the endorsement of statements, but obviously, animals like dogs do 
not use or endorse statements or claims, so it hardly seems as if propositional 
content in this sense can apply to their experiences. We shall see another sense 
in which „proposition‟ may be used in this context below. For now, it is 
suggested that the „high-level‟ propositional feature, at worst, does not apply to 
some experiences at all; at best, the notion stands in serious need of 
clarification. However, just as some experiences have propositional content and 
others do not, so some experiences are not informational experiences in the 
same way as Sherlock Holmes‟s experience of the cigar-band. Despite this, 
such experiences are still inferential in some important sense. Again, this 
objection can be levelled at the inferentialist treatment of animal experiences. 
Dogs, for example, clearly learn things about spatial location - they carry out 
avoidance behaviour; they bury objects and retrieve them. So there must be 
some kind of inference from background knowledge going on, even if - in the 
case of the dog‟s experience - there may not be judgement-like intentional 
features such that it seems to him that ø, in the same sense in which Holmes 
experienced that there was a cigar-band next to Jones‟s body. (If this example is 
unclear, consider the experience of an even less sophisticated animal such as a 
bee or a dragon-fly.) Such animals might experience the cigar-band in the sense 
of representing them as objects, but not represent them as anything 
informational.30  The point is: there is a sense in which not all high-level 
features go together. For one thing, inference can be separated from 
informational content, and propositional content as it is expressed in terms of a 
language may, it seems, be involved in some cases, though not necessarily in 
other cases.  
 Some features of human experiences can also be separated like this too: an 
experience that something is „to the left of‟ something else, for instance, 
scarcely requires a language-like propositional content, yet it is clearly 
representational in some sense. Even in the case quoted above, some aspects of 
a tree being experienced may not be captured propositionally - say, for instance, 
the tree seeming to be a certain distance from another object in one‟s visual 
field, or the tree occupying more of the visual field than another object. In this 
case, the experience has a certain representational content, yet there seems to be 
more to the experience than that. I will return to this example in Chapter 5 and 
look at it in some detail.  
                                                 
30 „Informational‟ here, of course, is ambiguous. Well-trained animals might represent some 
objects informationally, but not judge them as cigar-bands etc., in the sense which requires a 
linguistic ability. I shall expand on and distinguish such subtleties in Chapter 2. 
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 But there are yet still more complex cases: when one looks at an assemblage 
of objects with one eye closed and then looks at the same assemblage with both 
eyes open, it is clear that what is represented has not changed, though there 
seems to be something quite different about the experience. So, there seems 
more to an experience than simply what is represented and what is captured in 
terms of propositional content or background concepts and theories. 
Binocularity enables a considerable refinement of the perception of objects in 
terms of their depth relationships than does monocular vision - yet the 
high-level categories mentioned are of little help in capturing the content of the 
experiences. It is likely that other experiential features can be separated off and 
distinguished in a similar way. Such examples will later provide good reasons 
for accepting an alternative to both the observational account and the 
inferentialist proposal. It shall be suggested later that if high-level 
considerations do not influence experiential content en bloc, it may be better to 
consider a weaker view of the relation between experience and „high-level‟ 
factors.  
 There is, however, yet another reason to consider some high-level features in 
isolation from the rest. This reason concerns the notion of a propositional 
content. The idea of a propositional content in the context of a belief or an 
experience might not always be said to be captured by linguistic features at all, 
but in other terms. Propositions may not necessarily be tied to language use as 
is commonly supposed. The notion of a proposition is, admittedly, notoriously 
unclear, so we can easily accept this suggestion. One might even continue to 
agree that beliefs and experiences require some high-level propositional 
features but not propositional features in the character of a language.  
 Armstrong, for one, has argued just this - holding that perception requires 
beliefs and concepts and propositional content in the manner stipulated by the 
inferentialist proposal.31 But he has also been careful to disassociate himself 
from the view that propositions are essentially linguistic. „Propositions‟ he 
notes, „have no special connection with language.‟32 Instead, Armstrong seems 
to closely attach the notion of a proposition to a representational state of some 
kind, not the tokenings of an experience in the form of a language.33 Of course, 
                                                 
31 Note, for instance, his remark: „Perception [is] nothing but the acquiring of true or false 
beliefs ... To perceive that there is something that is red before us is to acquire the (true) belief 
that there is something red before us as a result of the causal action of that red thing on our 
minds .... Beliefs involve concepts. Acquiring the belief that a particular object is red involves 
the possession of the concept of red. Possession of the concept entails a general capacity of the 
perceiver ... to distinguish between things that are red and things that are not red. And so, a 
perceptual belief, which involves capacity for selective behaviour ... entails the possession of 
higher-order capacities.‟ op. cit., Armstrong, (1968) p. 339, italics mine.  
32 Ibid., p. 202. 
33 Armstrong actually claims that propositions are „simply features of belief states‟ which 
function „neither referringly nor predicatively.‟ See: Armstrong, (1973) op. cit., p. 46-7. 
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animals clearly have a representational component to their experiences, so in 
this sense their experiences can have propositional content: most animals, even 
fairly unsophisticated ones, we would assume, do represent something in their 
experiences, even if we might well query whether or not their experiences had 
an informational content in the same sense as Holmes‟s experience.  
 Propositions need have no „special connection‟ with language for a number 
of good reasons. Armstrong was right to distinguish propositional content from 
language. In Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Armstrong argues that high-level 
beliefs and thoughts are logically independent of the words that they are 
expressed in (see his Chapter 3). But the other important reason he advances to 
avoid this connection is that animals and pre-linguistic children have such 
things as beliefs and yet they do not have a facility with a language. So, the 
propositional content of their beliefs, at least, can‟t be language-like. By parity, 
of course, their experiences too might involve a propositional content which is 
not language-like. The relevant sense in which both beliefs and experiences 
might be fixed by high-level propositional features does not then necessarily 
hang on the acquisition of a language - one might hold the inferentialist 
proposal without it. This seems especially plausible in the case of colour 
experiences like that of red or green; for it is quite unclear how the propositional 
content of such an experience could be language-like (if, indeed, such 
experiences can be characterised as being propositional at all). Once again, it 
seems, such „high-level‟ features can easily be distinguished and separated. 
 The point here is not that no high-level features are brought to bear on 
experiences, just that it is unclear to what degree they are relevant. If high-level 
features are relevant to experiences only by degrees, then this amounts to a 
much weaker version of the inferentialist proposal than that expressed earlier 
where all the high-level features were seen as both necessary and sufficient for 
experiential content. However, it may be that this position is wrong: it may be 
that no such high-level features are necessary for certain kinds of experiential 
content at all, even if all the high-level features are generally present together in 
normal human experience. Moreover, if high-level features are only relevant by 
degrees and can be effectively stripped from experiences, then there may be a 
case for claiming that the individuation of each leaves behind an experiential 
residue. If so, then the various high-level features are not necessary and 
sufficient for content at all. I shall try to argue for both these points later on.  
 The point just mentioned enables distinctions to be made between various 
forms of inferentialism. If someone like Armstrong, for instance, can agree with 
the thrust of the inferentialist proposal and yet eschew the matter of language, 
then it would seem that some of the various features of high-level inference (in 
this case, propositional content and language) are logically separable: one can 
                                                                                                                               
Recently, Armstrong has been developing an ontology of „states of affairs‟ to which 
propositions belong. See his paper „A World of States of Affairs‟. 
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plausibly claim that some experiences are propositional and attached to the 
endorsing of certain statements (Sellars‟s view) or one can claim that some 
experiences are propositional in some other sense not involving language 
(Armstrong‟s view). Moreover, some experiences might be taken as 
representational and yet not informational in any sophisticated sense at all (e.g., 
a rats or a dragon-fly‟s experience of the cigar-band near Jones‟s body). Indeed, 
there seem to be several possible combinations in the ways in which high-level 
influences can be brought to bear on experiential content, and - correspondingly 
- several possible degrees of inferentialism.  
 One of the important points to be brought out of the above discussion is this: 
What was described as being fairly uncontentious before (that propositional 
contents are language-like) can now be seen as a matter of serious debate, even 
among theorists who are otherwise sympathetic to the terms of the inferentialist 
proposal. This issue is worth spending more time on before continuing.  
The continuum idea  
Armstrong‟s concern, in the earlier passage is with the content of belief states, 
not experiences. According to Armstrong, belief states can be characterised as 
propositional states. But, as we have seen, on the inferentialist proposal the case 
of beliefs and the case of experiences actually run parallel: because experiences 
fix belief states, what can be said of the one kind of content can rightly be said 
of the other. So if one accepts the inferentialist proposal and the view that 
propositional content is characterised by language, it seems that one could hold 
that the content of experiences, like the content of beliefs, are likewise 
characterised by language. But such a view would then make nonsense of the 
idea that animals and infants have experiences in any important sense. 
Although this argument clearly follows on the inferentialist proposal, it seems 
that it would leave anyone who held this view in a rather absurd position.  
 However, as we have seen, this problem can be overcome easily: by saying 
that some propositional contents are language-like and some are not. So again: 
some high-level features are easily separated from others. Someone 
sympathetic to the propositional requirement of the inferentialist proposal, 
might thus take the line that there are two senses of „proposition‟: one that is 
closely tied to language and one which isn‟t. It might also be suggested that the 
propositional content of animal/infant beliefs and experiences are inferior to the 
propositional content of adult beliefs and experiences for just this reason. 
Someone who wanted to keep the emphasis of the inferentialist proposal might 
take this inferiority line on animal and infant beliefs and experiences - ruling as 
insignificant or irrelevant any content which did not possess the required 
high-level features specified.  
 But a question can be raised here: does the argument that animals and infants 
might have propositional contents which are not language-like necessarily rule 
as inferior or irrelevant these kinds of beliefs or experiential contents? 
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Armstrong, for one, does not think so. Attacking the possibility that animals and 
children might have „logically secondary‟ cases of beliefs because of this 
deficit, he advances the view that such creatures might „lie along a certain scale 
or continuum‟34  with language-using humans on one end of the scale and 
amoebas at the other. Although it might be clear where to attribute linguistic 
competence on such a scale, it is less easy to see where to attribute notions like 
beliefs. But this doesn‟t rule such beliefs as thus having a necessarily inferior 
content. To suggest otherwise would be to already assume the 
proposition-as-language-like model. Instead, in a marginal note, Armstrong 
tentatively advances the idea that belief content attribution can be understood as 
being ascribable by degrees (hence, the „continuum‟ idea). The point here is 
that the high-level propositional requirement of belief states, which is built into 
the inferentialist proposal, may well be too strong.  
 Presumably, the same would go here mutatus mutandis for experiential 
content: if one assumes that experiences require a high-level background of 
propositional features, then such features cannot be language-like unless one is 
prepared to rule out animal and infant experiences. And one can‟t do this on 
pain of begging the question in favour of the bias towards language. But there 
may be a way of ascribing significant experiential content to animals and 
infants by dropping the inferentialist proposal and adopting a more 
graduationist account; allowing experience to feature by degrees - in terms 
rather like a continuum. On this revised account, experiential content may be 
characterised in a number of different ways, not simply and exclusively in terms 
of features of high-level inference, and, in particular, propositional content. 
Such high-level considerations may be part of the story, but not all of it. 
Moreover, using only high-level features as criteria for experiences may be as 
dangerous and misleading as using language-like propositional content as a full 
and adequate characterisation of the nature of beliefs. 
 This point can be linked to the previous concern about the strictly 
„high-level‟ emphasis given by the inferentialist proposal in the context of 
outlining an account of experiential content. What seemed a plausible analysis 
for the experience Sherlock Holmes had of the cigar-band near Jones‟s body, 
we saw, did not seem plausible for the dog‟s experience of the same scene. 
True, the dog must have spatially represented something, and formed 
inferences from previous experience, memory, etc. Even so, here it did not 
seem appropriate to label all experiential contents as being influenced by all the 
sophisticated high-level factors mentioned; it did not seem plausible that the 
dog underwent the appropriate reasoning. Rather, it seemed that where some 
high-level features were relevant to the dog, others were not. This seems 
particularly plausible in the case of propositional contents having the character 
of a language, for such things are obviously not a feature of dog experiences. It 
                                                 
34 D.M. Armstrong, op. cit., (1973) p 30. 
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does seem that the inferentialist proposal has taken things too far: there might 
be rather less in some experiential contents than the inferentialist proposal 
would have us believe.  
 This argument is plausible even in this very rough form. What it might 
indicate is that something is wrong with the proposal that necessarily and only 
attributes high-level contents to the low-level experiences of unsophisticated 
organisms. Such categories simply do not always capture the experiences of 
such creatures. What it also shows is that comparisons with cases of high-level 
influences which legitimately capture the experiential content of sophisticated 
creatures who can use language is inherently unfair: it is something of a 
category mistake; an error in explanatory overkill. Moreover, just because an 
account of how experiences originate in terms of high-level considerations 
doesn‟t altogether capture animal and infant experiences, does not mean that 
they have no experiences, or that their experiences are inferior in some sense. 
Even though some experiences might be characterised in terms of high-level 
features, these features may not simultaneously capture low-level experiences 
which might escape such an analysis. The model we are using of experiential 
content - the inferentialist proposal - may be faulty, or just plain wrong.  
 What we have looked at in the previous sections is an account of experiential 
content in terms of high-level inferential features. It seems now, however, that a 
serious alternative is emerging to the view that experience necessarily involves 
the imposition of such features, or the observational view that experiences 
require no such input at all. This alternative holds that the high-level features 
are relevant by degrees, and thus, do not necessarily underpin experience at all 
levels - only experiences of a greatly sophisticated kind. So, although Sherlock 
Holmes‟s experience of the cigar-band near Jones‟s body may be, in some 
sense, fully characterised in terms of inference from background knowledge, 
propositional content and representational features, this sort of analysis might 
not be altogether possible of very unsophisticated animal experiences or of the 
difference in our experience of an assemblage of objects viewed with one eye 
and then both eyes. The nature of such experiences seems to require a far more 
subtle and elaborate account of the bearing of the so-called high-level 
influences on experiences.  
 The point of this section is not to argue that propositional content must be 
non-language-like, or even that propositional content is necessary for 
experience as the inferentialist proposal assumes. It is unclear what 
propositions are, and this difficult question will be avoided in this book. The 
point about propositions has been raised only to bring out Armstrong‟s 
suggestive analogy of a continuum. Armstrong‟s suggestive remark will be 
used here as an idea which needs development in the context of an account of 
experiential content. 
 The useful thing about this notion is that it might allow us to think of the 
content of experiences as being at interestingly distinct levels without having to 
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say that one kind of content has to be inferior to another „higher-level‟ content. 
It may even give us reason to think that the inferentialist proposal, as it stands, 
is actually false.  
Rationality and the inferentialist proposal 
It is not sufficient, on the terms of the inferentialist proposal, that only some 
experiences involve propositional features, representational features or 
inference from background knowledge. It is also not appropriate that the 
various high-level features can be separated and individuated in the way which 
we have seen. On the proposal being examined, it must remain true that all 
experiences require all the high-level features specified. The inferentialist says 
that the combination of such high-level features - background knowledge, 
theory, propositional and representational features - are either necessary 
conditions of experiential content, or both necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Experiences are, on this view, propositionally specifiable, representational 
states, necessarily underpinned by inference from background knowledge, 
concepts and theories.  
 Part of the reason the inferentialist proposal is so inflexible is that it is a 
doctrine that has strong historical roots. The view goes back to Descartes‟ 
rationalism and his stress on the uniqueness of the human species. The human 
species was unique in Descartes‟ view, centrally because of its ability to employ 
a language. The human beings‟ greater knowledge and theoretical base also 
distinguished them intellectually from animals. On this view, such high-level 
intellectual abilities were the deciding features of an organism‟s claim to 
rationality. Along with rationality came the fruits of human beings‟ superior 
understanding and experience of the world around him. For Descartes, where 
animals were merely mindless automata responding to stimuli from proximal 
cues, human beings could actually discern features of the world, discriminate 
amongst them and use things in the world to their own ends. Part of the reason 
why human beings were superior to animals was that only they could 
experience the world, not merely respond to it. And the key to this difference 
was their knowledge, theoretical understanding and, particularly, their facility 
with language - in other words, the „high-level‟ features mentioned above. 35 
 Much later, Kant expressed a similar view of the importance of high-level 
intellectual attributes when giving his account of human rationality. Keeping a 
deferential tie with the stress Descartes gave to language, his view became an 
explicitly judgement-focused analysis of human rationality as well as human 
experience. Humans were rational and could experience the world because they 
made intellectual judgments. Kant thus shared Descartes‟ view that the human 
                                                 
35 For an exposition and an attack on Descartes‟ views on animals, see: J. Cottingham, „“A 
Brute to the Brutes?”: Descartes‟ Treatment of Animals‟, pp. 551-9. See also, by the same 
author: Descartes, pp. 107-110.  
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species could be individuated as vastly superior creatures compared with 
animals because language, intellect and knowledge distinguished them from the 
„lower‟ species.  
 Kant was far more explicit about how these high-level features distinguish 
human beings from other animals. More particularly, he saw there to be „a 
logical connection between „intuition‟ and „understanding‟, that is, between 
sensory and intellectual capacity.‟ 36  This insight formed the basis for his 
account of epistemology and philosophy of mind as well as his account of 
experience. For him, the intellectual input from the understanding was logically 
connected with the sensory capabilities of a sophisticated organism, because 
without this, an organism would be unable to make relationships and form 
inferences from one moment to the next. Such features then, operated as 
necessary a priori conditions for manipulating the material of sense. Kant 
called these intellectual features „categories‟ of the understanding and called the 
operation of these categories in each individual case „judgements‟. For Kant, of 
course, making a „judgement‟ involved bringing to bear the whole gamut of 
high-level a priori knowledge to bear on experience - Euclidean geometry, 
space and time - the works. In this sense, Kant‟s philosophy constituted an 
important extension of rationalist thought.  
 Both Descartes and Kant were major players in developing what has been 
called „the inferentialist proposal‟, so it was very natural that the importance of 
both language and intellectual manipulation were retained as necessary 
features separating the rationality, and the experiences, of man from animals.37 
Both became a priori necessary features of experiential content. The 
importance of such high-level features has persisted and can be found as a 
theme in the work of the early Wittgenstein, Davidson, Armstrong, Feyerabend, 
Sellars, Churchland, Hanson and Stich, to name but a few. Even a cursory 
glance at much of contemporary analytic philosophy will bear out this point.  
 Donald Davidson, for instance, has recently argued that only language users 
can have concepts like beliefs, and S. P. Stich has echoed this view by 
suggesting that belief attribution is possible only in situations where all the 
features of such beliefs can be „isomorphically mapped‟ in terms 
comprehensible by language users.38 To isolate language use as a criterion for 
                                                 
36 J. Bennett, Rationality, p. 41. 
37 Routley points out that this tradition may well have been a product of „a long, vigorous, and 
perhaps, dominant, tradition in Western Philosophy, ... which though weakened in the 
empiricism of Hume and Bentham, reaches current philosophy through both (Cartesian) 
rationalism and through idealism.‟ He cites Hegel, not Kant, as a representative of the latter 
influence: „What distinguishes man from the beasts is the faculty of Thought manifested and 
first laid down in ... human language.‟ Hegel‟s Science of Logic, p. 39. See R. Routley: „Alleged 
Problems in Attributing Beliefs and Intentionality in Animals‟, p. 412. 
38 D. Davidson, „Thought and Talk‟, in S. Guttenplan (ed) Mind and Language, pp. 7-23; S. P. 
Stich, „Do Animals have Beliefs?,‟ pp. 15-28.  
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conceptual sophistication is to make a substantial commitment to the terms of 
the inferentialist proposal. Similarly, as we have already seen, Wilfred Sellars 
has argued that all mental content attributions, including that of perceptual 
experience, can be captured, without residue, in terms of propositional contents 
which can be true or false. Armstrong has also claimed the same for perception 
in terms of the propositional content of belief states.39 Feyerabend, to take a 
different case, has declared that the idea of a „sensing subject‟ without the 
mediation of theory is „incomprehensible.‟40 And, somewhat in sympathy with 
Feyerabend, Churchland has contended that mental content is, by nature, a 
theory which can be discarded and replaced wholly with scientific 
descriptions.41 Much earlier, of course, Wittgenstein was famous for saying in 
the Tractatus: „Whereof we cannot speak we must pass over in silence.‟42 The 
stress on language, theory, representational states and propositions is obvious.  
 The emphasis in each of these cases conveniently displays how the several 
high-level features of the inferentialist proposal have made their mark on 
contemporary approaches to the issue of mental content and experience in 
general. Moreover, the various high-level features are mostly found together: 
Churchland‟s eliminative materialism, for instance, stresses the theoretical 
dependence of mental content, but he also claims that any such theory is held as 
a network of integrated sentences which are held true as a pattern of integrated 
holistic beliefs. Sellars holds to the view of psychological nominalism: that 
there is no awareness outside what can be expressed in the terms of a 
theoretically and epistemically loaded language. Feyerabend has claimed, 
counterintuitively, that the only difference between a blind man and a seeing 
man is that „one uses a different part of [a] theory (or some of the consequences 
of [a] theory) as his observation language.‟43 Each of these views shall be 
examined in detail in subsequent chapters. 
 Such views demonstrate what might be called the rationalist origins of the 
inferentialist proposal. The stress placed on the high-level aspects of 
experiential content will be obvious when they are considered later. The point 
should be made here that all of these views take a pejorative line on content 
which cannot be captured in the high-level terms mentioned. In this sense, they 
approach the issue as an inferentialist might approach the issue of animal and 
infant cognition - they view any other approach as tapping an inferior, irrelevant 
or even a non-existent resource. This will be obvious when Churchland‟s views 
are considered; less obvious in the other cases.  
                                                 
39 W. Sellars, op. cit., D. M. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, passim. 
40 P. K. Feyerabend, „Science Without Experience‟, in Realism, Rationalism and Scientific 
Method. 
41 P. M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness. 
42 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, § 7. 
43 P. K. Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 33. 
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 It was mostly this rationalist background to the inferentialist proposal which, 
as Bennett says, makes it possible to „swallow in a greedy and undigested lump, 
the Kant-Wittgenstein stress upon language.‟44 One might add to this lump the 
other high-level features specified, since it is clear that the rationalist influence 
contains much more than just a stress on language. Also, as will be recognised 
from some of the above views, the „undigested lump‟ has come to signify more 
than simply the distinguishing features of rationality and a way of separating 
the province of man and nature, but also a way of understanding what any 
account of experiential content must fulfil. Such a view holds that the 
distinguishing and essential features of all mental content attributions are the 
„high-level‟ features stipulated. And these features turn largely on the early 
importance Kant and Descartes jointly gave to language and high-level 
intellectual manipulation.  
 It is partly this rationalist influence on the nature of experiential content 
which will be questioned in this book. The aim is to show how high-level 
features, which influence the having of experiences, can be detached from their 
association with the rationalist origins mentioned. Rather than adopting the 
inferentialist proposal holus bolus, it is better to keep elements of it in the form 
of a substantially modified account of the relation between experience and 
content.  
 I have already mentioned three reasons for making this move; reasons which 
shall later be developed as arguments.  
 Firstly, as we have seen, it does seem obvious that sophisticated high-level 
features need not feature in dog experiences, let alone in the experiences of 
organisms lower down the phylogenetic tree. So there seems little case for 
insisting that the inferentialist proposal be adopted as an overall strategy for 
understanding how experiences are engendered. There may, instead, be a case 
for combining elements of the observational account with elements of the 
inferentialist proposal.  
 Secondly, since each of the high-level features can be individuated and 
separated, it seems unlikely that the various high-level features can jointly 
account for the nature of experiential content - something a more subtle account 
might achieve. The point is not that because the various features can be 
separated the inferentialist proposal cannot account for experiential content (for 
wholes can have properties over and above their parts). The point is that if it can 
be shown that each of the high-level features are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for certain experiences, then there is a case for claiming that 
individuating each leaves behind an experiential residue. It will be argued that 
any account of the relation between experience and content has to be seen in the 
light of evolutionary principles and the nature of the complexity of differing 
species and their species-specific cognitive architecture. Furthermore, there is a 
                                                 
44 Bennett, op. cit., p. 2. 
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need for low-level sensational experiences when this is considered. (This, in 
turn, will provide a connection between an attack on the inferentialist proposal 
and a legitimation of property dualism.) A graduationist account will more 
readily include these considerations.  
 Thirdly, it has been intimated that there is a more general problem with the 
inferentialist proposal as a fully-fledged account of experiential content. If the 
inferentialist proposal is true, then there is hardly any sense in which 
experiential content can be observationally fixed. All experiences should, 
instead, presuppose theory, knowledge, concepts and propositional contents, 
even - experiences like the experience of the colour red. This seems less than 
obvious. Such things seem to have more to do with the observational situation 
than high-level influences like knowledge, theories and language. Indeed, there 
is a good case for claiming that „observational‟ features of low level 
experiences such as colours have survival value too, independent of such 
influences. If the inferentialist proposal claims that such high-level features are 
necessary and sufficient precursors to any kind of experiential content, then 
something may well have gone astray.  
 These themes shall be taken up in the following chapters. In Chapter 3, it will 
be revealed just how things may have gone astray by showing how experience 
has been conflated with language. This conflation is premised on a simple 
philosophical error. In Chapter 4, it will be examined whether experiential 
content can be fully captured in terms of representational content; specifically, 
in terms of the propositional content of belief states (I will be looking in detail 
at the views of Armstrong in this connection). In Chapter 10, Sellars‟s claim 
that rejecting sense-data theory automatically goes with accepting an 
inferentialist account heavily dependent on the propositional content of 
statements is assessed. In Chapters 9, and 11, the ways in which experiential 
content has been said to be theory dependent will be questioned.  
 My response to the inferentialist proposal, finally, is not to rule out the 
application of such high-level features, but to modify and limit their influence. 
Chapter 5 argues the case for the experiential residue that escapes the 
inferentialist analysis, whereas Chapter 7 takes up the issue of animal 
experiences. The claim arising from these chapters will be that there is still an 
important sense in which experience can be said to originate observationally. 
The revised account I shall be making - the continuum account - will rest 
convincingly well with a modular view of mental content which is outlined in 
Chapter 8, and a property dualist theory of the mind which is outlined in 
Chapter 12. It will also reconcile the traditional dichotomy of the inferentialist 
proposal and the observational account and will provide grounds for a more 
subtle reading of Kant‟s views in Chapter 6. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, the case for the inferentialist proposal was presented. This 
account emphasises the importance of the high-level influences on experiences. 
It was demonstrated that this view has had a long history stemming from early 
rationalism. Each of the high-level features were itemised and shown to be 
important features of experiential content on this view. An alternative to this 
view was also described briefly and was counterpointed to the inferentialist 
view. Each of these approaches has some merit. Just as it seems necessary for 
experiences to be organised conceptually, so too does it seem necessary that 
some aspects of experiential content depend on features of the observational 
situation rather than wholly cognitive factors. The case of conceptually 
unsophisticated animal and infant experience was discussed in this connection. 
The claim here is that the nature of content need not be understood in terms of a 
dilemma: either entirely inferential or non-inferential. Instead, a broader 
combinatory position needed to be sought. It was argued that a combinatory 
position might best be developed by taking Armstrong‟s suggestion of a 
continuum seriously. 
 A final point: the inferentialist proposal stipulates „high-level‟ features as 
either a necessary condition or a necessary and sufficient condition for 
experiential content. The distinction here is taken to be degrees of emphasis of a 
single radical doctrine. However, the importance of this distinction for any 
attempt to abandon the inferentialist proposal was not explored in detail. 
 It is clear that the distinction is an important one. The necessary condition 
thesis is a legacy of Kant‟s views, and a rejection of this claim on its own is not 
enough to successfully attack the claims of the inferentialist proposal. On 
Kant‟s account, the sensory manifold was available in experience prior to its 
integration and synthesis by the forms of intuition and the categories. So, on 
Kant‟s view, there is more to experiential content than simply „high-level‟ 
features; there is also a sensory manifold. However, the high-level features 
were necessary for experience on this view, because the manifold itself was 
unformed and unstructured. What remains after separating the high-level 
features from the sensory manifold is not any kind of content. To Kant, 
experiential content amounted to sensory manifold plus the imposition of the 
categories and forms of intuition.  
 By contrast, the necessary and sufficient thesis is a view common to many 
recent materialist philosophers such as Churchland, Armstrong, Harman, 
Sellars and Feyerabend. This amounts to the view that all there is to 
experiential content are the high-level features specified by the inferentialist 
proposal. There is no unformed sensory content outside the imposition of the 
high-level features. Although this more radical view shall be examined in the 
following chapters I shall also treat the Kantian position in some detail in 
Chapter 6.  
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 The necessary condition thesis should not be confused with the necessary and 
sufficient condition thesis. However, the arguments to be advanced against the 
inferentialist proposal shall strike at both views. It shall be claimed that there 
are contentful experiences that do not contain the high-level features 
emphasised by the inferentialist proposal. So, low-level experiential content 
can be importantly separated from high-level content. Claiming this enables me 
to hit the necessary condition side of both targets. Against the necessary and 
sufficient condition thesis, it will be argued that there is more to experience than 
high-level features; against the necessary condition thesis, it will be argued that 
low-level experiences are actually contentful.  
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2. A Continuum Theory of Content 
[Man is] a mixture of all things and an orderly combination of 
contraries.45 
A taxonomy of experiential content 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that an adequate account of content 
should acknowledge that high-level influences can occur in degrees, rather than 
in all-or-none terms. It was also suggested that conceptually unsophisticated 
animal and infant experiences need some sort of account too. The burden of the 
theory of content that is advocated here takes as its starting point that there are 
low-level features as well as high-level features of experiences. Experiences 
can occur in degrees of sophistication anywhere along a content continuum.  
 An otherwise sophisticated „high-level‟ experience, of (say) a cigar-band 
being near Jones‟s body, can also have low-level aspects which can‟t be 
captured in any of the high-level terms mentioned. The continuum account thus 
holds what shall be called a complexity thesis: some experiences have low-level 
aspects and high-level aspects. Moreover, the relationship between high and 
low-level aspects is asymmetrical: an experience need not have high-level 
aspects but all experiences have low-level aspects. Several levels of experience 
will now be distinguished in some detail.  
2.2 Linguistic propositional judgements 
We have seen the problem that arose with the characterisation of a proposition 
in relation to experiential content. We can use this confusion as the starting 
                                                 
45 M. Aurelius, Meditations, VII, 48. 
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point for our taxonomy. On the one hand, it seemed plausible that Sherlock 
Holmes could have been in some state which was explicitly tokened in a 
language and which could thus be true or false in absence of the thing 
experienced. In this version, the experience had propositional content in a sense 
which was language-like. On the other hand, it also seemed plausible that the 
notion of a propositional content need not be so closely tied to a language. This 
was especially so because some (lower) animals might also represent their 
experiences propositionally in some sense, though without tokening their 
experiences in a language. Both of these views (and much else besides) can be 
true on the account presented.  
 We can begin by defining some experiential contents as having content 
explicitly tokened in some kind of language (or a language-of-thought).46 Call 
this level a linguistic propositional judgement. An example of this kind is 
Sherlock Holmes and his experience of the cigar-band near Jones‟s body. For 
Holmes, having the experience meant that he then underwent some kind of 
tokened, expressible, representational state. It is not that his experience put him 
in this tokened state; rather, the experience brought about his tokening of that 
state, because it necessarily involved the imposition of „high-level‟ 
propositional factors. His experience had content which was expressed (or 
thought) in words (or tokens) such as „cigar-band‟, „Jones‟s body‟, etc., and this 
involved the imposition of background knowledge, concepts, theory and so on. 
To avoid confusion, the term „proposition‟ shall be used only in relation to this 
level of content and no other. The account being developed will not make 
extensive use of this notion. „Proposition‟ is defined as a strictly linguistic 
feature of content.  
2.3 Representational judgements  
Holmes‟s experience was also represented as certain structural features in his 
visual field; that is, as certain discernible things distinct from their 
surroundings. This, presumably, is precisely the way in which fairly 
sophisticated animals like dogs might perceive such scenes. This level shall be 
called the level of representational judgements. This level of content can be 
distinguished from the linguistic propositional judgement in the respect that it is 
not explicitly tokened in a language or a language of thought, though it is 
implicitly structured by virtue of being an organised perception of some kind. 
                                                 
46 The essentials here do not matter for my account. The language-of-thought hypothesis might 
be true, if by it, is meant that one can represent certain aspects of one‟s experience in some 
tokened form or other. This might be true of aspects of animal experiences as much as ours. (A 
dog might have some mental token ø, by which he represents „master‟.) Where I diverge from 
this is in how less sophisticated aspects of experiences can be represented. (It does not seem 
obvious that all aspects of experiences need to have mentalese tokenings, but more on this 
below.) 
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(This, of course, can occur in degrees - a rather less sophisticated organism, for 
example, a dragon-fly or a bee, might structurally represent rather less in its 
visual scene than Holmes or a dog does, because it has less sensitive perceptual 
equipment - or more sensitive depending on the kind of experience in question.)  
 This kind of „gestalt‟-like structuring of experience which is not 
linguistically tokened, was presumably what Armstrong had in mind by his use 
of the term „proposition.‟ Armstrong‟s rejection of this term in relation to 
linguistic propositional judgements was mentioned earlier. His claim was that 
propositional content is not necessarily tied to the notion of a language. As 
mentioned, however, the use of the term „proposition‟ will be reserved for the 
strict linguistic sense only; I shall be using the term „representational 
judgement‟ to capture Armstrong‟s sense of „proposition.‟ The distinction 
between linguistic propositional judgments and representational judgements is 
thus important because it avoids the ambiguities in the term „propositional 
content.‟  
 It is not being suggested that by making these distinctions both kinds of 
„judgements‟ cannot occur jointly. Demonstrably, they can occur jointly. It 
seems obvious, for instance, that Holmes may form a representative judgement 
(have a certain gestalt-like experience) as well as token such features in a 
language. For some organisms, and in some circumstances, both kinds of 
judgements can occur together. Of course, by parity, they need not: Holmes 
might, for instance, have experienced certain structurally organised features, 
without tokening them explicitly in a language as certain types of things, even if 
he represented them implicitly as organised features in his experience. He may 
have been day-dreaming or concentrating heavily on having a conversation 
with Watson, for example. (This brings out the important influence of attention 
in fixing features of experiential content, but more on this later.) 
 The distinction made between linguistic propositional judgments and 
representational judgements is not meant to suggest that subjects are always 
fully conscious of the contents of their experiences. Linguistic propositional 
contents do not correspond exactly to „conscious‟ experience and 
representational contents do not correspond exactly to the converse. A 
representational judgement may be a conscious experiencing in which certain 
structural features represented are explicit. Holmes, or his dog, may 
consciously discern certain spatially represented objects in certain places etc., 
by the very act of experiencing some scene. But a representational judgement 
may also be of another character entirely: i.e., as a projection which is not 
explicitly conscious; i.e., as an implicit - and only partly conscious - „noticing‟. 
For instance, someone might project a visual array in space without being 
completely cognisant of what it is that is being projected. Something like this 
seems to be going on in „tactile vision‟ experiments. In a similar way, features 
of an experience need not necessarily be consciously tokened in a language, but 
may, nonetheless, be represented in linguistic-propositional form. 
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 Although some very sophisticated organisms (such as Sherlock Holmes) 
might unconsciously token their experiences, (Holmes might think „cigar-band‟ 
in some way in „mentalese‟ without noticing he did or intending to do so), there 
is a sense in which an experience can also be left untokened but nonetheless 
„represented‟ in some other way. (Presumably other animals do this and so 
might Sherlock Holmes in certain circumstances were he distracted or 
otherwise occupied.) Consider also the example of waking up in a strange 
place: in such a situation one might project certain spatially represented objects 
without tokening them as objects of certain types (a „thing‟ in a vague direction 
to the left of another „thing‟). There is thus a clear need to distinguish linguistic 
propositional judgments from representational judgements.  
2.4 Informationally representational judgements  
There are two distinguishable senses of experience so far - a linguistic 
propositional content and a representational content. Further complications 
arise, however, when one considers some of the high-level influences on 
experiences beyond that of representational and propositional content. Such 
considerations force us to extend the taxonomy. Consider, for example, 
concepts and background knowledge. It would seem likely that an experiencing 
organism such as Holmes might form a representational judgement without 
bringing to bear a concept or background knowledge of that particular thing. 
(He might recognise, for instance, that the cigar-band is near the body without 
recognising the objects as a cigar-band and a body.)47 In another circumstance, 
of course, he may bring such specific information to bear on the experience. To 
take the opposite extreme, a very unsophisticated animal might not have the 
conceptual equipment to bring such information to bear on its experience at all - 
it may be only able to represent certain features of its experience without 
conceptualising or knowing what they are in any way. (Consider a dragonfly‟s 
experience of Jones and the cigar-band.)48 To enable a distinction to be drawn 
between such clearly less sophisticated cases, and the representational 
judgement case mentioned above, call an experience which does involve these 
features, an informational representational judgement and call an experience 
                                                 
47 He has the concept of „near‟ in this case of course, but this is saying something rather less 
sophisticated than saying that he forms a representative judgement of the cigar band near 
Jones‟s body.  
48 Though again: a more sophisticated, well-trained animal such as a dog might be able to know 
(conceive of) features of its experience (e.g., its master). It is not being suggested that only 
humans can make such determinate judgements, but that experiential complexity trails off by 
degrees, from more to less sophisticated content with respect to their degree of phylogenetic 
sophistication. On the most plausible story, most lower animals bring rather less „high-level‟ 
input to their experiences than humans do to theirs, but this should not rule out that some 
animals, in some circumstances, can localise some cognitively sophisticated experiential 
features.  
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which doesn‟t involve such features simply a representational judgement. This 
allows the possibility that some experiences can involve more or less 
representational content than others.  
 Consider also the influence of theory in this context. Obviously, some 
experiences which are linked with background knowledge can also be crucially 
linked with theory. That is, an experience with informational content can also 
be linked with large scale epistemic connections. Such connections might 
involve a good deal of complicated references to historical information or 
analogies, or - in the case of Holmes - just plain off-the-cuff ingenuity. Such 
large scale connections are clearly not possible in the experiences of 
unsophisticated animals and infants, but equally, it need not be so in the case of 
Holmes‟s less astute partner, Watson. Watson may „miss the point‟ of 
experiencing the cigar-band so close to Jones‟s body and not make the 
theoretical connection between the murder and the suspected perpetrator of the 
crime. For some organisms, then, an experience can involve theoretically 
informational judgements, in the sense that large scale epistemic connections, 
or theories are involved.  
  Again, however, this need not be always so. Even Holmes, at times, (say, 
when he is sleepy or tired) may not bring to bear this theoretical input on his 
experience, even though he may still identify the cigar-band as a certain 
informational content and represent the cigar-band as a certain object (he may 
also „token‟ it in a linguistic propositional judgment simultaneously).The 
continuum theory allows that sometimes an experience can have certain 
degrees of high-level content at different times, or different degrees of content 
at the same time for equal or distinct experiencing organisms such as Holmes, 
Watson and the dog. 
 The above cases have considered the various „high-level‟ features and their 
connection with experiential content. They are obvious considerations, but 
surprisingly, the inferentialist proposal has traditionally not admitted such 
distinctions. This is reason enough to make them plain now. Linguistic 
propositional judgements have been distinguished from representational 
judgements, and informational representational judgements from theoretically 
informational ones. Since there seem to be good reasons for saying that each 
and all of these kinds of features can occur in experiences (sometimes in one 
and the same experience), it is suggested that we call these features, high-level 
aspects of experiential content. On the continuum account presented, 
experiential content can have varying degrees of such high-level content 
specificity. It remains to be seen if there is any other kind of content that can be 
present in experiences which is not exclusively „high-level‟.  
2.5 Non-representational aspects 
We can also extend this kind of taxonomy in the opposite direction, and 
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consider different degrees of low-level content specificity. A few examples of 
this should suffice, since these kinds of features will be treated in more detail 
later. For now, the suggestion is that at this low-level of content, an experience 
can have, what shall be called, non-representational or sensational aspects. 
Take the case, once again, of Holmes‟s experience of the cigar-band near 
Jones‟s body. Even though Holmes may be said to make a certain 
representational judgement in this instance, (and perhaps even a linguistic 
propositional judgement simultaneously), it can also be true that his experience 
has features which cannot be captured in any such 
representational/propositional terms.  
 Perhaps, for instance, Holmes registers certain colour hues of the visible 
objects he sees which suddenly change (become brighter) when a shaft of light 
enters the window, or perhaps he surveys the scene first with one eye open and 
then opens the other. In either case, something about the experience changes, 
and it is not what can be captured in the high-level terms already mentioned. 
Further, consider what an unsophisticated creature such as a rat might 
experience in the above situation. Presumably it experiences nothing 
theoretically representational or informationally representational, and certainly 
nothing linguistically propositional. The creature does not (plausibly) make a 
„judgement‟ about certain objects in certain relationships in any of the senses 
given above. It does not employ any of the high-level features we have been 
considering. Yet the creature might undergo some experience or other, however 
unsophisticated - perhaps it experiences only lightness or darkness, or only 
responds to such features in the same way as a knee will reflexively respond to 
being hit in a sensitive place.49  
 However, such an experience, although not representational and 
judgemental, might still be informational in some sense. Later, the experiences 
of a congenitally blind person having their sight restored by a tactile vision 
substitution system is considered as an example of informationally sensational 
features. It shall be clear from this sort of case that we need another category 
beyond that of the high-level features mentioned. These features shall be called 
non-representational, sensational aspects or purely sensational aspects 
depending on the context. The context stipulated is this: When an otherwise 
representational judgement has some sensational aspects, the experience will be 
said to have „non-representational, sensational aspects‟ (better: „impurely 
sensational aspects‟); when an experience with no representational features at 
                                                 
49 The „experiences‟ of very unsophisticated creatures such as stentor caeruleus (a ciliate - a 
unicellular organism) might well best be described in this behaviourist, stimulus and response 
terms. However, somewhat more sophisticated creatures such as rats surely experience 
something actually informational, even if it is only degrees of brightness and darkness. The fact 
that the responses of some creatures are best accounted for behaviourally does not contradict an 
account of experience which allows for different levels of sophistication to occur at the 
polarities of high and low-level content.  
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all has sensational aspects, the experience will be said to have „purely 
sensational‟ aspects. It is clear that although very primitive creatures might not 
be able to represent certain features in their experience, they might still have an 
experience with informationally sensational content. Similarly, a congenitally 
blind person who has had their sight restored, might well be able to represent 
things in some sense, yet, for the most part their experience is informationally 
sensational rather than informationally representational.  
 It is clear that an otherwise representational judgement can have 
non-representational, sensational aspects (consider the hue changes in 
Holmes‟s experience of the cigar-band as the sun moved slowly past the 
window). Such experiences can, in some sense, be informational, yet not be 
captured in representational terms. And an experience which is not 
representational at all can still have sensational aspects (consider the purely 
sensational aspects of the „experience‟ of the rat.) These sorts of features too 
can occur in degrees, and equally, can be present in some circumstances and not 
in others. It will later be suggested that the sense in which a person like Holmes 
is responsive to the representational features of his experience and not the 
sensational features, is largely a function of his attentiveness; his ability to 
concentrate on one or other aspect of his experience. Finally, where some 
experiences have purely sensational content, all experiences have at least 
impurely sensational content. So the continuum view is in serious disagreement 
with that of the inferentialist proposal which claims that experiences are 
necessarily underpinned by only „high-level‟ features; where high-level 
features are necessary and sufficient for content. On the continuum account, 
there can be contentful experiences that do not contain the high-level features 
specified by the inferentialist proposal. 
2.6 Three theses 
There are some important things to note about this view of experiential content: 
For a start, the account is quite literally continuum-like. It is claimed that there 
are several degrees of content for experiencing organisms which lie along a 
perceptual gradient. At each end of the gradient are the polarities of the 
„high-level‟ and the „low-level.‟ The „purely sensational‟ excludes the 
high-level; however, the high-level does not exclude the low-level. The 
high-level thus always contains low-level, impurely sensational aspects. What 
make the continuum are the degrees of constraint and conceptual organisation 
from the low-level to the high-level - i.e., the presence of differently organised 
low-level content in all experience. 
 This continuum account admits of several distinct elements which should be 
distinguished. These elements capture the relationships between the various 
kinds of content mentioned. These elements can be isolated as distinct theses: 
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(i) The continuum thesis. This is simply the fact that several 
distinguishable levels of organisation can be discerned in experiences as 
previously explained. Particularly, this refers to the „impure‟ low-level 
content reaching through all experiences (see diagram below).  
 
(ii) The complexity thesis. This claims that there are several different 
aspects to contentful experiences within each level. Experience is 
mostly an amalgam of several low and high-level aspects. A purely 
sensational experience, by definition, excludes high-level aspects but all 
other experiences contain both kinds of features. (Since human beings 
are sophisticated creatures, their experiences usually have the character 
of being „impure‟: i.e., an amalgam of several kinds of content.) 
 
(iii) The asymmetry thesis. This follows from the previous thesis. 
Because (ii) stipulates experiential amalgams, and as the purely 
sensational is excluded from this, the continuum is asymmetrical. There 
are varying degrees of (impurely) sensational content in high-level 
experiences, but there is no high-level content in purely sensational 
experiences. Experience should thus best be seen in terms of 
degree-additions to low-level content, rather than degrees of high-level 
content. At the very bottom end of the continuum no high-level aspects 
feature but moving toward the upper end of the continuum, both 
high-level and low-level aspects feature to varying degrees in every 
experiential complex.  
 
In addition, the point about focus of attention must be included. This can be 
seen to feature in terms of how an experiencing organism discriminates 
between the various aspects of an experiential amalgam. As will be clear from 
the preceding discussion, a perceiver may or may not focus their attention 
specifically upon (say) a change in hue, but there remains a sense in which the 
visual system registers the hue. The hue change (whether focussed on or not) 
remains a part of experiential content.  
 With these classifications and distinctions included, the taxonomy of 
experiential content has become considerably more complex than the high-level 
features itemised in Chapter 1. The relationships between the various degrees of 
content specificity can, however, be reproduced schematically to show the 
connections between them:  
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Linguistic propositional 
 
 
Theoretically informational 
 
 
Representationally informational 
 
 
Representational 
 
 
Non-representational 
(Impurely sensational) 
 
 
Purely sensational 
 
  
In this schematic view, various levels of experiential content are depicted as shaded blocks. 
Working from below, an experience with purely sensational aspects (no representational 
features at all) might belong to primitive animals only (say, some invertebrates which 
experience (are responsive to) only darkness and lightness). Further, something can be 
experienced as having non-representational, sensational aspects jointly with (some) 
representational features. A representational experience can be experienced as being 
informational as a certain conceptualised object or merely representational qua object distinct 
from its surroundings (in either case, it can be experienced as having non-representational, 
sensational aspects). Further, a determinately representational experience can be experienced as 
having theoretical content (again with or without experiencing non-representational features 
and non-representational, sensational aspects), while a theoretically representational experience 
can have linguistic propositional content in addition to the other kinds of content (again, with or 
without experiencing non-representational, sensational aspects). The schema here is subject to 
three general rules or theses: (1) there is a continuum between high and low-level experiences 
including varying degrees to which high-level features are realised at varying levels of 
experience (the continuum thesis). (2) there is always a multi-aspect or multi-level nature to 
high-level experience - i.e., it can simultaneously involve different levels of experience (the 
complexity thesis) and (3) there are (often) independently identifiable low-level contents in 
high-level experiential amalgams, but whether identifiable or not, low-level sensational 
contents are present in all experiences no matter how straightforwardly high-level (the asymmetry 
thesis). 
 
Figure 1 A taxonomy of content 
In what has been argued in setting up the inferentialist proposal, only 
„high-level‟ aspects of experiential content are considered to be necessary 
features of perception. However, if the view being developed is true, then 
experience can also have low-level sensational aspects too. In fact, on the 
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asymmetry thesis, experiences must have low-level content, even if - given the 
complexity thesis - this is not always separable from the overall experiential 
complex, or isolated via the focus of one‟s attention (sensational content is, 
thus, mostly „impure‟ and non-separable). It shall be assumed that, for the most 
part, the distinctions above are clear and will not need further elaboration in 
terms of how they relate and can be distinguished as taxonomic features, though 
more time shall be spent on elucidating the sensational aspects of experiential 
content in Chapter 5. 
Definitions  
2.7 Experience, perception and ‘aspects’ 
At this point, the terms used shall be defined more precisely. The word 
„experience‟ is used as a generic term encompassing the various kinds of ways 
in which contentful properties appear to sensing organisms. „Perception,‟ a 
species of this, might be defined as a mechanical achievement by which an 
organism may come to have an experience using the sense organs.  
 This definition is a little unorthodox, but there needs to be a rough and ready 
distinction here: it is clear, for instance, that not all experiences are perceived 
(consider, for instance, the case of gravity - always experienced yet rarely 
perceived) and not all perceptions are experienced (consider the case of having 
one‟s retina stimulated by EM light waves but still going through a red light; 
psychological experiments where the subject is unaware that she is responding 
in ways consonant with exposure to previous signals, etc.) The distinction 
between experience and perception is supposed to capture the sense in which 
experiences are sometimes conscious perceptions.  
 In this book I also speak of aspects of experiences, as the chief aim is to 
highlight the point that some features of experiential content cannot be captured 
by the inferentialist proposal. „Aspect‟ means those features of content which 
can or cannot be captured in terms of linguistic propositional, theoretically 
informational and representational judgements. Following Peacocke,50 these 
aspects shall be divided into two broad groups: „representative‟ aspects of 
experience - by which I shall mean those that have a discernible 
representational/propositional content (as Sherlock Holmes had when he 
discovered a cigar-band near Jones‟s body) and „non-representative‟ or 
„sensational‟ aspects of experience which do not have a discernible 
representational structure, but which has qualitative content. Occasionally these 
broad kinds of content shall be referred to as being „descriptive‟ and 
„sensational‟, respectively. Given the continuum account an essentially 
                                                 
50 C. Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and its Relations, pp. 5-7. 
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sensational experience can have some determinate/representational aspects to 
it, even if it can‟t be fully captured in such terms. There is no suggestion here 
that an experience can‟t have both aspects (in fact, regularly they do) but this 
does not tell against the point that there are aspects of experiences which are not 
entirely inferential in the high-level sense required by the inferentialist 
proposal. The two divisions are meant to legitimate two broad senses in which 
experiences have content, not to suggest that they either have one kind of 
content or the other. The argument here is against a dichotomous treatment of 
the issue.  
 There are convenient reasons for the distinction above. As shall be shown 
later, we can be aware of aspects of certain experiences without this aspect 
being necessarily „representative‟ in content. On the other hand, it is possible 
that we can have high-level theories about some things without being 
(necessarily) aware of anything at all. (One could, for instance, be a 
brain-in-a-vat believing that the earth was round.) So it seems on the face of it 
that there is a genuine conceptual distinction here.51  
 The legitimation of low-level sensational aspects to experiential content will 
allow me to reject the inferentialist proposal. It will be here where an 
evolutionary argument inserts its wedge. There must be such low-level content 
to account for why we react to such experiences in the ways that we do, and 
why experience seems constrained in the manner it is, and this for essentially 
phylogenetic reasons: experience, at all levels of sophistication, needs to have a 
content because it typically needs to fix beliefs. Something must be going on 
when conceptually unsophisticated creatures experience things like colour 
aspects and visual field enlargements, and that „something‟ is a kind of 
experience as good as any other. But the point is that it is not clear that these 
kinds of structured, low-level experiencings are captured by beliefs in the sense 
which involves representational, theoretical and propositional linguistic 
judgements.  
 So, for stronger reasons, there seem to be two broad ways in which 
experience can have content: one which can be properly captured on the terms 
of the high-level features of the inferentialist proposal; the other which cannot 
be captured in such terms, but which is still structured and, in evolutionary 
terms, useful. Correspondingly, there are two distinguishable senses of 
experiential belief-fixation. Such claims will provide reasons for the view that 
not all experiential content originates with high-level influences. 
                                                 
51 This example is not as insipid as it seems on first blush: recent theorising in the philosophy of 
science has it that science can be carried on without experiencing things at all: i.e., simply by 
plugging theories into computers and having other computers reading off the result. This kind 
of view makes a substantial commitment to saying that investigations about the world are not 
importantly observational. See Paul Feyerabend, „Science Without Experience‟ in Realism, 
Rationalism and Scientific Method, Philosophical Papers, Vol.1. Feyerabend‟s views are 
treated in detail in Chapter 9.  
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2.8 Four caveats 
There are four important caveats to note about the view of experiential content 
presented: 
 1. In saying that sensational features of experiences are useful, I am not 
making any reference to the sense data theory. This view claimed that conscious 
sensory experiences were not experiences of real objects or events in the world, 
but were properties of, for example, intervening coloured patches. It is not 
being claimed, however, that the sensational content of experience can‟t be 
represented as belonging to objects in the world. Such a view is not plausible in 
an evolutionary sense: intervening coloured patches cut no evolutionary ice 
unless they can be projected onto real events and objects. (What would be 
selectively important about an intervening red patch, for example?) The claim, 
rather, is that conscious sensory contents mostly do have a representational 
aspect which projects them on to objects, but this is not the only content they 
have. A vitally important evolutionary function of experience is that they can 
have a felt quality for the perceiver. And this is so simply because projected 
experiences may, on some occasions, be wrong. So, there might be a survivalist 
reason for why there must be „something that it is like‟ to have conscious 
sensory experiences in addition to any representational, descriptive, high-level 
judgements that something looks like this or that. When confronted with an 
object speeding before one, for example, it is survivally more important to be 
aware of an enlargement in the visual field, than seeing what seems like a 
balloon (in fact a sharp missile) is speeding before one. My attachments to this 
kind of argument will later allow me to link my thesis with a property dualism 
of the kind adumbrated by Nagel. Far from the views of Dennett, for whom 
„thrown into a causal gap, a quale will simply fall through it‟,52 I want to argue 
that qualia actually fulfil a genuine causal role - by providing low-level 
informational content to experiencing organisms.  
 2. Related to this point, it is stressed that sensational aspects of experiences 
are informational awarenesses in some sense and, as such, are not epistemically 
idle. „Felt‟ experiential properties do yield some informational content for 
perceivers. However, this kind of content is not anything which would be 
similar to the claims made for sense data. Sensational aspects of experiential 
content are not epistemically foundational, nor incorrigible, even though they 
may be, in an informational sense, sui generis to high-level judgements. The 
claim is that, concurrently with representing one‟s experience or forming a 
theoretically informational or propositionally linguistic judgement, one might 
also experience aspects of that experience which cannot be captured in 
high-level terms. However, there is nothing epistemically fundamental about 
such experiences; they can be overridden and ignored as a function of attention. 
                                                 
52 Epigraph to „Qualia Disqualified‟, in D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 369. 
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(One can either notice a certain hue or fail to, even if one‟s visual system may 
register the hue.) The sense of „informational‟ here should be seen in survivalist 
terms: having a felt aspect of one‟s experience is probably more to do with a 
biological story about how we have evolved, than a perceptual story about how 
the visual system processes information and directs us to items of particular 
epistemic interest. More will be said about the epistemic function of low-level 
content later.  
 3. It is not claimed that high-level considerations are not brought to bear on 
experiential content at all. It seems highly likely in fact that the various 
elements of the inferentialist proposal can be individuated, and said to be 
relevant to various degrees. The point is only that some aspects of experiential 
content are not captured by such features. If so, it would seem that the 
inferentialist proposal is false as it stands, and a more subtle and elaborate 
account of the relation between high-level considerations and experiential 
content needs to be developed.  
 A more refined version of the broad kinds of content mentioned earlier would 
be this. There may be a three-way manifestation of experience to the organism: 
proximal stimulations (psychologically non-inferential); low-level sensational 
contents (experienced qualitatively, perhaps partially inferential - depending on 
the organism in question) 53  and representative descriptive experiences 
(structured conceptually, highly inferential). It is the second sort of experience 
that will be crucial. Throughout this book, it shall be separated from the third 
level of experience.  
 On the inferentialist proposal, experience is taken to be primarily exhausted 
by the third form listed above. By contrast, the „observational account‟ of the 
classical empiricist and the sense-data theorist take experience to be exhausted 
by the first type (of course for these theorists, the first type was more than just 
„proximal stimulations‟). On the continuum account, the second option as well 
as the first and third, are required for a fully adequate account of experiential 
content. It is not claimed that experience can be exhausted by its 
representational or inferential content. The option is thus not entirely 
inferentialist; not entirely specified by an application of background epistemic, 
representational and propositional features. There is something about the 
content of certain aspects of experiences which is strictly observational and 
sensational and there is something about the content of other aspects of 
                                                 
53 Unsophisticated animals are less likely to have the latter aspects but more than likely to have 
the former (in varying degrees, of course). Again, the possibility of graduations of difference 
here is central to the continuum account. (It is noted in work on invertebrate perception that 
bees, for instance „can distinguish between different colours ... [but] they have a very limited 
ability to distinguish shapes.‟ See: P. A. Meglitsch, Invertebrate Zoology, p. 653. Moreover, 
some contents can be lost and others gained: certain species of fish, birds and butterflys, for 
instance, are able to perceive UV radiation - an ability lost in primates. (My thanks to Roger 
McCart for this point.)  
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experiences which is fully representational and can be explained and captured 
in the terms of the inferentialist proposal. There are also a number of 
possibilities in between these two options (see below). This kind of situation is 
implausible under any view of experiential content other than the continuum 
view. 
 4. Finally, it is claimed here that experiences need to be fixed by beliefs. 
Belief is usually understood as a „high-level‟ epistemic feature - a 
representational state or a belief-that in Armstrong‟s terms. This would seem to 
conflict with the claim that experience has aspects which do not depend on 
high-level features. Later, a continuum view of belief is outlined which rests 
well with my several levels of experiential content. This allows low-level, 
sensational experiences to fix certain low-level beliefs („look‟ beliefs, as I call 
them). In the view being presented, just as experience can have varying degrees 
of sophistication, so beliefs can too. So the claim that experiences fix beliefs 
does not conflict with the continuum theory because on this view not all beliefs 
can be characterised in high-level terms. The issue of experience and beliefs is 
dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.  
2.9 The continuum theory  
The continuum theory asserts the following: there are several levels in which 
contentful properties can be presented to experiencing organisms which may, 
in evolutionary terms, be differentially sophisticated. Thus, one can speak of 
high-level descriptive content, which has aspects which can be captured in 
terms of the inferentialist proposal, and low-level sensational content which has 
aspects which cannot be captured in such terms. There are, of course, a range of 
possibilities in between. Consistent with the notion of a continuum, we can also 
speak of sub-descriptive experiential content, which has some representative 
content, but perhaps not enough to qualify as being propositional or theoretical. 
The experience that a dog has of spatial location does not require very 
high-level features, although it still requires some inference if the dog is to 
negotiate and remember this region. By contrast, the experience of a cigar-band 
being spatially located requires yet more high-level conceptual and 
representational features, whereas the experience of a spatially located object 
having a certain relationship to Jones‟s dead body has yet more high-level 
(theoretically informational; propositional linguistic) features and so on.54  
 Moreover, some experiential content exhibit none of these „high-level‟ 
features. Such experiences harness structured sensational features of 
                                                 
54 To push the example I have been using: Holmes‟s dog usually brings rather less in the way of 
inferential sophistication to the visual scene than Watson, who brings rather less 
(inductive/theoretical) input than Holmes. This need not always be the case: if the object 
perceived was a leash or a slipper the dog might make somewhat stronger inferences than either 
Holmes or Watson - i.e., expectations of future behaviour. (My thanks to Roger McCart.)  
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experiential content which have discernible qualitative features, but very little 
else; certainly nothing that can be captured in the high-level terms of the 
inferentialist proposal. The various contents of experience thus occur in degrees 
from highly sophisticated features to very primitive features in something like a 
linear or ordinal sequence. 
 That there can be various degrees of cognitive penetration of the mechanisms 
of inference, background knowledge, theories and language can be plausible 
only if the inferentialist proposal is false. For inferentialism requires that all 
experiential content necessarily has such „high-level‟ influences (in the views 
of some, such influences are necessary and sufficient for experiential content).  
 A graduationist thesis like the one suggested makes evolutionary sense. It 
seems plausible that the detection of some low-level features like colours is 
experientially and perhaps cognitively prior to how such things are expressed in 
the linguistic propositional judgements and prior to how they are developed in 
high-level theories. The former may be possessed by pre-linguistic creatures to 
aid survival; the latter may be a symbolic vehicle employed by cognitively 
sophisticated organisms which have evolved in complex ways and have 
transcended, to some degree, such basic survivalist requirements. Between the 
extremes, mechanisms of inference may be operational in the detection of 
objects, relations and so on, which, although involving inference, may not 
involve high-level concepts and propositional features, and so can‟t be captured 
fully on the inferentialist account.  
 That there can be a graduation of such influences does not rule out the 
intrinsic value of Kant‟s idea that experiences and the mediating function of the 
intellect are typically closely linked; it does rule out the idea that experiences 
must be so mediated. On the continuum theory, some intuitions without 
concepts may well be „blind‟, but whether this is entirely true depends very 
much on one‟s initial focus of interest. The consequences the continuum view 
has for the traditional interpretation of Kant‟s account is outlined in Chapter 6. 
2.10 Other terms and miscellanea 
There are a couple of other words and phrases which should be defined 
precisely. The important terms „inferentialism‟ and „inferentialist‟ are to be 
used synonymously with „the inferentialist proposal‟: the doctrine that all 
experiential content necessarily draws upon high-level influences en bloc. The 
term „inference‟ shall be used to mean the psychological transition between 
high-level psychological states. It is possible on my account for an experience 
to involve inference yet not be explained entirely in the strictly high-level terms 
of the inferentialist proposal. The terms „high-level‟ and „low-level‟ refer, 
respectively, to the features of experience captured entirely in terms of the 
inferentialist proposal and those sensational features that cannot be so captured. 
I shall later be calling beliefs which correspond to such influences on 
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experiences as inferential beliefs and look beliefs respectively. For simplicity, 
visual experiences shall be the main focus, although what will be said about 
these cases should be taken as applying, equally well, to the other senses. Later 
discussion will clarify the issues that these terms raise. 
 Another word about the Inferentialist Proposal: The inferentialist proposal, 
as it is expressed here, is something of a philosophical fiction. No theorist has 
argued explicitly for this view by name, nor has one claimed to have been 
influenced by it. However, to the extent that it has been assumed, it is claimed 
that this position has the character of a myth; a myth which has pervaded 
contemporary thought and which needs to be examined. Later on several views 
on experiential content shall be treated which closely characterise this doctrine. 
All of them need to adopt a more subtle account of experience which sees the 
relation between elements of high-level inference as underpinned by other 
important considerations; namely, the evolutionary and observational 
considerations mentioned.  
 There is one final distinction to mention. It concerns the application of 
concepts to experiences. Since the various high-level features are characterised 
by a sophisticated conceptual ability of some sort, what is needed here is an 
account of conceptual content. The next two sections, accordingly, will deal 
with the nature of concepts. Out of this, the ambiguous nature of concepts is 
outlined. It is suggested that sensational experiences can be „conceptual‟ and 
yet not commit us to the overly sophisticated terms of the inferentialist 
proposal. This is done by turning to a treatment of „concept‟ unavailable on the 
terms of the inferentialist proposal. The claim is that, just as there can be several 
levels of non-exclusive content to experience, so one may speak of several 
distinguishable senses of concept.  
2.11 Descriptive concepts 
What concepts are in this connection is very problematic. We could define a 
concept as „the mode of presentation of a property.‟55 It is a vague definition, 
but I know no better. And it fits the purpose for the inferentialist account. Many 
concepts are usually understood as descriptive modes of presentation of a 
property, and descriptions are high-level epistemic notions. The definition is 
somewhat Fregean, so we can use a somewhat Fregean example. „Temperature‟ 
and „Mean Molecular Kinetic Energy‟ (MMKE) are presentations of the same 
property; however, they are described in a different way, and so thereby 
constitute different representations. By „Temperature‟ we employ a different 
epistemic/semantic description from „MMKE‟. The concepts are different 
because the descriptive mode is different, but in this case the reference or 
property represented is the same. And we fix our beliefs about these concepts 
                                                 
55 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 89. 
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partly through their location in the descriptive/theoretical net. The property in 
this case is subsumed under certain high-level descriptions which fit our 
broad-based theories about how we represent the world, and this descriptive 
mode amounts to the concepts, respectively, of „Temperature‟ or „MMKE‟ 
depending on the degree to which we understand and apply theoretical physics. 
Such concepts are descriptive concepts as they put a label on certain properties 
via the possession of certain theories. Descriptive concepts are properties 
subsumed under theories.  
 This account of the nature of concepts is plausible, and it fits with the 
inferentialist account of how concepts are needed in fixing experiences. 
Because experiencing the world amounts to the detection and identification of 
certain properties, it is clear that such properties are also described; our 
experiences are usually of something. Holmes‟s experience was of the 
cigar-band next to Jones‟s body. Moreover, experiences need descriptive 
concepts in this sense, if they are to fit with our theories, and Sherlock Holmes 
is an expert in manipulating such concepts precisely because he is a good 
theorist. Theoretical, propositional and epistemic factors, it seems, hang 
together with an essentially descriptive conceptual glue. 
 Having concepts in the descriptive sense means the following: to make 
experiences from observations, we need to describe a presented property in 
certain informed ways; ways which fit in with our theories and background 
knowledge. Allan Millar has called this „the concept principle.‟ To have an 
experience of a certain type one must possess the concept (so to have an 
experiential belief that one‟s cat is Russian Blue, one must have the concept of 
Russian Blue).56 Properties are thus subsumed under such descriptions: „Mean 
Molecular Kinetic Energy‟ is subsumed under the description it is because of a 
certain knowledge of physics. That this follows is a plausible extension of 
inference from background knowledge as mentioned. However, the claim of the 
inferentialist is not that this is so occasionally: the claim is that all stock 
observations are subsumed under concepts in this manner, even typical sensory 
properties like „green‟ or „blue‟, and subsumption under descriptive concepts 
presupposes the inference from background knowledge, theories and the 
propositional contents of a language. Commenting upon what he sees as the 
heretical idea of the „given‟ in experience, Sellars notes that: 
[E]ven such „simple‟ concepts as those of colour are the fruit of a long 
process of publically reinforced responses to public objects (including 
verbal performances) in public situations. ... instead of coming to have a 
concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have 
the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that 
                                                 
56 Allan Millar, Reasons and Experience, p. 20. 
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sort of thing and cannot account for it. 57  
Inferentialism with a vengeance. But, as it will be clear from the preceding 
discussion, it does not only presuppose a concept; it also tacitly presupposes 
linguistic, propositional and representational judgments. If true, on all levels, 
(even the lowest) there is more to seeing than meets the eye, and that the 
essentials of the observational account are fundamentally flawed. There is no 
form of observational „noticing‟ without the prior application of high-level 
descriptive concepts, background knowledge, representational states, 
propositions and theories.  
 All this fits together very well with the inferentialist package outlined. The 
idea that experiences involve high-level features of various kinds rests rather 
well with an account of concepts as descriptive modes of presentation of 
properties. Just as it was clear that Sherlock Holmes needed to involve some 
epistemic information to have an experience of the cigar-band, (or that he 
needed to token his experience linguistically, or represent it judgementally) it 
also seems clear that these concepts had to identify essentially descriptive 
features. The problem of how to regard concepts on this analysis thus has a 
natural solution: the solution must be that experience requires descriptive 
concepts to fix appropriate perceptual beliefs. So, if one takes on board the 
inferentialist proposal, it is very easy to say here that all experiences involve 
descriptive concepts. Such an account of concepts is grist for the inferentialist‟s 
mill. However, one can say this only on the assumption that concepts can only 
be of a descriptive kind. Query: are there modes of presentation of properties - 
concepts - which are not essentially descriptive in nature? 
2.12 Sensational concepts 
I think there are, and think this helps to have an account of experiential content 
without putting too much stress on propositions, representations, theory, 
knowledge, and high-level inference. Some modes of presentation of properties 
can simply have sensational features - aspects which are not descriptive in 
character and which can‟t be captured in any such high-level terms. Christopher 
Peacocke puts the point thus: „One way to think of the physical property of 
having high temperature is by a mode of presentation we can employ because 
we are capable of having sensations of heat.‟58 It seems plausible to suppose 
that conceptually unsophisticated animals (like rats) can utilise these sorts of 
sensational concepts though (perhaps) not the former descriptive kind. The 
point is that none of the sophisticated high-level concepts seem relevant here, so 
there might be a case for claiming that not all concepts provide grist for the 
                                                 
57 W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p.176. 
58 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 89.  
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inferentialist‟s mill. Some concepts harness sensational aspects of experience, 
not aspects which can be captured by descriptions.  
 This is not to say, of course, that there are only sensational concepts and no 
descriptive ones; it just means that some concepts might be best characterised 
in sensational terms. Just as one does not fully capture the experience of heat by 
describing it in a certain (physical) way, there might be some concepts that 
capture certain ways by which things are felt or sensed, whereas others best 
capture descriptions of things. With some experiences, of course, it might be 
genuinely unclear how they are best characterised (does experiencing 
something spatially located have descriptive representational features or is it 
simply sensational, for instance?)59 However, it is best in an overall sense to 
claim that experiences can have both descriptive and sensational aspects and 
human beings at least can concentrate on one or the other (it is a moot point 
whether animals have descriptive concepts at all because they don‟t make 
linguistic, propositional judgments).60 It is, therefore, not the case that only by 
high-level descriptive concepts can experiences be characterised.  
 This point can be applied to other experiencing creatures. Animals, including 
humans, are presented with features of thermal temperature and wavelengths of 
light; we experience these as contentful heat and colour sensations respectively. 
There are also more sophisticated examples of such modes of presentation, like 
that of shape, the appearance of largeness or smallness in the visual field, or 
length. 61  There are also examples which seem to be both descriptive and 
representational and which also have sensational features. An example might 
be the stereoscopic view of an assemblage of objects vis-á-vis a monoscopic 
view of the same scene.  
 The point is that sensational concepts can isolate features which are not 
descriptive in nature, but are only felt properties. There is some felt sense in 
which the stereo/mono experience changes, just as there is a sense in which 
some experiences, such as colours, have an indescribable look. Such aspects of 
experiences isolate sensed features and, in an important sense, have nothing to 
do with background, high-level beliefs and propositions.  
 It is not the case that such features can’t be described if one focuses on them 
in a certain way (one clearly can); rather, it would seem that there are „aspects‟ 
of such experiences which are not descriptive in the way in which other 
experiences can normally be captured by descriptions, yet these features are 
concept-like. They are concept-like because such experiences are not like 
                                                 
59 As will be argued in Chapter 5, this example is a particular problem case for the congenitally 
blind „seeing‟ with the aid of a tactile vision substitution system.  
60 It is a moot point because though they don‟t have a language, they may have descriptive 
concepts even if they lack one of our ways of giving expression to how they take things to be. 
61 Length would seem to be a clear case of a descriptive capacity, which depends on an 
inferential background. Fodor has supplied an example which makes this seem doubtful. (See 
Chapter 8). 
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James‟s „blooming, buzzing confusion‟; they seem to have an intrinsic 
structure. These features of experience will be called sensational aspects or (to 
change the terminology for variation) primordial contents. Such concepts are 
sensational because they seem to capture essentially „felt‟ aspects of 
experiences; they are primordial because they are concepts which are 
unavailable on the high-level descriptive terms of the inferentialist proposal. 
Because experiences may be fixed by sensational as well as descriptive content, 
we do not need to take on board the inferentialist proposal holus bolus - a better 
strategy is consider better ways of formulating the relation between experience 
and content. To suggest that the only concepts which are relevant to the fixation 
of experiential content are descriptive concepts might already be to beg the 
question in favour of the inferentialist proposal.  
 There is a sense in which the inferentialist proposal does not capture all 
aspects of experience. The various high-level features seem distinguishable. A 
dog‟s experience, for instance, might involve representational factors, but very 
little else; a very low-level experience of a pre-linguistic infant might not 
involve even that. The experience of looking at some objects with one eye, then 
both, may result in the representational features of the experience remaining the 
same but something else about the experience noticeably shifting. Such cases 
are much more ambiguous and unclear than the case of Sherlock Holmes and 
the cigar-band. In the latter case descriptive concepts fixing appropriate 
representational features seem mostly relevant but in the cases just mentioned, 
the experiences are marked by a variety of influences, of greater and lesser 
degrees of sophistication. If the various high-level features can be separated 
from experience there might be a case for claiming that none are necessary and 
sufficient for content, and thus, there may be a case for claiming that they leave 
behind an experiential residue.  
 By joining the account of concepts above with the elaborated taxonomy of 
experiential content, we can say that at some very low-level degree of 
sophistication, some aspects of experiences are just felt, not described and not 
represented; they are conceptualised as „sensed‟ aspects. Such is the case with 
the monocular/binocular visual scene above. There seems to be a qualitative 
feature to such an experience which is not captured on any of the high-level 
terms delineated. Such also might be the case with aspects of the experiences of 
unsophisticated animals and infants. Indeed, that there might be a graduation of 
kinds of ways in which experiential content might be fixed, may give support to 
the continuum view, not to the inferentialist proposal nor the observational 
account. The sense in which we seemed to be faced with a choice between 
either inferential factors and non-inferential factors at the beginning of this 
book, may have been an overly superficial way of looking at the issue of 
experience and content. Once this is admitted, of course, one begins to take 
seriously the continuum account advocated.  
 The continuum account doesn‟t assert that there is no fully-fledged 
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descriptive content brought to bear on experiences. It says that there can be 
aspects of experiences which are not descriptive but sensational. Also, it 
doesn‟t assert that all sensational contents are entirely non-inferential. It 
suggests that some features of such experiences are simply not in this category. 
All the view advanced claims is that there are a number of different ways in 
which differentially sophisticated organisms are presented with properties and a 
number of ways in which such properties are fixed into concepts, and only some 
of those ways have aspects which are properly descriptive or inferential. It is 
claimed here that most of the arguments for the radical inferentialist account do 
not, in effect, rule out the case for the continuum possibility. It is only by the 
latter that we can shorten what we earlier saw Fodor call the „etiological route‟ 
between observation and knowledge. The usual story is put in either/or terms: 
either experiences are made possible by the imposition of high-level features of 
cognition (the inferentialist proposal) or experiences are „built up‟ from 
non-inferential sense data (the observational account). However, I claim this 
kind of dichotomous treatment of the issue is superficial and misleading. 
 A further preliminary point that needs to be made is this: utilising the notion 
of concepts which are not descriptive, only sensational, translates naturally to a 
similar view of beliefs. It is suggested animals and infants might largely fix 
beliefs about some low-level experiences like colours etc., largely through 
concepts of this sensational kind. There are, then, possibly more than two ways 
in which experiences can be said to originate, and more than two ways in which 
experiences are fixed into beliefs: not only through inference from background 
knowledge involving descriptive concepts or through a supposed 
non-inferential direct action on the senses. There may be a middle road here. 
Perhaps some primitive animal or infant-like experiences are underpinned by 
qualitatively different sorts of concepts and different sorts of beliefs - concepts 
and beliefs which have very little to do with high-level linguistic propositional 
and representational judgements but everything to do with sensational 
appearances. Perhaps these concepts and beliefs act as evolutionary constraints 
upon the structure of our experience and high-level concept development, 
learning and so on. If this can be established then perhaps experiences can, after 
all, be said to be observational in some important sense. This will be a welcome 
conclusion. For it seems fairly obvious that experiential concepts are, at some 
level, simply observational and sensational to a degree regardless of what some 
philosophers say. 
2.13 Conclusion 
Three central reasons have been given for reconsidering the claims of the 
inferentialist proposal: 
 (1) High-level features (like linguistic propositional judgements) are not 
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always present in experiences of unsophisticated creatures like animals and 
infants. 
 (2) The terms of the inferentialist proposal can be individuated and separated, 
so there seems to be grounds for considering a more subtle account of the 
relationship between high-level factors and experiential content. 
 (3) Observationally-fixed experiential content would prima facie seem to 
have survival advantages over inferentially-fixed experience. 
 These points raise three key issues: the separability of the features of 
high-level inference; evolutionary considerations; and the matter of the 
rationalist underpinnings of this account of experience and content. Various 
degrees of high-level input have been outlined: linguistic propositional 
judgements, theoretically informational and representational judgements and 
non-representational or impurely sensational aspects. It was claimed that 
because such features can be distinguished, there are grounds for reconsidering 
the terms of the inferentialist proposal.  
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3. Experience and Language 
There is a „linguistic‟ factor in seeing ... Unless there were this linguistic 
element, nothing we ever observed could have relevance for our knowledge. 
We could not speak of significant observations: nothing seen would make 
sense, and microscopy would only be a kind of kaleidoscopy. For what is it 
for things to make sense other than for descriptions of them to be composed 
of meaningful sentences?62 
Language, meaning and experience 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters, the inferentialist proposal and the observational 
account were outlined as rival views of content. A continuum view of content 
was compared with these more traditional views.  
 There was a common theme in these introductory chapters. When 
undertaking both tasks, it was shown how important the imposition of 
high-level features were to an adequate account of experience. As argued, 
unless perceptual experience involved high-level features, the discrimination of 
objects and events in the world would not be possible. It is on this kind of 
argument that the inferentialist proposal relies, and it is enough of an argument 
to cast in doubt any fully observational account. Moreover, it is probably the 
intuitive acceptability of this kind of argument along with the influence of early 
rationalist thought and the unacceptable consequences that the observational 
account has in legitimating positivism, foundationalism and the sense data 
theory, that has made the inferentialist proposal the received dogma in much of 
contemporary thought.  
 There is another reason why the inferentialist proposal has become the 
received dogma. The inferentialist view of content has come about by 
conflating the high-level nature of language with a full and complete 
understanding of experience. This mistake has given the notion of content its 
present epistemic and propositional bias. This has come about because a 
                                                 
62 N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 25. 
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positivist account of observational terms has been unable to offer a fully 
adequate account of how such terms get their meanings. Attempts to suggest a 
better account of the meanings of observational terms has made 
theory-ladenness a necessary condition of meaningful language use. However, 
as an unforeseen consequence of this move, language and theory-ladenness has 
come to be associated with observational experience. This, in turn, has 
amounted to the conflation of high-level descriptions in a language being said 
to capture the nature of observational experience. This move will be criticised 
in this chapter, as it is one of the weak links in the inferentialist‟s position. But 
to make this criticism, it is first necessary to go into the issue of the relation 
between observational and theoretical terms.  
3.2 Observational and theoretical terms 
It is not obvious that our ideas about observational predicates need to be 
revised. It is less clear why theory-ladenness needs to be incorporated in an 
account of the meaning of observational terms. If theory-ladenness is seen to be 
a necessary condition of the use of observational predicates, then the oft-used 
and familiar distinction between observational and theoretical terms would 
seem to collapse. The reason for this is not obvious however, as the differences 
between observational and theoretical terms seem so great: 
 
Prima facie it looks as though there is an important difference between such 
putative O- [observational] terms as „... is warm.‟ and such putative 
T-[theoretical] terms as „... is an electron‟. One can grasp the meaning of „... 
is warm‟ without having to learn any scientific theory and one can apply the 
term on the basis of one‟s perceptual experience with a high degree of 
justified confidence. By contrast, to learn what is meant by „electron‟ one has 
to have at least partial mastery of a complex scientific theory. And 
furthermore, one does not sense the presence of electrons in the way that one 
senses that something is warm. One has to use sophisticated equipment to 
detect the presence of electrons and one‟s judgement that one has detected 
electrons is risky in that it presupposes a host of theoretical assumptions.63 
 
It would also seem that O-terms are semantically and epistemically privileged 
whereas T-terms are not: „... is warm‟ (or, at least, „feels warm‟), can be given 
through ostensive training and in eventually being able to make such 
discriminations one can be said to „know‟ such things through direct 
experience. It is not the case that T-terms can be experienced or learnt in such a 
„direct‟ manner.  
 There are other good reasons to preserve the distinction which would seem 
well-motivated: the meaning of O-terms would presumably remain constant 
through theory change if the two („O‟ and „T‟ terms ) were genuinely 
                                                 
63 W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, p. 22. 
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different.64 Tied to the immediacy of experience, observational terms such as 
„... is warm‟ would remain unaltered even if the composite superstructural 
scaffolding of T-terms surrounding it happened to shift. They could thus have a 
role in adjudicating and resolving clashes of theoretical opinion. This seemed to 
be a safe way of keeping some bedrock of knowledge in the face of the whims 
and fancies displayed in the motions of theoretical progress. Also, the 
separation of the two avoids having to presuppose theoretical assumptions in 
the articulation of observational terms: being supposedly theory-neutral, these 
could be rendered free of such corruptions and, hence, could be the foundation 
for resolving disputes at the higher (theoretical) level. 
 As Newton-Smith notes, the difference here between such terms was 
defended as a „difference in kind and not a difference in degree.‟65 But the 
sharpness of this difference simply did not hold up to close scrutiny: the 
characterisation of an observational term as something which had its meaning 
obtained without the aid of theoretical assumptions amounted to a term which 
could be understood without the aid of technical instruments, but, instead, 
directly in experience. This is far from true, however, as the example of the 
weight of an object makes clear.  
3.3 Problems with the observational account of meanings 
If we say that an object can be determined as having a certain weight, it is 
unclear that this can be said without reference to some scale or other technical 
device. Even if we restrict ourselves to weight as a mere sensation, say, the 
„feel‟ of a heavy pair of boots on our feet, we do not thereby explain the 
meaning of „weight.‟ In fact, we risk, thereby, ruling out as weightless, objects 
which were not felt in this manner, and which we would surely wish to say have 
weight in some important sense. If we thence appeal to that property observed 
through the medium of technical instruments as instead, some general feature of 
the world, we have then no reason not to admit other properties obtained in this 
manner (like „fields‟, „electrons‟, „forces‟, „quarks‟, and so on), which are 
usually deemed „theoretical‟ terms and also mathematical descriptions of them 
(„weight‟ becomes, then: w=mg ). If there is a difference between observational 
and theoretical terms then it is not a difference in kind, because the 
„observational‟ terms collapse ultimately into theoretical ones. 
 The complete rejection of the sharp distinction here, for those that opted for 
its rejection, admitted the idea that all observational terms are theory-laden. If 
observational terms and theoretical terms were not easily separated then it 
would seem that what went for the one, went for the other. Just as „is a quark‟ 
needed a systematic body of theoretical beliefs and generalisations, so did terms 
referring to weight, colour and so on which were usually considered 
                                                 
64 This is what Fodor hints at - see quotation, p. 20.  
65 Newton-Smith, op. cit., p. 23. 
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„observational‟ or „sensory‟, and the dependence on this theoretical 
superstructure was a matter of degree. For instance, a person had to see weight 
as a relatively stable property and not something which didn‟t change 
depending on the colour of the object considered or didn‟t alter in wet weather 
or on certain odd-numbered days of the year. But if this was so, then the closer 
an observational term was to the centre of a theoretical network, the more likely 
it was to change or be revised by a change in theory. 
 The long term implication of observational terms being theory-laden was 
that, all observation reports are revisable, even such banal reports as: „the 
counter now reads 4‟; and, being revisable, more likely than not there was a 
case for thinking that such observation terms could not be compared with each 
other (the notorious doctrine of „incommensurability‟). Just as such theoretical 
terms as „mass‟ in different theoretical structures did not mean the same thing 
(cf. Newtonian and Einsteinian theory) so too terms like „weight‟ or „the 
counter now reads 4‟ could mean different things in different theoretical 
circumstances. This seems counterintuitive, but is a plausible inference from 
the rejection of positivism and the conflation of observational and theoretical 
terms. 
 But there was another, less intuitive, consequence. Observational reports 
being theory-laden came to mean, for some, that observational experiences 
were so as well. Hence, we have Feyerabend arguing: 
 
The only difference between a blind person and a seeing person consists in 
the fact that the first one uses a different part of a theory (or some of the 
consequences of the theory) as his observation language.66  
 
This sort of move presents inferentialism in a new dress. The theory-ladenness 
of observational terms has come to signify the legitimacy of the idea that there 
is no observational experience outside making high-level theoretically 
informational judgements and propositional linguistic judgements. So, on this 
view, not only is the observational account seen as flawed because it ignores the 
importance of high-level categories in fixing experiential content, it also seems 
that this assumes the essential distinction between observational terms and 
observational experiences where the inferentialist conflates this distinction. The 
rest is recent history. 
 The issue of the rejection of the positivist account of observational terms and 
the consequences this has for an adequate account of experience will be dealt 
with in Chapter 9. For now it should be noted how the inferentialist proposal 
arrives at this view, and how, in the hands of those imbued with the spirit of the 
inferentialist proposal, it can lead to startling consequences. 
                                                 
66 P. K. Feyerabend, „An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience‟, in Realism, 
Rationalism and Scientific Method, Philosophical Papers, Vol.1, p. 33. 
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3.4 Experiences and meanings: the sleight of hand unveiled  
 
The comparative merits the inferentialist proposal had over the observational 
account were presented in an earlier chapter. Now there is an additional claim 
made in support of inferentialism. Not only is some conceptual ability 
necessary for the observational recognition of objects, observational terms also 
require high-level concepts. However, it is here that we have struck a snag. For 
if it is admitted that all observational terms are theoretically laden and if we 
admit that high-level features are important for experiential content, it seems an 
easy move from this to saying that all observational experiences are 
theoretically laden, and this seems nothing short of a fallacy. It also leaves us 
with the kind of counterintuitive remark that Feyerabend makes about the 
sighted and the blind.  
 This move is clearly far too swift. The idea that the language of observational 
reports should be theoretically imbued is explicitly tied to experiences 
themselves being theoretically imbued and vice versa. But surely there is some 
confusion here: observational language is not observational experience, just as 
the token expression of a pain („pain‟) is not a pain. Whether observational 
terms are theory-laden or not seems a shortfall from the claim that observational 
experiences are so as well. Experiences are not meanings.  
 There do, in fact, seem to be several ambiguities concerning the 
theory-ladenness thesis in relation to experience and observational terms. This 
may explain some of the confusion. On the one hand, the theory-ladenness 
thesis seems to say that one sees only what one has theoretically structured 
linguistic concepts for. On the other hand, it seems to say that one can only see 
what one expects to see as determined by one‟s background theory. (The 
Feyerabend quote above seems [literally!] to imply this second interpretation). 
But clearly, the theory-ladenness of observational terms, at best, only implies 
the first application to experiences, not necessarily the second. The second 
application seems to require much stronger argument. (This seems to require 
that language, in some sense, precedes or occurs concurrently with content.) A 
second ambiguity here concerns the assumed equivalence between the meaning 
of observational terms and the experiences that such terms stand for. Given the 
several levels of ambiguity, what can be legitimately asserted from all this? 
 The point of any conflation between experience and the theory-ladenness of 
observational terms has a simple explanation. In order to communicate about 
anything one needs to have a basis of recognition; for example, the scientist 
experimenting with electrical currents will recognise aspects of phenomena 
which the non-expert does not. The recognition amounts to the phenomena 
having a recognisable meaning for the scientist and not the non-scientist. 
„Having a recognisable meaning‟ in part, of course, requires sharing the same 
theory. (For a scientist who knows about theories of electricity, certain 
experiences will mean more.) Thus, all significant experiences must have a 
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theoretically-imbued meaning to be experiences for us. So, language, or at least 
meaning, is crucially involved in having experiences. H. I. Brown has argued 
this point by drawing an analogy with reading a text: 
 
[We must] recall that we are concerned with perception as a source of 
information: whatever it is that we „really see‟ when we are reading, it is only 
the meaning of what we see that can become part of our knowledge, just as 
when I observe familiar objects or laboratory phenomena it is only the 
meaning of these objects that is relevant to what we know. If there are bare, 
meaningless data, the very fact that they are meaningless makes them 
non-significant and irrelevant to knowledge.67 
 
As a claim that experiences can be meaningful, this seems fairly 
uncontroversial and uninteresting. However, this claim can be read in another 
way; namely, that experiences are like meanings in some sense. And this seems 
rather less than obvious. Here Brown could be interpreted as making the 
stronger claim - ruling as „non-significant‟ any experience which is not 
meaning-like. Read in this way it is a very odd argument indeed. Would the 
experience of „red‟ be significant or non-significant on Brown‟s view? It would 
seem that he must be committed to saying that it was non-significant, a view 
which seems rather paradoxical. For, why is the term of significance here the 
high-level factor of meaning? When animals and infants experience colours 
isn‟t their experience significant in some sense even though they have no 
facility with language? If not, it would make animals and infants experientially 
in vacuo. Yet this seems far from obvious; it seems indeed to be an argument for 
some kind of linguistic chauvinism. The extent of this chauvinism and its 
implications for animal experiences will be outlined in Chapter 7. 
 The point here is not that Brown is committed to a view like this, but simply 
that given the multiple levels of ambiguity concerning the theory-dependence 
of observational terms, the claim could be read in this way. It could be read in a 
way which legitimated a very strong sense in which features of high-level 
inference are necessary for experiential content. It could, for instance, be read in 
a way which stipulated perception as being propositional in some way which 
was language-like. (Such a view seems to lie behind Hanson‟s remarks at the 
beginning of this chapter and Feyerabend‟s comment cited earlier.) My point is 
that, given the levels of ambiguity, it is easy to fall into the trap of the 
inferentialist proposal, and assert that observational experiences, not just 
observational terms, need to be invested with high-level features such as 
propositions, representations, theory and background knowledge.  
 There is, of course, a historical reason for meanings, language and 
theory-ladenness having been tied up with experience, and it has largely been 
due to a subtle but pervasive confusion. The historical reason is as much a 
                                                 
67 H. I. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment, pp. 88-9.  
   77 
contributing factor to the inferentialist proposal as the rampant rationalism 
discussed in Chapter 1. (I owe some of the following points to G. J. O‟Brien.) 
 When W. V. O. Quine was busy attacking the positivist movement earlier this 
century, he was attacking the idea of the „building block‟ approach to 
semantics, where „simples‟, expressions which denoted facts, could be piled up 
on top of one another to yield meaningful sentences. On some views of science, 
these statements could be independently verified by virtue of their empirical 
atomic structure. Quine claimed that this was the wrong sort of picture: the unit 
of meaning of science, particularly, was a holistic network where observational 
terms „face[d] the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a 
corporate body.‟ 68  In this case, the theoretical/observational distinction in 
language was an elastic distinction, and, like every other facet of language, 
amenable to large-scale review and adjustments to the overall network of 
scientific discourse. Observational and theoretical terms were properly 
distinctions of „degree‟ in having a certain proximity in the network, either 
closer to, or farther from the outer sensory field. The important thing to note is 
that here the theoretical-observation distinction was a feature of language and 
was not confused with experience. Unfortunately, however, the important 
innovation of meaning holism did not stop there. 
3.5 The conflation of experience and high-level descriptions  
 
This view of theoretical and observational terms and experience was not the 
same in Hanson‟s work some time later. The issue of observational terms in 
language clearly became conflated with observational experience: 
 
Our visual sensations may be „set‟ by language forms; how else could they be 
appreciated in terms of what we know? Until they are so appreciated they do 
not constitute observation: they are more like the buzzing confusion of 
fainting or the vacant vista of aimless staring through a railway window. 
Knowledge of the world is not a montage of sticks, stones, colour patches and 
noises but a system of propositions.69  
 
Language, on this view, was the bearer of content; it became a necessary and 
sufficient condition for observational experience. The observational situation 
doesn‟t bring about experiences unless „set‟ by language. Paul Churchland has 
a similar view when he says that our experiences, our „perceptual judgments‟, 
are structured and organised by an underlying conceptual framework given by a 
language; a framework rooted:  
 
... not in the nature of the perceptual environment ... but rather in the structure 
                                                 
68 W. V. O. Quine, „Two Dogmas of Empiricism,‟ in From a Logical Point of View, p. 41. 
69 N. R. Hanson, op. cit., p. 26. 
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and content of our common language, and in the process by which each child 
acquires the normal use of that language.70  
 
A significant move has been made here and might easily go unnoticed. The 
holism thesis, with very little pushing, tells two very different stories. The idea 
that the systems of beliefs that a person holds might be expressed in the 
statements of a language lying at remote distances on „an infinite connected 
graph‟71 is one thing. The idea that these statements can simultaneously be 
construed as the (now familiar) idea that each location or „node‟ on the graph 
corresponds to „the entailments of [a] theory [and the] semantically significant 
relations that hold among its theorems; inferential relations, evidence relations, 
and so forth‟72 is quite another. However, the upshot of this view is that since 
experiences are fixed into beliefs by theory and so on, experiences are 
inexorably theoretical and not observational. Experience, in Hanson‟s, 
Feyerabend‟s and Churchland‟s view, is importantly holistic in this second, 
stronger sense: to be actually bound up, without residue, with the nature of our 
linguistic descriptions and the conceptual and theoretical network that contains 
such descriptions. Once this move is made, it is a relatively easy jump from this 
inferentialist construal of the situation, to the following more typical 
consequences that are often said to hold between observational terms, the 
underlying framework of such terms and observational experiences: 
 
Meaningful observational terms, therefore, will always be embedded within 
some set of assumptions. And ... those assumptions will always be 
speculative and corrigible. Meaningful observational terms, we seem bound 
to conclude, will always be laden with theory.73 
 
[T]he meaning of the relevant observation terms has nothing to do with the 
intrinsic qualitative identity of whatever sensations just happen to prompt 
their non-inferential application in singular empirical judgements. Rather, 
their position in semantic space appears to be determined by the network of 
sentences containing them accepted by the speakers who use them.74 
[T]he view that the meaning of our common observation terms is given in, or 
determined by, sensation must be rejected outright, and ... we are left with 
networks of belief as bearers or determinants of understanding.75 
 
The „ineffable‟ pink of one‟s current visual sensation may be richly and 
precisely expressible as a „95Hz/80Hz/80Hz chord‟ in the relevant triune 
cortical system...This more penetrating conceptual framework may even 
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72 Loc. cit. 
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74 P.M. Churchland, op. cit., (1979) pp. 11-12. 
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displace the common sense framework as the vehicle of intersubjective 
description and spontaneous introspection. Just as a musician can learn to 
recognize the constitution of heard musical chords, after internalizing the 
general theory of their internal structure, so we may learn to recognize, 
introspectively, the n - dimensional constitution of our subjective sensory 
qualia, after having internalized the general theory of their internal 
structure.76 
The emphasis does not really need to be spelt out: the examples here show how 
quickly and easily features of high-level inference have percolated through 
perceptual content. The quotations above begin with an innocent enough claim 
about the theory-ladenness of observational terms and then go on to reject 
sensation as being the bearer of semantic content. With sensations „rejected 
outright‟, however, the claims then move from the idea that networks of beliefs 
(as expressed in sentences) are the bearers of understanding, to the suggestion 
that sensations themselves are replaceable by internalising new belief networks 
or theories. Observational experience is thereby replaced with descriptions in 
the context of high-level beliefs, theories and language. The astounding claim is 
made here that because sensations do not bear on content at all, a common sense 
language of sensational content can be replaced by a better theoretical basis. 
Both language and sensations are thereby seen as replaceable by better 
descriptions. But this is not an isolated view: Hanson, Churchland and 
Feyerabend are not alone in making this philosophical sleight of hand; Sellars is 
in this camp too, as previous passages quoted have shown. And there are many 
others.  
 The turning point for this sleight of hand seems to be the factor of language, 
but once this has been embraced, other high-level features - theoretically 
informational judgements, descriptive concepts, etc. - follow. The flaw here is 
that once sensations are seen as being linked with high-level features, such as 
theories and language, and if theories and language are taken to be holistic and 
not immune from revision, the next step is to see sensational experiences 
themselves as theoretical and revisable. This move naturally leads down the 
slippery slope of eliminative materialism and to the rejection of the view that 
there is any content to sensory experiences at all.  
 The implications of such passages should be noted: it must be remembered 
that descriptive concepts which are expressed in the propositional content of a 
language are a crucial feature of one important and influential approach to the 
fixation of experiential content. Such passages then not only belie a confused 
connection between language, experience and meanings, they also 
wholeheartedly embrace the tenets of the inferentialist proposal. And, if the 
inferentialist proposal is true then animals and infants are experientially in 
vacuo and experiences cannot be fixed observationally. Instead, experiences 
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necessarily require the input of high-level features. These points were 
mentioned earlier. The suggestion now is that the collapsing of the 
theory-dependence of language with the theory-dependence of experience is 
rather less than satisfactory, if it is meant to be a justification of this position. It 
seems, instead, a rather simple and obvious philosophical error. What has 
happened here is that various philosophers have confused the point that 
high-level features (such as language) are important for experiences at one 
level, with the inferentialist‟s stress that high-level features generally are both 
necessary and sufficient for any kind of content at all. However, in view of what 
has already been said in support of a continuum account of content, this seems 
to be a very unconvincing move. What seems to have gone unnoticed here is 
that (i) experiences are not exclusively language-like, and (ii) though important 
for experience, high-level features generally are not thereby necessary and 
sufficient for content.  
 Consideration of cognitively unsophisticated animal and infant experience is 
surely enough to question the conflation of language and experience, thereby 
undermining the inferentialist proposal. Consideration of low-level content is 
enough to challenge the idea that all experiences are high-level. Neglecting 
point (i) above would be to commit oneself to something like a Kantian account 
of content (and a Cartesian view of animals); neglecting (ii) would be to go 
some way towards supporting an eliminativist thesis which seems prima facie 
untenable. Both of the above points need to be considered in any adequate 
account of experience. The inferentialist proposal, it seems, has neglected both 
of them with its conflation of language and observational experience, and 
therefore, needs serious revision. 
3.6 Consequences of the inferentialist proposal 
The subtle confusion between the theory-dependence of observational terms 
and the theory-dependence of observational experience has been outlined. It has 
also shown how this confusion lends superficial support for the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal. However, adopting this move uncritically leads to 
counterintuitive outcomes. One of the outcomes is that animals and infants have 
to be seen as creatures without experiences (rationalism); another is that since 
experiences are seen as being language-like, they are also seen to be replaceable 
by better descriptions of content (eliminativism). Conflating language and 
experience is clearly a move that has considerable ramifications.  
 This whole story has major ramifications for the distinction between theory 
and observation, and its bearing on experiential content. For if the view that no 
theoretical description of experience is immune from revision is bound up with 
the view that experience has no content outside the internalisation of theories, 
then „the speculative tail can wag the ... observational dog.‟77 A change in 
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theory ultimately translates into a change in experience and there can be better 
theories about experiential content and also worse ones. No fixed points of 
revisability means, in effect, no qualitative, non-theoretical content. In other 
words, the observational dog has been lost to its theoretical tail. A better 
metaphor for this, perhaps, is Campbell‟s „great Gippsland worm, with head 
and tail merging in one continuous, homogeneous structure.‟78  
As stressed before, the inferentialist proposal is not entirely faulty. Some of it 
is substantially correct. The meanings of our observational terms are inferential 
in the required sense, because „meaning‟ is, inevitably (even trivially) 
propositional in form. However, it doesn‟t follow that perceptual experiences 
are entirely inferential or propositional and necessarily involve „high-level‟ 
considerations. There are plausible reasons for being cautious here. The 
taxonomy of experiential content offered in the previous chapter suggests that 
these influences can actually be separated. Propositional content can be 
disjoined from representational content and sensational content can be 
separated from other high-level features. The intuition that experiential content 
is observationally fixed is, in a way, legitimised. Observational content, in my 
view, is importantly sui generis to high-level inferential content in some sense. 
Moreover, this has major ramifications for one‟s philosophy of mind and 
perception, leading us from the inferentialist proposal to a continuum view of 
content.  
 It seems that we must say this because the inferentialist proposal leads us 
inevitably to absurd conclusions. From the above brief analysis, it is clear that 
the relationship between experience and high-level factors has become what 
might be called inferential linguisticism: the doctrine that experience is 
dependent on a theoretical background of language. This, as we have 
previously seen, is part of the high-level content and a mainstay of the 
inferentialist proposal. It is also clear that this view cannot be true, if it is 
considered in relation to the experiences of animals, pre-linguistic children and 
us, when we undergo certain low-level experiences. (In what sense, after all, 
does the experience of one object being next to another require language?) It 
does not seem that theoretically informational or propositional, linguistic 
judgments have much to do with experiences in such cases, though they seem 
experiences with content nonetheless. The fully inferentialist story in such 
cases seems simply wrong.  
 An alternative picture is far more plausible. To remove the absurdities from 
this view that high-level features, such as language, are necessary for 
experiential content, something like a phylogenetic argument must be made. 
This appeal places experiential content of all creatures along an evolutionary 
continuum, and claims that the various high-level factors influence experiential 
content to various degrees. An argument against the thrust of the inferentialist 
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proposal in relation to animal experiences has been recently expressed by 
Mortensen and Nerlich: 
 
[I]t is very hard to believe that a sensory experience amounts in the end to 
something whose information content is wholly verbalisable. For one thing, it 
makes it difficult to explain how homo sapiens is an evolved creature. Dumb 
animals, from which we are descended, are known to have similar 
sensory-processing apparatus to ourselves, certainly at the cortical level.79  
 
Reasons why the sensory is „radically unlike the verbal‟ will be looked at in 
later chapters. Cases where the sensory is unlike the other features of high-level 
content will be examined as well. My claim will be that engaging the 
importance of evolutionary considerations in this context is a necessary way of 
keeping the relationship between high-level considerations and experiential 
content in some sort of perspective. 
 The inferentialist proposal is underpinned by the assumption that the 
imposition of features of high-level inference is more important to experience 
than the qualitative content of sensation. This certainly explains the impetus 
behind the philosophical sleight of hand outlined - a kind of rationalism is once 
again rife in contemporary circles. Moreover, if the historical characterisation 
of experience and language mentioned is a correct one, then it also explains 
why the collapsing of theoretical and observational terms simultaneously 
effected a collapse between observational terms and observational experience, 
and why the latter fell noiselessly under the aegis of theories, propositional 
contents and background knowledge along with its semantic counterpart. Yet 
this seems too quick a move. I am not alone in thinking that there has been an 
unfortunate sleight of hand here:  
 
The result of this conflation of language and experience is that any attempt to 
distinguish between observational and theoretical language, on the one hand, 
and observational language and experience, on the other, is caught in a 
vicious circle: because all language is saturated with theory, then 
observational language will always be theory-laden, (from Quine); and 
because observational language is always theory-laden, all observational 
experience will also be dependent on theory (from Hanson and Churchland). 
The circle is complete when we note that because all observational 
experience is theory-laden, then any language we use to describe that 
experience will also inexorably be imbued with theory. There is not much 
solace here for the apologist of theory-neutral observational experience, let 
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alone theory-neutral observation language.80 
 
Regardless of the historical reasons for the move, and whether or not the 
position admits of a vicious explanatory circle, the general malaise described 
here is close to the heart of contemporary philosophy and it needs to be 
remedied. As O‟Brien notes, it is not just a problem of separating 
theory-ladenness from observational language, but language and 
theory-ladenness from observational experience. Paul Feyerabend‟s comments 
demonstrate a rather nasty instance of the affliction outlined: 
 
Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions and not before them, 
and an experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) 
a theory without experience: eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a 
sensing subject and you have a person who is completely disorientated and 
incapable of carrying out the simplest action.81  
 
There is clearly something wrong here for essentially simpler reasons: theories, 
concepts, language and their descriptive ilk have been irrevocably bound up as 
necessary requirements for sensing subjects, and the idea of any reasonable 
conception of a sensing subject is claimed to be quite „incomprehensible‟ 
without such high-level mediations. However, would the removal of theoretical 
knowledge from a dog entail that the animal is entirely incapable of 
experiencing the world? Hardly. It seems easy to grant that dogs don‟t have 
theories about the world in any precise sense agreeable to inferential 
linguisticism; dogs do not (plausibly) make theoretically informational, nor 
linguistically propositional judgments. But it seems simply bizarre to suggest 
that they can‟t have contentful experiences because they have no such features. 
Reductio ad absurdum. This must mean that the inferentialist proposal needs to 
be substantially revised or reformed: contentful observational experience is 
importantly different to theories, concepts and language in some important 
sense. It is just that the important sense in which it is different seems 
unavailable on the terms of the inferentialist proposal.  
 It is clear what has happened here: the collapsing of the theory-dependence of 
observational terms to the theory-dependence of observational experience has 
simultaneously collapsed the quite legitimate separability between the various 
elements of high-level inference. As we saw earlier, however, propositional 
content could be understood independently of language as representational 
judgments. And, inference could be understood independently of the influence 
of sophisticated background knowledge. Here, however, the sense in which 
experience needs high-level features, has been confused with the necessity of 
such features for the intelligibility of language. This innocent „carry over‟ has 
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thus left contentful observational experience being defined by such features and 
no other. Experience has thus come to be seen in terms of both linguistic, 
propositional and theoretically informational judgments. It is this which has 
engaged us to consider the absurd situation in which some creatures who do not 
have language do not have experiences, or that blind people are deficient only 
in respect of not using a certain part of an observation language, or that the idea 
of a „sensing subject‟ without theory is „incomprehensible.‟  
 An overly sophisticated account of experiential content is as much a mistake 
as using language as the sole arbiter of beliefs. The strategy best adopted is to 
take a levels-of-content approach and to treat the importance of high-level 
features in decreasing orders of magnitude from sophisticated to very primitive 
experiences. In relation to primitive experiences, instead of arguing that all 
experience is vitally underpinned by high-level considerations, one can argue 
that only some experiences are. Experience can have a sensational aspect; 
which, far from being „bare and meaningless and irrelevant to knowledge‟82 is 
in some sense still crucial for it. There may be aspects of experiences which are 
informationally significant, regardless of the input of high-level inferential 
factors and this need not amount to reinforcing foundationalism (see Chapter 10 
for this). Instead of following this sleight of hand mentioned, I shall be drawing 
on the suggestive remark made by Armstrong mentioned in Chapter 1 and 
developed in Chapter 2. Again, the aim is not to rule out the importance of 
inference at a sufficiently high-level, but instead to suggest that features of 
high-level embeddedness is not the only, nor prime, consideration.  
 Ultimately, we want not a dog being wagged by its tail, or a great Gippsland 
worm, but a picture in which both high-level theory and structured, low-level 
observational experiences feature as mutually reinforcing elements of a larger 
story. And this larger story must be the nature of mental content. Because such 
contents are importantly conscious and sensational, we will, inevitably, be 
broaching property dualism. I want to consider a form of property dualism on 
these grounds as still being a serious and workable option. It is claimed here 
there must be some kind of felt properties to certain sensational experiences 
because not all content can be fixed exclusively by high-level influences such 
as language, representational descriptive content and theories. Some of what 
will be said later will, therefore, be relevant to the „qualia‟ issue in the 
philosophy of mind. Detailed consideration of such matters will be deferred 
until Part IV. 
3.7 The causal, sensory and epistemic orders 
Isolating a sleight of hand in the terms of the inferentialist proposal has 
displayed a confusion between high-level influences and low-level content. 
This confusion has lead to a seriously misleading characterisation of 
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experience.  
 An important result of this is a loss of the distinction between the causal 
origins of experience and the sensory and epistemic outcomes that experiences 
bring. These distinctive features shall be called the causal, sensory and 
epistemic orders. The causal order is simply the stimulus inputs on the sense 
organs, the sensory order is the level at which experiences are sensed or felt, the 
epistemic order is the level at which experience can yield sophisticated reliable 
or unreliable knowledge. On the continuum view of content all these orders are 
central to capturing the nature of contentful experiences.  
 Each complex human experience participates in these orders to a greater or 
lesser extent. However, the low-level experience of evolutionarily primitive 
creatures may participate in only the causal (or causal and sensory) orders. It is 
a plausible point that while conceptually unsophisticated creatures participate 
in the causal order and by and large receive similar perceptual inputs to that of 
more sophisticated creatures, it is nonetheless clear that how that information is 
used is very different. Very sophisticated creatures use sensory information to 
build large-scale conceptual models of the universe; very unsophisticated 
creatures do not. (In the simplest case, such information only achieves reactive 
behavioural responses in such creatures.) The problem with accounts of 
experience and content which ignore such differences is that perceptual data is 
seen predominantly in terms of the construction of meaning and „significance‟ 
in the acquisition of knowledge but not in other terms. Content is thus seen only 
in terms of its epistemic function, not in terms of its causal function or sensory 
function. The inferentialist proposal has tended to ignore the importance of all 
but the epistemic order.  
 Hanson‟s passage at the beginning of this chapter associates „meaningful‟ 
seeing with the formation of sentences in describing the world and gaining 
knowledge; Brown‟s passage associates perception simply with epistemic 
significance; Churchland‟s and Feyerabend‟s words suggest that perceptual 
data are strongly associated with the structure of language and theories. It goes 
unstated here the extent to which experiences arise concurrently as causes and, 
particularly, as sensations.  
 In inferentialist treatments of content what is generally stressed is only one of 
the functions of perceptual data in an organism‟s interaction with the world; 
hence the preoccupation with language, belief networks and theories. But, there 
is, of course, an obvious causal role of perception too: the raw „nerve 
impingings‟ as Quine might have it. It is not being suggested here that any of 
the inferentialist theorists that have been mentioned lose sight of this feature, 
only that, by adopting the inferentialist proposal, they are in danger of belittling 
or ignoring its importance.  
 Another more crucial consequence of an inferentialist treatment of content is 
that it ignores the sensory order altogether. At its most extreme, this attitude 
results in the view that because content does not play a sophisticated epistemic 
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role in animal and infant cognition, it does not thereby play a role in the overall 
economy of their experiential states either. This move would be to ignore the 
point made by Armstrong that even though high-level epistemic notions like 
belief are inappropriately applied to such creatures, there is no reason to 
suppose that they are thereby inferior in some sense (Armstrong‟s continuum 
metaphor is apposite here). Descartes‟ views about animals are, of course, an 
extreme example of this tendency, but so are some of the views of some 
contemporary materialist theorists.  
 However, the sensory order has an important selective function and should be 
included in any account of experience and content. The distinction between the 
various orders of content (causal, sensory and epistemic) parallels the 
distinction made earlier between proximal stimulations (which are 
psychologically non-inferential), low-level sensations (qualitative and partially 
inferential) and descriptive content (strongly inferential). 
 There is a clear need for an alternative to the observational account and the 
inferentialist proposal. The observational account was deficient by ignoring the 
important point that experiences have to be organised in some sense involving 
inference. The inferentialist proposal, by contrast, seemed to take the 
importance of high-level factors to the point of overkill. These features are 
over-emphasised and stressed to the extent that intuitions snap: that there are no 
sensing subjects without theory; that the blind are deficient only in respect of an 
observation language; that animals are experientially in vacuo. As mentioned, 
the reason for such claims is possibly historical, involving the rationalist legacy 
of Kant and Descartes, and the move to conflate observational language with 
observational experience. 
 What we have seen in this chapter is the end result of this philosophical slip: 
the holism thesis applied to observational terms has come to help situate 
experiential content in terms captured by linguistic propositional and 
theoretically informational judgments. If what has been argued so far is 
plausible, then this move is misplaced and there may be more to experiential 
content than what the inferentialist account stipulates.  
3.8 Conclusion 
Two major claims have been made in this and the previous chapters: 
 1. It has been argued that the inferentialist proposal rests on a rather confused 
and misleading connection between the theory-ladenness of observational 
terms and the theory-ladenness of observational experience. The effect of this 
confusion has not been insubstantial, tying meanings and language up with 
experiential content. The counter-intuitive consequences of such a confusion 
were obvious, and arguments were presented against this view. It has also been 
argued (in Chapter 1) that the view has historical roots going back to early 
rationalism - at least to the views of Descartes and Kant. This influence has 
been instrumental in making content attributions only along sophisticated, 
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„high-level‟ criteria. In each case, these supports are of no real comfort for the 
inferentialist proposal even though they have been of major importance in 
keeping the inferentialist myth going. 
 2. The inferentialist proposal is not the only account in which high-level 
considerations are said to influence the content of experience. Another account 
is the continuum view, which holds a substantially weaker claim: that 
experiential content can be characterised by such high-level features only to 
varying degrees. The continuum theory makes up for both the deficiencies of 
the observational account and the excesses of the inferentialist proposal. More 
supports for adopting this approach are developed in the subsequent chapter 
where the relation between belief and experiential content is discussed in detail.
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4. Experience and Belief 
Whenever we talk about perceiving things in our environment or talk about 
perceiving features of things, we can also talk of acquiring knowledge of 
particular facts about these things.83 
 
Total ignorance is not a sufficient condition for total blindness.84 
 
Epistemic and non-epistemic seeing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The role of beliefs in the content of experience will now be discussed. I will 
attempt to do two things: (i) rule as inadequate an account of experience in 
terms of the belief content of representational judgements; and (ii) show that 
even the notion of a belief can be understood in graduationist terms. By giving a 
fairly precise account of the relationship between belief and experience, it will 
be argued that the most plausible way beliefs influence experiential content is in 
the manner the continuum account specifies.  
4.2 Belief fixation and experience 
Experiences amount to being mental states of some complex kind. This can 
clearly be understood in a number of ways. A continuum approach has been 
advanced in which the content of experiences can be said to be states fixed by a 
number of variously sophisticated and non-exclusive means. The usual 
approach to this issue, however, has been in terms of a choice between two rival 
accounts which disagree over one main feature which is said to be central to 
experiential states. The feature which divides the two views is the role of 
beliefs:  
 
The [rivalling] accounts may conveniently ... be labelled respectively as 
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„epistemic‟ and „non-epistemic‟. The former attempts to analyse seeing (or 
perception generally) in terms of belief (or knowledge) or the acquisition of 
beliefs. According to it, an analysis of seeing things or events necessarily 
involves reference to believing-that, or to seeing-that, which, in turn is 
analysed, partially at least, in terms of believing-that. It is not held, generally, 
that seeing-that can occur without seeing things or events; but it is held that 
the former notion is the fundamental one. One, but not the only, impetus to 
developing this kind of theory is the wish to avoid ... the admission of items 
(sense-data, etc.) that ... are not physical or public items but are nevertheless 
„perceived‟ or „sensed‟ when we perceive physical things and events. 
 
The opposing account holds that there is some basic seeing ... that is 
„non-epistemic‟, i.e., does not necessarily involve acquisition of beliefs (or 
knowledge) and can be adequately analysed without reference to the concept 
of a belief at all. On this view, although someone who sees a thing or event 
may also in fact see-that something, and so acquire some belief, the notion of 
seeing-that must be analysed by reference to the more basic and 
non-epistemic notion, seeing.85 
 
We saw in Chapter 1 that experiences are importantly connected to the notion of 
a belief. Beliefs were shown to be connected to „high-level‟ abilities - to know 
and describe features of the world; specifically, to form various kinds of 
representational judgements. Given that experiences are always 
underdetermined by sensory arrays, background beliefs help sort out perceptual 
data in a meaningful form. In this chapter the „epistemic‟ account of perception 
will be compared to Dretske‟s view which allegedly eschews the emphasis on 
beliefs altogether. Jackson‟s contribution to this issue will also be looked at in 
this context. The claim shall be that the epistemic and non-epistemic accounts 
capture features of certain kinds of experiences, and that it is better to combine 
their insights in graduationist terms rather than treat them as rivals. The notion 
of a belief in the „high-level‟ representational sense - believing-that - receives 
some modification in the discussion that follows.  
4.3 Epistemic seeing: Armstrong’s case 
The „epistemic‟ view will be recalled as Armstrong‟s belief-based account, 
which was outlined briefly in Chapter 1. Armstrong has described the essentials 
of his „epistemic‟ approach to perception as „the acquiring of true or false 
information.‟86 For him, this information amounts to propositional states of a 
non-linguistic kind which are also belief states of some kinds, which may be 
either true or false. Armstrong‟s sense of „proposition‟ has been defined in 
terms of representational judgements. Beliefs are obviously important in this 
context, for, as has been argued on behalf of the inferentialist proposal, 
experiences fix beliefs of certain kinds. The content of Sherlock Holmes‟s 
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experience of the cigar-band and Jones‟s body, was epistemic in an important 
sense because Holmes could perceptually discriminate objects of knowledge: a 
cigar-band, a dead body, objects in certain relationships, and so on. One could 
also mount a case, as Armstrong does, for saying that experiences have 
propositional features. The epistemic and propositional features are two of the 
important „high-level‟ influences on experiences.  
 On Armstrong‟s account, experiences involve either beliefs about „the 
current state of our body and environment‟87 or an inference from one‟s current 
belief and background knowledge: „I acquire the belief that there is a certain 
muddy pattern of marks on the floor now, and this causes me to acquire the 
further belief that somebody came in with muddy boots last night.‟ 88 
Information acquisition by means of belief content is information by means of 
possession of prior concepts: experiences-that something is the case always 
presupposes concepts of some sort, even if, on Armstrong‟s view, some 
concepts are „subverbal‟ and „perceptual‟ as would be the case with animal 
experiences.89  
 On the face of it, it would seem implausible to argue that all experiences are 
beliefs-that something is the case. Experiencing perceptual illusions (like the 
bent stick illusion) are cases where what is seen is not what is believed. 
However, Armstrong‟s theory offers an account of such experiences too. He 
argues that even if the content of an experience may not correlate with a belief 
that someone holds, it is nonetheless true that there is some informational 
content, some believing-that. A coin may look elliptical from a certain angle, 
for example, even when it is plainly believed to be circular. For Armstrong, this 
would be a case of a „potential‟ belief which is later rejected in the context of 
background knowledge about the laws of perspective. For Armstrong, there is 
no question of complicated proto-mental properties like elliptical sense-data; 
there are only „potential‟ beliefs „which we have some tendency, but no more 
than some tendency, to accept.‟90 Experiential content, on his view, is then only 
properly of a representational nature, and the deliverance of sensory inputs is an 
important, but certainly less significant, part of this procedure of belief-fixation. 
The content of experience is not the input, but the beliefs derived thereby. A 
belief in something illusory is, for Armstrong, still a belief, albeit a „potential‟ 
one. Armstrong‟s account will be considered again after an outline of the 
opposing position. 
 
                                                 
87 Ibid., p. 210. 
88 Loc. cit. 
89 See ibid., pp. 202 and 210; pp. 341-2. That he must hold this is a result of his rejection of the 
language-like account of the propositional content of beliefs. 
90 Ibid., p. 225. 
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4.4 Non-epistemic seeing: Dretske’s case  
The second main account mentioned here, the „non-epistemic‟ account, is 
formulated in reaction to such a view. Although there is some dispute about the 
interpretation of „non-epistemic‟ in this context, this account is best 
exemplified by Dretske‟s work. Dretske rejects the move that identifies seeing 
something to believing that there is something which is seen. On his view, there 
is an important sense in which experiences are not believings. There are at least 
two reasons given for adopting this view. The first is that the relationship 
between believing and seeing is not symmetrical. Believing that something is a 
certain way and not another does not guarantee that experiences which are not 
believings are not seeings: 
 
The fact that we normally do believe something about the things which we 
see in this way is irrelevant. The point I am driving is that our failure to 
believe these things would not, in itself, prevent us from seeing what we see 
in this way. The bewildered savage, transplanted suddenly from his native 
environment to a Manhattan subway station, can witness the arrival of the 
3.45 express as clearly as the bored commuter. Ignorance of X does not 
impair one‟s vision of X; if it did, total ignorance would be largely 
irreparable.91  
 
This kind of argument is not very convincing on its own. It certainly does not 
demonstrate that there are no beliefs or sets of beliefs in such a case. Armstrong, 
of course, can argue that even if the savage were ignorant of features like trains 
in his experience, he would still believe that there was a certain object in his 
experience moving towards him. As his experience has a certain projected 
representational content, it still involves beliefs in Armstrong‟s sense. (There is, 
after all, something that the savage sees.) However, this doesn‟t seem to be 
Dretske‟s point, despite the misleading example. What he seems to be 
suggesting is that there can be certain aspects of an experience which are not 
belief-like in Armstrong‟s sense. The point seems to be that whatever their 
importance, beliefs are not necessary and sufficient for features of experiences 
seeming a certain way.  
 Dretske describes his account as showing that „there is a way of seeing that is 
devoid of positive belief content.‟ 92 By this he means that there is a way of 
seeing in which there is no entailment relation from „S seeing D ‟to S believing 
that there is (was) a D that he saw. What brings out Dretske‟s point most clearly 
is the fact that one can have seen the number of distinct letters on the previous 
page, without entailing that one believed anything specific about those letters: 
 
Now I think that the likelihood is that, if you did read the entire page, you saw 
hundreds of different letters... What, then, are the necessary consequences of 
                                                 
91 Dretske, op. cit., p. 8.  
92 Ibid., p. 12. 
   
  
 
92 
these hundred or so different statements about what you saw? Does each one 
entail that you had a certain belief about the way that letter looked to you? 
During the time that it took you to read the page, did you acquire hundreds of 
distinct beliefs about the assorted letters you saw? Granted, each letter that 
you saw must have looked some way to you, in some sense, but does that 
mean that you had to believe this? Can you remember believing anything of 
the sort?93 
Again, Armstrong could reject such an account on the basis that even in this 
circumstance one at least believes that one is seeing words on a page. So, 
Dretske does not rule out a connection between believing and seeing. However, 
does Dretske establish that believing is not necessary and sufficient for seeing? 
With clarifications, it can be shown that he does.  
 What needs to be clarified is the sense of „belief‟ that Dretske is objecting to 
here. His use of „belief‟ throughout Seeing and Knowing constantly refers to 
believing that one saw something, or that something seemed like that. In view 
of this, it would seem obvious that the focus of attack is belief content of the 
kind the „epistemic‟ account specifies as being crucial to experiences. Dretske 
is reacting to a view of belief as representational judgement; as a belief - that 
something is the case. And a belief-that something is the case, in Armstrongian 
terms, amounts to having representational content. Dretske‟s claim is that some 
experiences can be devoid of a positive belief content of this kind. In this sense, 
of course, the above example shows that one does not necessarily believe 
(represent) anything about each individual letter on the page (one might not 
even notice each individual letter as one reads). There is thus no entailment 
relation between seeing and believing in this case. So, believing-that is not 
necessary and sufficient for all cases of seeing. As shall be shown later, 
however, an important extension of Dretske‟s work would be to take his 
arguments as applying only to this kind of „high-level‟ representational belief, 
but not another kind of „low-level‟ belief. This would effectively make his view 
a partial non-epistemic account in some sense, not a fully non-epistemic 
account. Indeed, this qualification makes his account a far more coherent 
position for other reasons. It will also require us to revise and broaden the terms 
of the dispute beyond that of the „epistemic‟ and „non-epistemic‟ accounts.  
 There may be a further, independent sense in which Dretske‟s claims are 
instructive. At a certain level, it might be that some features of experiences, 
while informational, are not captured by belief states at all. There may be a 
sense in which some experiences are devoid of not only „positive‟ belief 
contents, but any belief content. Some experiences might involve unnoticed 
seeings, but such cases are far from the kinds of sophisticated experiences 
Dretske uses for his examples. Dretske seems to be suggesting that there is no 
necessary and sufficient connection between seeing and believing; his 
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examples show that some experiences have features which need not be believed 
(not that they are not believed at all). Dretske‟s claim, then, is not that there can 
be no beliefs in perception, but that there need not be an entailment from 
perceiving to believing in the „high-level‟ sense of believing: „All I am 
suggesting ... is that the possession of no particular belief, or set of beliefs, 
constitutes a logically indispensable condition for the individual‟s seeing what 
he does.‟94 Elsewhere, he is clear about his aims: 
 
I have not said that S ... can see something without any beliefs; I have only 
said that no particular belief is essential to the seeing. He may have many 
beliefs, and it may be essential (especially in the case of human agents) that 
he have some beliefs in order to qualify for such „mentalistic‟ predicates as 
„sees so-and-so‟. Nonetheless, of no one of those beliefs is it essential that he 
has it.95 
 
For Dretske, possession of high-level representational beliefs are a generally 
necessary condition of being a certain creature which sees, but they are not a 
sufficient condition. To this extent, the label „non-epistemic‟ for Dretske‟s 
position is a misnomer. Dretske‟s position is only non-epistemic if one‟s 
conception of belief is of the kind that Armstrong uses to support his account of 
perception; it might be partially epistemic otherwise. As shall be suggested 
later, there might be a sense of belief in which no particular states, objects or 
events in the world are represented, but which still constitute beliefs of some 
very primitive kind, if only because one must be capable of attending to certain 
qualitative features of an experience, even if there is not a particular thing or 
state of affairs that one is attending to. Specifically, the whole question of the 
relation between belief and experience is a matter of emphasis: there may be a 
number of different levels in which beliefs are involved in experiences, ranging 
from Armstrong‟s representational sense to low-level „look-beliefs‟, which 
have no representational content but which are still belief-like to some degree, 
and also „unnoticed seeings‟ where it makes no sense to speak of them having 
belief content at all. Dretske‟s examples fall into the second category; 
Armstrong‟s examples fall into the first category. Certain other cases which 
shall be mentioned later fall into the third category.  
 Does ignorance about a given perceptual situation still imply „a rudimentary 
... elementary belief ... that something is appearing to us in such-and-such a way 
... or that something looks some way to us[?]‟96 Dretske doesn‟t think so. 
Again, he fully rejects Armstrong‟s strict necessary and sufficient connection 
between representational judging and the having of experiences. He concludes 
from the example given earlier (about seeing letters on a page), that even 
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though seeing something in a certain way does normally issue in a belief that 
there is something that one sees, it need not be „a necessary consequence‟97 of 
all cases of seeing. Hence, some „seeings‟, on his view, have features which are 
genuinely non-representational and are not belief-like in Armstrong‟s sense. 
 The second reason Dretske offers for his position brings out why this might 
be true. Although Dretske is sympathetic with the view that some degree of 
belief content bears on experiences, he does argue that there is no case at all for 
ascribing such contents to all experiencing creatures. The „epistemic‟ account, 
in Dretske‟s view, over-intellectualises the issue in taking all perceptual 
experience to have sophisticated belief contents. I am very sympathetic to this 
kind of claim. Take the case of the experiences of unsophisticated creatures, 
such as insects. It seems hard to believe-that such creatures see (represent) 
particular things. Some simple invertebrates have sensory detectors which are 
responsive merely to patterns of lightness and darkness or certain temperature 
thresholds. 98  Their „experiences‟ seem merely reactive, not instruments to 
convey propositional or representational belief content. Similarly, a treatment 
in terms of „potential‟ beliefs does not capture such examples: such creatures 
don‟t believe anything (even „potentially‟); they just see (lightness and 
darkness) in a certain way. The belief-based account seems far too strong in 
such cases. This, as Dretske notes, is particularly apposite to the experiences of 
unsophisticated creatures like animals and infants:  
 
I would agree ... that whenever it becomes true to say of an infant that it can 
now see its mother, or of a rat that it can see the lever, it also becomes true to 
say of the infant and the rat that they see the mother and the lever as 
something - the mother looks some way to the infant and the lever looks some 
way to the rat. Must the infant believe, however, that something is a dark 
figure on a light background ... or that something looks like a dark figure? 
What must our experimental rat believe about the lever which it sees? I, 
personally, have no idea what the infant or the rat believes, or whether they 
believe anything, but I do think that the sorts of beliefs described [on the 
„epistemic‟ account] imply an unusual degree of sophistication on the part of 
the creatures to whom they are ascribed.99  
 
It would seem from this example that there are some kinds of experiences which 
cannot be captured in representational terms at all. This is most marked in 
creatures which can‟t detect things of the objective world (only say, lightness 
and darkness) but it is also marked in ordinary human experiences. Rubbing 
one‟s eyes gives an experiential content of certain colours, yet it would be a tall 
order to give an account of such an experience as a belief-that something is the 
                                                 
97 Loc. cit.  
98 P. A. Meglitsch, Invertebrate Zoology, p. 653. See also H. S. Jennings: Contributions to the 
Study of the Behaviour of Lower Organisms, passim, especially second paper, pp. 31-71.  
99 Dretske, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
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case, because the experience is neither represented in the world (like a 
cigar-band) nor is it in one‟s head exactly - nor is this content, in any strong 
sense, of information like Armstrong‟s sense of belief. There simply seems to 
be no projected feature about such experiences to allow them to be accounted 
for representationally or epistemically.  
 A congenial interpretation of Dretske‟s work might be as follows: Dretske‟s 
claims might legitimate the idea that some experiences have observational 
features structured at an extremely low level. For some creatures, it is less 
important to believe-that one is seeing something in some circumstances, than 
for something to seem a certain way to them. Just as there is no immediately 
plausible reason why an invertebrate needs to believe that something is before 
it, as opposed to having a certain illumination in its visual field, so a savage 
does not need to believe in any specific way he is seeing (representing) a 
Manhattan subway train for features of his visual field to seem a certain way. 
Indeed, there may be several levels of experience and content corresponding to 
different levels of cognitive input for various kinds of organisms. This is the 
line that shall be taken on this matter. A sophisticated organism like Sherlock 
Holmes or a savage may have a good deal of representational belief content in 
their experiences; an unsophisticated organism may have rather less. However, 
Holmes may also have a belief content about an experience, but not necessarily 
believe-that something is the case (e.g., he may not believe that there is a 
cigar-band near Jones‟s body even if he sees it, because he is not concentrating 
or attending to what he is seeing). But it might also be true that things seem a 
certain way for such creatures, regardless of those influences.  
 Something „seeming a certain way‟ is a rather ambiguous phrase, and 
Dretske uses it continually. This is unfortunate, as it can be interpreted as a 
belief-laden notion; it could be taken to mean that something seen „is (seems 
like) a train‟, or „is (seems like) red‟ etc., and hence could be seen as supporting 
Armstrong‟s thesis. For this reason, perhaps, Dretske‟s views have been seen as 
no real alternative to claims of epistemic accounts like that offered by 
Armstrong. However, there is a more subtle way of looking at the relation 
between belief and experience which neither Dretske‟s nor Armstrong‟s 
account seems to capture. It will be assumed here that the phrase „seems a 
certain way‟ suggests there are aspects of even belief-ridden experiences that 
have features which are not belief-like in Armstrong‟s sense. Therefore, there is 
no reason at all to suppose that all features of experiences need to be captured in 
terms of the content of beliefs as representational or propositional linguistic 
judgements. Being able to see in a certain way need „not involve the acquired 
abilities to identify, recognise, name, describe and so on.‟100 Some experiences 
might not, in other words, involve „high-level‟ features at all. But on the other 
hand, experiences might involve belief contents which are something rather less 
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than fully representational.  
4.5 Individuating beliefs  
It is clear that there are certain problems associated with the view that it is only 
in circumstances of high-level inference from representational states that 
„beliefs‟ obtain. For it is possible that beliefs about some features of 
experiences can be logically detached from beliefs about these features as 
objects of experience - and vice versa. That this can be done suggests that there 
is, in fact, no intrinsic tie between them. Consider Jackson‟s examples: 
 
I may, ... see [a] tomato without believing I see it - perhaps I think it is a wax 
dummy, or perhaps I see it without in any way noticing it. Second, suppose I 
both see the tomato and believe that I see it, must my belief that I see the 
tomato derive from believing I see a red shape? ... Suppose that I glance 
briefly into the kitchen and see a bowl of fruit and vegetables containing a 
tomato. And suppose I am then asked whether I saw a tomato and whether it 
was red or green (that is, was ripe or unripe). ... I might be able to answer the 
first query without being able to answer the second; that is, it is possible that I 
noticed seeing the tomato without noticing in any way the colour (which I 
must, of course, have seen). Hence, it is possible that I believe that I see the 
tomato without believing that I see a red shape (though I am seeing a red 
shape) .... Every leaf seen on my walk must look some colour and shape to me 
and must be seen as having some colour and shape by me at the time of 
seeing. But, just as I may see something without noticing it, without believing 
that I see it, so something might look some way to me (or be seen as ... ) 
without my noticing this in any way. As I drove quickly through the village, 
perhaps I saw the third house on the left without noticing or believing that I 
did. If so, the house must have looked some way to me, but I may not have 
noticed what way that was.101  
 
Like Dretske, Jackson tries to point out a more subtle and complex relation 
between experience and belief. These examples show that the idea that there is a 
necessary and sufficient connection between belief and content is a fabricated 
and misleading view of the matter. Though there is often a very close relation 
between belief and content; there may be content without there necessarily 
being beliefs in Armstrong‟s sense. One might represent in one‟s 
experience-that that one sees a tomato, without representing its colour; one 
might „see‟, in some sense, autumn leaves while on a walk without representing 
them as autumn leaves. In some cases an experience can be seen in terms of 
having a „high-level‟ belief; in other cases it can‟t. The point is that the 
„epistemic‟ account is not always true of experiences, so it is not the only way in 
which they can have content. Moreover, as Jackson points out, experiences 
might consist to some extent of unnoticed seeings, whereby experiences 
register certain features without those features actually being noticed, and 
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hence, believed.  
 To be more specific, Jackson‟s examples show a number of things: they 
clearly show that an experience can have some kind of content, without there 
being any particular feature of the experience that is represented (the autumn 
leaves example). Representational judgements cannot then be a necessary and 
sufficient condition for experiential content. However, they also show that there 
might be an aspect of some experiences that has representational content but 
which does not capture all the features of the experience. For example, seeing a 
tomato without representing its colour shows that a representational content 
may be present without capturing certain other features seen. Furthermore, the 
examples show that seeing is not necessarily tied to believing in any general 
sense as there is a case for saying that one can recall having seen the third house 
on the left without necessarily believing that one saw it. So, experiences can 
involve representational beliefs, beliefs with content that is not represented, 
represented beliefs which do not capture certain seeings, and certain seeings 
which are not believed at all but which are seen. I‟ll return to this kind of 
complex, multi-level view of the relationship between belief and experience 
later and suggest that this kind of view of the relationship between beliefs and 
experiences accords well with the continuum account of content. 
 The points mentioned above highlight some important problems which must 
be successfully handled by the epistemic account:  
 Firstly, it must be explained why all experiences should be seen as 
underpinned by beliefs-that something is the case rather than in other terms. 
Some cases of experiential content do seem difficult to place in the category of 
being believings-that. As argued in Chapter 1, an experience of an assemblage 
of objects seen with one eye and then both eyes does seem to have a different 
experiential content, but the belief-that one is seeing certain objects in certain 
relationships remains unchanged. Such a case has representational content, but 
this feature just does not capture the difference in the experiences. Nor does 
Armstrong‟s rather odd notion of „potential‟ beliefs seem to capture this 
difference in content. 
 Secondly, if we are to take Jackson‟s or Dretske‟s claims seriously, then the 
relationship between experience and belief is more complex than the 
„epistemic‟ account assumes as beliefs of sorts can occur without those beliefs 
having representational features. For example, one might immediately believe 
something about leaves on one‟s walk without representing them as leaves. It is 
clear that any tight relation between experiences, representational content and 
beliefs is oversimplified. The „epistemic‟ account seems to capture only certain 
sorts of experiential beliefs.  
 Thirdly, an account must be offered of cognitively unsophisticated animal 
and infant experiences, which do not seem to have the features that the 
epistemic account says they do. Belief, on Armstrong‟s view, involves 
informational content and, at the very least, representational concepts. But none 
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of these things seems terribly central to unsophisticated animal and infant 
experiences, nor to very low-level experiences as had by humans (even though 
these things might have some place in a more inclusive account of belief and 
experience).  
 A response to the third problem has been given by Armstrong in another 
context, but it is hardly a way of legitimating the belief-based account of 
perception. As we have already seen in Chapter 1, Armstrong entertains the 
idea that belief content attributions might lie along a continuum, a graded scale, 
between organisms of various degrees of cognitive sophistication. This sort of 
consideration is suggestive in that it might be sensible to treat the nature of 
beliefs in terms of degrees of applicability, rather than in all-or-none terms.  
 But if beliefs are treated in these terms, it is hardly an argument for accepting 
the stronger thesis that epistemic features are fundamental features of 
experience in the required sense. That Armstrong reaches for such a metaphor 
would seem to indicate that he is trying to overcome the deficiencies in his 
inferentialist analysis. When considering unsophisticated animal and infant 
experiences, for example, it does seem more plausible to look at perception in 
terms which incorporate „epistemic‟ features but which seriously limit the 
degree to which a belief-based view can give an account of perceptual content. 
A subtler account would take into account such considerations as low-level 
content, unnoticed seeings, experiences with some belief content but without 
representational content, and so on. 
 
Combining the epistemic and non-epistemic views 
 
4.6 A non-dichotomous treatment of beliefs 
The case has been given for both the „epistemic‟ and the „non-epistemic‟ 
account of experiential content. The „epistemic‟ account captures experiences 
or features of experience having a discernible representational content, which 
can be understood as believing-that something is the case. Sherlock Holmes, for 
example, did believe that there was a cigar-band near Jones‟s dead body. The 
„non-epistemic‟ account, by contrast, captures experiential content which 
seems to have features of a less sophisticated kind: several objects viewed with 
one or both eyes open may have a distinctly different look, but the belief-that 
one is seeing certain objects in certain relationships may remain the same.102 On 
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this view, such beliefs are not necessary and sufficient for content at all. 
Armstrong‟s account thus captures experiential content with high-level 
features; Dretske‟s non-epistemic account captures features of experiential 
content which have certain non-representational looks. There are clearly stock 
examples which offer reasons for accepting both views to some degree.  
 Is either approach here necessarily more plausible than the other? If not, there 
might be a case for claiming that the two views need to be combined somehow. 
A way of doing this might be to allow different levels of content to feature in 
perception, but to recognise that none of these levels fully defines or captures its 
complex nature. This view of experience might embrace levels at which some 
experiences are fixed by high-level beliefs; others which are fixed by low-level 
appearances which might be primed for the organism in any number of ways - 
either endogenously or via the presentation of certain properties to highly 
discriminating sense detectors which operate on selected environmental cues. 
This suggestion will be taken up in detail in Chapter 8. The point here is that 
there might be a case for claiming that some experiences have several kinds of 
experiential content simultaneously. If this could be said to be true, then 
experiential content is neither fundamentally „belief-like‟ nor fundamentally 
„non-epistemic.‟ The terms of the dispute in this sense are misleading. 
Experience might, instead, have a number of different features; features for 
which it seems and looks to the subject a certain way, and features for which it is 
believed by the subject that it is a certain way. And there might be a number of 
different possibilities in between these extremes.  
 That there might be different aspects of experiential states which have these 
respective features is plausible on all but an inferentialist‟s treatment of 
experiential belief content. But it is also clear that the traditional formulation of 
the dispute about belief and experience has not admitted of a multi-aspect view. 
In terms of offering an account of experiential content, the formulation of the 
„epistemic‟-„non-epistemic‟ options above has come to give an either/or 
relationship, not a combination of the two. It has come to mean this: if the 
content of experience is not importantly belief-ridden, then it must be 
observationally fixed non-inferentially in some sense; if it is not observational, 
it must always have a representational content such that it is believed to be a 
certain way and not another. Both Armstrong and Dretske clearly see this as a 
dichotomous relationship and, equally, see the rejection of their own account as 
leading to undesirable alternatives.  
 While Armstrong panics over the rejection of the belief-based account of 
perception („[If] perceptual experience is to be distinct from the acquisition of 
beliefs about the environment, [then it will become] some relationship that the 
mind has to non-physical sensory items‟),103 Dretske expresses a similar fear 
for any rejection of the observational fixation account, suggesting that a 
                                                 
103 Armstrong, (1968), op. cit., p. 217. 
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consequence of this line of attack ends in perceptual relativism („if there was no 
non-epistemic way of seeing objects and events ... one would be lead to suppose 
that people who possessed radically different beliefs ... did not, indeed could 
not, see the same things ... this is but a prelude to the view that we each have our 
private perceptual world.‟)104 No intermediate position seems to be possible on 
such statements of the problem.  
 This situation need not have arisen. In the usual way the dispute is 
formulated, an experience might have both features on each of the views 
mentioned (see Sibley‟s quotation near the beginning of this chapter). But how 
the topic is actually explored and emphasised for either „epistemic‟ or 
„non-epistemic‟ views, one kind of feature is usually seen as more fundamental, 
and hence, explicable in those terms. If there is a sense in which the two views 
are compatible whilst isolating two legitimate and important aspects of 
experiential content, then it is clearly not brought out in traditional expressions 
of the problem such as those given above. For both Armstrong and Dretske, to 
adopt one view is to largely reject the importance of the other. Hence, the issue 
becomes a dispute, not an acknowledgment of the various different kinds of 
content that experience may have. 
 This can be seen from some of the responses of adherents of each of these 
views. For Armstrong, who is an advocate of the view that perceptual content is 
importantly belief-ridden and propositional, the „information-flow‟ account of 
perception can „explain the other idiom.‟105 By this he means that an account of 
perceptual content in terms of the imposition of beliefs can explain away the 
intuition that features of experiential content can be importantly non-epistemic. 
By contrast, Dretske on occasion claims that perception can be accounted for 
entirely in terms of what he calls „seeingn‟106 which, he and others claim, „has 
no belief content,‟107 and which can be experienced without „making [any] 
judgement whatever.‟108 From what has been mentioned before, it is unclear 
how this kind of conclusion can be drawn from Dretske‟s arguments which only 
show that beliefs are not necessary and sufficient for some perceivings, not that 
they are not needed at all. Also, it is not easy to see how any kind of conciliatory 
approach could be possible with such statements of the dispute. Both kinds of 
theorists claim that their view of experiential content is fundamental and, in 
practice, largely ignore the application of the other.  
 Despite the divisive nature of the epistemic-non-epistemic dispute, adherents 
of each of these rivalling views do acknowledge the importance of some kind of 
compatibilist position. We have already seen Armstrong‟s rejection of a 
                                                 
104 Dretske, op. cit., pp. 76-77. 
105 Armstrong, (1968), op. cit., p. 228.  
106 „Non-epistemic perception‟ is discussed in Dretske passim.  
107 Ibid., p. 19.  
108 Warnock, op. cit., p. 52. 
   
  
 
101 
propositional basis for the content of animal experiences, and the suggestion of 
the continuum metaphor instead. This showed that he was prepared to embrace 
only some features of the inferentialist proposal and not others. Elsewhere, he 
allows for the possibility of low-level experiences, or „small perceptions‟ 109 
which do not seem to involve belief states and are not, demonstrably, cases of 
„seeing-that‟: 
 
At a certain instant the perception occurs ... But this state disappears so 
rapidly - the impression fades so fast - that we may well be reluctant to 
describe it as a state of belief. The state is gone before there is any possibility 
of a manifestation of belief. And if there is no possibility of manifestation 
how can we speak of belief?110 
 
The sorts of things Armstrong had in mind are „immediate‟ experiences of the 
kind which admit of no inference - experiences like the „mere registration of 
colour or shape.‟111 Armstrong allows that such experiences amount to the 
registration of „visual properties of things‟ and that, „by an automatic and 
instantaneous inference‟, such properties are fixed into beliefs about the 
perception of physical objects. Yet Armstrong gives no precise account of what 
it is to register the „visual properties of things.‟ Does he want to suggest that 
there are some visual experiences which are not belief-like, or that some beliefs 
are non-informational in his sense? Either position would amount to modifying 
Armstrong‟s strongly inferentialist position. His position on this is unclear. 
What is clear is that such comments are not entirely consistent with the belief 
content being the fundamental content of experiences. If there are „visual 
properties of things‟ registered in perception, in addition to „beliefs about 
physical objects,‟ then such experiences need an account of some sort too.  
 Similarly, Dretske has claimed that one need not be pushed in the direction of 
assimilating experiential content to features of the observational situation: 
 
One could, I suppose, continue to insist that I was believing something at the 
time about the things which I saw, but that I simply can no longer remember 
the fact. Or, alternatively one could insist ... that I did not really see 
anything.112  
 
It is clear that even the enthusiasts of each position are rather ambiguous about 
the extent to which their views offer complete accounts of experiential content.  
                                                 
109 Armstrong, (1968), op. cit., p. 232. 
110 Ibid., p. 233. As Sibley notes, Armstrong elsewhere considers the possibility of a third way 
by admitting „the notion of perceptual experience as something quite distinct from the acquiring 
of beliefs about the environment‟ without admitting non-physical sensory items, but adds „I 
have been unable to see how this can be done.‟ op. cit., p. 217. See also, Sibley, op. cit., p. 127.  
111 Armstrong, (1968), op. cit., p. 235. 
112 Dretske, op. cit., p. 11. 
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 The opposing positions described here correspond, with some reservations, 
fairly closely to what has been termed the inferentialist proposal and the 
observational account. In this context, „seeing-that‟ corresponds to aspects of 
experiences which can be captured in terms of features of high-level inference; 
whereas, just „seeing,‟ or „seeingn ‟ amounts to something very close to the 
perception of sense data, which is (supposedly) non-inferential, „direct‟ and 
immune from a belief-based, or „epistemic‟ analysis. Neither view wants to 
hold that the only content of perceptual experience is „epistemic‟ or 
„non-epistemic‟. The point of the divergence in views is over whether „seeing 
(with a direct object) or seeing-that ... is the primary or more fundamental 
notion.‟113 One view stresses high-level „epistemic‟ features; the other view 
stresses features of the observational situation and largely rejects the emphasis 
on beliefs. The means by which such views arise was outlined in Chapter 1. In 
this chapter, I want to give reasons for attempting the strategy of combining the 
insights of both approaches.  
 Before this is attempted, the slight difference in emphasis between the 
expressions of the two positions should be spelt out clearly. On the 
„epistemic‟-„non-epistemic‟ statement of the dispute, the discrepancy between 
the two views hinges centrally on the relevance of beliefs to experiential 
content; where „belief‟ means the exercise of judgmental and representational 
abilities - seeing-that something is the case.  
 However, it is possible to take a wider perspective on the nature of 
experiential content than simply concentrating on belief fixation. By using the 
terminology of the inferentialist proposal and observational account earlier, I 
aimed to capture some of the other equally important high-level features which 
are also part and parcel of this tradition. It was also possible to show these 
features were separable. On my view, the terminology of the „inferentialist 
proposal‟ subsumes the „epistemic‟ account: it admits of more than simply 
beliefs; it also admits of propositional content, theories, descriptive concepts 
and so on, and these notions are critically linked. As argued earlier, the 
inferentialist proposal is committed to more than the „epistemic‟ account, and it 
has a longer tradition going back to the influence of early rationalism. It seems 
appropriate for these reasons to retain my terminology rather than Sibley‟s.  
 The use of „epistemic‟ and „non-epistemic‟ in place of the wider doctrines 
mentioned actually leads to a stalemate on the entire issue. It ties the content of 
experience far too closely to the content of beliefs. As has been stressed, the 
standard account of beliefs is closely associated with representational content, 
or seeing-that. However, this marks the boundaries of the dispute too clearly, 
and brings the issue down to a choice: one approach where a 
representational/belief content is more fundamental, the other where it is not. 
This has had the effect of ignoring other high-level and, particularly, low-level 
                                                 
113 Sibley, op. cit., p. 83. 
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features of experiential content. On a continuum view of content, the 
boundaries of the dispute are less individuated than this, and it is misleading to 
speak in such oversimplified terms. 
 It seems plausible that though the content of an experience might be 
representational in some circumstances, it need not be in others. Take the 
previous examples. In the case of seeing an object (Jones‟s body) it was obvious 
what was represented. On an account such as Armstrong‟s, what is represented 
is also what is believed; so perception, in this case, is closely tied to the belief 
that a certain object (Jones‟s body) is before one. However, take the case of two 
walls believed to be painted the same colour of yellow. Even though it may be 
believed that walls painted a certain colour are before one, and this captures the 
representational content, it might not capture the sense in which one wall might 
seem a different hue because light is falling on one wall and not the other. In 
such a case, there is still a content to the experience which the representational, 
belief-based analysis does not capture. But now take the case of the visual scene 
perceived with one eye and then both eyes. It is clear that though what is 
represented has not changed, the different content of one‟s experience does not 
thereby become non-epistemic: one still believes that certain objects are before 
one in certain relationships. A rejection of the „epistemic‟, belief-based account 
of Armstrong does not give way to a fully „non-epistemic‟ account such as that 
attributed to Dretske.114 
 These examples show two things: first, the epistemic and non-epistemic 
accounts should not be seen as a dichotomy. Just because the epistemic account 
does not capture certain levels of experiential content does not mean that a 
non-epistemic account will. So a rejection of one view is not an affirmation of 
the other. Secondly, saying a certain experience is not belief-like is not to say 
that it is non-inferential. To an experience of two painted walls of different hues 
one brings a memory of the effect of light on visual scenes which contributes to 
how the scene looks (even if memory may not be a sufficient explanation for 
how the scene looks). So a case which seems difficult to account for in the terms 
of the epistemic account does not simultaneously rule out the input of other 
high-level features.  
 This is a critical issue if the terms of the dispute are merely over the question 
of whether perception is „epistemic‟ or not. For clearly, if there are some 
contents of experience which cannot be captured in either epistemic or 
non-epistemic terms, and some which are belief-like but not representational, 
then the whole dichotomy - either „epistemic‟ or „non-epistemic‟ - begins to 
look superficial and misleading. 
 Even though one might press for a broader analysis of the issue, this need not 
rule out the substantial importance of both „epistemic‟ and „non-epistemic‟ 
                                                 
114 As mentioned earlier, Dretske‟s account is best understood as „partially‟ epistemic. I‟ll 
return to this point. 
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influences. The problem is this: if the issue is too closely defined in terms of 
beliefs, particularly beliefs as defined in terms of a representational 
„believing-that,‟ then either experience is belief-ridden in this way or it isn‟t. 
By contrast, if one‟s account of how high-level features of experience influence 
experiential content is broadened to include features other than beliefs, it is 
possible to argue that some high-level features are crucial at times when others 
are not. As already indicated, this latter option is supported. 
 Following from this point, a way out of this bind might be to take 
Armstrong‟s „small perceptions‟ as being kinds of beliefs. Armstrong‟s account 
could be made to include two broadly distinct beliefs: a high-level, 
representational belief, and a „look‟ belief. A „look‟ belief would capture the 
sensational aspects of experiential content (the kind of experiential content 
which seems otherwise immune from Armstrong‟s analysis) rather than 
representational aspects of experiences. This approach would preserve the 
Armstrongian intuition that experiences are belief states of some kind. 
Armstrong already admits of „potential‟ beliefs and „subverbal‟ or „perceptual‟ 
beliefs in the case of animals - perhaps there is a case for saying that there are 
also low-level sensational „look‟ beliefs as well as high-level representational 
beliefs-that. This strategy would also support the claim that some high-level 
features are relevant when others are not, and hence, goes some way to 
supporting the terms of a continuum view of content. On this analysis, there are 
many different kinds of beliefs - not just representational beliefs - and all of 
them are relevant to the fixation of experiential content. 
 The trouble with this argument is that it dilutes the notion of belief to the 
point where it becomes doubtful whether we need to talk about beliefs at all - at 
least beliefs in the representational sense which Armstrong wants. It makes the 
whole idea of a „belief‟ in this context very mysterious. As we have seen, 
Armstrong‟s inferentialist treatment of experiences captures a strongly 
informational sense of belief, which specifies concepts and propositional and 
representational states. However, Armstrong‟s acknowledgment of „small 
perceptions‟ and his reference to a graduationist („continuum‟) view of content 
to keep the legitimacy of animal and infant beliefs are a substantial move away 
from this view. A final severing of the position would be an admission that 
some beliefs are not of this „high-level‟ sort at all. Whether Armstrong would 
take this line or not is not clear. What is clear is that if he does embrace „small 
perceptions‟ then Armstrong‟s overall position can then be criticised as being 
too „high-level‟ in its treatment of beliefs as well as experiences; too zealous to 
embrace the terms of the inferentialist proposal and not to see that there may be 
other kinds of contents which his account cannot capture. Armstrong‟s account 
could also be criticised as being reductionist: in assimilating all experiential 
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contents to be beliefs of a certain sort. 115 
 The issue here centres on whether to call sensational features of experiences 
„beliefs.‟ One way of understanding Armstrong‟s position in this respect would 
be like this. If he insisted on treating all experiential content in belief-based 
terms, then he could properly be said to be maintaining an „epistemic‟-type 
analysis of sorts though it is clear here that some beliefs are not captured by 
high-level content; if he did not, then it is unclear how features of some 
experiences could fit with his inferentialist views. The issue of whether „look‟ 
beliefs are bona fide beliefs would thus amount to a mere semantic 
disagreement, not a way of resolving whether or not his view of experiential 
content is adequate. If Armstrong wants to take this approach and keep calling 
the sensational features of experiences „beliefs‟, then he can do so, but it should 
be noted that the rest of his claims about beliefs being „inferential, „conceptual‟ 
and „representational‟ etc, no longer apply to them. In which case Armstrong‟s 
view is no longer really an inferentialist view of substance, but a continuum 
account along the lines being proposed.  
 This way of understanding the problem has its advantages. What once was a 
point of serious disagreement between Armstrong‟s position and my own view 
- the issue of belief content - has become a way of affecting a reconciliation. 
Interpreted as occurring in degrees of sophistication, „beliefs‟ are no longer a 
threat to a continuum approach to experiential content. 
 However, although Armstrong‟s account can be interpreted in this way, it is 
still clear that the issue about how beliefs influence experiential content is an 
issue not only of degree but also of kind. We can speak of some aspects of 
experiences being belief-like in the „high-level‟ sense, and we can speak of 
some aspects of experiences being belief-like in some „low-level‟ sense. But 
there is still a genuine sense in which the low-level beliefs are quite unlike the 
high-level beliefs. Specifically, the latter, but not the former, require 
representational content, concepts, etc. We shall shortly see how examples of 
„look‟-beliefs are not only hard to fit into criteria acceptable to Armstrong‟s 
analysis, but also hard to conceptualise as belief states - such cases make the 
notion of a „belief‟ in this context unacceptably dilute.  
 But there is the further point that a combinatory analysis will not capture 
Jackson‟s unnoticed seeings. As mentioned before, some seeings simply seem 
to go unnoticed, and hence, are not believed at all.116 These features, too, seem 
                                                 
115 Armstrong acknowledges this to a certain degree: „My account may be called a reductive 
account because the concept of perception is shown to be a complex concept, definable in terms 
of such concepts as knowledge, belief and inclination to believe.‟ Armstrong, op. cit., (1961): p. 
121. 
116  Not believed in the „high-level‟ representational sense of belief, that is. There is 
considerable evidence of beliefs being registered in the case of subliminal perception, which is 
a kind of unnoticed seeing. I wouldn‟t deny that this kind of seeing goes on. However, it is 
debatable if these kinds of subliminal beliefs are high-level in the required sense; or, if they are, 
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to be genuine cases of contents which are unbelieved at the time of seeing. Such 
cases are quite unlike even the non-representational beliefs mentioned earlier in 
the context of Dretske‟s examples. These factors also need to be included in the 
analysis. 
 It seems then that there are two possible strategies here. The first is to 
combine the intuitions of both the epistemic and non-epistemic accounts. This 
would mean that perception can be characterised by beliefs, but beliefs of 
various levels of complexity. If one can interpret Armstrong as having 
„low-level‟ beliefs as well as „high-level‟ beliefs-that, and Dretske‟s view as 
being partially epistemic and holding that experiences simply cannot be 
characterised in a necessary and sufficient way by representational content, 
then there seems no great conflict between the two positions. 
 The second strategy would be to rule out the application of beliefs to the very 
low-level end of the continuum. This option allows differences in degree 
between „high‟ and „low-level‟ perceivings, to shade into differences in kind at 
the polarities. „Unnoticed seeings‟ would thus not really be counted as beliefs at 
all, though they are, in some low-level sense, informational. The next section 
will clarify the options here. 
4.7 Sibley’s account 
Sibley recognises this need to stress another kind of belief content 
corresponding to lower level experiences. He considers several possible 
interpretations of Armstrong‟s work, but interprets Armstrong‟s epistemic 
account as the „acquiring of beliefs about the physical world‟ in the strongest 
possible sense - the representational sense. In S‟s acquiring a belief, „S must 
possess the concepts involved in that belief ... the status concept of a physical 
thing or of a physical environment.‟117 But this seems to Sibley a mistake. Such 
a strong view of belief content would require Armstrong to re-interpret 
unconvincingly cases of experiences which do not seem to be amenable to such 
an analysis in belief-like terms, and also to disparage unsophisticated animal 
and infant experiences. Armstrong might accomplish this by „denying that our 
perceptions are distinct from our beliefs.‟118  But, according to Sibley, this 
„smacks of ad hoc theory saving.‟119  
 Sibley argues against the thrust of Dretske‟s views, though his reasons are 
rather different from mine. The suggestion in this chapter is that we can 
interpret Dretske‟s view as proposing that there are features of experiential 
content which are not informational or inferential in Armstrong‟s sense. We 
                                                                                                                               
if the kind of perceiving in question consists of the same degree of unnoticing as Jackson‟s 
examples. The continuum account allows for variations in degrees of unnoticing as much as it 
allows for degrees of noticing.  
117 Sibley, op. cit., p 126. 
118 Ibid., p. 127 
119 Ibid., p. 126. 
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should interpret Dretske as arguing against the claim that beliefs in Armstrong‟s 
sense are necessary and sufficient for all experiences, only some of them. It has 
not been suggested that we take Dretske to mean that there are no beliefs in 
perception. Sibley, however, takes Dretske to be claiming that perception 
contains no beliefs at all: 
 
Some of [Dretske‟s] statements ... suggest the extreme position („I 
personally, have no idea what the infant or the rat believes or whether they 
believe anything, „ p. 10, my italics). Moreover, in those passages where he 
offers his positive account of seeingn (p. 18 ff.), there is no suggestion that S 
must, in seeing D acquire some belief. And since this account of seeingn is 
offered, I believe, as a full, not a partial, positive account ... we may conclude, 
I think, that his positive account of seeing is totally non-epistemic.120 
 
Sibley has a quick response to this kind of fully non-epistemic account. He 
argues that there is a sense in which noticing something, or attending to 
something, requires a minimal form of belief, so a fully non-epistemic account 
cannot possibly be true: 
 
We are prepared to say that someone in a brown study, or grief stricken, or 
engrossed in an argument, „stared at something unseeing‟, „looked right 
through it without seeing it‟, etc. ... [If] correct, and if such obviously 
attention-involving locutions ... are interchangeable with „seeing‟, it surely 
cannot be denied that there does exist a use of „see‟ that involves attention 
and hence belief-acquisition. (Just as I take it to be absurd to say that 
someone glimpsed or spotted or, in one sense, saw something without giving 
it, or its taking, any of his attention, so I take it as undeniable that someone 
could not have spotted or noticed or otherwise given attention to something 
without acquiring some belief or other, if only the belief that, e.g., something 
happened or seemed to ...).121 
 
Sibley‟s point is that every experience, even unsophisticated ones, must involve 
attention focusing, and consequently, beliefs. According to him, if one doesn‟t 
focus on something, one doesn‟t see anything, and since attention focussing 
involves noticing, seeing involves believing. Such an argument is clearly 
apposite to the cases offered by Dretske considered earlier. There is a sense in 
which the infant, the rat and the savage all noticed something, so their 
experiences did involve beliefs. This is another reason for considering 
Dretske‟s account, at best, a „partial epistemic‟ view. We have already seen 
reasons for rejecting this kind of claim with some of the cases Jackson offered. 
As we saw, some experiences may involve unnoticed seeings: one might „see‟, 
in some sense, the autumn leaves or the colour of the tomato, without noticing 
that one does, so not all kinds of seeings involve noticings. Or, again, one might 
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see something „in the corner of one‟s eye‟ (say, the scratches on the window 
pane) without noticing them and only be able to have one‟s attention drawn to 
such an experience if the scratches were actually removed. Sibley‟s account is 
unacceptable if he takes all seeing to involve noticing (and hence, believing).  
 But there is another reason why Sibley‟s account is unacceptable. It concerns 
his interpretation of Dretske as holding a fully non-epistemic account, and not a 
partially epistemic account. Unlike Sibley, I am reluctant to attribute this view 
to Dretske. It seems to me that Dretske‟s vacillations over whether beliefs can 
properly be attributed to all cases of „seeings‟ can also be interpreted to be 
questioning the degree to which high-level beliefs can account for some kinds 
of experiences, not that there are some experiences which do not have a belief 
content at all. Such a view seems simply implausible on the basis of examples 
Dretske offers for his account, even if it may be plausible on the basis of some 
of the unnoticed seeings just mentioned. 
 There seems to be another likely interpretation of Dretske‟s work, however, 
which is defensible: Dretske‟s emphasis might be closer to my own - that some 
aspects of experiences have features that cannot be captured by Armstrong‟s 
analysis; that some beliefs are „look‟ beliefs rather than „inferential‟ beliefs. His 
original arguments, after all, were directed against the view that „no particular 
belief, or set of beliefs constitutes a logically indispensable condition for the 
individual‟s seeing that he does see.‟122 He was attacking the view that all 
experiences involve „positive belief content,‟ not the view that experiences 
could not do without any belief content.123 On the interpretation given here, 
Dretske might have been making a point of arguing that there need not be any 
particular and identifiable representational aspect to an experience, not that 
there are no „look‟-beliefs in experience. There is an important difference in 
emphasis here, yet Sibley does not see this difference and interprets Dretske as 
holding a fully non-epistemic account.  
 Sibley‟s approach tries to avoid the counterintuitive nature of both the fully 
„epistemic‟ and the fully „non-epistemic‟ view thus interpreted. It amounts to an 
attempt at a middle-of-the-road position between Armstrong and Dretske. His 
claim is that a „weaker and non-specific belief view‟,124  which he calls a 
„broadly epistemic account‟, 125  will avoid the problems associated with 
Armstrong‟s „specific epistemic account.‟ The thrust of the position is that 
some kind of „rudimentary‟ belief mostly goes along with perception („not an 
                                                 
122 Dretske, op. cit., p. 13. Italics mine. 
123  „Positive belief content‟ is defined in Dretske as an entailment relation between the 
activities of some sentient agent „S ...‟ and S‟s having a particular belief. See ibid., Dretske, p. 
5. As we have already seen, Dretske‟s claim is that no particular belief is necessary for 
experience, not that no beliefs at all are necessary.  
124 Sibley, op. cit., p. 127. 
125 Ibid., p. 84. 
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inhibited tendency [or potential] to believe‟) 126  and that this rudimentary 
believing is of a very low-level kind: minimally, of something which „existed‟ 
or „happened.‟ 127  This is particularly apposite, in Sibley‟s view, to the 
unsophisticated experiences of animals and infants: 
 
If [a belief acquisition account of seeing] is to be tenable, it must apply to all 
creatures who see, including infants. No doubt many concepts are acquired 
and used in seeing; but many are not required. This must eliminate the kind of 
view [such as] attributed to Armstrong. Since, however, on any epistemic 
account some concepts are required, the minimum that would suffice would 
seem to be the rudimentary „something‟ and „existing‟ or „happening‟ ... The 
infant who, for the first time hears a noise or sees a flash and jumps and cries 
must be held to at least think that something happened.128  
 
The upshot of this kind of analysis is that beliefs are necessarily involved in 
perception, but they are not the kinds of representational beliefs Armstrong 
avows. Sibley then claims that experiential content involves rudimentary 
belief-like features which do not even imply „a realisation that [something] 
looks somehow to [a perceiver] at all.‟129 Sibley wants, in fact, to rule out of his 
analysis „looks‟ as well as high-level beliefs as the fundamental features of 
experiential content. Because of his treatment of Dretske, „looks‟ implies 
perceiving something non-epistemically. But Sibley wants to react against this 
view. He claims that his beliefs, unlike Armstrong‟s, do not have a special 
connection with „external or physical occurrences‟ but unlike Dretske, they do 
not become totally non-epistemic „looks‟ or seeings-as. They remain, 
nonetheless, „beliefs‟ in some sense. The argument for a primitive belief which 
does not imply anything looking a certain way, on Sibley‟s view, is that some 
primitive experiences do not lead the perceiver to believe that there is 
something about his experience which is one way rather than another: 
 
The situation can occur in adult as well as in infant life, when for instance we 
know that something (in fact a slight change in the lighting) disturbed our 
concentration, that we cannot say whether it was a change of lighting, a slight 
sound, or what. Its being a matter of looks, i.e., of vision (and hence of light 
and colour etc.), need not be incorporated in the belief of the perceiver.130  
 
The point to be made against his account is this: Sibley takes the 
epistemic/non-epistemic debate to be one of an exclusive dichotomy, not 
aspects of an inclusive account in which both kinds of accounts may feature. On 
                                                 
126 Ibid., p. 127. 
127 Ibid., p 128. 
128 Ibid., p. 130. 
129 Ibid., p. 129. 
130 Loc. cit. 
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his view, either experience is fully „epistemic‟, in Armstrong‟s sense, or it is 
fully „non-epistemic‟ in (how he has interpreted) Dretske‟s sense. It is this 
interpretation that is behind Sibley‟s rejection of „look‟-like features of beliefs. 
He takes Armstrong (rightly) to be advocating a highly inferentially-driven 
account of experience, and he takes Dretske (wrongly, I think) to be advocating 
a totally non-epistemic view of experience. Sibley also sees the dispute in terms 
of an exclusive either/or dichotomy. So, the upshot of his criticism of 
Armstrong leaves him in a curious position. He does not wish to agree with 
Armstrong entirely, but likewise, his view of Dretske is that there are no beliefs 
at all in perceptual „looks‟, so he cannot agree with him either. This requires 
him to fall back on beliefs, but beliefs which have no look-like features. This 
makes his notion of an experience with a „rudimentary‟ belief very odd indeed:  
 
If my arguments are correct, S may see D without having any belief about 
how D looks to him, or even any realization [sic.] that it does look somehow 
to him at all. S need not have either the concept „looks‟, or any predicate 
concepts, or the concept „being like something‟, or that of „having a quality‟, 
or of the „is‟ of predication.131 
 
We don‟t have to accept this conclusion. The interesting sense of a „look‟ belief 
is not that it is any form of high-level cognising; nor is it entirely non-epistemic. 
(Sibley attributes the latter view to Dretske.) The reason for invoking „look‟ 
beliefs is that some experiential contents seem to have sensational features, 
features which the „epistemic‟ account of Armstrong simply does not capture. 
Sibley realises that a more primitive kind of belief is needed here. His „weaker 
and non-specific belief-view‟132 is, at least, plausible. His intuition is that very 
primitive experiences such as „that something happened‟ or „that something 
exists‟ are experiences so inchoate that they cannot be captured in terms which 
are representational, propositional or inferential, yet they are legitimate features 
of experiential content. The claim is that the very notion of a belief itself needs 
to be understood as occurring in degrees, not in all-or-none terms. The problem 
is that Sibley has taken the terms of the „epistemic‟-„non-epistemic‟ debate as 
an exclusive dichotomy, not elements of a larger, more encompassing account 
in which beliefs of many kinds may feature. Sibley‟s mistake was not to see that 
this kind of account can be read into Dretske‟s analysis, and so he does not have 
to reject the application of „looks‟ to low-level beliefs. On this continuum view 
of beliefs, of course, „look‟ beliefs which capture sensational features are as 
much a part of the overall account of experience required as Armstrong‟s 
„propositional‟ beliefs-that. Even Sibley‟s „rudimentary‟ beliefs can be plotted 
on the same graph. Consequently, Sibley has no grounds on which to rule 
„looks‟ out of his account of beliefs. He only needs to do this if he: (1) accepts 
                                                 
131 Ibid., pp 128-9 
132 Ibid., p. 127. 
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that there is an exclusive dichotomy involved in the application of beliefs to 
experiences, and (2) assumes that Dretske‟s non-epistemic account implies 
there are no beliefs at all in perception. The suggestion given here is that we 
reject both of these assumptions. 
 If it does not make sense to rule out look-like features in the application of 
beliefs to experience, then perhaps it makes no sense to rule out unnoticed 
seeings as well. Perhaps the correct account of the relationship between such 
things will include them in the one belief-experience taxonomy. There might 
thus be a qualitative difference between very low-level look-beliefs (not really 
„beliefs‟) and higher level beliefs which have look-like features and still higher 
level beliefs which can be captured in terms of representational content. Just as 
there are differences in degree in a continuum, so there are differences of kind at 
the polarities. In what follows, I shall undertake a rough characterisation of this 
belief-experience taxonomy.  
4.8 ‘Look’- beliefs  
Experiential content may involve „look‟-beliefs. These beliefs might be fixed 
by sensational features of perception, and as such they are distinct from beliefs 
which are fixed by „high-level‟ representational and propositional features. 
Even so, it is clear that several kinds of „look‟-beliefs are possible: 
 (1) One kind of „look‟-belief may not really be believed because it is not 
noticed. This is at the very end of the continuum. Such a case can be later 
recalled as something that one saw but did not notice (e.g., the third house on 
the left). Recalling assists believing in this circumstance, but at the outset the 
experience simply captures certain unnoticed and unbelieved looks.  
  (2) Another kind of „look‟-belief may have no representational features at all, 
but it is believed in a very simple way. (It might just be a belief „that something 
happened‟ or „existed.‟) These kinds of belief have no discernible object 
content at all. Call this a „Sibley Look-Belief.‟ An example might be the belief 
that something has happened to how a painted wall looks, but not being able to 
say what it is. (Say the light on the wall has suddenly shifted unnoticed - 
without one noticing either the shift or that one was looking at a wall ).133  
 (3) Another kind of „look‟ belief might be that „something happened‟ or 
„existed‟ and being able to say what it was about that experience that looks 
different. (Say one is able to say „something about my experience looks 
lighter/darker now.‟) Call this a „Partial Representational Look-Belief‟. (This is 
to be distinguished from a belief about the wall that it has changed.) Some of 
Jackson‟s examples fit into this category. We may also believe that we saw 
something (some tomatoes) without noticing anything about them (i.e., whether 
                                                 
133 If this seems implausible, imagine driving along a road without being aware that one is 
driving along a road, and then „something happens‟ which changes how things look, without 
being able to say what it was, or, indeed, how the look is different. 
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they were ripe or unripe). 
 (4) Yet another kind of „look‟-belief might be that there is some aspect of 
one‟s experience of a painted wall that looks different. (Say that one is able to 
say that „this experience of a painted wall looks different from the previous 
experience of the same wall.‟) Call this a „Representational Look-Belief‟. 
 The above kinds of beliefs are all about features or aspects of experience 
which have a certain look, yet they have an increasing degree of sophistication. 
(A Representational Look-Belief is close to an experience which is a belief-that 
there is a wall before one, but it captures more about the look of the wall than 
the representational/propositional content of „wall‟).  
 The important thing to note is that, if true, this characterisation of content is a 
substantial move away from traditional conceptions of the relationship between 
belief and experience. Moreover, it seems that this characterisation supports the 
claims in this book. Several differentiating levels of sensational features of 
experience corresponding to several levels of beliefs is entirely consistent with 
what has been termed the continuum view of experiential content. 
4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the relationship between beliefs and experiential content has 
been looked at in detail. Two conventional approaches were considered. The 
conclusion arrived at is that there are stronger reasons for holding a continuum 
account of the relationship between beliefs and experience than either of these 
more traditional views. I effected a reconciliation between these approaches 
along the lines the continuum theory specifies. This involved treating beliefs as 
having levels of sophistication corresponding to the levels of sophistication of 
experiential content. The upshot of the analysis of experience and beliefs is that 
although sensational features of experience might be beliefs this does not 
warrant a treatment along the lines of either an „epistemic‟ or a „non-epistemic‟ 
account. 
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5. Sensational Content 
The external senses have a double province; to make us feel, and to make us 
perceive 134 
 
Sensational content 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Reasons have been given in the previous chapters for thinking that there might 
be features of experiential content which cannot be accounted for in terms of the 
inferentialist proposal. The discussion so far has centred around the relationship 
between belief and experience, and language and experience. It has been 
pointed out how several philosophers have taken experiential content to be fully 
characterised in terms of „high-level‟ influences. We have seen that this kind of 
characterisation of experience stems from a confused and misleading account 
of content. In this chapter two recent views which argue for an alternative 
account will be outlined. From this, it will be argued that there is more to 
content than the inferentialist proposal specifies. An examination of various 
views, ancient and contemporary, on the structure of mental content is then 
attempted in later chapters. 
5.2 Aspects of experiences 
In the terms of the inferentialist proposal, experiences necessarily involve the 
inference from „high-level‟ features: background knowledge, concepts and 
theories. Experiences also have representational and propositional features on 
this account. We have already had reason to regard some of these claims as 
being oversimplified and even misguided. Chapter 2 raised the question of 
animal and infant experiences and the whole question of how evolutionary 
considerations might bear on the issue of experiential content. The distinction 
between descriptive and sensational features led to the case for „concept‟ to be 
viewed in a manner which did not imply „high-level‟ abilities. Chapter 3 
                                                 
134 T. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 17.  
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continued this examination of the terms of the inferentialist proposal and 
distinguished low-level content from its association with language, meaning 
and theories - with linguistic propositional and representationally informational 
judgements. The conflation of observational language and observational 
experience was examined and shown to be of doubtful support for the 
inferentialist proposal. Chapter 4 distinguished beliefs as representational 
judgements from what was called „look‟ beliefs. The suggestion here was that 
experiential content need not be understood in representational terms as 
high-level beliefs, as the very notion of a „belief‟ itself could be said to occur in 
degrees of sophistication. All of these points made it seem likely that the 
inferentialist proposal needed to be substantially revised. 
 What arises from the preceding discussion is that the relationship between 
experiential content and high-level influences is more complex than either the 
inferentialist proposal or the observational account assumed. There seems to be 
a number of different ways in which high-level features can be brought to bear 
on experience, and a number of ways in which a full and adequate 
characterisation of experiential content escapes such an analysis. Cases of 
experiences where the various high-level features can be individuated have 
already been given. (To take one example: propositional content can be 
separated from language.) The claim is that this indicates that no single 
high-level feature is necessary for contentful experiences. There may be good 
reason, therefore, for thinking that none of the high-level features are necessary 
and sufficient. High-level experiences might also have distinguishable 
low-level, sensational aspects. As the idea that all experiential content is 
necessarily underpinned by features of high-level inference, and the idea that 
experiential content is basically non-inferential do not seem promising 
alternatives, I feel entitled to explore other options. 
 Drawing upon Thomas Reid, Christopher Peacocke 135  usefully clarifies 
experiential content in terms of sensations, perceptions and judgements. This 
tripartite distinction has been echoed recently by Allan Millar in terms of 
sensations, sensory experiences and propositional attitudes. Both typologies 
have a similar basis and can be treated together. According to Millar, 
„sensations include itches, tickles, feelings of numbness, and experiences 
generally.‟ These, he claims: 
 
... are always conscious in the sense of being episodes in the current stream of 
consciousness, though the subject may not always be conscious of them in the 
sense of noticing them. We may forget a back pain because absorbed in some 
activity, but it should not be inferred from this that while forgotten about the 
pain was not a conscious state.136  
 
                                                 
135 Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and its Relations.  
136 Allan Millar, Reasons and Experience, p. 11. 
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By contrast, propositional attitudes „ are states like belief, desire, intention, and 
hope, in which the subject has an attitude to some proposition.‟ Sensory 
experiences, by contrast again, are „akin to sensations in so far as they are 
always conscious occurrences [but they] can be described in ways which 
involve the ascription to them of propositional contents.‟ 137  According to 
Millar, while sensations are always conscious (but need not be noticed), 
propositional attitudes „are not always episodes in current consciousness.‟138 
However, while propositional attitudes are characteristically captured in terms 
of „giving the content‟139 of the attitude in question, sensory experiences - like 
sensations - are best captured simply in terms of how they are felt or how they 
seem to the subject. Sensory experiences thus have characteristics common to 
both sensations and propositional attitudes. However, they are also distinct. 
Like sensations (but unlike propositional attitudes), they are always conscious, 
albeit not always noticed, and like propositional attitudes (but unlike 
sensations), they can sometimes be said to be about something. The benefits of 
this kind of experiential typology is discussed in what follows.  
 The category of „sensations‟ in the above classification is fairly 
uncontroversial. For both Millar and Peacocke it is roughly equivalent to what 
was earlier called „low-level‟ content. This is awareness at one end of the 
experiential continuum. Such content can arise at several levels on my account 
as unnoticed experience in various sensory modalities. (Unnoticed seeings of 
varying degrees of sophistication were considered in the previous chapter in 
relation to Jackson‟s work.) Characteristically, sensations are contentful 
without requiring inferential and representational input (at its most primitive, 
there is no object-content at all in experiencing such sensations - i.e., they 
amount to what was earlier called „purely sensational content‟). As we have 
seen, a kind of very low-level experience may be present to some degree in 
every experiential amalgam as „impurely sensational content.‟  
 The class of „propositional attitudes‟ or „judgements‟ is also fairly 
uncontroversial. For both Millar and Peacocke, these categories are strongly 
inferential, requiring the input of high-level content such as representational, 
conceptual and propositional elements. A judgement formulated in response to 
                                                 
137 Ibid., pp. 10-11. „We can say that it visually appears to someone that p, meaning by that to 
describe how the person‟s experience represents the world as being without implying that the 
person believes or is even inclined to believe that p ... [W]hen we see things we see them under 
certain descriptions. Looking at a rose bush, for instance, you might see it as a rose-bush where 
this would imply that your visual experience would not be as it is but for its seeming to you that 
a rose bush is there.‟ ibid., pp. 11-12. 
138 Ibid., p. 11. „At any given time some of our propositional attitudes are conscious and some 
are not. As I touch my coffee mug I form the conscious belief that the coffee in it is cold. A few 
moments ago my current belief that my son is at school, which I undoubtedly held then, was not 
conscious.‟ loc. cit. 
139 Ibid., p. 10. 
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an experience, for instance, characteristically requires that the subject believe 
something about the experience in question. This belief is what is captured 
when a subject „gives the content‟ of a propositional attitude. A certain sound, 
for example, might be judged (believed) to be the sound of rain falling. The 
attitude, in this case, represents the experience as an experience of a certain 
kind. (It is a belief-that in Armstrong‟s terms.)  
However, it is clear that the content of a judgment can cause the content of an 
experience to be taken as an experience of another kind altogether. A person 
experiencing a certain sound that is believed to be rain, might judge later that a 
stereo has been left on, and the „rain‟ sound then comes to be heard as applause. 
The attitude representing the sound as rain has been influenced by the attitude 
that the stereo has been left on. Propositional attitudes or judgements can fix the 
representational content of an experience by bringing to bear different kinds of 
high-level information to the perceptual situation.140  
 By contrast to propositional attitudes, „sensory experiences‟ or „perceptions‟ 
can be characterised in sensational terms as well as representational terms. 
They cannot be classified properly either as sensations or as judgements. That 
this is so needs some explaining.  
 Like propositional attitudes or judgments, „perceptions‟ (Peacocke‟s term) or 
„sensory experiences‟ (Millar‟s term) have some representational content in 
most cases (in normal human experience). But in other circumstances they may 
not have such features. Nonetheless, there will always be some sensational 
content in an experience, conscious or otherwise. This flexibility and 
independence in content is what distinguishes perceptions from judgments or 
propositional attitudes.  
 Millar offers a reason for distinguishing these kinds of contents. He suggests 
that a judgement or a propositional attitude, strictly speaking, must satisfy two 
principles: a concept principle and an intrinsicality principle. But a sensory 
experience does not always satisfy these principles. Simply put, the concept 
principle states that „if a concept is an ingredient of the mental state then the 
subject must grasp the concept.‟141 The intrinsicality principle states that „if 
token mental states in a given category (belief, desire, or whatever) have 
                                                 
140 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 6. This need not happen. Sometimes the representational content of an 
experience is independent of the content of a judgement. „A man may be familiar with a perfect 
trompe l’oeil violin painted on a door, and be sure from his past experience that it is a trompe 
l’oeil: nevertheless his experience may continue to represent a violin as hanging on the door in 
front of him.‟ loc. cit. Peacocke notes that: „The possibility of this kind of independence is one 
of the marks of the content of experience as opposed to the content of judgement.‟ loc. cit. I 
shall look at other cases where the content of a judgement can be separated from the content of 
experience below. 
141 Millar, op. cit., p. 20. „If, for example, you believe that your pet cat is a Russian blue then 
you must grasp the concept of a Russian blue.‟ loc. cit. 
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different contents then they are of different state-types within that category.‟142 
More simply, the intrinsicality principle states that „the representational content 
of a state is intrinsic to that state ... two states which differ in representational 
content are different states.‟143 These claims will be qualified later in light of 
the continuum account. For the moment, it shall be assumed that each of the 
principles need to be satisfied in their present form.  
Obviously the two principles are connected. It is surely not normally possible 
to represent a given state of affairs without having a concept with which to 
represent that state of affairs (so the intrinsicality principle requires that the 
concept principle be satisfied). 144  Yet, by parity, to have a concept as an 
ingredient in a mental state requires that one can identify experiences of certain 
representational state-types (so the concept principle requires that the 
intrinsicality principle be satisfied).145  
 In the case of propositional attitudes or judgements (desires, beliefs and so 
on) both these principles are satisfied. (It seems hardly possible to 
desire/want/believe some p without having the concept p, and it hardly seems 
possible to have p as a concept without knowing what kind of thing p would 
represent.) But in the case of sensory experiences, these principles are not so 
easily satisfied. To take an example used previously: a perceptual judgement of 
a tomato both requires that I have the concept „tomato‟ and also requires that the 
token experience I am having is a state-type intrinsic to a representational 
content of a certain kind (which someone else can share). However, both these 
conditions need not be satisfied. I can, for instance, experience a visual scene 
with a tomato in it without necessarily engaging the relevant concept (perhaps I 
am in a hurry or am being distracted at the time) and two people can share the 
same experience even if one possesses the concept and the other doesn‟t (but 
this will not mean that their experiences are thereby of a different 
representational state-type). This kind of content is what makes an experience a 
sensory experience or a perception, rather than a propositional attitude or a 
                                                 
142 Ibid., p. 21. „Thus if Kate‟s belief B is the belief that p and Fred‟s belief B’ is the belief that 
q, then B and B’ are different beliefs in the sense that they are different belief-types.‟ loc. cit. 
143 A. Millar, „What‟s in a Look?,‟ pp. 86. 
144 Peacocke affirms this point: „[I]t is in the nature of representational content that it cannot be 
built up from concepts unless the subject of the experience himself has those concepts: the 
representational content is the way the experience presents the world as being, and it can hardly 
present the world as being that way if the subject is incapable of appreciating what that way is.‟ 
op. cit., p. 7. 
145 Peacocke seems to affirm this point too: „[T]he representational content concerns the world 
external to the experiencer, and as such is assessable as true or false ... this content is something 
intrinsic to the experience itself - any experience which does not represent to the subject the 
world being the way that this content specifies is phenomenologically different, an experience 
of a different type.‟ ibid., p. 9.  
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judgment.146  
 According to Peacocke, judgments („propositional attitudes‟) involve „past 
experience‟ and are inevitably inferential in content involving all the high-level 
influences mentioned in previous chapters. However, perceptions („sensory 
experiences‟) can have both non-representational and representational aspects. 
The non-representational aspects are supposed to be „independent‟ 147  of 
inference, but not entirely: the representational aspects capture the 
inferentialist‟s idea that there seems to be a representational or an object content 
to experience, while the non-representational aspect captures the idea that 
experiences can have observational features. Peacocke‟s two „aspects‟ of 
perception then, are supposed to capture the intuitions of both the inferentialist 
proposal and the observational account: the representative aspect has a 
determinate content; the non-representative aspect has a sensational content. 
He explains: 
 
Historically, the distinction between putative perceptual experience, and 
sensation has been the distinction between those experiences which do in 
themselves represent the environment of the experiencer as being a certain 
way, and those experiences which have no such representative content. A 
visual perceptual experience enjoyed by someone sitting at a desk may 
represent various writing implements and items of furniture having particular 
spatial relations to one another and to the experiencer, and as themselves 
having various qualities; a sensation of small, by contrast, may have no 
representative content of any kind ... Representational properties will be 
properties an experience has in virtue of features of its representational 
content; while sensational properties will be properties an experience has in 
virtue of some aspect - other than its representational content - of what it is 
like to have that experience.148  
 
The representational content of a perceptual experience, Peacocke says, has to 
be given by a „proposition or set of propositions‟149 which specifies the way the 
experience represents the world to be; for instance, the items of furniture or, in 
                                                 
146 Millar adopts the convention of calling an experience which fails to satisfy the above 
principles an F- type experience, and an experience which satisfies these principles to be an 
experience such that it seems to the subject that an F is there. The former is „an experience of 
the type which an F would yield, that is, would produce under certain suitability and normality 
conditions.‟ The latter is an experience which, „in the absence of countervailing considerations 
its subject would believe that an F is there.‟ op. cit., pp. 1- 2. The idea is that in some cases (like 
the ones just mentioned in relation to the tomato) an experience can be F- type without 
necessarily being an experience such that it seems to the subject that an F is there. (Being 
distracted or not having „tomato‟ as a concept yields one sensory experience or perception, but 
not the corresponding propositional attitude or judgement.) Only in having both experiences 
according to Millar, can one yield an experience of an F. (loc cit. ). 
147 C. Peacocke, op. cit., p. 6. 
148 Ibid., pp. 5. 
149 Loc. cit. 
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the case of Sherlock Holmes, the cigar-band, Jones‟s body and the relation of 
„nearness‟ of the body to the cigar-band. The representational content of an 
experience seems properly classified under what was previously called 
descriptive content. The non-representational aspects are not usually specified 
in this manner, but are properties by virtue of an organism being capable of 
having sensations of certain sorts. This is equivalent to what was previously 
called „impurely sensational‟ content. The distinction is: a representational 
content is the content of an experience which is specified in words by an 
application of descriptive concepts (say, about the presence of certain things in 
one‟s visual field, i.e., of the form x is ø); a non-representative experience is 
specified in quite different terms, perhaps in terms of some element of 
experience which is simply sensed. Is there any reason to think that there is a 
basis for a distinction here? This needs to be established.  
5.3 Representational content  
Consider the following cases offered by Peacocke:  
 
(1) You are standing on a road which stretches from you in a straight line to 
the horizon. There are two trees at the roadside, one a hundred yards from 
you, the other two hundred. Your experience represents these objects as being 
of the same physical height ... Yet there is also some sense in which the nearer 
tree occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree. This is as 
much a feature of your experience as is its representing the trees as being the 
same height ...We can label this problem, the „problem of additional 
characterisation‟...  
(2) Suppose you look at an array of furniture with one eye closed. Some of the 
pieces of furniture may be represented by your experience as being in front of 
others. Imagine now that you look at the same scene with both eyes. The 
experience is different. It may be tempting to try to express this difference by 
saying that some chairs now appear to be in front of others, but this cannot 
suffice: for the monocular experience also represents certain objects as being 
in front of others...  
(3) Consider an example in which a wire framework in the shape of a cube is 
viewed with one eye and is seen first with one of its faces in front, the face 
parallel to this face being seen as behind it, and is then suddenly seen, without 
any change in the cube or alteration of its position, with the former face now 
behind the other. The successive experiences have different representational 
contents. ... Yet there seems to be some additional level which the successive 
experiences fall under the same logical type.150  
 
The above are not problems of perception as such, but problems for an entirely 
representative view of experience. If experiences are said to have only 
representative features, then the above are dilemmas, because they clearly 
illustrate that there are things about experiences which are not representational. 
The first example shows that a tree can occupy more of the visual field despite 
                                                 
150 Ibid., p. 12-16. 
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being represented as the same size as another; the second shows that something 
non-representative about the experience of the furniture can vary despite the 
representation of the furniture being „held constant‟151 and the third shows that 
something can look the same, (i.e., „non-representational similarities‟ can 
occur) despite the variation in what is represented.152  
 The first example, „additional characterisation,‟ can occur in a number of 
situations even when experiencing one object on successive occasions. 
Sometimes this is known as the phenomenon of „size constancy.‟ A distant 
object under certain viewing conditions, to take an example, can actually seem 
larger than the optically represented size on the basis of that perceived distance. 
However, one can usually operate satisfactorily in the world by ignoring such 
changes in apparent size.  
 This phenomenon has some explanation in the psychological literature. 
Objects normally become smaller when seen as being distant; however, when 
viewing conditions are disturbed by features such as atmospheric mist, apparent 
distance of an object can be exaggerated. (This occurs when viewing the moon: 
the presence of an horizon within the field of view causes the moon to appear 
larger there than it does at the zenith.) 153  When this happens, the brain 
compensates for the decrease in retinal image by correspondingly enlarging the 
distant object. This occasions a discrepancy between the true distance and the 
apparent distance, and the apparent perceptual dimensions of the object is thus 
distorted. So an object can be experienced as both larger than and smaller than it 
should be on the basis of its represented size.154  
 In underwater situations this size constancy effect is very pronounced. Even 
very familiar objects, such as a diver‟s hand can seem too big, or too close. It is 
unlikely, however, that such experiences can be explained entirely in terms of 
the brain‟s enlargement of the retinal image, as the experience of distant objects 
under unusual viewing conditions. Such objects as one‟s own hand seem too 
familiar as objects and could hardly be seen as so visually deceptive. Another 
explanation offered to account for this phenomenon is that there is a conflict 
                                                 
151 Ibid., p 13. The point here is that the representation of the objects will not vary, but there is 
something qualitatively different about the experience. Peacocke notes that this phenomenon 
also occurs in aural experiences: „A stereophonic recording of a wave breaking sounds quite 
different from a monoaural recording, even if one cannot locate aurally the direction of the 
components of the whole sound.‟ ibid., p. 14. 
152 The point is, there will be something that seems the same about the cube, despite the 
representational differences. Peacocke notes that the Duck/Rabbit example was not used here 
because „the arrangement of lines on paper remains constant‟ (ibid., p. 17) in this case, and the 
similarity of the successive experiences could be attributed to the representation of these lines. 
The wire cube example shows no such representational stability: the frame of the cube is 
represented differently, but something non-representational seems the same which accounts for 
the switch. 
153 My thanks to Roger McCart for pointing this out. 
154 See: H. E. Ross, Perception and Behaviour in Strange Environments, pp 54- 56. passim. 
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between different perceptual modalities - in this case proprioception and vision 
- and what „feels‟ to be at its correct distance, looks too near, or alternatively, 
what appears at its correct distance, is actually represented visually as being too 
large. The sensational content of „small‟ or „large‟, in this case, seems to bear no 
intrinsic relationship to the visually represented experience with which it is 
usually associated. Interestingly, divers adapt to this problem in ways which 
suggest that they attend to different aspects of the perceptual situation.155 We 
shall shortly see another example in which discrepancies arising from different 
sensory modalities can yield similar ambiguous perceptual results. Such cases 
are suggestive in indicating how there can be more to an experience than how it 
is visually represented. Clearly, if there can be enlarged visual aspects to an 
experience despite its optically represented size, then there is plainly more to an 
experience than simply its projected representational features. In other words, 
Peacocke‟s point, that sensory experiences involve both kinds of features, 
seems to have some basis.  
 There are other more obvious ways of making the point. The „problem of 
additional characterisation‟, for instance, does not arise only with size in the 
visual field. Peacocke notes that it can also arise in the case of visual colour, 
and aural loudness. Two walls of a room uniformly painted in terms of hue, 
brightness and saturation, might still look different in some non-representative 
fashion. And two car engines running equally loudly, might be represented as 
being indistinguishable in volume „but again it seems undeniable that in some 
sense the nearer car sounds louder.‟156 These examples suggest again that some 
sensational content can be wrested from the representational aspects of one‟s 
experience. (How one represents the situation is only a part of one‟s 
experiential content in these cases.)  
 These examples are interesting, but it is not clear that they quite capture one 
major feature of experiential content. For one thing, the distinction Peacocke 
offers between representational and non-representational (sensational) 
experience should not be seen as being too rigid. There seems to be a clear case 
for saying that there are many intermediate cases here. There is a case for 
saying, for example, that some experiential contents might be neither 
exclusively sensational nor representational in content. A visual experience one 
may have upon initially waking up in the morning seems to have both kinds of 
features, but appears to be characteristically neither one nor the other. (The 
vague waking experience seems initially neither representational nor strictly 
                                                 
155 „Divers respond to the conflict in different ways, some perceiving mainly size-distortion, 
and others mainly distance-distortion. If the diver moves around under water, or handles 
objects, he begins to adapt to some aspect of the distortion. Some divers adapt to size and 
counter adapt (perceive increased distortion) to distance; others do the opposite; and a few 
manage to adapt to both size and distance, thus learning new size constancy rules which are 
appropriate to the underwater situation.‟ ibid., p. 57.  
156 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 13. 
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sensational, like an unnoticed back pain.) It is unclear if such an experience 
should be said to have exclusively representational or non-representational 
aspects. This is not necessarily a problem with Peacocke‟s distinctions, it might 
just show that there may be various levels at which these features of perceptions 
might overlap. This would be consistent with the continuum account being 
advocated in which several degrees of content can occur jointly in single 
experiential amalgams. In any event, there are problems with a view which 
stresses that only representational features fully capture the nature of 
experiential content. Non-representational sensational content („impurely 
sensational content‟) seems to occur in experiences too.  
 There are other cases which seem to go against the claim that only certain 
high-level features capture the content of experiences. One can, for instance, 
think of examples which separate representational content from sensational 
content, but retain substantial degrees of inference from background 
knowledge, concepts and theory. But, even here, there are aspects of the 
experience which remain unaccounted for. There is no sense in which the 
experience of music, for instance, is fully captured by its representational 
content. Though it may be inferential in some other (complex) sense, there is 
still something different about the experience of music that such inferential 
features do not capture: a solo drum player, for instance, produces music which 
sounds grouped in some way (it has certain representational features) but such 
features clearly don‟t exhaust the content of the experience, otherwise there 
would be no difference between a solo drummer and a drum machine (and no 
reason to prefer one over the other). Likewise, a subdominant chord resolves 
naturally to its tonic chord in a plagal cadence in a manner that seems to have 
other features beyond the (doubtless) cultural familiarities and preferences 
which give rise to such musical conventions.157 What we can understand about 
such examples is that they exhibit features of experience which have a 
representational content and varying degrees of inference from background 
knowledge and theory, but which still have features that these aspects of 
experience cannot capture. Such features, moreover, amount to more than a 
mere mechanical stimulation of the sense organs: there is an experiential 
content to them which just does not seem to be representational or fully 
culturally informed (though it does seem to be structured in some sense).  
 Such considerations as those given above lend some support to the idea that 
there might be features of experiences which escape the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal. And this, in turn, seems to lend support to the idea that 
there are sensory contents („perceptions‟) as well as wholly 
                                                 
157 Peacocke suggests the example of hearing a chord as an augmented fourth rather than as a 
diminished fifth: „Someone can have this experience without having the concept of an 
augmented fourth. His hearing it that way is necessarily linked to the resolutions of the chord 
that sound right to him.‟ ibid., p. 25. Such examples seem to be structured in some sense which 
does not seem to be fully representational or dependent on background concepts. 
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judgement-informed experiences. The examples given above clearly suggest 
that neither the concept principle nor the intrinsicality principle captures all the 
important features of experiential content of interest in such cases.  
 Another example which lends more support for this claim is the phenomenon 
of visual grouping. Grouping is a pervasive representational and conceptual 
feature of experiences in most circumstances. One ordinarily brings to bear 
concepts of objects in normal human experience which help to sort out the 
various representational features of the visual scene before one. This is the 
intuition which makes the application of Millar‟s „concept principle‟ and 
„intrinsicality principle‟ seem so plausible in the context of experiences. 
Sherlock Holmes undoubtedly brought to bear concepts of objects, relations 
and events to sort out his visual scene. In the case of grouped experiences, the 
application of the concept principle also yields the application of the 
intrinsicality principle (because one applies concepts, one‟s experience yields 
certain grouped representational features). Holmes‟s experience thus exhibited 
a content that had projected certain representational state-types. Indeed, visual 
grouping is ordinarily so commonly tied to the concepts and representations 
that one brings to an experience, that one ordinarily „sees‟ one‟s experience as a 
group of objects. Yet the case of visual grouping as necessarily involving 
„high-level‟ concepts and representational content is obviously too simple a 
story, even if it might be true of normal human perception. For it is clear that in 
other circumstances one may not have a concept with which to group some 
scene and yet one‟s experience might be „intrinsically grouped‟ in some 
fashion. The arrays below seem to involve no organisational concepts (beyond 
the concept of „line‟) yet they are clearly seen in one way rather than any 
other:158 
 
                                                 
158 I. Rock, Introduction to Perception, p. 259. In the first array below (i) and (ii) and (iii) and 
(iv) are seen to be grouped; in the second array (ii) and (iii) are seen to be grouped. 
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Figure 2 Ambiguous line groupings 
 
This kind of case does not seem to require concepts in the very strong sense in 
which representational or propositional linguistic concepts are needed. But 
there does seem to be a structural way in which the various experiences are 
organised. Are we to call this pattern of organisation „inferential‟ in the 
high-level sense or not?  
 It seems to be extending the notion of inference too far to answer this 
question in the affirmative; however, the experience does not seem to be 
altogether „sensational‟ either. Again, like the music case, this experience 
seems to be structured, but not entirely representational; nor does it seem to 
involve the imposition of sophisticated concepts.  
 There are more interesting cases of grouped experiences than this. Peacocke 
suggests that the following array: 
 
 
  
 125 
 
 
shows that experiences can be „differently grouped in successive experiences 
[being] seen as either rows or columns‟159 i.e., as the following configurations: 
 
Figure 3 Ambiguous dot array 
He also suggests that this phenomenon might demonstrate a problem with the 
idea that perceptions might have intrinsically sensational properties. This is 
because switches in aspect can be distinguished „within the class of sensational 
properties of experience.‟ 160  (This, in turn, seems to suggest that there is 
nothing intrinsic to the experiences which makes them a sensational experience 
of one kind rather than another.) It shall later be suggested, however, that this is 
precisely what one should expect of such experiences if the continuum account 
is true. The case of intra-grouping aspect switches (such as that between rows 
and columns) is an instance of the various features of an experience being 
attended to at different times. And this is possible only if experience has the 
                                                 
159 Peacocke, op. cit., pp. 25-6. 
160  Ibid., p. 26. This example is taken from Rock, op. cit., who describes the original 
configuration as „unstable and ambiguous.‟ (p. 257). 
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character of being a composite of various kinds of content simultaneously.  
 The point of the examples given above is simply to demonstrate that the 
application of concepts and representational content do not exhaust a 
specification of the nature of experiences. Both the concept principle and the 
intrinsicality principle seem to be insufficient to capture the content of sensory 
experiences or perceptions, even if they might be adequate to capture the 
content of propositional attitudes or judgements. (This is the reason that both 
Peacocke and Millar see the need to postulate a further category which is 
neither proposition-like, nor sensation-like.) There seems to be a qualitative 
kind of sensational or perceptual content in the former kinds of experiences 
which simply cannot be captured in strictly „high-level‟ terms. (Some of the 
above examples suggest that there is more to an experience than its intrinsic 
representational content; others suggest that the application of the concept 
principle is irrelevant to some grouped experiences.) These examples 
notwithstanding, it is nonetheless clear that philosophers have not been 
completely wrong to concentrate on high-level features when giving the content 
of experience. In each of the above examples the content of the experience does 
involve appeal to some inferential features. (In the case of the line groupings, it 
is simply the structural features of a „line‟; in the case of the resolving chords, it 
is the structured features of a culturally familiar musical progression.) The point 
is just that the extension of such inferential features as necessary and sufficient 
characteristics of experience generally seems to have been seriously 
over-emphasised.  
 The above considerations are important if they are true, and they do seem to 
be true. The considerations here should suggest that there is an inherent 
flexibility in the notion of experience being inferential or non-inferential, which 
neither the inferentialist proposal nor the observational account allows for. 
Some experiences, while not captured by inferential features, are certainly 
informed by them to some degree. This leaves neither the inferentialist proposal 
nor the observational account in a position to claim to be fully adequate 
accounts of experiential content, the above examples being instances in which 
experiences which are otherwise strongly inferential yet still have content 
which cannot be captured in inferential terms.  
 There are even stronger reasons for doubting the terms of the inferentialist 
proposal as a full and adequate account of experiential content. Peacocke notes 
that in „the normal human experience ... visual field properties are associated 
with a representational content,‟161 but it is, in principle, possible to conceive of 
cases in which the sensational property and the representation of certain objects 
are present but where it is unclear to what extent there is a projection of these 
features onto the representational content of the world being experienced. Such 
cases offer examples of representational experiences without the normally 
                                                 
161 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 14. 
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projected state-type features. This is so in the case of congenitally blind people 
equipped with a tactile vision substitution system (TVSS), which registers the 
output of television cameras in terms of the motion of vibrating rods on the 
subject‟s back. These patients learn to transform vibro-tactor displays on their 
skins into „visual‟ arrays, projected in space. But although a „projection‟ of 
sorts occurs here, what kind of projection is it? According to the results of such 
a procedure, the subjects seem to undergo „intrinsically spatial sensations ... 
which are not those of pressure or vibration, and which are reported to be quite 
unlike those of touch.‟ Furthermore, in some studies, the patients report that 
their spatial sensations seem to be centred around the lens of the camera, not 
their backs, or objects in the world. Now, although this kind of experience may 
involve some kind of projection, it is clear that the projection need not be 
associated with representational content of objects in the world. The reports of 
subjects undergoing such „experiences‟ are also very curious: As well as saying 
that these sensations appearing to come from the face of the camera not their 
backs, nor out in the world, they also suggest that the visual data seem to exist in 
two dimensional space with no depth. According to such subjects, the normal 
vocabulary of „seeing‟ (presumably that vocabulary associated with 
representational content) is inappropriate for capturing the experiences.162 
 The evidence, of course, admits of several interpretations. What it might 
mean is that one can have experiences which are both unlike visual sensations 
and visual representations. The subject might not represent the content of his 
experience in any fully projected way like Sherlock Holmes does with the 
cigar-band, although it seems he/she is still consciously aware of certain 
(non-visual, non-tactile) representational features. This phenomenon is very 
odd, but we might think of reasons for this: it seems prima facie reasonable that 
in order for an organism to achieve success in modelling experiences in terms of 
their projected representational contents, a requirement is that such an organism 
undergo prior non-projected (or partially-projected) representational 
experiences in the first instance. (In a congenitally blind person these inchoate 
partially-projected experiences don‟t come via their usual route due to the 
defect in the visual system, though this route can, apparently, be short-circuited 
to produce the appropriate sensations in the absence of their [visual] 
representational correlates). What a blind person experiences when equipped 
with a TVSS are spatial sensations with only partly-projected features that his 
visual system would fully represent if his visual system were operating 
normally.163  
                                                 
162 Ibid., p. 15. See, for instance: G. Guarniero, „Experience of Tactile Vision,‟ pp. 101-4; P. 
Bach-y-Rita et al, „Vision Substitution by Tactile Image Projection,‟ pp. 963-4.  
163 A possible analogy to the case of the congenitally blind person‟s sense of space is the 
phenomenon of waking up in a strange place and „not knowing where you are‟. At the instant of 
waking one experiences certain spatial sensations of things being in certain vague relationships, 
but one‟s projection of them is not clear. (The table is in a vague direction within one‟s visual 
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 The suggestion that one can have sensational features of spatial experiences, 
but not necessarily fully projected features of the same experience, is damaging 
for the inferentialist proposal. But the idea that such aspects of experience 
might be necessary precursors to fully projected, representational features 
seems plausible for evolutionary reasons. Briefly, it would seem that if 
inferential/non-inferential dimensions constitute a continuum and not an 
exclusive dichotomy, then some primitive kind of content must be available to 
very unsophisticated organisms simply to help them survive. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, there might be selective advantages in having some kind of sense of 
spatiality without very complex representational content. One need not be able 
to fully project one‟s experience as a certain spatially located object in the world 
(though it is doubly advantageous if one can do both). All one has to have, in the 
simplest case, is a visual field experience of some vague spatial kind without 
fully projected features („fully‟ in the sense of having the projected features 
associated with a given representational content). One need only the sense that 
something is fast approaching, rather than representing that an object is fast 
approaching. One could even run a line similar to Dawkins here: if no eye, 
better a light senstitive patch than nothing. Similarly, if no projected state types, 
better a semi-projected sense of spatiality than nothing at all.164  
 Of course, like a very unsophisticated organism, the congenitally blind 
cannot represent objects spatially in any visual sense either. However, in such a 
case, it is better that an organism can feel, at least, some kind of representational 
aspects of experience, if it has no other more sophisticated abilities; but even if 
it did, given that one can project spatial features of objects incorrectly, it is also 
selectively useful to be able to sense spatiality without necessarily being able to 
fully project it. Sensing a visual field enlargement is useful selectively, since 
one may be wrong about exactly what one projects, and how one‟s projection is 
occupying visual space. How an experience is processed depends less on the 
actual object represented, than on the segregation of certain groups of stimuli 
which are then available for later more detailed processing.165  
 Another consideration here is the point that one might somehow register 
features of experiential content without necessarily representing those features 
                                                                                                                               
field etc.) As one becomes more conscious of the situation, of course, the projected spatial 
features become more dominating than the partly-projected spatial ones. 
164 Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, passim, especially „Making Tracks through 
Animal Space‟. 
165 There is some evidence for the independent processing of subjective contour brightness and 
sharpness which suggests a limited application of „higher-order‟ cognitive mechanisms. There 
is also some evidence for an expanded role in perceptual processing for so-called „preattentive‟ 
vision (i.e. low-level stimulus grouping which does not depend on the identification and 
analysis of that stimulus). See: S. Siegel and S. Petry, „Evidence for the Independent Processing 
of Subjective Contour Brightness and Sharpness,‟ p. 233-41. See also: M. Bravo and R. Blake, 
„Preattentive Vision and Perceptual Groups,‟ pp. 515-22.  
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at all. It is this kind of phenomenon that Millar has in mind when he considers 
what he calls an „aspect‟ of experience. The example he has in mind arises most 
vividly in the case of colour perception: 
 
Sensational properties can be further illustrated with the help of the notion of 
an aspect. A uniformly red surface looked at from a particular point of view 
in particular conditions of light may present a richly variegated pattern of 
light and shade and hue. This pattern is a colour aspect and is as much an 
objective property of the surface as its colour which is uniformly red. Often, 
perhaps more often than not, we do not notice the colour aspects of the things 
we look at. That is one reason why it is difficult to paint and draw. But even if 
in looking at the red surface we failed to notice the variegated pattern it 
presents, there remains a sense in which our experience could be said to 
register the aspect. Even if we are not attending to the aspect in a way that 
would enable us to describe it, our experience would in normal circumstances 
have a phenomenal character which would be different if the aspect were 
different. A change in the position of the light source, for instance, would 
alter the aspect and this would normally produce a change in the phenomenal 
character of the experience. Registering the colour aspect in question is a 
sensational property. An experience can possess this property and yet not be 
of a surface presenting this aspect in question. One could obtain an 
experience of the latter sort by attending to the aspect with the artist‟s eye, but 
an experience might register the aspect even if it did not result from such 
attention.166  
 
In this case, the experience of a coloured hue might not seem to be fixed onto 
the experience of the painted surface as such; it may seem, instead, to be a 
product of attention. (One may notice a painted surface, yet not the change in 
hue, even though one registers the hue and can attend to it when required.) The 
passage quoted from Sibley in Chapter 1 gave a case of scratches on a window. 
In this case, one might not be attending to the scratches, yet the scratches may 
still present themselves as blurry „in the corner of one‟s eye‟. There is a 
difference in these cases. The first example shows that an aspect may not be 
noticed and yet be present in one‟s experience (the colour hue); the second 
shows that an aspect might be noticed and yet not projected in one‟s experience 
(the window scratches). So, as well as there being unnoticed seeings, there can 
be unprojected noticings or low-level registerings. Such examples are 
problematic for a representational view of experiential content and the 
inferentialist proposal generally. They are a problem because such examples 
show that some features of experience are simply not captured by high-level 
influences. 
 There are more interesting cases of experiences with non-representational 
features. Beck offers a case of colour perception in which the features of a 
colour hue can be noticed to switch between aspects in successive experiences 
                                                 
166 A. Millar, „What‟s in a Look?‟, op. cit., pp. 88-89. 
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of the one projection. In Beck‟s example, the intersection of three sets of 
differently coloured circles is a combination of the colours of each circle in 
equal proportions. Yet when the circles are seen on various inclined planes, the 
intersecting colour can be seen only sometimes as a mixed colour and 
sometimes as an unmixed colour as seen through the overlain „transparent‟ part 
of one circle.167 In this example, it is also possible to notice only one aspect or 
the other; the other not being obvious until it is pointed out or concentrated on. 
Millar‟s claim above about often not noticing the colour aspects of the things 
we look at is clearly a pervasive feature of colour perception. It is attention that 
makes us notice certain colour features over others. But when one is attentive to 
changes in aspect one can also notice successive aspect shifts as Beck‟s 
example shows. The class of alternating sensational experiences in this case is 
clearly experienced as something quite different from the representational 
content of the experience as circles of certain non-uniform colours.  
 The case of intra-grouping aspect shifts mentioned earlier is no less 
mysterious than the aspect shifts in Beck‟s surface colour example. Such cases 
show that the content of an experience can oscillate between its various aspect 
features as a function of attention. And this is perfectly intelligible if the 
complexity thesis is true and experience is composed of various interposed 
(sensational, representational, etc.) elements as an experiential amalgam. In 
concentrating on an experience, one cannot normally notice all its various 
aspects. But over time, and by concentration, those various aspects can come to 
be the subject of one‟s attention (hence, the phenomenon of aspect-switches). 
Peacocke‟s problem earlier need not be a difficulty unless it is assumed that 
experiences have one or other sensational property and not several kinds of 
content simultaneously.  
 The phenomenon of attention fixing itself is troublesome for the inferentialist 
line. In perception, it is important to be able to notice something without 
representing it or knowing what that thing is - it is important for the visual 
system to register information without the necessary input of „high-level‟ 
features. It is well known in the optical sciences that parts of the retina (in 
particular, the extreme edge) is very sensitive to low-level informational inputs 
such as movement, but not to highly complex, inferentially-mediated 
discriminations like objects. The very physiology of the eye, it seems, allows us 
to register low-level, selectively useful „aspects‟ - of scenes, events, etc. - 
without being able to process that information intellectually. In Dretske‟s 
terms, it allows us, paradoxically, to „notice them even before one sees 
them.‟168  
                                                 
167 See J. Beck, Surface Colour Perception, plate 1. 
168 F. I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, p. 15. Gregory remarks of the extreme edge of the retina: 
„when stimulated by movement we experience nothing, but a reflex is initiated which rotates the 
eye to bring the moving object into central vision, so that the highly developed foveal region 
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 Several examples have been given where significant experiential content can 
be shown to issue in circumstances in which the representational content of an 
experience is either absent altogether or occurs in degrees. Representational 
features of experience clearly do not fully capture what has been called 
low-level „aspects‟ of content. An experience can have certain representational 
features as well as having aspects which do not seem representational. An 
aspect may also be noticed or unnoticed without being projected. Aspect shifts 
can also occur in successive experiences of the same projected object. My 
conclusion about such cases is that they are a problem for the inferentialist 
proposal and, in fact, go some way to add to the plausibility of the continuum 
account. On this account it is plausible that there are such low-level sensational 
features of experiences as much as high-level features, and, given the 
complexity thesis, there should be such sensational features in every 
experiential amalgam.  
5.4 Epistemic content 
Another feature of the inferentialist proposal is the emphasis on background 
knowledge in experiential content. On this view, the content of one‟s 
knowledge necessarily filters one‟s experience. Sherlock Holmes brought to 
bear implicit knowledge of objects and events as well as information about 
Jones, his assailant‟s smoking habits, etc., in order to have the experience he 
did. Experiences are necessarily epistemic on this view.  
 However, while such claims are plausible for aspects of some experiences, 
they are not plausible for the experiences of conceptually unsophisticated 
organisms, nor even for experiences of a certain type. Again, the phenomenon 
of colour experience must be seen as a difficulty for this account. In this case, 
while it may be clear that one represents certain features of the world, one is 
very hard-pressed to see the relevance of the influence of „high-level‟ 
background knowledge. It would seem, in fact, that despite what one knew 
about colours, one cannot help but experience them in a certain way. „Seeing‟ a 
colour amounts to perceiving contentful features which are independent of what 
colours actually are.  
 C.L. Hardin considers various illusions as being problematic for any broadly 
„physicalist‟ account of the phenomenon of colour. The implications of this 
view are problematic for any inferentialist account of experiential content also. 
Colour, on the physicalist account, is a feature of wave-lengths of light hitting 
the retina and exciting photoreceptors, which, in turn, hyperpolarize and 
generate electrochemical signals in the surrounding cells. Colour perception is a 
purely physical process involving purely physical mechanisms. The process of 
                                                                                                                               
with its associated central neural network is brought into play for identifying the object. The 
edge of the retina is thus an early-warning device, used to rotate the eyes to aim the 
object-recognition part of the system on to objects likely to be friend or foe rather than neutral.‟ 
R. L. Gregory, Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing, p. 91.  
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absorbing the various frequencies of such lightwaves is supposed to account for 
the phenomenon of colour.169 But „Bidwell‟s Ghost‟ is a striking challenge to 
this view, as Hardin explains: 
 
Imagine the following experiment. Before you is a spinning disk, illuminated 
by an ordinary incandescent lamp. If most people are asked what color they 
see on the face of the disk, they will unhesitatingly reply that they see a bluish 
green. ...[T]his proves to be a trick of sorts. When the wheel is made to turn 
very slowly you see a half-black, half-white disk with a slot through which a 
red lamp flashes. You saw no red at all before, and you can discern no bluish 
green now... This particular after-image phenomenon is called Bidwell‟s 
ghost...When you view Bidwell‟s ghost, it is always open to you to deny that 
you are seeing bluish green, on the grounds that after-images are not physical 
objects and only physical objects have colors. But it is then fair to ask you 
what color you do see. Red? Grey? No color at all? None of these answers is 
intuitively very appealing.170 
 
It is not satisfactory to appeal here to the colour properties of spectral 
wavelengths of light either, as the anomalous cases can be multiplied. A 
projected „pure‟ yellow light of (roughly) 577 nanometers is perceptually 
equivalent to the superimposition of a „pure‟ green light of (roughly) 540 
nanometers and a „pure‟ red light of 670 nanometers. There is no trace of 577 
nm. light in the superimposed light, though it looks exactly the same as its 
isolated equivalent.171 A further example of a colour illusion is when a blue, 
green or red light is projected onto a white surface. Such colours appear as such 
- i.e., as blue, green and red; however, when a yellow light is projected onto a 
white surface, it appears as white at the surface. This phenomenon is 
particularly puzzling, given that the physiology of colour vision supposedly 
involves the excitation combinations of only three types of cone cells which 
contain only red, blue and green pigments.172 Such cases throw doubt upon the 
„physicalist‟ account of such experiences. For, as Hardin notes: „the physicalist 
                                                 
169 For details, see C. L. Hardin, Colour for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, passim. 
170 C.L. Hardin, „Colour and Illusion,‟ from Mind and Cognition: A Reader, op. cit., p. 555. 
171 Perceptually equivalent yet physically inequivalent colour visual stimuli are known as 
metamers. The examples of this phenomenon are legion: the case of the colour white, for 
instance, which is a composite of wavelengths of all colours and seems to have no visible 
chromatic colours at all. And it can be demonstrated in the phenomenon of „simultaneous 
contrast‟ that a physically identifiable colour when placed alongside other colours can induce 
the complementary colour in that region. The point here is that „.. any theory of colour that is to 
be of any interest, must go beyond a set of raw stipulations to the effect that such-and-such 
wavelengths are to count as red, and that so-and-so wavelengths are to be cyan, and so on ... At 
the very least, we can demand of a theory of colour that it satisfactorily represent what is going 
on when we see red and brown and white and black in ordinary life.‟ For multiple examples, see 
Hardin, ibid., pp. 556-8.  
172 For an account of the physiology of colour perception, see: S. L. Merbs and J. Nathans, 
„Absorption Spectra of Human Cone Pigments,‟ pp. 433-435.  
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who would reduce real colors to wavelengths of light should be able to pick out 
the real colors on the basis of physical considerations alone.‟173 
 Physicalists have different approaches to this issue. Colour has been taken by 
some physicalists (e.g., Armstrong) as a complex environmental property. 
Other physicalists (e.g., Smart) have taken colour to be a secondary property 
which can be analysed reductively. The reductionist-type proposal has to meet 
the kinds of problems just mentioned. The other kind of proposal has to face the 
difficulty that the complex physical processes in question are highly disjunctive 
(and, hence, cannot easily be described) but, worse still, they don‟t seem to 
capture our ordinary conception of colours as we experience them. There really 
seem to be no other authentic possibilities to deal with this problem despite 
recent attempts to develop intermediate positions.174 Marie McGinn argues that 
we cannot have our ordinary „subjective‟ understanding and our physicalism 
too: 
 
Either colour is identical with some complex physical property of a surface 
(for example, its propensity to reflect light of a given wavelength), but the 
apparent connection between colour and the notion of an object‟s looking like 
this is lost. Or, colour is accounted for in terms of primary qualities on 
perceiving subjects, but at the cost of creating an intensional realm whose 
contents are conceived as subjective qualities beyond the scope of scientific 
investigation.175  
 
Of course it doesn‟t follow that colour aspects are beyond the scope of scientific 
investigation at all. More argument needs to be offered for this to be a plausible 
claim. What does follow is that what one experiences appears to be different 
from what is known about the physical properties of such experiences. Knowing 
what a colour is, doesn‟t help one with cases of colour illusion. This is as much 
a problem for inferentialism as it is for physicalism. There appear to be features 
of colour perception which are qualitatively irreducible to how physics tell us a 
colour should behave in the case of superimposed wavelengths of light. 
„Background knowledge‟ may capture Holmes‟s experience of Jones and the 
cigar-band, but it doesn‟t capture certain features of how colours look.  
 Nor can colours be captured by representational features. Take the case of the 
after-image produced by a camera flash-bulb. In such a case, the red spot 
precisely obscures the photographer being represented in the experience by the 
people being photographed, yet there is no question that the red spot is located 
in the experience as any represented feature: rather, the transitory colour 
                                                 
173 Ibid., p. 557. Presumably, on the strength of such examples, the same conclusion should 
have to be reached on the so-called „dispositional‟ account of colours. For a critique of such a 
view along the same lines, see: P.A. Boghossian and J.D. Velleman, „Colour as a Secondary 
Quality‟, pp. 81-103. See also their „Physicalist Theories of Colour‟.  
174 See: K. R. Westphal, Colour ; C. McGinn, The Subjective View. 
175 M. McGinn, „On Two Recent Accounts of Colour‟, pp. 316-324. 
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appears to be a sui generis feature of the experience or an „aspect‟ of the 
experience in my sense. The colour flash seems to be a partly qualitative, not an 
entirely representational, experience.  
 Colours have some quite peculiar features which militate against the idea that 
they can be captured in the terms of the inferentialist proposal. Katz isolates 
several distinguishable aspects of colour perception which he describes as the 
„modes of appearance‟ of colours.176 Surface colours, according to Katz, can be 
distinguished from film colours. Colours can also have voluminousness and 
transparency. So-called mirrored colours can also be distinguished from those 
which have lustre; and colours with luminosity can be perceptually 
discriminated from those which have glow. (I shall outline only some of these 
below. For further details see Katz.) 
 Any of the above features of colour experiences must be seen as problematic 
for the view of experiential content being criticised. This is so because not all 
the features mentioned can be captured in inferential terms. Katz shows that 
where some colours seem to be localised „so precisely at an exactly definable 
distance‟177 (e.g., the colour of a piece of paper), other colours „seem to be 
gauged only with some degree of uncertainty‟178 (e.g., viewing the colour of the 
sky through a hollow tube, or viewing a spectrometer where the location of a 
colour is judged to vary widely at distances between 50 - 80 cm). The first kind 
of colours seem to belong to an object or surface and hence are called „surface‟ 
colours; these alone seem to have a representational content. The latter kind of 
colours, however, seem not to be so located and are known as „film‟ colours. 
These colour appearances have other distinguishing features: the appearance of 
film colours also seems to have an essentially frontal plane orientation, whereas 
the surface colours „may appear in all possible modes of orientation‟, 179 
corresponding to the orientation of the object. Surface colours can also have a 
wrinkled or smooth texture, whereas film colours are always uniformly smooth. 
In the case of film colours, it also seems as though one can penetrate deeply into 
the colour. In the case of surface colours, however, the colour seems to present a 
barrier beyond which the eye cannot pass „as though the colour ... offers 
resistance to the eye.‟180 Compare the blueness of the sky as a film colour and 
the orange of a pomegranate as a surface colour as examples which exhibit 
these characteristics. These features are not stable characteristics of colours. 
Katz notes that „all possible intermediate stages are to be found between surface 
colours and film colours.‟181 It is also apparent that colours of the one kind can 
                                                 
176 D. Katz, The World of Colour, p. 7. 
177 Loc. cit. 
178 Loc. cit. 
179 Ibid., p. 71. 
180 Ibid., p. 8. 
181 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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be made to have features of the other in some circumstances. Various influences 
can also be made on both surface and film colours which change their 
appearance. Seeing a colour through one eye, rather than both, results in surface 
colours appearing to recede; seeing a surface colour through a small aperture 
(e.g., a key hole) makes it seem like a film colour in having a frontal plane 
orientation. Looking at the orientation of a film colour (e.g., the blueness of the 
sky) can be influenced by the presence of surface colours in the same visual 
region when they stand in clear relief (they will often make the blue of the sky 
„bend towards‟ the object).182 However, when no surface colours are present, a 
film colour seems to lack spatial localisation (e.g., the subjective visual grey 
experienced when one‟s eyes are closed).   
 Some surface colours also seem to have volume which is quite distinct from 
the volume of an object. Ordinary objects have no volume in respect of their 
colour (even though the object itself has volume). However, the grey of a fog or 
the colour of a liquid may appear to have volume by seeming to occupy 
tri-dimensional space. According to Katz, a colour can have voluminousness 
only when it is transparent. The more dense a fog becomes (and 
correspondingly less transparent) the more it takes on the appearance of film 
colour. The volume filling surface colour of the fog is lost with an increase of 
opacity. 183  A colour, however, can be transparent without having 
voluminousness at all (a coloured perspex sheet does not seem to occupy 
tri-dimensional space like a moderately thick fog).  
 Such features of colours are variable in the extreme and seem to be quite 
different to the representational localisation of the particular surface colour of 
an object. Moreover, it is easy to ignore these features; it is easy to see the world 
simply as groupings of surface colours. This is so because we have largely 
adapted to attend to such colour aspects over others (we normally see colours in 
terms of coloured represented objects ). There are, however, strong reasons for 
thinking that this is but one mode of appearance of colours among others. 
Presumably there is a case for claiming that this is the most survivally useful of 
all colour aspects (it is, after all, objects which are the source of many of our 
survival needs and avoidances); however, this should not go to rule out other 
colour appearances. The point here is that such features of colour experiences 
seem too complex to be captured in the simplistic terms of the inferentialist 
proposal.  
 Colour reductionism seems to be false, and so does a simple view of colours 
as being the surface properties of objects. Why should a reductionism of 
perceptual experiences to „high-level‟ features (such as representational or 
                                                 
182 Ibid., p. 73. „In general, the more distinctly the surface colour acting upon it deviates from 
[the] orientation [of the film colour], the more the film deviates from the frontal-parallel 
position.‟ Loc. cit. 
183 Ibid., p. 21. 
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epistemic content) be true? The suggestion here is that this issues from a 
skewed conception of the observation/theory distinction. This has led to an 
over-emphasis being placed on the importance of high-level input to 
experiential content. There seem to be good reasons, however, for taking a 
somewhat less extreme proposal seriously.  
 Some experiences have aspects like „additional characterisation‟ over and 
above what is represented in the experience; others are spatially represented in 
some sense, yet not fully projected; others still have content in a way which is 
not influenced by background knowledge and concepts. Colour experiences 
seem to have features which cannot be captured in entirely representational or 
epistemic terms. Besides this, there are reasons for supposing that some 
experiences, though involving inference, are not propositional and also cases 
where it is an over-rationalisation to speak of theory being involved. In view of 
this, it seems plausible that the various features of high-level inference do not 
influence experience en bloc. It is also plausible that they do not have the 
important focus that the inferentialist attributes to them. In the light of the 
examples given, Millar‟s concept principle and intrinsicality principle certainly 
do not capture some interesting features of experiential content. There are some 
features of experience which escape such characterisations.  
 Considerations like this may suggest that the tripartite characterisation of 
sensations, sensory experiences (perceptions) and propositional attitudes 
(judgements) is a more accurate way of describing experiential content. 
Generally speaking it is a better account. However, it is not the kind of 
characterisation being defended in this book. The claim is that an even more 
compelling proposal would allow for degrees of influence even within the 
various levels of experience. That is, there seems to be no logically compelling 
reason to stop at Peacocke‟s or Millar‟s three-way distinction between 
sensations, perceptions and judgments.  
 A number of considerations suggest an application of graduated categories 
even within these divisions. Firstly, the phenomenon of intra-grouping aspect 
switches (above), like the colour aspect switches, seems to indicate that within 
the class of sensational properties, distinguishable contents can be isolated (this 
not only demonstrates a fundamental role for attention in the fixation of 
experiential content, but also that certain structural grouping abilities require 
low-level inferential capacities). Secondly, the phenomenon of representational 
aspects and non-representational aspects within the class of sensory 
experiences alone seems to be too rigid: there is surely a case for saying that 
some experiences can be neither strictly representational nor 
non-representational in Peacocke‟s or Millar‟s sense (e.g., the vague waking 
experience, or the experience of a film colour). Finally, both the concept 
principle and the intrinsicality principle seem to be too blunt. What constitutes a 
„concept‟ in the case of the line groupings given above? How does having the 
concept of Russian Blue capture an unnoticed (but registered) colour aspect? 
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What constitutes an „intrinsic‟ representational state-type in the case of 
experience via the tactile-vision simulator? A more plausible application of 
such categories would not be just to judgements or propositional attitudes, but 
to lower order, less sophisticated contents in various degrees of sophistication.  
 Such experiences seem to require more than just sensory inputs and rather 
less than high-level concepts, background knowledge and representational 
states. The typology of sensations, perceptions and judgements does not capture 
such considerations. Though the accounts offered by Peacocke and Millar 
constitute an improvement on the inferentialist proposal and the observational 
account, they still require some refinement.  
 What can we conclude from all this? Peacocke‟s view of the matter is this: 
 
Those who say that sensation has almost no role to play in normal, mature 
human experience, or at least in normal human visual experience, commonly 
cite as their ground the fact that all visual experience have some 
representational content. If this is indeed a fact, it shows that no human visual 
experience is a pure sensation. But it does not follow that such experience 
does not have sensational properties. It is one thing to say that all mature 
visual experiences have representational content, another thing to say that no 
such experience has intrinsic properties (properties which help to specify 
what it is like to have the experience) explicable without reference to 
representational content. We can label those who dispute this view, and hold 
that all intrinsic properties of mature human visual experiences are possessed 
in virtue of their representational content, „extreme perceptual theorists‟.184 
 
What are called „intrinsic properties‟ here correspond fairly well to what has 
been called sensational aspects of experience (Peacocke also calls them 
„sensational properties‟). On the basis of the previous discussion, it would seem 
there are intrinsic properties. By implication, of course, the inferentialist 
proposal stands in need of serious revision. 
 Peacocke‟s claim suggests a way of transcending the traditional dichotomy 
of the inferentialist proposal and the observational account. He claims (rightly 
in my view) that even though straightforward, inferentially-informed 
perceptions („mature visual experience‟) contain representational content, it 
does not follow that such experiences do not also have sensational properties. In 
other words, Peacocke admits the possibility that low-level content is always 
present even in straightforwardly „high-level‟ perceptions.  
 Of course, being an „extreme perceptual theorist‟ is another way of saying 
that experience needs a background of theories and concepts to embed the 
representational contents; it is another way of describing the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal. But, as Peacocke notes, this does not rule out a 
complexity thesis: that experience actually contains low-level content as well. 
He does not attempt to provide a reason for this, but a reason for this is provided 
                                                 
184 Peacocke, op. cit., p. 8. 
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in what follows.  
5.5 Several reasons why the inferentialist proposal won’t work 
Beyond the problems already mentioned, there are several immediately 
plausible reasons why the inferentialist proposal is not adequate.  
 The first reason: for the fully inferentialist view to be true, experience must 
be loaded with high-level concepts which are epistemic in the required sense. 
Experiences must involve descriptive concepts drawn from background 
knowledge. (This, in essence, is Millar‟s „concept principle‟: „a concept can be 
an ingredient of the content of [the representational] state only if the subject 
possesses the concept. If a person believes that he caused embarrassment at the 
party the other night then the concept of embarrassment is an ingredient of the 
content of his belief.‟) 185  This sort of principle naturally translates into 
experiential content on the terms of the inferentialist proposal and hence, 
experiential content is seen as representational and propositional etc. But it is 
fairly clear that the concept principle will not work. 
 As Millar notes, if this is true then it means that only if a person has a concept 
of a ø can they have an experience of a ø, and (importantly) if the concept 
differed, then so must the experience. But this is less than self-evident, as he 
explains: 
 
Tom, a keen gardener, is looking in the direction of a dahlia. Being in good 
order, he has a visual experience of a dahlia. Dick, his decadent flat-dwelling 
friend, lacks even a rudimentary knowledge of horticulture. He does not even 
know that dahlias are flowers, never mind that they grow from tubers, come 
in a variety of gorgeous bright colours and so on. In fact, Dick lacks the very 
concept of a dahlia ... if the hapless Dick were to look at the dahlia from 
Tom‟s point of view he could not have a visual experience of the same type as 
Tom‟s. His experience would differ from Tom‟s in respect of its 
representational content for the simple reason that for want of the right 
concept he is in no position to judge that there is a dahlia before him. The 
counterintuitive feature of this analysis is the implication that Dick‟s 
experience would have to differ qua experience from Tom‟s. No problem 
attaches to the fact that while Tom would be prompted to judge that there is a 
dahlia before him, Dick would not. The problem is to see why experiences 
which differ in this way would have to be different sorts of experiences.186  
 
There are some things to be distinguished here. Millar seems wrong about one 
of them. Presumably Dick would represent the same thing in his experience that 
Tom does, even if he didn‟t know what that thing was (leaving aside chronic 
myopia etc.) In this sense the experience is the same. However, Millar is right to 
isolate the problem that, on the inferentialist proposal, Dick must have had a 
different experience from that of Tom in some sense because he lacked certain 
                                                 
185 Millar, op. cit., (1985) p. 86. 
186 Ibid., pp. 90-1. 
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background knowledge. If descriptive concepts drawn from background 
knowledge are a necessary feature of the inferentialist proposal, then the 
experiences in question would have to be qualitatively different. But this 
doesn‟t seem intuitively right at all. Knowing what a dahlia is should not 
influence the experience one has in any qualitative way. One should be able to 
register something about an experience (besides its representational content) 
without knowing what that thing is. If not, knowledge can be conflated in a 
necessary way with experiential content, in the manner the inferentialist 
account stipulates. But this seems less than plausible for reasons already given. 
One can register an „aspect‟ without „noticing‟ or „knowing‟ it; so in this sense 
we can say that Dick‟s experience is not different from Tom‟s. Millar calls the 
necessary conflation of knowledge with experience „a consequence of the 
judgement theory,‟187 by which he means a view of experiential content which 
is heavily inferential. If a consequence of the inferentialist proposal is that 
experiences must differ qualitatively for want of high-level beliefs and 
concepts, then this hardly rests well with what we take to be commonsensical 
about perception. What seems true about this case is that Dick has the same 
qualitative experience, but simply does not recognise a particular object in his 
experience as being a dahlia.  
 The second reason: for the inferentialist proposal to be true, there would have 
to be no more to the content of such experiences than the concepts drawn upon. 
But this too seems to be doubtful, since representational experiences, 
experiences that, always seem to be under-determined by other features. An 
experience of a tomato, for instance, is under-determined by the experience of a 
tomato-like thing or a fake tomato. The experience of tomato-likeness by the 
presence of shape and colour features, under-determines the presentation of the 
tomato, since one can experience such things without (actually) experiencing a 
tomato. This is a pervasive feature of experiences generally, if one looks hard 
enough.  
 
The idea we are examining is that visual experiences represent or present 
possible states of the world. Their contents are supposed to be built from 
concepts under which physical objects and scenes fall. The trouble is that 
where the concept of a ø is of this sort, there is always more to there being a ø 
before the subject than can be captured by an experience.188  
 
This is precisely the reason that justifies Peacocke‟s comment above. The fact 
that there can be more to an experience than that which is represented or built 
from concepts is the reason why sensational content can escape the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal. However, it is not suggested that representational 
judgements, concepts etc., should be jettisoned from experiences altogether. 
                                                 
187 Loc. cit. 
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The claim is just that we need to adopt an application of „degrees of concept‟ to 
experience and say that there are also aspects of experiences which do not 
depend on the high-level influences drawn upon. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the notion of a concept in this connection is an 
ambiguous one. There seem to be two legitimate senses of concept, and the 
inferentialist employs only one of them. Following Peacocke, it was suggested 
that „concept‟ could be understood in terms of mode of presentation of a 
property, and there seemed to be two kinds of such modes: descriptive and 
sensational. From the emphasis placed on representational and propositional 
content, it is clear that the inferentialist holds that there are descriptive 
concepts, concepts which label and itemise certain represented objects of 
experience. However, there are also aspects of experience which seem simply 
sensational, not descriptive or representational. In the sense that experience 
needs concepts, my suggestion is that both kinds of concept are required. This 
would avoid the problem that there cannot be more to experience than the 
(descriptive) concept drawn upon.  
 The third reason: for the inferentialist proposal to be adequate, it must be 
true; but high-level features simply do not penetrate through experience in any 
comprehensive way at all. Just as what is represented is not the only feature of 
experiences, so too what is congruent with background theory does not 
necessarily exhaust what is sensed. The upshot is that Peacocke and Millar are 
right about needing at least a three-way categorisation of experience content. 
There at least needs to be a distinction between high-level judging, perception 
which is both judgement-informed and intrinsically sensational, and proximal 
stimulations (which are not „experiences‟ in any sense, but patterns of causal 
stimulation at the sensory surfaces). Jerry Fodor has also reached this 
conclusion in another context, which will be considered in Chapter 8. 
 The fourth reason: this concerns the application of very high-level inferential 
features to animal and infant experience. Unsophisticated creatures have 
experiences which need not be fixed by the terms of the inferentialist proposal, 
particularly linguistic propositional judgements and 
descriptive/representational concepts. Such features seem irrelevant in these 
cases. On the other hand, experiential content needs to be fixed somehow, so it 
would seem that some kind of low-level sensory content is required here. That 
low-level contentful experiences occur in addition to inference, would seem to 
have an important evolutionary function: for it seems reasonable that 
observational sensations fix simple contentful experiences for all organisms in 
a biologically direct manner. The reason this might be true is obvious enough: 
by conscious observational experience, the etiological evolutionary lead is kept 
short, which would otherwise necessitate long, unwieldy and time-consuming 
inferences. Extinction often offends if credit is asked, so certain perceptual 
information has to exist in the form of a basic and uncomplicated given for 
those organisms for whom rapidity of message and survival is important. 
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Ultimately, the argument for a continuum view on the relation between 
low-level observation and high-level inference must rely on this sort of 
evidence. And the argument would go something like this: for phylogenetic 
reasons, animals have (essentially) the same, though less well developed, 
conceptual equipment as us. They do not possess the facility to describe and, in 
particular, to propositionalise over their experiences, but they do have concepts 
of sorts, and they do sense; so sensing has content too, much more than the 
„proximal stimulations‟ lead us to believe. This kind of non-verbal, contentful 
sensing would seem to be the main mode of belief fixation in animals and 
infants. For in their case, inferential abilities are sparingly developed if at all, 
and yet something has to be recognised just to make sense of how their 
movements are guided. The issue of animal experience will be dealt with in 
detail in Chapter 7. 
5.6 Conclusion 
A reconsideration of experience along the lines of the continuum account sees 
low-level content feature with high-level content along a graded, non-exclusive 
scale. Experiential content, may be an amalgam of several kinds of content. For 
the most part we can account for experiential content in these high-level terms; 
however, this is far from saying that inferentialism is correct. More needs to be 
considered than the elements of high-level inference. What also need to be 
considered are: (i) evolutionary principles (an account needs to be given of the 
experiences of unsophisticated creatures, and the fact that some content are 
selectively advantageous); (ii) the fact that the features of high-level inference 
can be separated and distinguished; and (iii) the possibility that the rationalist 
influence on philosophy has been far too strong, and has led to an 
over-emphasis of high-level features in our assessment of experiential content. 
Peacocke‟s and Millars‟ views go some way toward suggesting that 
experiential content is more complicated than the inferentialist proposal says it 
is. These views are essentially in sympathy with my own. As we have seen in 
this chapter, there are aspects of experiential content that the inferentialist 
proposal simply does not capture. 
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6. Idealised and Naturalised Experience 
It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add 
the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to 
bring them under concepts.189  
 
Kant: experience idealised 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the rationalist heritage central to the inferentialist 
proposal. Kant‟s metaphysic of experience will be assessed and compared with 
Lorenz‟s biological perspective on Kant‟s innovations. In Chapter 7, the 
question of low-level animal experience will be looked at in the light of the 
inferentialist proposal and the continuum view. In Chapter 8, Fodor‟s account 
of the mind as an informational system will be discussed. Fodor‟s account of 
the structure of mental content is suggestive of a multi-level view of perceptual 
processing and, with modifications, is an important support for the view that 
there are several non-exclusive degrees in which contentful properties may 
appear to experiencing organisms. In concluding this part, the causal role of 
low-level content is looked at in some detail.  
6.2 Kant’s metaphysic of experience 
Kant has supplied a very influential view of the origins of experience, which 
could, in modern terminology, be called an information-theoretic account, 
involving the presentation of data, its organisation and its output. Kant‟s 
metaphysic was directed at how the objects of knowledge are possible, of 
course, but it is also a strong general claim about the nature of experience. 
Experience, to Kant, was a function of the material of sense unified by the 
categories of reason. 
 On the orthodox interpretation, Kant‟s view was that experiences were the 
                                                 
189 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B75, p. 61. (In the following citations from Kant, A and B 
refer to the first and second editions of the Critique - 1781 and 1787, respectively.) 
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organised matter of sensation. What came in as input through the sense organs 
was a disorganised sensory material which was then sorted into intelligible 
bundles, and it was this sorting function which made experience possible.  
 This sorting was achieved by an „inescapable duality‟190 of two departments 
or faculties of the mind, two mind-imposed structures - the forms of intuition 
and the categories. The former was a receptive faculty; the latter, an active one. 
The former shaped intuitions by means of structuring experience in space and 
time - objects were necessarily experienced in space and in time, and hence, 
both space and time were „declared to be „in us‟ [as] forms of our sensibility.‟191 
This organisation of experience in space and time allowed sensible intuitions to 
be actively brought under the faculty which actively imposed what Kant called 
„categories‟ on experience, which, as well as constituting generalised forms of 
space and time, also imposed other necessary features to objects such as cause, 
relation, permanence and so on. 
 There was a good reason for applying this bipartite division of the faculties to 
experiential content. On the one hand, experience required singular or 
particular instances of things to be present in perception - like certain objects in 
time and space (it is impossible, according to Kant to experience the world in 
any other way). On the other hand, experience required general concepts to 
recognise a particular object and classify it. To recognise a particular object, 
spatio-temporally located, required a general conception of space and time of 
which this particular experience was an instance. It would be impossible to be 
aware of a particular thing undergoing successive movements in time, for 
example, were it not for these general categories.192 
 The duality of function also went both ways: just as the material of sense 
being formed in space and time required general concepts to recognise them as 
such, so if such abilities are to be exercised, „we must have material on which to 
exercise them; particular instances of general concepts must be encountered in 
experience.‟ 193  The two mind-imposed faculties were, thus, intimately 
connected. For Kant, knowledge was possible because the conditions of 
experience were possible, and what made experience possible were these 
categories of understanding and forms of sensible intuition. 
 The categories and forms of intuition were a function of the operation of the 
human mind (Kant did not care much for how animal experiences originated). 
As the faculties made experience possible, they were not derived from 
experience so they were said to be a priori: schemata of our minds which we 
imposed on reality like a grid to make sense of it. We obtained these categories 
just by being human. But the categories were stable structures - one could not 
                                                 
190 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 20.  
191 Loc. cit. 
192 Loc. cit. 
193 Loc. cit.  
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change one‟s experience of some object in time, as a temporal object, because 
the experience of time itself was a mental fixture; a sensible intuition. Nor could 
one penetrate beyond how one‟s categories represented objects to actual 
objects, because such things were possible for us only as items of knowledge 
and because relation, space and causality, etc., made them possible. We could 
know about such things only through how experience was organised. This was 
legislated by the categories and the forms of intuition, so what objects were like 
independent of our experiences we could never venture to find out. However, 
we did know how experiences originated, so at least that was something. For 
Kant, the innovation of explaining experiential content was achieved at the 
inevitable and regrettable sacrifice of a realist account of empirical knowledge. 
 The capacity to have experiences is then a function of two cognitive faculties 
operating in unison; one which frames the chaotic „manifold of intuition‟ (the 
„imagination‟) and the other which applies general intellectual concepts upon it, 
by virtue of which it becomes an experience of a certain type (the 
„understanding‟). This is an important distinction, because it is one thing to 
have an „awareness‟ of something indeterminate in space and time, and it is 
another thing to have knowledge of something determinate in space and time as 
a certain object. On Kant‟s account, the two faculties were supposed to explain 
both as requirements for experiential content. The important thing is that there 
is first the inchoate material coming into the sense organs as input and then 
there is the organisation of this input by the operation of the two kinds of 
framing apparatus.  
 There is much debate over what Kant meant by this „material of sense,‟ and 
also the function of the „forms‟ of intuition and the categories of the 
understanding, though there is little doubt that the latter were something like 
transcendental logical conditions for the possibility of experiences, which 
legislated unity to experiences prior to our having them. The categories gave 
sensory inputs the only means by which they could become items of empirical 
knowledge. As for the former, this is, I think, harder to determine.194 In fact, 
there are a number of tensions in Kant‟s „formalist‟ account of experience and 
its relation to the mind-imposed faculties which I would like to try to isolate in 
setting out the concerns of this chapter. 
 Everything would seem to be so clear-cut in Kant‟s famous analysis: he 
didn‟t want to „sensualise‟ all concepts of the understanding by considering 
them „empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection‟195 (as the empiricists did), 
but nor did he want to „intellectualise appearances‟ (as the rationalists did). The 
two faculties together made experience possible, by „filtering‟ in various ways 
                                                 
194 Recent work has uncovered multiple ambiguities in Kant‟s notion of sensation. See L. 
Falkenstein, „Kant‟s Account of Sensation,‟ pp. 63-88. And, by the same author, „Kant‟s 
Account of Intuition‟ pp. 163-195.  
195 R. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 30. 
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the material of sensibility and „imposing‟ intellectual categories upon it. The 
„material‟ the faculties worked with was „undifferentiated and indeterminate‟ 
196  in itself; an inchoate material conveyed by the sense organs which 
„affected‟, in some sense, the human process of representation. We have 
experiences not by representing them by such sensations, but representing 
through them by means of the faculties of imagination and understanding. 
Since ex hypothesi we cannot but work through the categories and forms of 
intuition, we cannot ever experience the material of sense in itself as anything 
determinate, and it cannot be an object of knowledge for us even though it 
provides the „matter‟ of our sensible intuition. The whole business prior to 
when the faculties get to work is rather like some sort of formless „empty 
grasping.‟ 197  This sort of treatment of perceptual content, being strongly 
mind-dependent, makes it legitimate to call Kant a defender of what I have 
called the inferentialist proposal.  
 There are considerable tensions with this sort of metaphysical profile of 
experience, however, especially in regard to the relationship between the 
„matter‟ of sensation, the forms of intuition and the categories. The question of 
the nature of this „material‟ which supplies the stuff on which the forms of 
intuition and categories operate, for instance, is extremely puzzling. What, 
precisely, is the connection between this material and the forms and categories 
which make experience (and knowledge) possible? I am not asking here for a 
description of this matter, as in Kant‟s view it has no description beyond 
legitimating the „formal‟ process of experiencing. But I am interested in why 
Kant thinks that this matter necessarily lacks any sort of contentful unity in 
itself.  
 The quick answer to this is that the categories and forms of intuition supply 
conditions for knowledge and experience and the senses supply the material on 
which the faculties operate, but this is clearly not an argument for why the 
matter of sensation has no contentful structure prior to such influences. This 
issue is important because it seems the orthodox view of Kant‟s theory is quite 
unclear on the relationship between the matter of sensation and the organisation 
of this matter at the integrative level of „high-level‟ knowledge. Indeed, it might 
be suggested that this lack of clarity has ramifications for the work on the theory 
and concept neutrality of observational experience. It shall be argued in this 
chapter that even on Kant‟s account, there is some degree to which experiential 
content may escape the imposition of high-level structures and so Kant‟s 
metaphysic can be read as according with the central thrust of the continuum 
account. 
 
                                                 
196 Loc. cit.  
197 Ibid., p. 35. 
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6.3 Tensions in Kant’s account 
An argument for why the sensory component of Kant‟s analysis of experience 
has no inherent organisational structure can be expressed in the following way:  
 
Simply put, any claim for the representative function of sensation alone will 
flounder hopelessly on the question of false representation. Considered as a 
mode of knowledge, such purely sensory representation must be capable of 
turning out to be false ... If it is the senses which represent x to me, and if x 
was not in fact the object sensed, how am I to explain what happened? If the 
senses represent things in themselves unclearly, and it turns out that the 
object represented was not the object the senses purported to represent, I 
seem to be faced with the alternative of saying it represented what is not, or 
saying that in such cases that the senses do not represent at all. The first 
[negative entities] has never been satisfactorily explained, and it is not open 
to us to argue that the senses only represent when they represent truthfully. 
(Of course, if I claim that the senses represented obscurely, and that I 
misconstrued that representation, Kant would claim that this concedes his 
whole point. He would claim that this admits that the senses do not represent 
but merely provide the material which the understanding must discriminate). 
The solution must be that the senses do not represent at all, but only contain 
the results of the affection by objects on our senses (appearances) and are 
construed as representing only when so interpreted by the spontaneity Kant 
calls the understanding.198 
 
The claim here is that if we get knowledge from the material of sense, and that 
„knowledge‟ turns out to be false (through a mirage, say) then we would be 
hard-pressed to explain what happened. We must in this case say either that we 
had knowledge of what is not the case (a negative thing) or that we did not 
receive knowledge from the senses at all, but only the substance for the 
„judgement‟ that we made, in this case, erringly. Kant‟s response to why the 
material of sensation requires the input of the faculties of cognition is, basically, 
that if it was itself a source of knowledge, we could not make coherent sense of 
how it was possible to be wrong about our judgments.  
 As Pippin points out, this „undetermined‟ nature of sensation in Kant‟s view 
is a radical thesis, „denying at once central, although differently expressed, 
claims in Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke and Hume.‟199 The long tradition of 
the „passive intuition of sensible form‟200 is jettisoned by Kant in favour of a 
„judgement‟ focused analysis, whereby „sense‟ is a mute, malleable fabric 
furnishing the material of experience, though being in no sense an articulable or 
well-defined medium itself. Kant himself displays just how radical this thesis is 
when he tries to tease out the difference between the identical sensations 
involved in a true judgment and one in the context of „dreaming‟:  
                                                 
198 Ibid., p. 30. 
199 Ibid., p. 35. 
200 Ibid., p. 35. 
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The appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgement upon the 
understanding ... The difference between truth and dreaming is not 
ascertained by the nature of the representations which are referred to objects 
(for they are the same in both cases) but by their connection according to 
those rules which determine the coherence of the representation in the 
concept of an object and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in 
an object or not.201 
 
So Kant seems to put all his weight upon the forms of the imagination and the 
categories of the understanding which supposedly determine the veracity and 
„subsistence‟ of the material supplied in appearance. However, although this 
seems intelligible as a consequence of Kant‟s views, we still need an argument 
to the effect that the matter of sensation requires such formal constraints to 
make it necessary to be organised in this fashion. Drawing on Kant, Pippin 
notes:  
 
There is all the difference in the world between claiming that we do not seem 
to be able to make intelligible to ourselves a conception of experience 
wherein some item is not experienced under some description („intuitions 
without concepts are blind‟) and claiming that the description constitutes the 
item‟s being experienced („the combination of the manifold in general can 
never come to us through the senses‟). The former is compatible with the 
description of the way sensibly apprehended unities are experienced (or 
described) within the conceptual scheme we have; the latter ties any 
experience of unity (or determinacy or complexity) much more closely to 
those describing capabilities. Thus the question to raise is why this use of the 
matter-form dichotomy; this claim that sensations comprise only the 
undifferentiated material of experience, and that all formal unity or 
determinacy is a result of taking up the manifold and unifying it?202 
 
This is a good observation, and I wish to stress it for my own purposes. The 
point here is that there is both a weak and a strong theme running through 
Kant‟s metaphysic of experience in the relationship between the faculties of 
cognition and sensation. The orthodox interpretation of Kant‟s views is 
misleading insofar as it neglects to distinguish these very different themes. The 
weak theme, as indicated, is that intuitions without concepts are blind; the 
strong theme is that categorical synthesis is necessary for the possibility of 
experiencing anything at all. These themes are usually conflated in 
commentaries on Kant‟s work, though it is clear that they have quite different 
commitments: the former seems to suggest that it is useful for experience to be 
described and categorised; the latter suggests that experience of any kind cannot 
occur without it. This is, however, not just a consequence of how one interprets 
                                                 
201 I. Kant, Prolegomena Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 4, p. 290. 
202 Pippin, op. cit., 35-6. 
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Kant‟s views: Pippin claims it is actually a point of confusion in how Kant 
himself understood his own theory. But it was not a confusion which applied to 
both the faculties of the mind; it essentially applied to one and not the other. The 
problem case, in particular, was the role of the categories of cognition to the 
material of sensation.  
 There is textual evidence to support the claim that Kant was very confused on 
this issue. Graham Bird has cited examples from Kant in which he shows that it 
is comparatively easy to demonstrate that space and time - as forms of intuition 
- can be necessarily related to the matter of experience,203 but arguing to the 
same conclusion on the question of the influence of the categories, Kant‟s 
remarks produce „either contradiction or incoherence.‟204 In some passages, 
Kant seems to want to say that the categories are necessary for sensation, 
otherwise „nothing is possible as an object of experience,‟205 but elsewhere, he 
claims that „objects may appear to us, without their being under the necessity of 
being related to the function of the understanding.‟ 206  Bird concludes by 
remarking: „it seems that Kant is saying inconsistently that appearances both 
are, and are not necessarily related to the categories‟ and hence: „there is no 
impossibility in supposing that appearance might be given in intuition 
independently of [concepts of] the understanding.‟207  
 How might this conflicting situation arise? The forms of intuition and the 
categories are both mind-imposed structures for Kant, yet one being an „active‟ 
faculty is clearly a more sophisticated intellectual ability. It was the categories 
which applied Euclidean geometry, among other things, to experiential content. 
The other faculty seems clearly a less sophisticated ability, but nonetheless still 
a critical means by which one frames the material of sense. Kant‟s concern in 
the passage cited above is strictly with the categories, not the forms of intuition. 
 The function of the „categories‟ is, of course, to label experiences under 
certain general concepts. Judging appearances thus involves appeal to certain 
propositional features and hence involves inference. Moreover, experiencing an 
instance of an object in time is, in a sense, described or „judged‟ by this faculty 
in terms of successional events of the same type, and this presupposes that there 
is some general conception or background knowledge that the subject has of 
temporally and spatially ordered events. In terms that have been used before, 
what Kant calls the „categories‟ harbours all the general „high-level‟ features 
we have been considering in this book. But significantly, it would seem, from 
the previous passage cited, that Kant himself is at least allowing the possibility 
                                                 
203 It is very hard to see how one could experience anything without that experience being „in‟ 
space and time. See: G. Bird, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 57. The relevant passage in Kant 
is B 121-123. (Bird uses the Kemp-Smith translation). 
204 Loc. cit. 
205 Loc. cit. The relevant passage in Kant is B 125-126. 
206 Ibid., p. 58; Kant, B 122-123. 
207 Loc. cit.  
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that some experiential contents do not require the input of such sophisticated 
high-level inferential mechanisms at all.  
 The doubts Kant seems to be entertaining here is over whether or not it is 
logically impossible to experience something in sensation without imposing 
such intellectual capacities. And he seems at least to be allowing the possibility 
that this is not logically impossible - i.e., that one can have experiences of sorts 
without such input. However, this interpretation of his claims clearly runs 
against the orthodox interpretation of Kant‟s famous metaphysic of experience 
outlined earlier. 
 This seems paradoxical: if it is possible that some level of experience is not 
informed by such intellectual (categorical) features at all, then this creates an 
internal tension between Kant‟s theory and the traditional interpretation of it. 
The usual story is that both the categories of cognition and the forms of intuition 
are necessary structural features for organising experience of any kind. But now 
it seems that while in places he insists that categorical synthesis is necessary, 
elsewhere he doesn‟t support a prejudice in favour of „formal‟ organisation at 
the level of the understanding, only at the level of the imagination. It seems that 
though Kant thought that it was necessary to frame the material of sense in 
space and time, it was not necessary to impose categories on it. To say the least, 
this seems very un-Kantian.  
 When one considers this carefully, however, it does seem to hang together 
with the reasons given for the postulation of the faculties in the first place. The 
argument mentioned earlier that false knowledge cannot be given any plausible 
account if experience was not organised in both these ways seems, in fact, to be 
a shortfall from the grander claim that the matter supplied by sense must 
necessarily be informed by these faculties. As Kant seems to have noticed, 
there is no logical entailment from one claim to the other: one can still claim 
that knowledge requires categorical input, without claiming that all experiences 
do. All the „intuitions without concepts‟ thesis guarantees is that experiences do 
not make much sense without being described and otherwise intellectually 
processed (such an experience could hardly be described as knowledge, if it 
wasn‟t); but as Kant seems well aware, this does not secure the stronger claim 
that there are no experiential contents at all without such „high-level‟ 
intellectual concepts. Bird explains this point by examining Kant‟s remarks in 
relation to unsophisticated animal experiences:  
 
There is certainly something odd in envisaging a situation where appearances 
are presented but cannot be described, though it is not easy to pin down the 
kind of absurdity involved. It will not do to say simply that our habitual mode 
of identifying what we perceive involves the ordinary resources of 
description. For it is certainly possible to speak of creatures who are able to 
perceive, even when they have no such conventional devices ... To promote 
such an argument against Kant ... does not produce a good enough reason for 
denying Kant‟s claim that it is logically possible to perceive without being 
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able to describe what is perceived ...The obvious way to resolve this paradox 
is to suppose that when Kant claims that appearances are necessarily related 
to categories, he is not denying that it is logically possible for them to be 
uncategorised. The kind of necessity involved in the former claim is not, then, 
a logical necessity.208  
 
There is every reason why the relationship here should not be a „logical‟ or 
necessary one. These reasons add to make Kant‟s metaphysic of experience 
(with qualifications mentioned) a far more plausible account than the usual 
version we know so well. The „creatures‟ being referred to here might possibly 
be animals and infants - and, as have been claimed elsewhere - such creatures 
surely lack some of the conventional devices of „high-level‟ description and 
categorisation in the sense Kant required, yet they do have experiences in some 
sense. Any suggestion to the contrary is simply to reinstate the rationalist legacy 
inherited from Descartes.  
 The usual version of Kant‟s theory of experience, of course, does not allow 
for such subtleties - animal and infant experience was not on Kant‟s 
epistemological agenda, so it naturally did not arise as a problem case. But it is 
clear they must be considered: if such creatures do possess any categorical input 
at all, it is certainly not the input of the level of sophistication that, according to 
Kant, the categories imbue our experiences with - Euclidean geometry and 
complex generalised concepts concerning space, time and relation. In this 
sense, experiences without concepts are certainly not blind. If they were so, 
animals would not be experiencing creatures. I shall be returning to this issue in 
the next chapter. 
 But there is another important point to note here. The doubt about the logical 
necessity of the categories in organising experience does not escape application 
to the forms of intuition either. For, just as it seems implausible that the entire 
edifice of a priori concepts should be brought to bear on all cases of 
experiential content (given animal experiences), so it seems implausible to 
claim that other high-level features cannot be separated and distinguished, and 
have to apply en bloc. Given the separability of the various features of 
high-level input, for instance, it would seem that not all features of experiential 
content necessarily have to be framed in space and time.  
 What kinds of experiences would escape such features? We have already 
considered some cases. The Peacocke examples, for instance, must be seen as a 
problem for Kant‟s theory: while it might seem obvious that some experiences 
seem to have representational, spatial and temporal content, other „aspects‟ of 
those experiences just seem to be sensational in some sense. It is not clear how 
Kant‟s forms of intuition doctrine, for instance, might capture sensational 
aspects of certain experiences such as the tree which seems to occupy more of 
the visual field even though it has certain fixed spatial and temporal features. 
                                                 
208 Ibid., pp. 58- 60. Italics mine. 
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The relevant experiential content in question seems to escape such an analysis. 
The extent to which both the categories and the forms of intuition are said to 
affect the material of sense, then, perhaps has been over-emphasised by 
traditional Kantian scholarship and even, in places, by Kant himself - there may 
not be a logical relationship between these various elements of mental content 
as much as a highly likely and very common relationship. And this qualification 
may apply as much to the high-level forms of the imagination as to the 
high-level categories of the understanding.  
 We are splitting hairs here, but it is necessary to split these hairs. The central 
point is that saying experiential content can be uncategorised, or somehow 
escape the forms of intuition, amounts to an „odd‟ kind of experience is one 
thing; to reject this as impossible is quite another. If the claims that have been 
made in this book are in any way plausible, it does seem that experiential 
contents can have sensational aspects both with and without sophisticated 
„high-level‟ input. So there are grounds for saying that there is not a necessary 
connection between experience and the faculties at all. Kant was right, it seems, 
to have the doubts he had; orthodox Kantian scholarship was wrong to ignore 
him. 
 This kind of interpretation of Kant is certainly possible if the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal can be weakened and some kind of continuum account of 
experience maintained instead. If so, then Kant‟s „inferentialism‟ would no 
longer be a threat to the view that there are some experiential contents which do 
not depend on the input of inferential mechanisms. The revised view would end 
up holding that at some levels, experiential content depends on the input of 
fairly high-level background beliefs and concepts; at a very low level, 
experiential content does not require this input all. Between the extremes, there 
might be cases in which some categorical input is required, but not others, etc. 
All this has been rehearsed in earlier chapters, and have already seen how some 
aspects of content do not seem to be closely tied to high-level input. Now it 
seems we can revise Kant‟s metaphysic of experience to agree substantially 
with these considerations.  
 If we can take this claim seriously, then one could perhaps take the opposite 
line on the traditional view of Kant‟s relationship between the faculties and the 
material of sense. One could say here that it is not clear how the faculties could 
determine the appropriate formal organisation if one‟s experiential content had 
no structure independent of the imposition of the categories of reason and the 
forms of intuition. Rather than holding the usual stronger theme here, it might 
be argued that even though intuitions without concepts do not make much sense 
without categorical descriptions, this is no reason to say that concepts constitute 
the content of such intuitions. It would make more sense to say that some sort of 
„pre-packaging‟ would seem to be the minimal requirement needed simply in 
order for the faculty of the understanding to carry out its representative 
function. Pippin again:  
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It may be that we need to conceptualize a sensory manifold; but it seems 
equally the case that we must have some cognitive grasp of the manifold in 
order to know which concepts to apply. ... It seems open to assert that we only 
know which rules to apply in order to connect these representations because 
of something apprehended „in the nature of representations.‟209 
 
This runs directly against the grain of Kant‟s analysis of experience and 
content. On the usual story, it was plausible to suppose that all the structure of 
experience was given by the interpretive cognitive elements and that 
non-interpreted sensations furnished the unstructured material for this. But then 
Kant‟s argument for why we need a distinction between sensory experience and 
knowledge to account for false experiences is a substantially weaker claim than 
the claim that false experiences are only possible if the content of sensation is 
entirely without structure itself. It may be that most of the content is supplied 
from the cognitive faculties and the forms of intuition, but at least some (an 
indeterminate amount) is present „in the nature of representations.‟ Contentful 
aspects of experiences might thus escape the imposition of both the forms of 
intuition and the categories.  
 On such an analysis, false experiences would still be possible in the 
circumstance where most experiential content was supplied by the faculties, but 
some aspects of such content escape their influence. It may be that some 
structure or content is provided by sensation itself, albeit not a requisite amount 
to guarantee conceptual knowledge. It is suggested there may be a place for an 
organisation and structure at both the level of knowledge and concepts and, to 
some degree, the level of sensations. And if this is true, then the inferentialist 
claim that all experiential content depends on high-level organisation would be 
false.  
 There is another issue here concerning the extent to which sensation is 
organised by the categories and the forms of intuition. If the usual story about 
Kant is right, then it is more accurate to hold fast to the undifferentiated and 
content-less nature of such sensations. But then it is unclear how and why such 
material can link us with the world in the way that it does if it is contentless. If 
sensation is completely without organisation, then it is not obvious how and 
why there can be a certain inexorable relation between our sensations, our 
interpreting faculties and „the world‟: specifically, how the latter is in some 
sense amenable to the parameters of the former. For we cannot, it must be 
conceded, frame experience in any way whatsoever, but only in certain 
determinate ways. How does this happen if the material of sense is formless? 
More specifically: why are certain ways favoured for organising appearances 
over others? Pippin asks the question in the following way: 
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If Kant‟s claim is true, how do we then describe the fact that empirical 
knowledge about the external world seems to be directly guided by sensation, 
that our interpreting faculties are restrained in a way yet to be explained by 
some feature of our sensations that does seem directly connected with what 
we ultimately take to be a public, spatio-temporal world? If sensations do not 
provide any direct [i.e., organisational] link with such a world, what kind of 
link do they provide?210 
This seems to be partly an empirical matter: the issue is how low-level 
perceptual processing mechanisms feed into the development of high-level 
knowledge. The central point for Kantian scholarship is that if the metaphysic 
of experience offered is heavily inferentialist, as it is usually taken to be, then it 
would seem that Kant is lacking an account of how the faculties frame the 
material of sense in the way that they do. Any suggestion that it is quite 
arbitrary how this happens would seem unsatisfactory, and any appeal to 
low-level content, which in some sense „guides‟ the application of the faculties, 
would make it seem plausible that the account is rather less dependent on the 
imposition from high-level features than orthodox scholarship would have us 
believe.  
 Two major tensions, then, arise for Kant‟s view of experiential content: (i) 
Does the claim that the matter of sense does not provide grounds for knowledge 
guarantee that such sensation itself has no content at all (or is this a non 
sequitur?); and (ii) if sensation is itself without organisational form, how can 
the categories seem to be guided in their application? Simply asserting the 
orthodox view of Kant‟s theory in response to (i) is inadequate since, as we 
have seen, there are passages from Kant himself which indicate that he thought 
otherwise. Responding to (ii) in any way which does not allow some features of 
content to evade the imposition of the high-level faculties seems simply 
implausible in view of the examples of sensational content given in the last 
chapter.  
6.4 Conflicting intuitions: the problem resolved 
A recent paper on Kant‟s theory of intuition is apposite here. Lorne Falkenstein 
argues plausibly that Kant actually presented two quite different accounts of his 
„sensible intuition‟ doctrine at different periods of his thought: one in terms of 
„singular representation‟ and the other as „immediate cognition.‟211 The former 
account best captures the view inherited from the scholastics, whereby the 
sense organs „could be imprinted with the forms of external objects, in much the 
same way that wax is imprinted by a seal.‟ 212  Upon this „singular 
                                                 
210 Ibid., p. 44. 
211 See L. Falkenstein, „Kant‟s Account of Intuition,‟ op. cit., (1991). The references to Kant‟s 
two views of intuition are, respectively, A713-B741; Logic §6, and A19-B33. These, and the 
following citations are taken from the first and second original Hartknoch editions. 
212 Ibid., p. 170. 
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representation‟ cognition acts to extract the discriminating features of objects. 
For Kant, however, it was a quick and decisive move from this to think of the 
one process as merely „receptive‟ and the other „facilitative.‟ On this view, 
„sensory data are ...„coordinated by a natural law of the mind‟ (Inaugural Diss. 
§4) ... an act performed by the mind, not a datum received by it.‟213 This move 
is taken seriously to form the basis for a second account of intuition, where all 
reference to an impression prior to intellectualisation is lost, and intuition 
becomes just a „blind grasping‟ with no form or content at all. Falkenstein calls 
this „the blindness thesis‟. The point is that in the one account there is some 
primal, pre-structured content to sensible intuition, in the other there is none.  
 Falkenstein gives persuasive problem-based reasons for the evolution of 
these views in Kant‟s thought, and so, helps us to see how the one view gives 
rise to the other. Hence, we are able to make sense of Kant‟s quite different 
claims about the manifold such as the following: 
 
Our cognition springs out of two fundamental sources of the mind. The first 
of these is that by which representations are sensed ... the second the capacity 
to cognize an object by means of these representations ... through the first an 
object is given to us; through the second this object is thought.214 
Sensitivity gives the mere material to thinking ... intellect disposes of this 
material and brings it under rules or concepts.215 
 
All our intuition is bound to a certain principle of form under which form 
alone can be something discerned by the mind immediately or as singular, 
and not merely conceived discursively through general concepts.216  
 
One case clearly spells out the orthodox „inferentialist‟ interpretation of Kant‟s 
views, the other something far less clear, seeming to suggest that there is at least 
a singular representation in sensation prior to its being conceptualised. The 
perception of the phenomenon of objects in time is a good example of how and 
why Kant arrived at this latter view. In the case of time, time itself cannot be 
defined as a wholly intellectual structure because temporality is perceived in 
singular, not general terms. The perception of time must be a case of „singular‟ 
instances falling under „general‟ concepts, so the „perceiving‟ of things in time 
has a singular content in experience as well as a general, intellectual content. 
This feature of Kant‟s thought was outlined earlier when describing his general 
theory. Kant, it seems, wanted to keep this distinction, but also the idea that 
there was an extraordinary amount of high-level intellectual input involved in 
perception. Hence, the two views of the manifold. The point Falkenstein makes 
is that both of these views are needed when Kant‟s concerns are isolated. For, 
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where some of Kant‟s remarks stress the necessity of intellectual input for an 
adequate conception of experience, other remarks stress that there are some 
aspects of experiences which are solely derived from some aspect of sensation 
itself: 
 
[Kant] argues that time and space are not known by intellect. From these 
points, the conclusion that space and time must be forms of the sensible world 
follows immediately. Since all our sensations are in fact arrayed in space and 
time, it follows that space and time must be orders of sensations, and since 
these orders are not infused by intellect they must be products of sense itself. 
But since these products of sense are not due to sensation, the matter of sense, 
it only remains that they pertain to a further, special element of sense, a form 
distinct both from sensed matter (sensation) and from all form invented by 
the intellect.217 
 
This is, of course, an argument for why the forms of intuition have to be a 
distinct cognitive capacity from the categories, and necessarily of less 
sophistication than them. There must be an organisational form of space and 
time which is relatively non-intellectual on this reasoning. However, this is also 
an argument which sheds insight on a theme which is implicit in Kant‟s theory 
and which has not been brought out in the literature. For if the forms of intuition 
have to structure experience in a manner which is less sophisticated than the 
categories, and if the categories themselves are not logically necessary for all 
experiential content, it seems open to assert that what Kant is suggesting in his 
metaphysic of experience is something far more subtle than the usual 
inferentialist emphasis given to his work: he seems, indeed, to stand mid-way 
between embracing the inferentialist proposal and something much weaker; 
namely, that high-level factors influence experiential content by degrees.  
 There is a further complication to this. Paradoxically, Kant also held the 
„blindness thesis‟ whereby sensations devoid of input from the intellect are 
without content. He argues elsewhere that sensation is „blind‟, „for us as good as 
nothing,‟218 which suggests that intellectual concepts are necessary to infuse 
content into sensations. These claims are clearly antagonistic. Something had to 
give way and, according to Falkenstein, it was a single, coherent conception of 
the sensory manifold: 
 
Kant claims that time must be an intuition because different times are only 
parts of one and the same time and because intuition is that representation 
which can only be given through a singular object. The argument apparently 
is that, because there is really only one time, it cannot be represented 
intellectually. But this argument comes to nothing given the blindness thesis. 
If blindness is correct, there can be no cognition of singular objects 
independently of intellectual synthesis. So, if time, or the different parts of 
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time, are not intellectually represented, we cannot say anything about them; 
in particular, we cannot say anything about their singularity. But if they are 
intellectually represented, if we do have concepts of time or times, then these 
very concepts falsify Kant‟s claim that all our intellectual representations 
must, in principle, be general - either that, or Kant must admit that time is not 
singular.219 
 
The two views of the sensory manifold lead to other absurdities: Falkenstein 
points out Kant‟s remark in his Logic, where he argues that „where a savage 
sees a house in the distance the use of which he does not know, he has the same 
object before him as another who knows it is a dwelling furnished for people.‟ 
Leaving aside the imperialist connotations of the word „savage‟, and the 
implausible point that a so-called „savage‟ would not have a concept of a house 
(perhaps „aeroplane‟ is a better example), there does seem to be a problem here. 
Because Kant also wants to claim that the savage‟s cognition of the house is 
„mere intuition‟ while for the cognition of the civilised person it is „intuition and 
concept at the same time.‟220 There is an immediate problem of how this can be 
coherently sustained, given Kant‟s ambiguous view of the relationship between 
the interplay of the categories, the forms of intuition and the material of 
sensation. Falkenstein seems to suggest that it cannot be sustained without 
jettisoning the fully „inferentialist‟ interpretation of Kant‟s thesis. This, at least, 
has some textual as well as argumentative support: 
 
The passage hints that it is possible to perceive something without 
synthesizing the array under concepts (we could hardly suppose that there 
would be a house-shaped hole in the savage‟s visual field because intuitions 
without concepts are blind). This implication is seconded by Kant‟s claim at 
B422n that an indeterminate empirical intuition is perception, and further 
reinforced by the ... passage (A320-B377) where he claims that intuition is a 
perception ... which not only relates immediately to an object, but is single.  
But if any of these claims were in fact true - if the savage‟s perception of what 
we recognise as a house were „mere intuition‟ - then synthesis under the 
categories would not be necessary to effect a unity of apperception and 
thereby become conscious of anything manifold. Thus, a crucial premise of 
the Transcendental Deduction - the claim that all connection is an act of 
intellect (B129-30) and that a collection of matters can never be brought to 
consciousness insofar as it is merely presented through the senses, but only 
insofar as the matters are connected in a single thought (B132-3) - would fail. 
For the argument of the Transcendental Deduction to be correct, the savage 
must be supposed either to see nothing at all (which is implausible) or to 
synthesize the variety presented in intuition under some other concept (in 
which case perception is not „mere intuition‟ but intuition rendered 
intelligible through intellectual processing).221  
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I don‟t think this is wholly right. We need to consider the respective roles of the 
forms of intuition and the categories once again. Presumably, like the „Tom and 
the Dahlia‟ case in Chapter 5, the savage would represent the same visual scene 
(the house) in space and time as the civilised person does, even if he did not 
have the concept of what it was he was looking at. Even if the blindness thesis 
were true, the savage could still represent the same perceptual data in space and 
time even if the intuition was not fully intellectually informed. (To suggest 
otherwise would be to confuse the various levels of high-level influence that I 
have argued are separable.) However, Falkenstein is right to point out that Kant 
is committed to saying that the forms of intuition are a distinct capacity from the 
categories of the intellect and that more needs to be considered than the 
imposition of „the intellect‟. 
 However, the point is germane for more reasons than this. If there is a 
genuine difference in sophistication between the function of the understanding 
and the imagination, it seems that Kant must be committed to weakening his 
view of the blindness thesis to something like the following: that the intellect is 
often involved in classifying and making experiences comprehensible; not that 
it is necessary for all aspects of experiences. Intuitions may be blind without 
concepts, but it doesn‟t mean they are empty. On this revised account, there are 
good reasons for admitting that the fixation of experiential content need not 
occur in all-or-none terms, but rather by degrees, and this seems to tally closely 
with my own continuum view, not the orthodox view attributed to Kant.  
 Falkenstein‟s point is not to dismiss entirely Kant‟s views on time, or the 
Transcendental Deduction for that matter. The point is rather that there is a 
serious problem with scholars‟ treatment of Kant. Part of the reason for this 
issues from his thoroughly ambiguous doctrine of sensory intuition: Kant seems 
to have wanted to say both that it depends on input from the intellect (in my 
terms, „inferential‟ content), and that there is also a more primal aspect of 
contentful sensation which is prior to intellect. This also applies to the function 
of the imagination, since there are aspects of experience which even the 
imposition of space and time cannot capture, as we have seen. The problem is 
that the traditional scholarly treatment of Kant‟s position has, for one reason or 
another, affirmed the primacy of the categories and the forms of the imagination 
in the organisation of experiential content, and has not tried to uncover the 
limits of their influence. Orthodox scholarship has not recognised the subtleties, 
and has taken Kant to be a full-blooded inferentialist. However, this 
interpretation runs against both his marginal remarks, which suggest the 
contrary view, and his ambiguous conception of the relation between the 
material of sense and the faculties of cognition. I have tried to suggest that there 
is more to it than that. The nub of this issue, of course, extends beyond the 
problems with which Kant was most concerned to the nature of inference vs 
observationality generally. It extends beyond Kant and his categories to the 
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whole issue of the bearing of inferential content on experiences. However, 
Falkenstein offers some interesting suggestions in relation to Kant‟s 
contribution: notably, to henceforth regard Kant‟s account of „concepts‟ not as 
being a „species of high-level intellect‟, but as „no more than a subset of the 
representations delivered by intellect.‟222 In other words, to admit a number of 
levels of possible integrations of the content of sensible intuition. This might 
allow room for particularly low-level integrations which are quite unlike the 
kinds of high-level structures essential to the inferentialist view. In view of this, 
it is perhaps better to treat Kant not as an inferentialist, but as an early 
proponent of an information-theoretic account of perceptual content, where 
there are several distinguishable levels of structure to experience. This 
approach allows for a contentful level which is not, strictly speaking, 
expressible or explicable in terms of „concepts‟ in any recognised (high-level) 
sense. The view of Kant as an inferentialist must, on this view, be modified 
because of the ambiguities in the notion of „intuition.‟ There is, it seems, more 
to intuition than inference. A more contemporary information-theoretic 
approach to perceptual content which runs along these lines will be presented 
and discussed in Chapter 8.  
 Falkenstein summarises this kind of analysis by saying, that „preserving these 
claims requires recognising intuition as a distinct cognitive capacity from 
intellect‟; 223 and that „concepts are only one among the products of intellectual 
synthesis; there are also perceptions and images.‟224 One may wonder just how 
„perceptions‟ and „images‟ actually feature in this revised Kantian account. 
Without overdoing speculations here, it is suggested that Kant had perhaps 
more of a continuum account of experiential content than has hitherto been 
recognised.  
 This is not a book about Kant‟s ideas, but about experience and the degree to 
which it has low-level sensational features. The claim is that low-level 
experiences have some content other than that which is imposed on them by 
„high-level‟ concepts, background knowledge and theory. The thrust of the 
foregoing section is that there are at least a number of inconsistencies in Kant‟s 
views of the structure of experience being comprehensively organised by the 
interpretive faculties of intuition and imagination.  
 
Lorenz: experience naturalised  
 
6.5 Experience and biology 
Konrad Lorenz has furnished a way of resolving some of the problematic 
features of Kant‟s views on experience in evolutionary terms, by making the 
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notion of the categories answerable to the strictures of evolutionary biology. 
His views are worth a slight digression to complete the section on Kant. Lorenz 
begins his study of Kant by asking a number of pertinent biology-related 
questions levelled at the notion of the a priori categories of cognition: 
 
Is not human reason with all its categories and forms of intuition something 
that has organically evolved within a continuous cause-effect relationship 
with the laws of the immediate nature just as has the human brain? Would not 
the laws of reason necessary for a priori thought be entirely different if they 
had undergone an entirely different historical mode of origin, and if 
consequently, we had been equipped with an entirely different kind of central 
nervous system? Is it at all probable that the laws of our cognitive apparatus 
should be disconnected from those of the real external world? Can an organ 
that has evolved in the process of continuous coping with the laws of nature 
have remained so uninfluenced that the theory of appearances can be pursued 
independently of the things-in-themselves as if the two were totally 
independent of each other?225 
 
Lorenz adopts a scientist‟s view of the origins and structure of experience, and 
although sympathetic to some of Kant‟s views, he takes issue with him over the 
notion of the categories as a priori mechanisms. His complaint is not that the 
conceptual apparatus of thought organises experiential content (a feature of 
Kant‟s thought that he described as „[a] great and fundamentally new 
discovery‟) 226  but that the explanation of its importance in structuring 
experience does not involve considerations of the „organic nature‟ of the 
apparatus, and „does not pose the basic biological question concerning their 
species-preserving meaning.‟227 It seemed likely to him that the categories are 
„not something immutably determined by factors extraneous to nature, but 
rather something that mirrored the natural laws in contact with which they had 
evolved in the closest reciprocal interaction.‟228 In other words, the a priori 
forms of cognition that Kant used to make sense of the experience of objects 
and our knowledge of them, were evolving structures and natural ones, just like 
dolphin fins. It occurred to Lorenz that the idea that experiences were 
cognitively formed somehow by the apparatus of the mind into items of 
knowledge, could somehow be presented and reconciled with evolutionary 
biology. This was important to do because, on Kant‟s view, the limits of 
possible experience by virtue of the form imposed by the categories were 
logically the same for both man and amoeba. In view of our knowledge of 
evolutionary processes, this seemed deeply implausible, and an „unjustifiable 
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anthropomorphism.‟229  
 Lorenz‟s claim, by contrast, is that if one was to hold onto the idea of a 
„forming‟ of experience at all, then what was capable of being experienced must 
vary in sophistication from organism to organism - otherwise one could not 
account for the role of inference and background knowledge in the experiences 
of humans, the apparent non-cognitive awarenesses in animals and babies, the 
tactile sensations had by plants, and so on. Removing the heavily rationalist 
emphasis on „high-level‟ features of cognition could make the structure of 
experiential content a purely natural phenomenon, evolving according to the 
selective pressures on differentially sophisticated organisms. Lorenz‟s 
diagnosis, hence, is to „naturalise‟ the concept of the forms of experience and 
make them a function, not of strictly intellectual a priori categories of the mind, 
but of the development and adaptation of organs of the body to real natural laws 
present in the world. To cope with these laws and to negotiate them through 
millions of years of evolution, the functioning organs themselves have been 
shaped organically to „think‟ in certain forms. This hypothesis, in a sense, 
avoids Kant‟s idealist troubles with objects in the real world being inaccessible 
to a realist view of knowledge acquisition. For Lorenz, this is a position not 
worth entertaining.230  
 The point is that, in an „organic‟ manner, „our forms of intuition and 
categories are embodied in our evolved capacity to „fit‟ to that which really 
exists in the manner in which our feet fit the floor or the fins of a fish fits the 
water.‟231 For Lorenz, then, the origins of experience are natural mechanisms 
shaping the evolving organism‟s capacity to respond to the world. Contentful 
experiences, like the functioning organ of a body, are a functional outcome of 
this adaptation. 
 There is a point to Lorenz‟s claims, and the point is this: to the extent that 
Kant‟s view of experiential content is a useful and informative one, it should be 
considered outside its traditional rationalist framework. The idea that the a 
priori categories are relevant to the fixation of experiential content can be 
plausible only if those categories are seen as occurring along the phylogenetic 
tree, and this means that they must be seen as having variable degrees of 
sophistication. This development of Kant‟s view of how the intellect mediates 
sensation then ensures two things: (1) that the experiences of unsophisticated 
organisms like animals and infants are not seen as necessarily inferior to the 
way in which human beings organise their experiences with high-level 
categories; and (2) that the idealist dichotomy between the mind-dependent 
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structured world of phenomena, and the trans-empirical world of noumena 
could be transgressed on naturalist grounds. For Lorenz, but not Kant, our 
representations of the world through experience assure us that they correspond 
to that world - because of the dialectical interaction by which the two have 
simultaneously evolved. For Lorenz, the question of closeness of „fit‟ and 
idealist scepticism simply does not arise. Nor does the need to conceive of 
elaborate transcendental arguments for the possibility of that real world.  
 Lorenz does not aim to rule out the idea of the imposition of „high-level‟ 
categories in the formation of experiential content. His claim is that the 
cognitively informed experiences of humans - the forming of objects in space 
and time and so on - is a certain highly adapted evolutionary response to 
selective pressures. But so too, presumably, are what have been called the 
sensational or low-level „aspects‟ of experience. Both are legitimate ways in 
which experiential content is organised.  
 Presumably, there would be an evolutionary justification for the distinction in 
the levels of sophistication: at a push, one could say that a sensational 
experience was a lower-order adaptation to stimulus and situations in the 
natural world where high-level features are not required, or where conceptually 
fixed experiences simply take too long. (cf. Fodor‟s claim about the „etiological 
route‟ to beliefs „being shorter in observation than in inference.‟)232 Such an 
account might constitute an evolutionary justification for the relevance of both 
low-level sensational experiences and high-level, intellectually informed 
experience to survivalist strategies.  
 I differ from Lorenz in only one respect. To his plausible evaluation of Kant‟s 
metaphysic of experience, the further claim is added that in no sense are the 
levels of experiential content entirely distinct: if the terms of any account of 
such content are to be amenable to evolutionary biology, then it is plausible that 
experiential content can come in degrees of sophistication and can also occur 
jointly. What I have called „aspects‟ of content can occur simultaneously along 
with representative, highly inferential content by virtue of both kinds of 
features having been selectively advantageous. We have seen several examples 
in previous chapters in which both high-level and low-level features do seem to 
be aspects of some experiences. We have also seen how this account may even 
be consistent with Kant‟s more marginal views. It only needs to be added that 
this kind of naturalist reading of the issue provides further support for the 
continuum account of content rather than any inferentialist view. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the continuum account was shown to be congruent with a certain 
reading of Kant‟s work, and to be consistent with the evolutionary emphasis of 
Lorenz‟s view of experiential content. The usual interpretation of Kant‟s theory 
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can be modified to give a more plausible perspective on the relationship 
between high-level inference and low-level sensations. However, we still need 
an argument for taking sensory aspects of experience to be an evolutionary 
adaptation. The next section looks at the issue of animal experiences in this 
connection.  
  163 
7. Animal Experiences 
The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ‟d 
to account for the actions of the mind, is that they suppose such a subtility 
and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere 
animals, but even of children and the common people in our own 
species.233 
Consciousness and concepts 
7.1 Introduction  
In the last chapter, Lorenz‟s naturalised account of experiential content was 
compared with an unorthodox reading of Kant‟s views. In this chapter, the issue 
of animal experiences will be confronted. It will be suggested that the 
continuum view of content is the best model with which to handle such cases. 
Various inferentialist views will be treated and rejected. 
7.2 Animal consciousness 
It has been maintained throughout this book that animal experiences constitute 
an important case for the view being suggested. The claim is that animal 
experiences consist largely of certain low-level sensory features which amount 
to concepts, but not concepts in any sophisticated, high-level descriptive sense. 
High-level features are not, generally speaking, relevant to animal experiences. 
But there are still sensory „aspects‟ of low-level experiences to account for how 
animals fix appropriate sensory beliefs.  
 A claim such as this seems uncontentiously true, given what we know about 
animals in any philosophically unreflective sense. We feel confident, for 
instance, in attributing to animals beliefs about the experiences they undergo 
                                                 
233 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 177. 
  164 
despite them being cognitively impoverished compared to us. We feel that they 
believe in some sense that they are experiencing features of their perceived 
environment, colours, shapes and so on. We also feel confident, to some degree, 
in attributing more sophisticated beliefs to complex animals about objects and 
events in the world. (Dogs being able to perceive their master, for instance). 
The inferentialist proposal, however, has a rather different view of animal 
experiences, coming, as it does, from the Cartesian and Kantian rationalist 
tradition. Such a tradition asserts that animals have no basis for contentful 
experiences because they have no high-level concepts and no propositional 
contents and, in particular, no language to express them. Such a position, as has 
already been pointed out, is a consequence, and a reductio, of the inferentialist 
proposal.  
 The kind of view in mind here has been characteristic of Descartes‟ work, but 
also a surprising number of contemporary theorists, who openly make claims 
like the following: 
I see no reason to attribute any of the mental states that involve 
intentionality [e.g., belief, thought, etc.] to the „lower‟ animals 
[non-persons]. On the best available understanding of what is involved in 
intentional descriptions ... a fairly high-degree of rationality is a 
prerequisite.234 
 
Such a position seems rather less than obvious, given what we often assume 
about animals. Therefore, the burden for supporting such a view clearly lies 
with those who defend it. The argument to this conclusion must amount to 
showing what is wrong with the suggestion made above regarding the 
„philosophically unreflective‟ view of animal sensory consciousness. This 
generally has two elements: showing animals are not conscious of their 
sensations at all, and showing that animals do not have concepts of any kind. 
Each of these suggestions will be discussed below and both will be dismissed. 
The views of some of the modern-day adherents to this view will also be looked 
at and rejected. 
 Most arguments designed to show that animals are not conscious of their own 
experiential states make an assumption that begs the question in favour of the 
rationalist legacy; they often involve an appeal to an inferential background of 
thinking, concepts and other high-level cognitive capacities. One such 
argument is given in Radner and Radner‟s Animal Consciousness: 
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If all thinking involved reflection on one‟s mental states, then any being 
that failed to think about its own thinking would fail to think at all; in 
other words, it would be mindless. In such a case, it would be fairly easy 
to argue that animals do not think. One would simply have to point out 
that they lacked the wherewithal to engage in introspection. Having no 
concepts of pain, anger and so on, they cannot be said to identify their 
own feelings and passions, and thus they cannot form the belief that they 
are, in this state rather than that. Moreover, having no concept of self, 
they cannot be said to know that they have mental states at all.235 
This is not a complicated argument to disentangle. It is a valid argument and is 
of the following form (I shall supply a missing premise-P1): 
P1: The content of all conscious mental states involves thinking 
P2: All thinking involves reflection on the content of one‟s mental states 
(introspection) 
P3: Introspection involves having concepts of pain, self, etc. 
P4: Animals have no concepts of pain, self, etc., and, hence, cannot form 
beliefs that they are in conscious states 
C: Animals do not think and thus are not conscious of their own states 
The argument is, admittedly, conditional in the original; it has been expressed 
in its most positive form. Even so, it is difficult to see why anyone would take 
this argument seriously. It seems simply false to draw the conclusion that 
animals don‟t undergo any conscious states from the major premise that being 
conscious requires reflective „thinking.‟ There are, for instance, some conscious 
states which do not require this ability even among organisms who can 
reflectively „think‟: (A person may forget a backpain while engaged in some 
activity, for instance, but it should not be inferred that it was not a conscious 
state).236 So to assert premise (1) to get the argument going may be already to 
set off on the wrong path. 
 For the purposes of my account, the suspicious premises here are 1, 3 and 4; 
the suspicious premises for the Radners are 1 and 2. A rejection of all these 
premises in their present form will show that though the argument is valid, 
some of its premises are false, and so is the conclusion. 
 The Radners‟ interest in this argument is to deny the claim that „all 
consciousness is self-consciousness.‟237 This, they believe is the assumption 
that is in error, an assumption which is due to a confusion arising from the work 
of Descartes. Their point is that this confusion springs from views on the nature 
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of consciousness which „play two different roles in Descartes‟ theory of 
mind.‟238 The details will not concern us here, but textual evidence they supply 
supports the idea that, according to Descartes, consciousness is both 
synonymous with experience, and also that it consists of that „of which we are 
conscious‟239 where thought has, as its object, consciousness. The claim is that 
this ambiguity is the reason that animal consciousness is often denied. If 
consciousness is taken in this latter sense, then animals may not be so endowed, 
as they may not be thinking (reflecting) beings. 
 I say „may not be‟ here since it is clear that even if the claim about the 
importance of reflective thought is granted, it is not obvious that the argument 
would go through to the desired conclusion. Anyone who held this view would 
hardly have established that animals were not conscious from such premises, 
even if the premises were accurate. Nor would they have established that 
animals have no such reflective intellectual ability at all. However, this point 
will not be developed here. There are far better reasons to cast this kind of 
argument in doubt and, in doing so, provide reasons to consider the continuum 
account more seriously. 
 It has been suggested that experiential content might involve two broad kinds 
of features: high-level inferential, descriptive content and low-level, sensory 
content. It has also been shown how the terms of the inferentialist proposal 
draw exclusively upon high-level features largely from the attachment to the 
Cartesian/Kantian rationalist legacy it inherited. Such high-level features 
constituted criteria for separating the provinces of man and animal, as has been 
explained. The point to be made here is that the argument just mentioned 
explicitly endorses the inferentialist criterion for consciousness by asserting 
that consciousness requires a high degree of self-reflective „thinking.‟  
 This criterion is, of course, inherently unfair given the circumstances. No-one 
expects or claims that animals are conscious in this sophisticated deliberative, 
reflective sense. No-one would want to claim (sensibly) that even complex 
animals can perform the feats of conscious cognitive integration that Sherlock 
Holmes can perform; in this sense, animals are not conscious. But, to an 
important degree, the argument against animal mental states above endorses 
precisely this, and argues from the (relatively) uncontentious claim that as 
animals do not possess reflective awareness, to the stronger claim that animals 
are not conscious at all. But clearly, this stronger claim leads to a deeply 
counterintuitive conclusion. For the accurate and relevant sense in which 
animals might be conscious is that they are conscious of their sensations and 
their perceived environment. And this seems, on the face of it, absurd to deny. 
Fido will come when he is called; he chases cats; he avoids punishment. Such 
behaviour is surely reason enough to believe that Fido has some conscious 
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contents of experience at some level, even if it is not captured by strongly 
high-level inferential abilities. The inferentialist stipulation to any other 
conclusion seems simply too strong. 
 The point here is that the argument above does not call these lower-level 
experiences into question; it does not demonstrate that animals are not 
conscious of their experiences as much as (at best) demonstrate that certain 
feats of high-level deliberations are not achieved by animals. The latter is an 
agreeable claim; the former is reached without argument, and is almost 
certainly false. Animals may still be conscious of important features of their 
perceived environment. 
 There are several issues here of course. For one thing, „being conscious of 
features of one‟s perceived environment‟ is to be too vague; the sentence blurs 
too much. To develop this kind of claim would require spelling out that animals 
can, in fact, be conscious of several things about their environment: Dogs, for 
instance, we would uncritically assume, perceive spatial relationships between 
objects (they search behind objects for food etc.) They also have memory and 
can locate things temporally, hence they have some background knowledge, 
some memory of previous experiences and so on. They are also conscious of 
lightness and darkness, and have remarkable auditory and olfactory 
discriminatory abilities, etc. Some animals then perceive both complex and 
simple features. Of course, one cannot say the same thing about all animals. The 
extent to which amoeba or sea-slugs or simple invertebrates experience their 
perceived environment is very unclear. Some less sophisticated creatures would 
seem to have some of these capacities but not others. Nonetheless, it is a 
principle of sufficient reason to assume that to the extent certain animals are 
similar anatomically and biologically to ourselves, they must, at least, share 
some of our abilities to consciously discern aspects of the perceived 
environment and believe something from such perceptions. This is mentioned 
because, oddly enough, the point is not obvious to some philosophers at all. 
 This brings me to the second point: the phylogenetic argument that was 
mentioned earlier should be brought out in the open. For it is possible for a 
latterday Cartesian to argue that animals are not even conscious in this 
non-reflective sense, and this does not rule out the hypothesis that they are mere 
mechanical automata responding to cues from the world in the way that a 
machine or computer would. Such a situation is, of course, a logical possibility, 
but it scarcely seems a plausible claim: especially since it is uncritically 
accepted that there is some kind of biological link (and lineage) between 
species with similar taxonomical features. It seems very unlikely that animals 
which do share the same neuroanatomical features would not share the same 
perceptual and discriminatory capacities to some degree. A world in which 
sufficiently similar and closely evolved organisms (e.g., chimpanzees and man) 
happen to be radically distinct in the ways in which they perceive the world 
would be a very odd world indeed. (This is so especially if we are asked to 
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imagine one such organism to be a mere automaton with no perceptual abilities 
at all).240  
 For these reasons, it is false to assert that the criteria for evaluating the 
question of animal consciousness lies in the ability to reflect/introspect and 
perform sophisticated inferential operations. It is false to suggest, from this, that 
animals are not conscious of their perceived environment in some sense. One 
can still say that they are importantly conscious of their sensory and perceptual 
states, and this seems a fairly undeniable claim. Of course, in saying this one 
must be wary of the vagueness in this claim. Some (complex) animals can 
discern features of the perceived environment which do require some 
„high-level‟ inferential, though perhaps not „reflective‟ abilities (dogs 
perceiving spatial relationships, etc), but this need not be so for less 
sophisticated organisms. Still, the fact that some conscious experiences are by 
nature reflective, should not license the move to suggesting that non-reflective 
experiences are not conscious. Allowing some conscious experiences to be 
characteristically reflective does not mean all are. Some p’s are q’s should not 
license the move that non-q’s are non-p’s. Such a move doesn‟t fit with the 
evolutionary scheme of things and it simply takes for granted precisely what is 
in dispute.  
 The first premise is flawed for similar reasons as those outlined. If „all mental 
experience is characterised by thinking‟, and „thinking‟ here is taken to imply a 
high-level inferential capacity, then the premise is misapplied for animals. 
No-one should be suggesting that animals are necessarily reflectively 
conscious. If (1) is taken to cover all kinds of perceptual experience, then it is 
simply false, as it has been argued in this book that one can have contentful 
experiences without necessarily concentrating or deliberating in any sense at 
all. (Aspects of a colour experience, for instance, might be registered without 
thinking or knowing about them at all.) This indicates that conscious experience 
at one level demonstrably does not involve „thinking‟ (if, that is, we take 
„thinking‟ to involve high-level inferential capacities). Premises like (1) will 
clearly not assist the argument under consideration.  
 Premises (3) and (4) hinge once again on the ambiguity of the word 
„concept‟: specifically, the suggestion that concepts can be descriptive in 
character and sensational too. As Wittgenstein observed, „pain‟ concepts are 
modes of presentation that we learn, in one way, by behavioural gestures and 
ostension, which we learn to label, describe and specify in terms of types: 
„sharp‟ pains, „dull‟ pains, etc. (How a pain is described, moreover, depends on 
broad theories about what sort of observed behaviour is appropriate to what sort 
of pain descriptions). But, if as I have been suggesting, it is reasonable to 
                                                 
240 Hume seemed to be aware that some kind of comparative analysis was required here: „„Tis 
from the resemblances of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform, that we 
judge their internal likewise to resemble ours.‟ op. cit., p. 176. 
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separate the notion of concept from only its descriptive or propositional 
linguistic mode of presentation, then concepts of pain might be said to be 
importantly sensational as well. This seems plausible on grounds we have 
considered already - that the descriptive mode seems to „miss out‟ on something 
about the experience. As has been suggested in this book, it is one thing to 
conceptualise a pain under a certain description, and another to conceptualise it 
as a certain felt quality. What sort of „pain‟ concept might an animal be said to 
have? Clearly not the descriptive or linguistic kind of concept, but almost 
certainly the sensational kind and, again, it seems absurd to deny this.  
 I conclude from this brief assessment of the argument that animals are not 
conscious at all, two simple points. Firstly, it is inherently unfair to claim the 
terms of the dispute here to be high-level inferential features, „reflective‟ 
consciousness, etc. This is to beg the question that what is salient here is only 
that which characterises some features of human consciousness. Secondly, even 
if these are the terms of the dispute, it does not license the claim that animals are 
not conscious, since some kinds of (sensory) consciousness may not be 
captured in such terms. 
7.3 Animal concepts 
If the argument that animals are not conscious fails, it is still open to the 
upholder of the inferentialist proposal to assert that animals are perceptually 
deficient because of a lack of high-level concepts with which to fix 
representational and descriptive features of experience. Animal cognition 
cannot be characterised in such terms. Animals do not, for instance, believe, or 
otherwise conceptualise, that Jones‟s body is near the cigar-band. Since 
descriptive features of experience need to be fixed by concepts, this brings us 
naturally to the argument that animals might not actually have concepts (and 
hence, no experiences) at all. Again, like the claim that animals are not 
conscious, this claim too has many contemporary adherents.241  
 There is a direct reason why a claim like this will not work. Concepts 
generally are clearly non-uniform in structure and content. There is no earthly 
reason why we should expect that concepts can only be considered in 
sophisticated anthropocentric terms, as reflective features of cognition which 
can be described and which involve inference from high-level background 
knowledge - features which animals clearly do not possess. It is this point that 
Routley has in mind when he argues: 
 
                                                 
241 See, in particular, P. T. Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and their Objects. See also, N. 
Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge. Geach, for instance, argues that since animals lack concepts 
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The notion of „our concepts‟ or „our conceptual scheme‟ (with the „our‟ 
not too tightly specified, but perhaps excluding temporally or culturally 
remote humans) is something of a myth: concepts, discriminatory 
abilities, vary enormously among humans as among animals. (In a strict 
philosophical sense, which there is a point in inventing, and which many 
philosophers are prepared to accept, there is no the concept of a bone: 
such a unique concept supposes uniformity which does not occur). 
Furthermore, only a fairly low and undemanding level of discriminatory 
ability is required for the attribution of beliefs, as our dealings with 
humans help reveal. Fido certainly can meet these standards, he can 
distinguish bones, including the one in question: he has a concept of a 
bone. His concept may, like mine, lack the nuances of the archaeologists‟ 
concept; but it will include features such as those linked with taste and 
smell that mine and the archaeologists‟ lack, and it will almost certainly 
be richer than Baby Bunting‟s concept.242 
 
For these reasons, it seems fatuous to argue, as many philosophers have done,243 
that only high-level concepts could fix beliefs and conscious experiences in 
animals. The „fairly low and undemanding level of discriminatory ability‟ in 
terms of taste and smell that Routley refers to, in fact, does the job, and this is 
clearly a sensory capacity of sorts. And it is this „discriminatory ability‟ that 
appears not to be inferential, but which is nonetheless conceptual, that interests 
me. For what is being suggested is that this is an important feature of contentful 
experiences too. Routley highlights the importance of this feature when he 
reveals the extent of conceptual variability between species: 
When it comes to conceptual poverty it is commonly humans that are 
poor in comparison with animals: animals can discriminate objects and 
types of objects in ways that elude humans (and often humans cannot be 
taught to make similar discriminations e.g., because they lack the 
appropriate sensory apparatus). Dogs generally have considerably better 
knowledge (information if you like) on much that concerns bones than 
humans e.g., the location of old bones, the many scents and shapes of 
bones, the immediate history of various bones and so on .... More to the 
point, dogs‟ ability to discriminate bones and their types considerably 
exceeds that of humans in important respects. Consider, in particular, the 
different scents of bones. A layman may be able to distinguish a few 
dozen scents; a perfume expert would distinguish many more, perhaps in 
                                                 
242 R. Routley, „Alleged Problems in Attributing Belief and Intentionality to Animals,‟ p. 390. 
243 Notably: Davidson, Bishop, Stich and Descartes. See J. Bishop, „More on Thought and 
Talk,‟ pp. 1-16. I discuss Davidson and Stich below.  
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excess of thirty thousand (as with perfumes or perfumed bones); but a dog 
could distinguish vastly more again, in fact as many as there are physical 
things. This reveals two points of importance: a dog‟s conceptual 
richness in certain matters concerned with bones as compared with 
humans; and the variability in human conceptual apparatus.244 
The issue needs refining here of course. Discriminatory abilities on my account, 
may simply be sensational for some creatures, though they may also be 
sub-descriptive and hence, low-level inferential for others. A dog is a fairly 
sophisticated creature compared to a rat or a sea-slug; it is likely that it could 
make some inferential discriminations, such as location of objects in certain 
relations. Such concepts then have partially sensory aspects and partially 
descriptive aspects. For other creatures the discriminatory ability may be 
merely sensory. This amalgam story does not run against the continuum 
account of concepts, of course, but reinforces it.  
 The variability in the human conceptual apparatus that Routley mentions is 
undeniable and obvious. Humans seem capable of low-level sensory 
discriminations like animals, but they are also capable of high-level descriptive 
conceptualisations (as archaeologist-type concepts of bones testify). In terms of 
conceptual variability, we clearly span the concept continuum to an awesome 
degree. But the point about variability of conceptual apparatuses should be 
extended to the variability in kinds of concepts here. This is not brought out in 
the above passages, though it is a reasonable implication of them. Variability in 
concepts is a function not just of different conceptual apparatuses but 
importantly different categories of concepts and the two points are clearly 
connected. The claim Routley makes is that there appear to be highly developed 
„smell‟ concepts in dogs which are shared to some (moderate) degree by 
perfume experts, but not by the rest of us to whom the concept of a bone 
amounts to having only some kind of descriptive anatomical significance.245 
This, of course, is true. An interesting, though neglected, point here however is 
that there might be an important difference in the kinds of concepts that are 
relevant to perceptual cognition generally. Some concepts, it is suggested, 
capture descriptive and propositional content; others capture sensational 
content. 
 Concepts are best defined as modes of presentation of properties, and animals 
can presumably be presented with properties of various sorts as we can - 
specifically in the form of what has been called „sensory‟ concepts. It might be 
in dispute whether they can reach the feats of high-level cognitive integration 
we do, but it should not be in dispute that they have concepts at all. This belies 
                                                 
244 Routley, op. cit., p. 390. 
245 Of course this does not hold for all humans. Two-year-olds wouldn‟t have a concept of a 
bone in this descriptive sense either. 
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an association of „concept‟ with only the high-level capacities that cognition 
serves and not the lower-level capacities. It is this association that leads to the 
latter-day Cartesian treatment of animal cognition (of which, more shortly). But 
this emphasis surely seems wrong. The issue, properly, seems to depend on the 
varied capabilities of organisms in receiving different sorts of information and 
the manner in which it is received. This is precisely what we want. For it seems 
fairly clear that the concepts animals have involve integration of experience at 
an importantly sensory level, not only through complicated high-level 
processes like inference.246 This accounts for Fido‟s manifest abilities with 
(say) manipulating and discovering bones, while preserving the insight that 
animals, in some sense, are conceptually poor, and are not in possession of 
high-level concepts and theories. 
 Humans seem to function with a certain competence at a sensory level also 
(witness: the perfume expert), but we also function at a higher 
descriptive/epistemic level involving another quite sophisticated network of 
concepts, which integrate quite different information, as in the archaeologists‟ 
concept of a bone. This descriptive ability is not uniform, and degrees of 
competence among people and cultures are evident. (I, for instance, have no 
archaeological knowledge and cannot form the relevant concepts of „bone‟, but 
my next-door neighbour, being fond of that sort of thing, might.) These latter 
concepts involve highly inferential appeals of relatively sophisticated access to 
background knowledge of chemistry, geology, anatomy and so on. Perhaps 
some human beings, senile and intellectually deficient, have something like a 
low-level sensory concept of a bone (for instance, smell and touch); perhaps 
others have a concept of a bone as being a certain shape and colour; perhaps 
others have an archaeologist‟s concept of bones. Perhaps, (plausibly) we lose 
conceptual integrative capacities with age and gain them with maturity. The 
point here is, though there might be a difference in sophistication and kind here 
between the two broad kinds of modes of presentation, there is no point in 
denying the efficacy of such different sorts of concepts obtained for different 
purposes utilising different mechanisms and being differently presented. The 
division in concept is at least a plausible suggestion, given what we know about 
the variability of our own concepts and the deficiency of high-level concepts in 
animals. We evidently need both. Thus there is no argument, unless on quite 
parochial grounds, for saying that animals do not have concepts. And all 
arguments which suggest so are not making this distinction. 
 These points are ignored by philosophers keen to claim that animals cannot 
have concepts at all. The way such philosophers argue this is usually by 
claiming that animals cannot have conceptual contents sufficient to fix attitudes 
                                                 
246 On the continuum view, of course, the degree of inferential and sensory content depends on 
the sophistication of the organism in question. So some inferences may be involved in animals 
which are phylogenetically similar to us. 
  173 
like beliefs. And „conceptual content,‟ again, means here high-level descriptive 
concepts, not sensory concepts. Correspondingly, „beliefs‟ here means 
high-level epistemic beliefs. Stich, for instance, has an argument of this kind, an 
argument which specifies that attributions of belief depend on an already shared 
conceptual richness between relevant (human) parties: 
 (1) Our difficulty in specifying the contents of animals‟ beliefs derives 
not from an ignorance of animal psychology but rather from a basic 
feature of the way we go about assigning content to a subject‟s beliefs. 
(2) We are comfortable in attributing to a subject a belief with a content 
only if we can assume the subject to have a broad network of related 
beliefs that is largely isomorphic with our own. 
(3) Where a subject does not share a very substantial part of our own 
network of beliefs we are no longer capable of attributing content to his 
beliefs in this area.247 
Stich closely ties belief attribution to the kinds of beliefs that humans share 
among one another. Of course, human beliefs are mostly considered to be of the 
high-level propositional and descriptive variety. (Armstrong‟s example in 
Chapter 1, for instance, was of several people believing the proposition that the 
earth was flat). Clearly, if beliefs are understood in this sense, then animals do 
not have beliefs, and thus, we cannot assume that they are conceptual creatures 
because we cannot attribute beliefs like this to them.  
 We can attribute beliefs to animals, of course, so there is something 
intuitively wrong with this argument. The following resolution is suggested: 
just as we cannot doubt that animals have some sorts of concepts, we cannot 
doubt that animals have some sorts of beliefs. We normally have no doubts, for 
instance, in assigning the content of Fido‟s seeing his master with the food bowl 
equalling Fido‟s believing that he will soon be fed. Again, however, the issue 
needs dividing here. What this belief might not be is a sophisticated mechanism 
involving inductive reasoning (Fido thinks: „I was fed at approx. 6.15 last night, 
so this behaviour means feeding time‟). This is a „high-level‟ inferential ability, 
involving access to background knowledge; something that we have agreed 
Fido may have only to a limited degree. But this does not mean that Fido 
doesn‟t have beliefs of any sort at all. Fido can have beliefs if the notion of 
„belief‟ is weakened to include what has been called „look‟-beliefs.  
 Hence, fixing the terms of the argument by a tacit stipulation of a 
sophisticated notion of „belief‟ in terms of conceptual contents of certain kinds 
has helped Stich gain territory, only if we admit that this is a reasonable 
assumption. It is precisely this assumption, that the only conceptual contents 
possible are of a sophisticated inferential nature, that we are rejecting with the 
                                                 
247 S. P. Stich, „Do Animals have Beliefs?‟ p. 22. 
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continuum account. On my view, Fido (and other animals) can still have beliefs, 
if it makes sense to say that observational experiences can fix beliefs of a 
low-level sensory kind. And, as it seems quite plausible that Fido does have 
beliefs, and does not have high-level descriptive concepts, (but does have 
concepts of some kind), it seems that a very low-level of belief fixation in terms 
of sensory concepts is required here. There may, in other words, be more ways 
of attaching beliefs than only to high-level descriptive concepts; sensory looks 
may also fix kinds of beliefs. And they should, because in Fido‟s case or that of 
a sea-slug, there is clearly not much else to go on.  
 Obviously all this is complicated, but the point here is that the most someone 
could say about the conceptual poverty of animals is that animals do not have 
high-level inferential, cognitively penetrated concepts as we clearly do. But 
claiming that they have no concepts at all, and worse still, no concepts with 
which to fix states like belief, is not only counterintuitive, but an unreasonable 
view which avoids the complicated and problematic area of the nature and 
structure of concepts in the context of experiential content, and the obvious 
degrees of animal intellectual/cognitive sophistication. Stich commits this 
error: 
 [G]iven Fido‟s conceptual and cognitive poverty in matters concerned 
with bones, it is surely wrong to ascribe to him any belief about a bone. 
To clinch the point, we need only to reflect that we would certainly balk if 
the same belief were attributed to a human who was as irremediably 
ignorant about bones as we take Fido to be.248  
There is no justification for this conclusion because the premise here can be 
questioned. Fido is clearly not conceptually ignorant in matters concerned with 
bones. He may be conceptually poor in certain respects if we take the ability to 
conceptualise to be an exclusively „high-level‟ descriptive capacity. But poor 
doesn‟t mean conceptually empty. And imagining a person who has Fido‟s 
discriminatory capacities but no more, does not „clinch the point‟ for Stich, 
because we could argue that such a person still has a belief about bones as well 
as Fido does; a belief admittedly, which is not at all sophisticated or congruent 
with a network of other descriptive beliefs, but a belief nonetheless. „Clinching 
the point‟ for Stich here is no more than begging the question. Stich has failed to 
see that the nature of „concepts‟ runs deeper than the kinds of concepts that 
humans are able to share with one another in a descriptively rich cognitive 
network. But this is plainly a superficial view of concepts. Perhaps conceptual 
content runs between species as well as between human individuals, and that 
there is some reason to claim that not all such contents are specifiable in terms 
of high-level considerations; some are importantly observational. Stich‟s view 
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makes the inference criterion the starting point for his argument, and so, begs an 
important issue. It is suggested, therefore, that his argument will not work.249 
 But there is another important reason why Stich‟s argument will not work. He 
says that we are comfortable in attributing beliefs only when the „attributees‟ 
share related beliefs which are isomorphic with our own. There is something 
wrong with this claim also. „Isomorphism‟ with the sorts of things that we 
believe, as a criterion, is more than unjustifiably anthropocentric; it is also 
culturally totalitarian, for, if it were true, it would mean that other human beings 
could not be said to have beliefs. Referring to Stich‟s argument, Routley notes 
that this is a ridiculous suggestion:  
The ascription of beliefs to animals, to members of other remote cultures, 
to various ancient and future peoples, is done commonly enough by the 
layman, without discomfort, without semantic propriety, and without the 
insinuation of substantial theoretical assumptions. It does seem a reductio 
ad absurdum of the common network view incorporated in (2) and (3), 
that temporally or culturally remote humans cannot be attributed beliefs 
with specifiable content.250  
Davidson‟s argument for the same conclusion is also worth noting in this 
context. It is even more starkly „inferentialist‟ than Stich‟s argument: 
 (1) Only a language user can have a concept of belief; 
(2) Only a creature who has the concept of a belief can have beliefs. 
                                                 
249 I hasten to add that I am not opposed to all of his argument in this respect. Stich, like 
Churchland, articulates the view of psychological holism: that beliefs and concepts necessarily 
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animals too, have belief „systems‟. It is arguable, however, whether this claim itself gets Stich 
what he wants. For, as mentioned, he wants to rule out significant content attribution to animals 
on the basis that their „network‟ is not as thoroughly „integrated‟ and high-level as ours. This is 
clearly a non sequitur. For it is open to argue, as I do, that there are distinctions of a qualitative 
nature between the high and low level contents. It is plausible, indeed, to suppose that we have 
relatively isolated low level contents in addition to content of an inferential sort, and that this 
might occur as a system of content sub-systems. (This is, in fact, the burden of modularity 
theory which I shall discuss in Chapter 8.) It is not legitimate to claim that beliefs etc., must 
occur in the context of the high level networks only, and that each part must be inferentially 
accessible to each other part etc. See J. Glover, The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal 
Identity, for a statement of this kind of view.  
250 Routley, op. cit., p. 392. Routley notes also that this view is in „circularity trouble‟: „For 
consider (2) as affording a necessary condition of a subject‟s having a belief with specific 
content. In order to attribute such a belief, we should have to know already that we can attribute 
such beliefs to the subject-which one cannot in general do without (epistemic) circularity. 
Insofar as the network view forces us toward solipsism, that too is a reductio of it.‟ Loc. cit. 
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(C) Therefore, only a language user can have beliefs.251 
This is simply intellectual foolishness. Both of these arguments have false 
conclusions, to say nothing of the premises. They clearly ask too much of 
concepts and beliefs, to say nothing of language, and thus lead to 
counterintuitive cases. Where Stich‟s position implies that other cultures do not 
have concepts or beliefs, Davidson‟s position rules out young children and 
mutes for similar reasons, as well as animals which clearly do seem to have the 
requisite conceptual content: Fido evidently believes that Ginger Puss is in the 
tree when he hears her miaow, despite not being able to string one word to 
another - and despite not having any „high-level‟ inferentially-sophisticated 
background knowledge about trees and cats. For Stich and Davidson, 
inferential linguisticism rears its ugly head. The point here is this: the ability to 
use a language and the ability to access high-level descriptive concepts and 
other inferential features is not relevant to all forms of belief fixation; 
specifically, the low-level concept formation evidently achieved by animals. 
The problem here, especially in Davidson‟s case - but also in Stich‟s - is 
keeping the notion of belief too closely tied to high-level cognitive capacities 
like language.252 There is no justification for this if there can be reasonably said 
to be lower level cognitive capacities which can fix beliefs by means of 
sensations. And, there seems to be reasonable common sense evidence that this 
is true. 253  The claim that „high-level‟ inference is necessary for animal 
cognition is clearly too extreme. Like a besotted lover, inference goes even 
where plausibility does not ask him to follow, and reason enough has already 
been given to think that such features need not be required to fix all kinds of 
content.  
 The claim that animals are not conscious of their sensory states is false and 
the claim that they do not have concepts or beliefs is also false. Animals are 
certainly cognitively poor when compared with humans, but, as Routley says: 
„cognitive poverty, of many sorts, is not material for the attribution of 
beliefs.‟254 „Cognitively poor‟ should mean here cognitively poor relative to us, 
and to our high-level concepts; „belief‟ should mean here a high-level epistemic 
notion. However, as has been argued, this is not the only kind of belief we have, 
                                                 
251 An extracted argument from D. Davidson, „Thought and Talk‟ in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind 
and Language, pp. 22-23. See Routley, op. cit., p. 390 
252 Stich is less obvious with his interpretation of content isomorphism and makes no explicit 
tie with language. But note that, in relation to content attribution, he does use words like 
„broad‟, „largely‟, „substantial‟, in the preceding argument, which gives away the emphasis on 
high-level inference.  
253 See B. E. Rollins, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science, 
and D. Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness: The Evolutionary Continuity of Mental 
Experience. 
254 Routley, op. cit., p. 389. 
  177 
and it is not the only kind of conceptual contents we can speak of. „Cognitively 
poor‟ does not mean cognitively empty, and not all beliefs are epistemic in the 
sense required. Numerous common sense examples show that animals have 
concepts of sorts, and have low-level kinds of beliefs which fix them: the 
interesting and important issue here is the sense of the words „sorts‟ and „kinds‟. 
The arguments in support of the view that high-level inferential factors are 
necessary for cognition in animals have failed to address this issue by 
obfuscating the distinctions here. But the resolution is simple: at the very least, 
animals have certain important sorts of sensory concepts, and such concepts 
clearly fix some sorts of important low-level sensory beliefs. Propositional 
beliefs and inferences of an epistemic kind are qualitatively distinct from this 
level, though both levels can be represented on a graded scale. Some 
sophisticated animals (e.g., dogs, dolphins and chimps) can even have some 
inferential features as well, though probably not of the propositional or 
linguistic kind - though one wouldn‟t want to rule anything out in such cases.  
 The claim that there is a graded scale here should not seem implausible. It is 
sanctioned from an evolutionary and phylogenetic perspective, though it also 
seems intuitively fair. Animals are not exceedingly different creatures from us, 
though they are clearly less sophisticated in fairly obvious ways. The nature of 
their mental content - their beliefs, their concepts, their experiential world - is 
likewise only different from ours by degrees. It seems appropriate, therefore, to 
allow degrees of cognitive sophistication rather than ruling one kind of creature 
as having these features and the others not. Plausibly, humans have very 
high-level beliefs and concepts and experiential content; animals have rather 
less than this in decreasing orders of magnitude. That „higher‟ organisms can 
override such mechanisms of belief fixation with a high degree of cognitive 
inference merely expresses a degree of conceptual sophistication or 
competence; it does not rule out the possibility of low-level sensational 
concepts in animals. We can, in fact, endorse the very real differences in 
cognitive competence between animals and humans, and use them to cast doubt 
on the arguments, by showing that the notion of cognitive content naturally 
bifurcates into different sorts of concepts. The way of sharpening the dispute is 
to maintain a distinction between the relevant types of concepts and the 
accessibility of largely sensory concepts to animals. This seems an appropriate 
solution. It is appropriate because we have already agreed that animals do have 
conscious sensory states. We would face a difficulty with this if we jointly 
upheld the argument that animals have no concepts at all; the reason being that a 
certain cognitive capacity seems a necessary and sufficient condition for any 
sensible attribution of conscious perceptions to animals at all. As Routley has 
noted: 
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Likewise animal perception presupposes animal beliefs. Are we to say 
that the small birds saw the raptor overhead, but that none of them 
believed that another bird was overhead? Yet surely we are not expected 
to forego (the advantages of) ascriptions of perception to animals ... It is 
enough that (i) perception guarantees certain ... attitudes, and that (ii) 
these attitudes, under conditions sometimes satisfied by animals, 
guarantee beliefs. Both (i) and (ii) are readily satisfied. For that a sees xf 
(e.g., the raptor overhead) implies that a sees that xf (e.g., the raptor is 
overhead), so satisfying (i), and the latter normally guarantees that a 
believes that xf, so satisfying (ii).255 
The above is, at least, a plausible argument, but note: just because perception 
needs concepts (like belief), it doesn‟t follow that perception or belief needs 
high-level inference. Animal beliefs and concepts might be informationally 
local and conceptually low-level. If this is plausible, then it seems reasonable to 
grant a further claim: given that the perceptual/discriminatory abilities of 
animals presuppose attitudes like beliefs, the reverse might be reasonably said 
to hold also. Attitude and belief formation would seem to require at least a 
minimal conscious perceptual/discriminatory ability for such attitudes to be 
fixed to certain states of affairs and events in the world. To believe anything 
about Ginger Puss‟ predicament in the tree, Fido would have to be consciously 
aware of some experience that he was having. The experience would have to be 
a contentful experience for Fido in some minimal sense. The important point 
here is that we have admitted that Fido does not have high-level descriptive 
concepts as we do, and we have admitted that Fido‟s experiences do presuppose 
contentful states like beliefs. It seems that the only way that we can grant both 
of these claims is to keep the idea that some contentful states are fixed into 
beliefs through being simply sensory and informationally low-level. The 
possibility of this is all that is needed in the foregoing section. The possibility of 
low-level contentful experiences in animals is enough both to avoid latter-day 
Cartesianism and to make a continuum view of content seem a very likely 
option. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Much of this chapter has been concerned with points that may seem fairly 
obvious. The case for animal experiences being at a number of interestingly 
distinct levels has been presented. On the view given here, there are aspects of 
experiences which are low-level and sensory (in the sense that they are required 
to fix look-beliefs), and aspects of experiences which are inferential (which are 
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required to integrate such low-level beliefs into full-blooded high-level theory). 
There are also a number of intermediate possibilities: sophisticated experiences 
which have low-level „aspect‟-like features, and so on. It has not been claimed 
that no inference goes on in contentful, low-level experiential states, only that 
high-level cognising is not necessarily part of that story. The continuum 
proposal asserts that there are all sorts of graded possibilities with respect to the 
cognitive penetration of sensation by inference, and the two elements are 
dialectically interposed, not antagonistic. It is suggested that several 
non-exclusive kinds of content fits better with evolutionary continuity and also 
with the ethological and developmental facts.  
 We have seen in this chapter how the legacy of the inferentialist proposal has 
resulted in views that ignore the common knowledge that animals are conscious 
of their perceived environment and have primitive concepts. At its most serious, 
views which rely on a more sophisticated account of content result in animals 
being seen as having no experiences at all. It has been argued that none of these 
views are credible.  
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8. Modularity and Insularity 
Perceptual analysis ... is not, truly speaking, a species of thought.256 
Content modularity 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The focus in this chapter will be a recent contribution to perceptual psychology 
and how its view of the organism as an informationally complex group of 
subsystems can be adapted to support the continuum account being presented. 
This view will first be outlined and modified before turning to the issues of 
epiphenomenalism and evolutionary theory. The chapter concludes by arguing 
that low-level informational content should be understood as having a causal 
informational role in perception. 
8.2 Modularity theory  
Jerry Fodor has recently advanced an information-theoretic model of perceptual 
content. Like Kant‟s view, it is fundamentally concerned with the presentation, 
processing and output of data, though unlike the orthodox reading of Kant‟s 
position, it is not entirely „high-level‟ in its approach. It is a view which 
highlights the difficulties with the inferentialist proposal and it goes some way 
towards resolving the question of whether experience is in some sense 
organised at a low level prior to high-level conceptual organisation. In this 
chapter, Fodor‟s modularity thesis (with recent modifications) will be outlined. 
What has been argued so far receives some support from Fodor‟s work in 
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perceptual psychology. 
 Fodor‟s approach to the nature of experiential content is to treat the organism 
as being like a computational machine. In his view, what perception must do is 
to so represent the world as to make it accessible to thought.257 This occurs by 
means of „subsidiary systems‟ which operate to effect informational exchanges, 
by „provid[ing] the central machine with information about the world; 
information expressed by mental symbols in whatever format cognitive 
processes demand of the representations that they apply to.‟258 Explaining how 
these subsidiary systems represent the world in order to make it accessible to 
thought is the aim of Fodor‟s modularity theory of the mind. 
 The account Fodor offers describes a „trichotomous functional taxonomy‟259 
to effect this process of representing the world in thought. Transducers, input 
systems and central processors constitute the machinery, each with a specific 
function. I shall briefly describe each in turn.  
 Transducers are described as „analog systems‟ which function to map 
„proximal stimulations onto more or less precisely covarying neural signals.‟ 
„Proximal stimulations‟ here refer to strictly physical information impinging on 
the sense organs; „covarying neural signals‟ self-evidently refers to the 
information such stimulations instigate in a neural form. Transduced neural 
messages covarying with proximal stimulations are mediated by input systems 
to deliver „distal outputs‟. These outputs are meant to represent, and 
characterise in a suitable vocabulary, the arrangements of things in the world; 
again, in a computational form that the machine can understand.260 In being 
mediated by the input systems, the information is altered from its 
non-inferential form, as surface stimulations on the sense organs, to a 
meaningful inferential form within central processors. The input systems thus 
„encode‟261 but do not translate the output of the transducers to the central 
processors which use and store these representations as data in a cognitive 
context. The informational schemata thus flows from the mapping of the 
stimulus (transducers), to encoding its products (input systems), to storing and 
retrieving it in the form of representational icons (central processors).  
 The distinction between the input mechanisms and the central processors is 
crucial to Fodor‟s taxonomy. In making the distinction, Fodor noted that it was 
one thing to process information and it was another thing to have it available as 
material for inference from one‟s „background beliefs and set.‟262 Here he takes 
sides against much work done on the mechanisms of perception from Kant 
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onwards. Perceptual analysis, typically, has appealed to background 
information, concepts, cognitive structures and the like, to make sense of how 
perception is possible from the input of proximal data, and this has been 
deemed necessary on the strength and persuasion of „poverty of the stimulus‟ 
arguments. 263  Such arguments emphasise that sophisticated cognitive 
mechanisms must be available to filter experiential content, since perception 
was always underdetermined by sensory arrays. In earlier chapters it was 
discussed how assumptions like these give rise to an inferentialist theory of 
content.  
 Fodor generally agrees with this sort of evaluation of the inferential nature of 
perceptual processing, but also notes that, in some respects, perception itself is 
less like inferring and more like reflexing. If so, then this may be a basis for 
distinguishing mechanisms which effect a high-level inferential contribution to 
perceptual processing, from mechanisms which are reflex-like in character, and 
responsive locally to the transduced outputs of proximal stimulations (i.e., 
sensations). This may even offer a basis for explaining primitive experiences of 
animals (and cases of low-level content in humans) which do not, intuitively, 
seem to have much to do with high-level concepts, inference and background 
knowledge. The proposal is obviously central to our concerns in this book.  
 Fodor‟s claim is that there has been a confusion in applying the „poverty of 
the stimulus‟ arguments to perceptual processing; specifically, a confusion as to 
what the arguments are supposed to demonstrate. What the arguments try to 
show is that it is reasonable to assume that perception needs inferences to sort 
out stimuli into coherent perceptual patterns. And a non-inferential basis for 
perception in terms of proximal stimulations cannot fulfil this, i.e., we cannot 
construct perceptual data from a concept-free input. But, it is unclear what the 
inferential story tells us exactly on closer inspection: does it mean, for instance, 
that perceptions are wholly inferentially mediated; or that this is mostly the case 
- perceptions mostly appeal to high-level inferences?  
 This difference is important, because as we saw in Kant‟s case, it was 
actually ambiguous what the mediation by the categories and forms of intuition 
was designed to show; the sensible manifold could have been the basis for some 
kind of intrinsic perceptual structure, albeit a structure insufficient to guarantee 
high-level conceptual knowledge. We also saw that there was a case for 
claiming that the „top down‟ heavily inferential approach is not even fully 
argued for in Kant‟s writings, and is inconsistent with some of the more 
marginal claims in his writing. In view of the continuum theory being 
advanced, of course, this is a point of crucial interest: for if true, then it casts in 
doubt some of the strongly pro-inferentialist work from Kant onwards. 
 In the case of the Sherlock Holmes example, however, the value of the 
„poverty of the stimulus‟ story seems clear cut, and makes sense of Holmes‟s 
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abilities: we saw that he was able to extract from peripheral sensory clues a 
meaningful body of perceptual information about the dispositions of his 
suspects, their habits and the likely perpetrator of the crime, and that this was a 
function of the role of inference in perceptual processing. In this case, it seemed 
a straight forward case of the penetration of sensations by inference.  
 On the strength of what we have been considering so far, of course, this is all 
a bit quick: though it might follow that Holmes needed to form inferences to 
reach conclusions, it does not follow that without inference, concepts, etc., 
Holmes could make no meaningful perceptual discriminations at all. The 
conclusion that he could not just does not seem to follow from the „poverty of 
the stimulus‟ arguments. The whole „poverty‟ argument seems even less sound 
when animal experiences are considered: for since unsophisticated animals are 
said to have few inferential mechanisms at their disposal, then they must have 
no experiences. But as was argued in the last chapter, this does not seem 
plausible at all; certainly not in the face of the phylogenetic link between 
animals and ourselves. Rather than high-level factors constituting a dividing 
line between experiencing humans and non-experiencing animals, it seemed far 
more plausible to view the relationship as being a matter of degree, not kind.  
 The inferentialist proposal has been criticised in previous chapters on both of 
these grounds. A weaker view of the relation between experience and features 
of high-level inference has been presented instead. It is now suggested that 
Fodor‟s modularity theory provides some empirical as well as theoretical 
reasons for taking the continuum account seriously.  
 Consider the action of a reflex: say, my blinking when you attempt to poke 
me in the eye. This could not, by a long shot, be considered a perceptual 
response to stimuli, because this is not an integrated representation of proximal 
stimulus: it does not represent the action of poking in thought, as a perception 
must represent the world in thought. Indeed, it doesn‟t seem to represent 
anything; it is just a „straight-through‟ unmediated connection of stimulus to 
reaction. Rather a lot of significant perceptual integrations actually seem 
something like this too, as Fodor observed; for example, the cases of 
face-recognition, object-recognition and the perception of speech-patterns, 
vocalisations and utterances. Such perceptions are domain specific, immediate 
and, seemingly encapsulated from inferential analysis in terms of background 
knowledge. Fodor‟s claim is that some level of perceptual processing has, in 
fact, properties rather like the properties that reflexes have.  
 On orthodox inferentialist views, such as Kant‟s, there is no distinction 
between cognitively penetrated (inferential) percepts, and so-called 
encapsulated ones. On the Kantian view, the categories and forms of intuition 
uniquely determine the percept on the basis of prior schemata structured „in the 
mind.‟ For experience to be possible at all, the forms of intuition and categories 
have to organise the manifold of intuition. Intuitions without concepts are blind. 
A judgment may err (be „false‟) through insufficient sensory input, but 
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essentially perceptual processing must occur by means of the faculties. Fodor‟s 
point is that this sort of approach may explain how we experience anything at 
all given the underdetermination of proximal stimulation. However, on this 
view of perception, there is no flexibility to allow for the kinds of perceptual 
content that is insulated from background beliefs and concepts and which seems 
to resist background interpretation. Fodor‟s argument that this sort of 
non-inferential and encapsulated perceptual processing does occur rests mainly 
on his account of the Muller-Lyer illusion.  
8.3 The Muller-Lyer illusion: cognitive encapsularity  
The familiar Muller-Lyer illusion goes something like this: two lines of 
identical length are presented with arrowheads on each end pointing in and out 
respectively (see below, figure 4). Line (b) looks longer than the other owing to 
the figure being interpreted three dimensionally as a „concave corner with its 
edge receding from the viewer.‟264 The other figure, (a), is perceived (again, 
three dimensionally) as projecting a convex corner, which appears to emerge 
toward the viewer, and thus, appears shorter. Despite appearances, the two lines 
in question are actually the same length. The discrepancy between the two 
projections in the illusion can be explained by a wealth of background 
information which constitutes „a complex of assumptions about the relation 
between three-dimensional objects and their two-dimensional projections,‟265 
like those, for example, relating what we know about the edges of rooms, 
doorways, and so on. Adding credence to this „top down‟ explanation is the 
plausible claim that some people (particularly those from other cultures) and 
children, are less susceptible to the illusion than those familiar with edges, 
corners and their perspectival relationships, presumably owing to a 
demonstrable lack of culturally attuned background beliefs.266    
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(a)
(b)
 
Figure 4 The Muller-Lyer illusion. 
Fodor‟s point about all of this is simply that if high-level influences penetrate 
perception wholly, then why is it not the case that the knowledge that the 
illusion is an illusion penetrate one‟s perception of it? 
The Muller-Lyer is a familiar illusion; the news has pretty well gotten 
around by now. So it‟s part of the „background theory‟ of anybody who 
lives in this culture and is at all into pop psychology that displays like 
[this] are in fact misleading and that it always turns out, on measurement 
that the centre lines of the arrows are the same length. Query: why isn’t 
perception penetrated by THAT piece of background theory? Why, in 
fact, doesn‟t knowing that the lines are the same length make it look as 
though the lines are the same length?267  
According to Fodor, what the Muller-Lyer shows is not that perception is highly 
cognitive. Rather, it suggests just the reverse: that how the world looks can be 
„peculiarly unaffected by how one knows it to be.‟  
 Cases like this can be multiplied to include the Ames room and the phi 
phenomenon illusions, and also to cases not involving vision. Fodor cites the 
phoneme restoration and the click displacement effects in speech as other 
examples. (In these cases, a subject can hear a recording of a word that has had 
a phoneme cut out and a „click‟ put in its place. Despite being told about the 
alteration, a subject will still hear the entire word).268 Fodor‟s conclusion about 
all this is, in an important sense, damaging to the case of „top down‟ perceptual 
processing:  
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The issue raised by the persistence of illusion is not, ... whether some 
inferences are „more conceptual‟ than others ... [The] issue is: How rigid 
is the boundary between the information available to cognitive processes 
and the information available to perceptual ones? How much of what you 
know/believe/desire actually does affect the way that you see? The 
persistence of illusion suggests that the answer might be: at most, less 
than all of it.269  
The accusation is that there is all the difference in the world between claiming 
that perceptual inferences from background knowledge are available to 
perceptual integration, and claiming that perception is cognitively penetrated 
by such inferences. Perceptual implasticities make the idea of cognitive 
penetration seems highly implausible.270 For cognitive penetration to be true, it 
would have to imply „the continuity of perception with cognition.‟271 But if 
Fodor‟s claims about perceptual illusion are reasonable, then it would seem that 
perceptual implasticities do imply a „radical isolation of how things look from 
the effects of much of what one believes.‟272  
 Fodor‟s diagnosis is that there are, on an increasing scale, three sorts of 
architectural arrangements in respect of the relations between cognition and 
perception: a case where no background information is available to perceptual 
integration; a case where some but not all background information is available; 
and a case where everything one knows is available to integration. The first 
seems implausible in view of the poverty of the stimulus arguments, and the 
third seems implausible in view of the Muller-Lyer illusion. Fodor‟s claim is 
that, on balance, the second seems the „better bet.‟273 Certain contents are 
always encapsulated from knowledge and beliefs.  
 Within the limits of analogy, Kant‟s model is a useful comparison. Kant 
faced two options with respect to the categories and their influence on the 
content of experience: one was that they wholly determined (read: cognitively 
penetrated) the structure of the manifold of sense. The other option was that the 
manifold of sense is somehow organised (read: is „encapsulated‟) in some 
primitive manner, despite the imposition of the categories. It would seem that 
Fodor explicitly takes the second option, whereas it is unclear if Kant does. 
(Though if his views of the sensory manifold are as systematically ambiguous 
as has been pointed out, then it may well be that the orthodox view of Kant is 
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misguided, and that he was actually sympathetic to the second option too).274 
 H. I. Brown has reached a similar tertium quid on the nature of our 
perceptions, and though the boundary he is drawing is unclear, he seems to be 
suggesting that there are certain important encapsulated constraints on 
perception. Referring to ambiguous perceptual illusions like the duck/rabbit and 
the face/vase illusions, and in response to the relativist objection that such 
stimuli can be „perceived in any way at all‟, he writes: 
We can begin our response by noting that I have nowhere maintained that 
theories create their own data or that our theories alone determine what 
we perceive. Rather, the objects of perception are the results of 
contributions from both our theories and the action of the external world 
on our sense organs. Because of this dual source of our percepts objects 
can be seen in many different ways, but it does not follow that a given 
object can be seen in any way at all. Consider again the duck/rabbit. We 
have already seen that this figure can be seen as a duck, a rabbit, a set of 
lines or an area, and one might plausibly imagine its being seen as a piece 
of laboratory apparatus, a religious symbol, or some other animal by an 
observer with the appropriate experience. But try as I will, I cannot see 
this figure as my wife, the Washington monument or a herd of swine.... I 
do not maintain that theories impose structure on a neutral material. The 
dichotomy between the view of perception as the passive observation of 
objects which are whatever they appear to be and perceptions as the 
creation of perceptual objects out of nothing is by no means exhaustive. A 
third possibility is that we shape our perceptions out of an already 
structured but still malleable material. This perceptual material, 
whatever it might be, will serve to limit the class of possible constraints 
without dictating a unique percept.275 
Of course, there are some important differences in the claims here. Fodor is 
suggesting that there are boundary conditions on what the perceptual apparatus 
can do computationally; Brown seems to be saying that what is in the world 
limits perceptual content. Clearly though, there are also some similarities here. 
Perceptual experience is a function of perceptual equipment interacting with the 
world as it impinges on our sense organs, and constraints can occur at the 
junction of both levels. The interesting issue is the exact nature of this 
relationship. 
 I want to draw attention here to the important distinction between the central 
processors and the input mechanisms in light of the foregoing. The point of the 
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subsidiary systems is to provide information to a computational machine in a 
form that it can understand, about the world in which it operates and engages in 
informational exchange. On any ordinary view of perceptual processing, a 
distinction is normally made between „cognition‟ (employing high-level 
background beliefs and so on) and „sensing‟ (which is responsive to the output 
of proximal stimulations). In Fodor‟s picture, this is amended with the 
introduction of a third „mechanism.‟ Sensations, on his view, become 
„responsive solely to the character of proximal stimulations and [are] 
non-inferential‟ while cognition is „both inferential and responsive to the 
perceiver‟s background theories.‟ 276  Fodor‟s innovation is to „split the 
difference‟277 between the sensory component which is non-inferential, and the 
cognitive component which is inferential, and to postulate a new mechanism 
which has both these characteristics. This mechanism Fodor calls a perceptual 
„module‟:  
A module is, (inter alia) an informationally encapsulated computational 
system - an inference-making mechanism whose access to background 
information is constrained by general features of cognitive architecture, 
hence relatively rigidly and relatively permanently constrained. ... at least 
some information that is available to at least some cognitive processes is 
not available to the module.278 
With its informationally encapsulated and relatively permanently constrained 
cognitive architecture, the „module‟ allows perceptual integration to occur at a 
lower level than input from high-level beliefs, theories, background knowledge, 
etc. And it is this which is supposed to account for the fact that in some 
perceptual situations, what one sees is curiously unaffected by what one knows 
or believes.  
 There may appear to be some confusion in the above passage. Fodor is 
explicitly claiming that a module is an inference-making mechanism, whereas 
before he seemed to be embracing the non-inferential character of reflexes as a 
distinguishing feature of some kinds of perceptual integrations. The claim is, 
however, that a module is inferential only in respect of information confined 
within its own modular „architecture,‟ and that this information is still 
permanently encapsulated from the high-level inferential deposits of 
background beliefs and concepts.  
8.4 Empirical supports for modularity 
I would like to turn now, briefly, to some of the empirical supports for the idea 
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that perception is modular. We have seen that the visual effect of the 
Muller-Lyer illusion admits of an interpretation contrary to the usual 
explanation in terms of the penetration of culturally acquired background 
beliefs about common geometric patterns. The alternative view was that not all 
perceptual mechanisms are inferential and at some perceptual level, how certain 
information is received is unaffected by how things are believed or known to be, 
and this seemed to indicate a more primary processing level is available to 
complex perceptual organisms. This is hardly a decisive argument on its own, 
and so Fodor provides us with a wealth of other cases. The interesting thing 
about them is that not only does visual perception seem like this, but there are 
examples which show that many other types of information processing, both 
auditory and tactile, also seem informationally encapsulated in his sense; in 
fact, low-level perceptual integrations of all kinds are modular. 
 A good example is the processing of speech sounds. Evidence by several 
theorists, including Liberman,279 has suggested that the way subjects hear a 
signal greatly depends upon whether the signal is in the form of an utterance or 
not. This seems to indicate that the mechanisms of audition are, in an important 
sense, „pre-tuned‟ to be responsive to certain types of meaningful acoustic 
contexts. If this is an adequate hypothesis, then it would seem to fit in rather 
well with the Chomskian view that natural language has certain unique and 
universal grammatical properties which are responsive to species-specific 
learning systems. It would jointly account for the ability of a language-speaking 
organism to learn language so rapidly. The phenomenon of speech „tracking‟ or 
„shadowing‟ is also relevant here: as Fodor reports, a significant number of 
people can repeat continuous speech with only one quarter of a second latency, 
and also understand what they are saying.280 These findings seem to display that 
in order for certain highly efficient responses of utterance and speech 
recognition to be possible, the integrations must be unmediated by complicated 
cognitive processes and fairly local and direct in their application. Other 
examples include phoneme recognition, face recognition and the recognition of 
three-dimensional shapes, all of which suggest the same sort of reflex-like 
responses to certain sorts of stimuli.281 These studies indicate that a special kind 
of perceptual mechanism is operational - domain-specific in its function and 
„modular‟ in performing it. 
 How else might this sort of data be made informationally accessible, if not in 
a modular (encapsulated) fashion? Fodor sketches an alternative means which 
involves the employment of a „similarity metric‟ and a conceptual 
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„prototype‟.282 The suggestion is that perceptual integration might happen by a 
matching of data against an inferential standard, and by assessing the degree of 
closeness or „fit‟. If this was the way in which perceptual integration of 
utterances or faces, etc. occurred, then it would mean that we could imagine „a 
quite general computational system‟283 which was „horizontal‟ in structure, i.e., 
it could cross perceptual domains, and assess facial data in the same manner in 
which it assessed speech vocalisations, colours or cows. In this case: „The 
procedures for estimating the distance between input and a perceptual prototype 
should have pretty much the same computational structure wherever they are 
encountered.‟284  
 If this is meant to be a rival to the modular hypothesis, then it is not a good 
one. For, considering how „eccentric‟ a stimulus can be, it would be somewhat 
remarkable that such perceptual integrations could occur for such things at all, 
let alone with the speed that they do. A more likely possibility, the one that 
Fodor presents, is that some primitive modes of perceptual recognition are 
already „tuned‟285 to „special classes‟ of stimuli, and so operate in a relatively 
isolated fashion from inferential prototypes, to achieve recognition fast. This is 
not to say, of course, that all feats of integrative processing are performed in 
this „modular‟, domain-specific way. A complicated activity, like playing the 
piano, demonstratively requires inferences from background beliefs and set, not 
only to make informed perceptual judgments about the object itself, but to work 
out what possibilities are open to one if one wanted to use it. Inferences from 
one‟s life history, memories of concerts, childhood music lessons, as well as 
knowledge of harmony, chordal relationships, etc., are relevant here. But if 
one‟s intention does not happen to be to play it, but to use it as a piece of 
furniture, then all such background beliefs about pianos can be abandoned. This 
is not so with face recognition, speech analysis, and perception of three- 
dimensional objects. It is not only that these sorts of perceptual integrations just 
seem positively impervious to background knowledge, beliefs and concepts; it 
simply seems that such things do not even bear on such lower level responses, 
and, as they do not, it scarcely seems an issue that they could be 
„conceptualised‟ in any other way. Rather, what is most clear about such ex 
hypothesi modular tasks is that we can’t but integrate them as we do: 
You can‟t help hearing an utterance of a sentence ... as an utterance of a 
sentence, and you can't help seeing a visual array as consisting of objects 
distributed in three-dimensional space. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for 
the other perceptual modes: you can‟t, for instance, help feeling that what 
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you run your fingers over is the surface of an object.286 
The claim is not that all perceptual processes are modular, and thus 
informationally encapsulated. It is only that it is questionable that all perception 
involves the imposition of high-level inferential features and that the boundary 
between what is available to perceptual processes and what is available to 
cognitive processes is inferentially porous. If it was inferentially porous, then 
all perceptual processes would predictably involve a certain amount of 
high-level inference in the form of background beliefs and concepts, but as we 
have seen, the evidence just doesn‟t run this way. However, Fodor is far from 
claiming that no perceptual processes are inferential: the point is that it depends 
on the level of processing in question. Some (complex) processing certainly 
involves cognitive mechanisms, inference and so on, but some of the simplest 
cases of perceptual integration are not influenced by them at all. This is 
transparently clear in the case of the Muller-Lyer illusion, but it is also, if we 
believe Fodor, evident in utterance and speech sound recognition, tactile object 
integration and perhaps even the recognition of colour primitives. Perhaps, this 
also might be true of the kinds of perceptual integrations that unsophisticated 
animals perform: summarily, we might begin to believe that animal awareness 
is informationally local too.  
 Fodor has provided grounds for thinking that there may be some perceptual 
content which is not necessarily dependent on high-level features and this is 
tantamount to a rejection of the inferentialist proposal we are considering. 
However, there have been modifications of Fodor‟s view which need to be 
noted. 
Content insularity 
8.5 Cam’s thesis  
Philip Cam has suggested, like Fodor, that in constructing a perception from 
available sensory information, certain „assumptions‟ are adopted by the 
perceptual mechanisms which may be false in the light of background 
knowledge.287 One of the Muller-Lyer lines may look longer, for instance, 
despite our knowledge to the contrary. As to how this might happen, he offers 
three possible answers: (1) there is a lack of physical connections between 
high-level knowledge and the lower order mechanisms of perception; (2) the 
cognitive processes contained in high-level language ability outstrips the lower 
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perceptual processes which have „a relatively primitive competence‟ 288 
(meaning: that they literally cannot communicate with each other); and (3) the 
two, cognition and perception, are physically linked and can communicate but 
sometimes, when „highly conditioned‟, the assumptions that the perceptual 
mechanisms employ can „override‟ this higher processing.  
 The first two explanations, he notes, are compatible with Fodor‟s account of 
the informational encapsulation of perceptual modules; stressing that, for both 
reasons, the architecture and the assumptions of the module are „inaccessible‟ 
to penetration by intellect, and so, operate autonomously. But Cam‟s point is 
that the third option also is „not without grounds to recommend it.‟289 The 
advantage of the third option, he believes, is that it fits better with the facts. His 
argument is that the cases that Fodor considers to substantiate the encapsulation 
of the modules (lines, faces and so on), are „arguably all highly conditioned by 
experience. Rooms are nearly always rectangular (at least in our culture), faces 
protrude, solid shafts that appear to join do join and so forth.‟290 The point is 
that if the perceptual mechanisms are constantly confronted by such stimuli 
with no intervening „counteracting cues‟ then „homebased assumptions might 
do just as well as ignorance of intellectual knowledge to account for the 
effects.‟291 Thus, the perceptual modules may be operating autonomously not 
because they are totally constrained from high-level features, but because they 
have been conditioned to function in that way.  
 The perceptual integrations of ambiguous stimuli support his case. In the case 
of the duck-rabbit where alternative perceptual possibilities feature, there are no 
overriding perceptual preferences made by the input systems and either 
„construction‟ will do - hence, one‟s perceptual integration of the stimulus (how 
it looks) can also oscillate easily between cognitive interpretations. This is not 
so with strongly constrained perceptual information. In cases where homebased 
processing has „solidified‟, this becomes increasingly less possible. (This is 
why, perhaps, the sun always seems to rise and the earth never seems to sink, 
despite our knowledge to the contrary, or that we can‟t help feeling an object 
when we run our fingers over it.) In Cam‟s view, only this latter kind of content, 
strictly speaking, seems to be informationally encapsulated in Fodor‟s sense.  
 The point is that „rather than having informational encapsulation in some 
cases and permeability in others and the attendant difficulties upon sorting out 
why this might be, perhaps we should posit a single principle to cover them all. 
The principle would be (roughly) that perceptual analysis will accept 
instruction to the extent that its own preferences are not clear and univocal.‟292 
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290 Loc. cit. 
291 Loc. cit.  
292 Loc. cit.  
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Cam‟s claim, contra Fodor, is that the assumptions that low-level modules 
employ in integrating sensory stimuli do not always suggest encapsulation, 
bull-headedness or recalcitrance from conceptual processing, but an insularity 
or narrow-mindedness. The modules first call „on their own resources‟, and 
they tend to be guided by information or suggestions intruding from other 
„authorities‟ „only to the extent that decisions based upon their local 
information base leave open further or alternative possibilities.‟293  
 Unlike Fodor, Cam allows the possibility that the low-level architectural 
arrangement of the module is not „permanently constrained‟ from high-level 
influences, but, to some degree, open to it for use when conditioned tendencies 
do not influence it in other ways. This seems to be a plausible suggestion and it 
is supported by empirical work suggestive of a more flexible arrangement 
between the influences of higher and lower content structuring.294 
 Cam‟s analysis of perceptual mechanisms seems on the surface to support a 
more subtle account of content than Fodor‟s modular view. On Cam‟s account, 
the information that the low-level processing units possess is conditioned by 
experience, though not determined by it, due to the conduits of sensation being 
informationally poor. Instead, early and constant sensory irradiation of 
particular kinds is sufficient to form constraints which make up the organic 
„home-based preferences‟ of the lower-order informational system. And these 
preferences amount to primitive conceptions of things „looking longer‟ etc.  
 However, the prima facie advantages of an insularity account should not go 
toward ruling out the encapsularity view. Fodor‟s account also allows for such 
subtleties if read correctly. There is no principled reason why the encapsularity 
view could not be seen to encompass such cases of content which seem clearly 
less dependent on the constraints of information contained in the modular 
architecture. The differences between the views may be simply a matter of 
emphasis. Fodor stresses examples where low-level content does not seem to be 
influenced by background knowledge; Cam stresses cases which demonstrate 
that occasionally it does seem to be influenced in this way. However, in 
principle, Fodor‟s modularity view remains as flexible as Cam‟s insularity 
view. Content which seems to be „narrow-minded‟ in Cam‟s sense may also be 
seen to be informationally encapsulated, providing that encapsulation is 
understood to occur in levels or degrees.  
                                                 
293 Ibid., p. 234. 
294 Loc. cit. This account is particularly plausible in view of cases of Muller-Lyer decrement, 
where the illusion has been shown to reduce in effectiveness not through prolonged exposure, 
but „cognitive recalibration.‟ (D. J. Schiano and K. Jordan: „Mueller-Lyer Decrement: Practice 
or Prolonged Exposure‟, pp. 307-316). Though the evidence is ambiguous here, it seems to tell 
against the views that attribute illusion decrease to features of neural fatigue. By contrast, what 
seems to be central is learning and practice in response to experience as much as to features of 
the processing system. This seems to indicate that there must be experiential permeability of 
modules rather than encapsulation.  
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 I shall not attempt to adjudicate between these views as this issue is not 
central to this book. Whether the modules are best described as encapsulated or 
insulated is of no concern to me here. The important thing is that there is some 
degree of isolation of perceptual content from the mechanisms of high-level 
inference. However one interprets the insularity/modularity distinction, the 
important thing is that inferential input is not necessary for all forms of 
perceptual content. Both Fodor‟s and Cam‟s views suggest that this is indeed 
the case. 
 Something important follows from all this. If content can be said to have 
some independence from high-level reasoning and it is granted that experiences 
can have sensational aspects (as argued earlier), it seems natural to conclude 
that these features of content might be modular-like in Fodor‟s or Cam‟s sense. 
The examples of sensational properties offered in Chapter 5 might be best 
understood in terms of informational features of experience at a very low-level. 
And these features might function is just the way Fodor and Cam suggest (being 
relatively constrained from high-level influences). 
 Earlier chapters have argued that animal and infant experience, must be 
understood as contentful in some sense. It also seems natural to conclude, from 
the material just discussed, that the kind of perceptual outputs in question are 
just those that may be central to the perceptual systems of unsophisticated 
organisms. Modular-like informational content of an impurely sensational 
nature may be the kind of experiences had by such primitive creatures (in 
various degrees of complexity). This point seems to fit with the arguments 
against the inferentialist proposal offered earlier, for, as previously discussed, 
there is no good reason to deny contentful experiences of some kind in 
organisms which are phylogenetically related to us. This claim could be 
strengthened by taking seriously the suggestion that the deliverances of 
perceptual mechanisms are largely subject to selective pressures and that 
experiential content of all kinds has a causal role in perception. If true, then the 
origins of modularity might suggest a view of content susceptible to the 
influence of evolutionary pressures on developing perceptual mechanisms. The 
kinds of contentful outputs processed by the modules could thus be seen as 
being causally responsive to selectively important features in an organism‟s 
environment.  
 To factor in evolution here requires that low-level contentful information be 
seen in terms of an evolving system, responsive to relevant features of the world 
that system was engaged in, and able to process naturally; in other words, what 
were observable properties for that processing system. Such processing would 
be similar to Lorenz‟s „organs‟ of the body being able to „think‟ in certain 
forms. On this view, the nature of content should certainly be a part of an 
evolution-primed biological account of organisms.  
 To take an evolutionary line here means that the content of the informational 
modules would be responsive to both input and high-level cognition (if 
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available). It would also be inherently flexible and could occur among species 
in degrees. Some unsophisticated organisms might not have high-level 
processing at all, only modular units; others might have some but considerably 
less than humans, and so on. This would also allow for the possibility that 
low-level inferential content (sub-descriptive inferences) may be available to 
fairly sophisticated animals, like dogs and chimpanzees. The outline of an 
account of this kind was given in Chapters 1 and 2. It is now suggested that 
some kind of modularity view goes some way to supporting a continuum 
account of content.  
 On the continuum account, at each extreme of the continuum there are quite 
separate structures to our perceptual organisation of experience: a lower-order 
level which contains sensory information, which is local to perceptual domains 
of „looks‟, and a high-level structure which is influenced to some degree by 
these home-based preferences. Each kind of content is important in selective 
terms for experiencing organisms (an argument will be advanced for this in the 
next section). It is suggested here that in fact the lower level of perceptual 
integration is a kind of low-level concept which is informationally primitive, 
and to an important degree, insulated from the high-level influences. The 
home-based preferences which have these characteristics have been called 
„sensational concepts‟ to distinguish them from other kinds of higher-level 
conceptualisations.  
 That a modular view of content rests well with a Lorenzian account of the 
naturalistic and organic basis of perceptual structure is convenient for my 
purposes. It is far easier and certainly more parsimonious to view the organism 
as a processing system which operates in response not only to mechanisms of 
inference, but also to selective pressures at an important lower-order sensory 
level: to contentful colour aspects and other such fairly undemanding 
discriminatory features, which need not be tied to high-level concepts and 
background knowledge etc. Moreover, it also seems instructive to see such a 
low-level ability, as Lorenz did, as an ability which can vary among species and 
creatures depending on their perceptual evolutionary bias. These points go 
together uncompromisingly well:  
The notion of constrained faculties views humans less as all-purpose 
machines and more as biological organisms that have, through the course 
of evolution, developed specialised „mental organs‟ that are used to deal 
with different aspects of their physical and mental worlds. Each organ 
imposes its own set of constraints on the types of knowledge structures it 
uses, such that we have different domains of cognition with different 
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formal properties.295  
Such an analysis rests well with an account of the perceptual structure that 
conceptually unsophisticated animals actually seem to have. It seems quite in 
order to suppose that some unsophisticated animal and infant cognition, though 
bereft of high-level content in the manner specified by the inferentialist 
proposal, is fixed around certain lower order conscious observables that 
evolution facilitates. It is not unreasonable to suppose that some such 
informational constraints on concept acquisition are exceedingly primitive and 
are possessed by less differentiated organisms, and perhaps even constitute the 
sum total of their conceptual repertoire. In such cases, the matter of high-level 
inference is of little practical consequence in determining the content of their 
observational experience. 
 Fodor‟s claim that there is a „third mechanism‟ between proximal 
stimulations and high-level cognition has given a further reason to reject the 
inferentialist proposal. Cam‟s modification of this view, along with 
evolutionary considerations, indicates that content is sometimes 
narrow-minded, not encapsulated. Both of these views are supported by 
empirical work suggesting that content is constrained to some degree from 
high-level influences.  
 Campbell claims that Fodor‟s modularity thesis actually „underwrites the 
return of the requirement to save ... Appearances.‟296 But he also claims that this 
doesn‟t imply a return to Cartesian foundationalism: 
It marks no limit in breadth or depth of vision, beyond which speculation 
may not pass ... [but] place[s] the onus for explaining any incompatibility 
between theory and common sense on the theoretical, speculative side of 
the disagreement ... It is for the theory, not the observation, to yield.297 
Such an interpretation of modularity theory would be generally sympathetic to 
the points made in this book. Primitive observational looks, which fix kinds of 
experiential content, might remain importantly distinct from high-level 
influences. It is theory, not observation, that needs to yield. Experiential 
content, in my view, must be understood to occur in degrees of sophistication, 
and to some degree at least, it need not involve high-level inferences. 
 As we have seen earlier, there are reasons for adopting a view of content 
which embraces several levels of informational complexity. Content, we saw, 
occurs along a continuum, from sensationally specified, to content which is 
highly inferentially specified. The former is immune to the higher level 
                                                 
295 F. C. Keil, „Mechanisms of Cognitive Development and the Structure of Knowledge‟, in 
Mechanisms of Cognitive Development, p. 94. 
296 K. Campbell, „Philosophy and Common Sense‟, p. 172. 
297 Loc. cit. 
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influences to a degree which is significant. A principle of parsimony applied in 
this context might be that one should not extend one‟s mechanisms of inference 
beyond their domain of utility. The inferentialist account clearly does this, and 
so is a seriously misleading picture of experience and content.  
8.6 Phenomenological accessibility and epiphenomenalism  
There is one important thing to add. It will be noted that the stress being placing 
on the conscious nature of low-level content does not mesh well with the 
essentially functionalist program behind Fodor‟s modularity theory. If Fodor is 
a major support in my characterisation of experiential content, it would seem 
that I am backing a loser, because Fodor‟s characterisation of the sub-systems 
central to perceptual mechanisms makes no reference to conscious 
accessibility, but, instead, only to the various computational levels at which 
information is processed. Fodor and consciousness are, it would seem, strange 
bedfellows.  
 However, it is not the case that Fodor altogether eschews considerations of 
conscious perceptual contents, even though it is certainly true that it is not a 
mainstay of his computational program. In an endnote to The Modularity of 
Mind, Fodor angles for „phenomenological accessibility as a criterion of the 
output of the visual processes‟298 and states explicitly: 
It seems to me that we want a notion of perceptual process that makes the 
deliverances of perception available as the premises of conscious 
decision and inferences ... I want a vocabulary for the output of the visual 
processor which specifies stimulus properties that are 
phenomenologically accessible and that are, by preference, reasonably 
close to those stimulus properties that we pretheoretically suppose to be 
visible.299 
And again: 
 [T]he activity of modules determines what you would believe about the 
appearances if you were going just on the appearances. Less gnomically: 
modules offer hypotheses about the instantiation of observable properties 
of things.300  
This just seems to be a convoluted way of saying that it is selectively useful for 
perceptual content to have conscious felt qualities. To suggest that our 
experience of colour hues or of enlargements of the visual field, for instance, 
                                                 
298 J. Fodor, (1983) op. cit., p. 136. 
299 Loc. cit. I would like to thank G. J. O‟Brien for drawing my attention to this passage.  
300 Fodor (1984), op. cit., p. 41. 
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must be „phenomenologically accessible‟ in the way that we „pretheoretically‟ 
take them in experience means, in plainer words: there is something 
qualitatively important about stimulus properties for the activity of perceptual 
processing. The dynamics of perception requires content to have sensational 
features. Indeed, it must be the overarching aim of any account of perceptual 
content and structure to offer an account of how some experiences can have 
such felt aspects. Felt experiences, of course, require some degree of conscious 
accessibility. 
 There are good reasons why experiences should have felt aspects, so Fodor 
should not need to conceal the point. The reason is entirely naturalist: there 
must be a way certain experiences feel or seem for the subject because 
sometimes, in the imposition of high-level inferences, we get our experiences 
wrong; we mistake sharp projectiles for balloons or feather dusters. A 
contentful visual field experience, such that something is getting closer, even 
when we may know it isn’t, is helpful in sorting out what kinds of experiences 
we need to concentrate on; the ones, for instance, that may cause us trouble or 
injury. Such „phenomenal‟ features are made available as material for 
conscious decision and inferences. Such material is informationally contentful 
without being heavily inferential (though it may be inferentially informed to 
some degree). This probably has a lot to do with our evolutionary past. It would 
seem plausible that not all experiences can be captured by the nature of 
representational features, beliefs that, or „high-level‟ knowledge imposition. 
Some contentful experiential features just have looks, and so are selectively 
useful as primitive, but necessary, processing units available to later, more 
discerning intellectual evaluation.  
 This kind of backdown from a healthy functionalist stance must be expected: 
it must be remembered, finally, that Fodor‟s psychological account is but one 
stratagem in the quest for an adequate account of experiential content; it may 
well be that the problem needs to be supplemented by other philosophical 
considerations, some of which have been considered here. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, there are several non-exclusive ways of treating the issue of 
experience and content. One of those is to look at the issue in terms of the 
mechanisms of perceptual psychology; another is to bring in evolutionary 
considerations. Many such influences may ultimately be necessary. An 
important aim of this book is to integrate such themes in an overall account. The 
upshot is that, Pickwickian or not, Fodor‟s „phenomenological accessibility‟ 
criterion should be seen as an important feature of his theory, just as a 
contentful sensory manifold should be an important part of Kant‟s.  
 A similar kind of reasoning must be engaged, moreover, to avoid the 
objection that low-level insulated modules are epiphenomenally irrelevant to 
experiential content. This problem arises only if it becomes an issue as to how 
the low-level, phenomenal features - „aspects‟ of experiences - feed into 
high-level perceptual processing. But it is clear what response must be given 
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here. It must be that it is simply a contingent fact that evolution has favoured 
organisms that have evolved with sense organs having such phenomenal 
experiential features.301 On evolutionary grounds the reason for this is clear 
enough: low-level, non-inferential content is not epistemically idle because it 
gives sophisticated organisms the informational basis for making conscious 
decisions about whether certain perceptual information is a threat or not, even 
in view of perceptual mistakes. It also helps us to process information in 
perceptual shorthand: noticing a certain „look‟ helps us to work out where 
inferences are to apply. Cognitive development at this sensational level assures 
that the processing eventuates in low-level informational content which helps to 
filter perceptual wheat from chaff. Low-level „look‟-beliefs, in other words, act 
as the watchdog on unbridled and erroneous inference-making. 
 There have been positions which argue for a contrary view. Frank Jackson, 
for example, has argued that certain felt properties of mental states - 
experiential „qualia‟ - are such that „their possession or absence makes no 
difference to the physical world.‟302 This commits him to saying that the kinds 
of conscious low-level outputs, which I have suggested are importantly 
efficacious aspects to experiential content, are actually causally irrelevant to 
the kinds of perceptual processing we make about that world. Such a claim 
would seem to be implausible in the face of evolutionary theory: evolution 
sanctions traits that are conducive to survival, not irrelevant; hence such 
qualitative properties must have some kind of causal importance in the 
evolutionary scheme of things.  
 However, Jackson‟s reasoning against this is as follows: just as a polar bear 
has evolved a thick coat, so it has evolved a heavy one. A thick coat is 
survivally advantageous because it insulates the animal from the cold; a heavy 
one is not survivally advantageous because it slows the animal down. But it 
does not follow from this that such an example refutes the idea that some traits 
can be causally impotent. Just because a trait can evolve which is not conducive 
to survival does not come in conflict with Darwinism. This is because the heavy 
coat, in this case, is an „unavoidable concomitant‟ of having a warm coat, „and 
the advantages for survival of having a warm coat outweighed the 
disadvantages of having a heavy one.‟ According to Jackson: „[t]he point is that 
all we can extract from Darwin‟s theory is that we should expect any evolved 
characteristics to be either conducive to survival or a by-product of one that is 
so conducive.‟303 Jackson‟s claim is that the appeal to Darwinism does not 
refute the epiphenomenalist‟s story about qualia, because such features can be 
                                                 
301 This is not so for non-organic creatures, machines, robots, etc., which might develop 
„high-level‟ inferential knowledge (scientific theories etc.) without such low-level features. 
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in the latter category and not the former.  
 However, the whole evolutionary issue in the context being considered does 
render it highly unlikely that low-level sensational contents are 
„epiphenomenally idle‟. The kinds of experiences which are 
phenomenologically accessible as outputs of the visual modules, do not seem to 
be like the heaviness of a polar bear coat; they do not seem to be merely 
causally inert by-products of some other evolutionary selected feature. 
Sensational experiences do seem to qualify as features of experiences which 
mostly have a genuine causal role: they seem to occur as primitive 
informational content for certain organisms which can direct them to action. 
Sensing an enlargement of the visual field or a colour hue, does seem to be 
causally useful because such features can filter perceptual information fast 
(allowing rapid application for more detailed processing) and hence, they can 
localise the application of high-level inference. They also allow the organism to 
call upon essentially simple processed features, which are easily stored, to aid 
in remembering more complex features of objects.304 So there do seem to be 
good reasons for thinking that contentful, low-level aspects of experiences are 
not epiphenomenal, even though they may be experientially sui generis.  
 The argument I intend to advance against epiphenomenalism was originally 
spelt out in detail by Popper in his defence of interactionist dualism. Its 
implications have most recently been outlined by Daniel Shaw in his paper 
„Natural Selection and Epiphenomenalism‟. The argument hinges on two 
assumptions: firstly, that natural selection is the only known theory, at present, 
which can explain the emergence of purposeful processes in the world 
(specifically, the evolution of higher forms of life); secondly, that conscious 
experiences consist of mostly structured and organised features which provide 
higher organisms with an instrument for survival. Shaw expresses the essentials 
of Popper‟s argument like this: 
 (1): The Darwinian theory of natural selection is the best theory we have 
for explaining the existence of what would otherwise be highly 
improbable states of orderly organization that exist in the organic world. 
(2): The theory implies that all (or nearly all) standard features of the 
members of a species of living organism that are of a kind that display or 
are capable of displaying a high degree of orderly systematic 
organization, must have gradually evolved and thereby have come into 
existence in virtue of the adaptive effects which such features have upon 
                                                 
304 Remembering how a house looks on the strength of comparing such experienced features 
with the aid of paint samples is a trivial example. Recall Mortensen‟s and Nerlich‟s „identikit 
picture‟ as an example which is suggestive of a more serious causal role for low-level content. 
(In this case, remembering sensory features helps to trigger more informative details about a 
suspect which may result in accurate identification later. I will expand on these examples in 
what follows.) 
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the organism‟s physical behaviour in relation to its physical 
environment... 
(3): The experiential aspects of human beings are capable of displaying, 
and frequently do display, exceedingly high levels of orderly systematic 
organization ... When a mathematician thinks through the steps of a 
complex proof, when a composer consciously thinks his way through the 
construction of a musical work, when anyone ... puts his mind to planning 
his days‟ activities, his monthly budget, or his tax returns, the experiential 
aspect of what takes place takes on what, from the explanatory point of 
view, is an exceedingly high level of systematic order. 
(4) Therefore Darwinian theory implies that conscious experiences must 
affect, or else are very likely to affect the physical side of human 
behaviour and, through behaviour, the physical aspect of our 
environment. 
(5) Therefore Darwinian theory implies that epiphenomenalism is false or 
else is very likely false.305 
Shaw‟s point is simply that epiphenomenalism does not account for the 
syste-matic order common to experiential states and conscious processes 
generally, whereas an account which appeals to Darwinian principles does. 
Darwinist principles make it seem likely that any such set of ordered states must 
have been selectively useful (being able to „affect the physical side of human 
behaviour‟) in order to have evolved at all (it would not be sufficient simply to 
have occurred as a concomitant feature of some other selected characteristic).  
 It follows that if the experiential aspects of human perception are systematic 
and ordered, it is highly likely that they have been (or are currently) causally 
efficacious, and hence, must have been subject to selective pressures. And if 
such states have a causal origin which, in turn, has effects on organisms, the 
particulars of an epiphenomenalist account of content must be seriously wrong. 
Against the epiphenomenalist‟s story, the conscious processes which have an 
organisation and structure must have been valuable at some stage of evolution 
because they did (or continue to do) some actual causal work.  
 It does seem likely that low-level contentful experiential states are systematic 
and ordered in an important sense. When one is asked to remember the face of a 
person for the purposes of a police investigation the memory search that one 
undertakes involves recalling, in a quite specific way, the circumstances of 
meeting that person and the details of their appearance. Much of this routine 
ability requires a fairly high degree of inferential capacity to be requisite, but 
equally, much of it does not. One can instantly say, for instance, (without 
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Epistemology, pp. 576-7; K. Popper and J. Eccles, The Self and its Brain: An Argument for 
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drawing explicitly upon background knowledge) if the hair colour of the 
suspect was the same or different from the colour of the coffee cup the police 
sergeant is holding. One can say quite precisely if the nose was like the one 
pictured or not. Such recollected features seem to be quite precise and organised 
and the stimulus that triggers them quite structured and specific. The benefits of 
having such informational mechanisms is that they aid us in rapid identification 
of certain perceptual features which require immediate processing and which 
can be easily stored and retrieved for later use (one may not be able to 
remember exactly when or where one saw the person in question, though one 
can easily recall if his hair colour was or wasn‟t like that). It is hard to see how 
such conscious sensory discriminations can be understood in entirely 
epiphenomenal terms. Information like this does not seem to be a by-product of 
some other selected feature - it does seem to have a distinct causal role.  
 Peculiar to this ability is that this informational content need not be explicitly 
available to the conscious inferential resources of the individual (one may fail 
to recall the nose or hair colour when merely questioned and not shown 
pictures), but it is nonetheless a feature of the agent‟s conscious recollections. 
One may even be unable to say in which respects the hair colour or nose is 
similar or different to the examples shown in the identikit pictures (one‟s only 
response might be a garbled: „that‟s the one!‟). A similar ability is also required 
in recalling colours with the aid of paint samples. Having the ability to make 
such unnoticed, sensational discriminations - which can be only later brought to 
explicit consciousness - is, of course, consistent with the continuum account 
being proposed. Much of police work relies on an individual‟s possessing this 
sort of an informational retrieval system as does work in interior design, 
restoration and decoration. The kind of sensory features recalled also require a 
perceptual matching of certain experienced features with others currently in 
sight often in a quite specific spatial or temporal order. Doubtlessly, other areas 
of human endeavour require the same kind of non-inferential or sub-descriptive 
inferential discrimination (recalling in an exam the order in which traffic lights 
appear, for instance). Sensational content of this structured and organised 
nature does seem to fit with Popper‟s Darwinian argument, and runs against 
Jackson‟s views. The kind of features important here do not seem to be causally 
impotent by-products, but experiential features which are structured and 
essential for basic survival. They are essential in the sense that organisms which 
are equipped with such non-inferential discriminatory mechanisms can best 
retain certain features of low-level content and apply it in new circumstances 
requiring instant identification.  
 There is also a plausible reason why explicit conscious discriminatory 
abilities might have evolved in complex organisms. This is in addition to the 
benefits of low-level processing which need not be explicitly conscious. The 
reason has to do with Popper‟s notion of open and closed behavioural programs 
in evolving biological systems. According to Popper, open programs evolve by 
  203 
natural selection due to the complex and irregularly changing environmental 
situations. Closed programs, by contrast, lay down the behaviour of the animal 
in great detail thereby precluding the possibility of taking advantage of 
survival-promoting opportunities. It is clear, according to Popper, which 
system is the better one for complex, perceptual processing organisms like 
primates. His view is that, by being equipped with open perceptual programs, 
an organism can more readily adapt to rapidly changing environmental 
circumstances. Being conscious of one‟s perceptual environment, at various 
levels of explicit awareness, is an important part of this survival advantage and, 
hence, constitutes part of an open system in Popper‟s sense.306  
 So there are several related reasons for thinking that low-level experiential 
content is causally useful: such features are structured and stimulus specific; 
they allow for rapid identification of certain perceptual features and they are 
also closely connected to the survivalist benefits of open behaviour programs. 
For the reasons mentioned, it seems likely that such content does have causal 
importance in an organism‟s overall processing potential. In the light of this, 
epiphenomenalism does not seem adequate as a full story about the nature of 
mental content. (Perhaps it might count as a partial story, but more on this 
below.)  
 The doctrine of epiphenomenalism actually contains a crucial ambiguity 
which needs to be noted in this connection. It concerns the sense of the 
„idleness‟ of phenomenal properties. Daniel Dennett has argued that 
epiphenomenalism is a confused doctrine: on the one hand, it refers to a 
nonfunctional property or by-product, which „while perfectly detectable, 
play[s] no enabling role, no designed role in the process of feeling and 
thinking.‟307 On the other hand, it is used by philosophers to mean „[an] effect 
but [which] itself has no effects in the physical world whatever.‟308 Dennett 
claims that the second philosophical meaning is too strong; it yields a concept 
of no utility whatsoever: „Since x has no physical effects (according to this 
definition), no instrument can detect the presence of x directly or indirectly; the 
way the world goes is not modulated in the slightest by the presence or absence 
of x. How, then, could there ever be any empirical reason to assert the presence 
or absence of x?‟309 Dennett attributes the first doctrine to Huxley and the 
second to the writings of Broad, though he claims that only the second usage 
has gained philosophical currency. However, the two versions, he suggests, are 
as different in meaning as murder and death.310  
 While any claim about such sensational features being epiphenomenal in the 
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strict philosophical sense is rejected (on the grounds that low-level content 
mostly seems to have a causal informational role), it is possible that certain 
features of an experience may be epiphenomenal in the weaker sense. The 
argument against epiphenomenalism given above relies on the point that 
conscious awareness is mostly structured and specific (and hence is likely to 
have causal importance in the life of the organism). It does not rule out 
fragmentary awarenesses that, while detectable, seem to be haphazard and 
arbitrary in their origin and purpose (after-images etc.) This kind of content 
needs some account too, and it does seem that this is best understood as an 
accompanying feature of some cognitive state, not one that has been 
specifically selected for. However, it seems that in view of the points given 
above, along with my overall argument in this book, we need not embrace an 
epiphenomenal account of content just to account for these cases. It seems 
plausible that this non-functional sense of epiphenomenalism can actually be 
reconciled with an account of low-level content as having causal import. It can 
be reconciled with such an account if the continuum theory is true. The way to 
approach the issue is to say that certain aspects of low-level content may be 
epiphenomenal in this sense. The suggestion I would make, consistent with my 
overall continuum approach, is that while modular processing units offer 
low-level informational content which is mostly causally useful, it may also be 
true that some experiences have epiphenomenal aspects (with non-functional 
effects) when they are not focussed on or attended to by the organism in 
question. When certain low-level content is an unnoticed seeing, such content 
may fail to have any functionally causal role. However, since such experiences 
mostly have a causal role, it means that epiphenomenalism is for us an 
inappropriate theory of mental content.  
 Calling Dennett‟s two senses of „epiphenomenal‟, epiphenomenalH and 
epiphenomenalB (after Huxley and Broad), I suggest the following kinds of 
instances are possible as aspects of a sensational experience (the instances 
below exhibit increasing degrees from being causally functional to being 
epiphenomenal): 
 (i) An experience of a low-level kind (say, a colour hue) has a causal 
(non-epiphenomenal) role when it is noticed or stored in the memory (and 
remembered later), and which activates some further high-level processing 
about that experience (that it is an experience of a ripe tomato or is the same 
colour as a paint sample, for example).  
 (ii) A low-level registering of a colour hue has had an epiphenomenalH 
aspect when, after the experience, the subject may notice something about the 
experience (say, that the hue in question differs slightly compared with the hue 
of a neighbouring colour), but which, at the time of the experience, does not 
cause the subject to respond in any way to this information (he does not 
immediately notice the colour of a ripe tomato, for example, but can recall 
registering a difference in colour later when asked). 
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 (iii) A low-level registering of a colour hue has had an epiphenomenalH 
aspect if, at the time of the experience it is unnoticed, but later, when asked, can 
be remembered by the subject to be „somehow different‟ in some inspecific way 
from other regions of the experience, but which, at the time of the experience, 
does not cause the subject to respond in any way to this information. An 
example might be when features of a room have changed (a skylight has been 
added) but being unable to pin-point the change.  
 (iv) A low-level registering of a colour hue is strictly epiphenomenalH if it is 
not noticed and not recalled, and cannot be retrieved as being experienced at all. 
(A lower animal or insect might have purely sensational epiphenomenal 
experiences in this sense.) 
 An experience cannot have epiphenomenalB aspects, on my account, since 
such an aspect cannot, by definition, have any physical effect on a subject at all.  
 Note that since most human experiences are cases of (i); and (ii) and (iii) are 
features which may later go on to be causally efficacious when focussed on and 
remembered, it seems appropriate to reject epiphenomenalism as a theory of 
mental content. For us, as experiencing creatures, low-level content can be 
stored, remembered and focussed on and can thereby bring about certain 
effects. This kind of approach to the problem is consistent with my overall 
view, because the account of content being supported can have several kinds of 
features simultaneously (the complexity thesis); it has not been suggested that 
there can only be one kind of content (either highly structured or not). A view of 
content which is capable of possessing non-functional aspects is quite typical of 
experience, according to the continuum account. However, this should not go to 
suggest that epiphenomenalism is an accurate account of mentality altogether. 
To suggest that experience has non-functional aspects is not to say that 
experience is non-functional simpliciter (by parity, to say that valve amplifiers 
seem to be able to function without transistors should not lead one to conclude 
that transistor amplifiers should be able to do so too).311 
 A final issue here is the evolutionary story best suited to my account of 
experience and content. The claim here has been that low-level features are 
selected for various reasons, and that while aspects of mental content might be 
epiphenomenal, the role of low-level experience is, typically, causally 
informational. However, the possibility that organisms might have evolved 
entirely with epiphenomenal experiential content in the non-functional sense 
can not be ruled out. This preserves the intuition Jackson raises above (it might 
have been the case that, like a polar bear‟s heavy coat, qualitative features of 
content may have been epiphenomenal). As mentioned elsewhere, it is also 
possible that organisms might have evolved experiencing no low-level 
phenomenal properties at all.  
 However, this is the wrong way of looking at the matter. Low-level 
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qualitative properties do exist and do provide informational content. Evolution 
is also a „best fit‟ matter; it is not a process which is necessarily well-designed 
for adaptation or originating ideal survivalist strategies.312 Whether a causally 
informational role for low-level content is the best adaptive possibility 
available for complex organisms, or whether aspects of content which are 
epiphenomenal might have played a larger role, is not at issue here. It only 
needs to be remembered that low-level content is, for us, typically, causally 
effective, and this is the way which content features in normal human 
experience. This is the perceptual world we do seem to inhabit. The fact that 
some aspects of experience seem to be epiphenomenal in the sense that they 
have non-functional characteristics need not indicate that low-level content 
itself is without causal import.  
Conclusion  
8.7 Conclusion 
The preceding four chapters were concerned with an account of mental content. 
It was first argued that experiences have content which cannot be captured in 
inferential terms. Kant‟s account of the mediation of content by intellect was 
then discussed. It was shown that there is a sense in which an already organised 
or structured basis of sensation is consonant with his views. It was also argued 
that Fodor‟s arguments against the poverty of the stimulus idea are essentially 
correct: that sensations are informationally poor does not mean that they do not 
supply a means to interpretation at all. All of these points support my contention 
that the structure of mental content need not be seen exclusively in inferentialist 
terms. Both historical and contemporary accounts of the nature of mentality 
seem to support a more subtle account. 
 It was suggested that any account of experience needs to be combined with a 
more realistic view of the low-level experiences of animals and other 
unsophisticated creatures. The inferentialist proposal ignores these 
considerations and arrives at absurd conclusions in this context. Contrary 
positions suggest that there are other ways of considering this matter. The 
evolutionary approach of Lorenz claims that experiential content is facilitated 
by adaptation, as much as other features of the body, and hence low-level 
content seems to have a selective purpose. The issue of epiphenomenalism was 
also discussed in this connection and low-level content was claimed to have a 
genuine causal role. It was submitted that only a continuum account of content 
can include all the above considerations.  
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9. Experience without 
Feyerabend 
Conceiving a science without experience is an effective way of ... moving 
on to a more comprehensive and more satisfactory kind of philosophy.313 
A science without experience? 
9.1 Introduction  
It has been argued that the inferentialist proposal is deficient in several ways 
and that an adequate understanding of such issues must see a number of levels 
of structure applied to experiential content - one accessible to inferential input; 
the other consisting of content selectively structured around the detection of 
low-level sensory features. The continuum view also allows that there can be 
various sub-levels in between these extremes. The arguments against the 
inferentialist proposal so far have been rather general in nature. This chapter 
narrows the focus to criticise a specific kind of inferentialism in the philosophy 
of science. 
9.2 Experience in the philosophy of science  
Experience, as a category, is usually considered to feature as an important 
factor in outlining an adequate philosophy of science. However, there is much 
dispute about how this should be conceived. Specifically, there is a great debate 
about the exact relation between experience (given in „observation‟), the 
theoretical superstructure which may underpin such observations, and how a 
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language of observations is to be given „meaning‟. We can take „observational 
terms‟ to be such things as colour and shape words, and „theoretical terms‟ to be 
„electron‟, „mass,‟ „is a quark‟ etc. The question that arises here is ostensibly 
semantic: science employs both sorts of terms, but, problematically, the origins 
of their meanings seem very different. The first sort of term seems to be 
observationally based, whilst the second seems to be inferentially based. The 
broader debate about this issue, however, has come to centre on whether 
„scientific theories and other general assumptions are nothing but convenient 
means for the systematization of the data of experience‟ 314  or whether 
„experience arises together with our theoretical assumptions.‟ 315  The first 
option, broadly speaking, is generally taken to be positivist in spirit (what we 
observe and describe with our „O-terms‟ is given in experience); the second, 
which has arisen in response to the first, is a fairly recent consequence of the 
move to conflate observational and theoretical terms, and to make the origin of 
their meaning come from the one and the same theoretical (and hence, 
inferential) source. The two relevant options here were outlined when 
discussing the historical origins of the inferentialist proposal in Part I of this 
book. 
 Much discussion has gone on over the issue of incommensurability which has 
been part and parcel of this debate. Such details will not be ventured into here. 
Instead, the differences between the two claims will be outlined and brought to 
bear on the issue of the content of observational experience. The central point 
for this purpose is that there are two approaches to the question of the relation of 
observation to theory. One supposedly amounting to a positivist account, 
stressing the importance of experience to the meaning of observational terms; 
the other amounting to an account which sees observational experience, as 
expressed in observational reports, as originating in theories. This chapter will 
reject the basis of the second account which seeks to make „observational 
experience‟ simply a contrivance of descriptions or theoretical structures. It 
will be argued that this view presupposes a sense of experience which it cannot 
explain in such terms and, although the resultant position is not positivist, it is 
not entirely experience-free either. Ultimately, it can be argued that this 
approach can be traced to the conflation between observational terms and 
observational experience outlined in Chapter 3. 
 In what follows, the central concern will be Paul Feyerabend‟s rejection of 
the category of experience in the philosophy of science. Feyerabend‟s attacks 
are launched at the doctrine of positivism which he takes all experience-based 
accounts to assume. He offers compelling arguments to reject positivism and 
outlines grounds for a „science without experience.‟ The claim here is that a 
rejection of positivism does not require a rejection of the importance of 
                                                 
314 Ibid., p. 20. „An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience‟. 
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low-level experiential content, so Feyerabend‟s attacks are seriously misplaced. 
In arguing this, it shall simultaneously be argued that there is good sense in the 
claim that the meaning of observational terms is not given in experience. This 
chapter attempts this task, but not without changing the relationship between 
„experience‟ and „positivism‟ slightly in the process.  
9.3 Positivism: what it is; how to be rid of it  
In „An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience‟,316 P. K. Feyerabend 
sets about eliminating the positivist notion that the meaning of an observational 
term can be given somehow in experience. His analysis has a number of lines of 
attack. His main claim seems to be that the interpretation of an observational 
sentence such as „I see red‟ is not logically determined by a given observational 
situation, even though this situation may evoke the acceptance or rejection of a 
sentence. Implicit in his approach is that while „experience‟ as a category is 
normally said to be given by such circumstances, it actually arises out of our 
theoretical assumptions which crucially underpin our observational language.  
 In this important sense, Feyerabend is a clear advocate of what has been 
termed the inferentialist proposal. He claims that a child „possesses means of 
interpretation even before he has experienced his first sensation.‟317 Since this 
theoretical approach, in Feyerabend‟s view, amounts to a rejection of the 
observational situation as a basis for experience (and offers instead its theory 
dependence), we shall have to look in detail at the supports for this claim. It 
shall be argued that this claim is wrong.  
 Philosophers have long argued that the observation-theory distinction could 
not be sustained; a factor which opened the way for a „theory laden‟ conception 
of observation language. Feyerabend is also a strong advocate of this view, and 
uses it to launch his attack upon the „positivist‟ conception of experience. The 
positivist view of experience is that content is best described in terms of what is 
„given‟ in observation; it is this which is the basis for our observation language. 
(Later, it shall be questioned whether all positions which strongly emphasise 
experience as a fundamental category need, perforce, to be seen as „positivist‟.) 
First, the arguments against positivism as Feyerabend presents them. 
The arguments against positivism 
Feyerabend first takes the positivist conception to be an expression of what he 
calls a „stability thesis‟: the commitment to the view that ‘interpretations ... do 
not depend upon the status of theoretical knowledge.’ 318  He takes both 
instrumentalism and positivism as being expressions of this thesis: 
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instrumentalism, because it takes theories to be „tools for the prediction of 
events of a certain kind‟ and, at the same time, denies that these theories 
actually describe anything; and positivism, because it holds that experience, not 
theories, yields the structure of our interpretations given to our theoretical 
language, and in which our network of observation sentences are contained. 
The commitment to a stability thesis, particularly of a positivist kind, 
Feyerabend feels, is the ruin of any realistic characterisation of experience. 
 His argument goes as follows: a positivist conception, such as the one 
outlined, has ontological consequences, and some of these consequences may 
turn out to be false even though we can’t determine them as such. His point is 
that if we use such an experience-based language, even just in communication, 
we already cannot but commit ourselves ontologically to certain general states 
of affairs, and we cannot assess them as being anything other than true on the 
basis of the language schema and metaphysic we are presupposing. He 
explains: 
 [W]e make assertions not only by formulating ... a sentence (or a theory) 
and asserting that it is true, but also by using a language as a means of 
communication. Thus, when using natural numbers for counting objects 
... we assume ... (1) that these objects are discrete entities which can 
always be arranged in a series, and (2) that the result of our counting is 
independent of the order in which we proceed ... However plausible these 
two assumptions may be, there is no a priori reason why they should be 
true.319 
This may seem a strange turn, but Feyerabend continues: 
 [I]t follows, (1) that those ontological consequences cannot have 
emerged as a result of empirical research (for if this were the case, the 
stability thesis would have been violated at some time in the past); (2) nor 
would it ever be possible to show by empirical research that they are 
incorrect (for if this were the case the stability thesis would have been 
violated at some time in the future). Hence, ... we arrive at the result that 
every positivistic observation language is based upon a metaphysical 
ontology.320  
Feyerabend‟s argument here is that the positivist commits a flagrant case of 
petitio principii. Taking on credit a positivist model, which assumes the 
language of beliefs to be „stable‟ constructs arising directly in response to 
experiential data, means that the observation language cannot possibly be 
determined as an adequate or justified language, without the metaphysic (the 
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„interpretation‟) which such a language describes being assumed true, and this 
is clearly a case of begging the question. The problem here is that the positivist 
assumes the stability thesis to start with, and so, cannot be in a position to 
justify their own language independent of the metaphysic of positivism. 
Pointing out that positivism begs the question naturally goes a good way to 
getting rid of it. 
 However, there are at least two recourses to justify such a positivist basis for 
meaning in language which Feyerabend notes: (i) the interpretation of the 
language can be defined and justified by its characteristics in use (the so-called 
principle of pragmatic meaning); and (ii) it can be justified by its „given‟ in 
experience (the principle of phenomenological meaning). But Feyerabend 
ultimately wants to say that neither of these options works for the positivist. We 
shall see how he rejects these proposals and how the conclusion Feyerabend 
arrives at is sound in some sense, though strikingly inconclusive in another. 
Feyerabend may be right about the positivist failings on the question of how 
observational terms get their meaning, but this does not mean that „experience 
arises together with theoretical assumptions and not before them.‟ Feyerabend‟s 
analysis commits the standard inferentialist overkill regarding the dependence 
of experiential content on features of high-level inference. And so, in an 
important sense, his claims for a „science without experience‟ will not go 
through. More on this later.  
9.4 Positivist responses and Feyerabend’s reply  
Let‟s take first: the principle of pragmatic meaning. Feyerabend argues that if 
one claims that the conditions under which a language is asserted (i.e., the 
practical situation of the utterance) are important, then we would need to show 
why it is that any particular conditions of assertability are both sufficient and 
necessary for the meaning of the utterance over and above other similar 
conditions. Any reliance on practical conditions would seem to be arbitrary. In 
comparing the human being with a physical instrument in terms of the ability to 
receive data, Feyerabend says:  
 [T]he fact that in certain situations it consistently reacts in a well defined 
way does not allow us to infer (logically) what those reactions mean: first, 
because the existence of a certain observational ability ... is compatible 
with the most diverse interpretations of the things observed; and 
secondly, because no set of observations is even sufficient for us to infer 
(logically) any one of the interpretations (problem of induction). ... the 
fact that in a certain situation he (consistently) produces a certain noise, 
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does not allow us to infer what this noise means.321  
These would seem to be unnecessarily sceptical arguments. The practical 
conditions of assertability seem to be relevant to utterance meaning. But the 
burden of avoiding the argument by saying how they are clearly rests upon the 
proponent of the positivist account. If one cannot give a precise account of the 
practical situation of making a certain utterance in relation to any number of 
sets of observations, then it hardly gives any strength to the assertion that the 
meaning of our expressions are „given‟ in such a way, and it is simply playing 
one‟s own hand to suggest otherwise. 
 Feyerabend is not using „pragmatic‟ here to designate some kind of 
Wittgensteinian position on language in terms of meaning being garnered from 
typical use situations or „language games‟. Feyerabend actually gives qualified 
support for this sort of picture of language in some of his other writings.322 
Meanings of terms are not, in Feyerabend‟s view, separate from the practice of 
using them. The point of the principle of pragmatic meaning that Feyerabend 
attacks is the claim that the meaning of a particular term is only determined by 
the person‟s tendency to produce it in connection with certain experiences. This 
is a much narrower notion of „pragmatic‟ situations than adumbrated by 
Wittgenstein, and more closely ties meaning to experience. S. G. Couvalis 
explains this difference in the following manner: 
Consider the following case: whenever a person X observes what we call 
a meteor he utters the expression A. A speaker of our language in the 
same circumstances says „a meteor‟. According to the upholders of the 
principle of pragmatic meaning, A and „meteor‟ (or „a meteor‟) would 
mean much the same. But a Wittgensteinian would need to know much 
more about the utterance of A by X. Suppose X‟s tone is consistently 
reverential or fearful when he utters A; this might indicate that A means 
some kind of supernatural being or phenomenon rather than „a meteor.‟323 
The point is that on the one version of the pragmatics of meaning the whole 
social group and cultural context is involved (the „language game‟), while on 
the other, the situational presence of certain experiences are (allegedly) 
sufficient. And, as has been outlined, Feyerabend‟s response to this is that the 
principle of pragmatic meaning does not get us past first base in justifying this 
principle.  
 The other way of justifying such an interpretation of observation language is 
the principle of phenomenological meaning. This argument is more important 
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for our purposes, and Feyerabend spells out this strategy clearly: 
The principle of phenomenological meaning assumes that ... in order to 
explain to a person what „red‟ means one need only to create 
circumstances in which red is experienced. ... [T]he meaning of an 
observational term is determined by what is „immediately given‟ at the 
moment of the acceptance of any observational sentence containing that 
term.324 
In this approach, „positivist‟ in the true sense, we are to imagine the „properties 
of things ... and their relations being „read off‟ the experiences without any 
difficulty being felt.‟325 That is, the acceptance (or rejection) of the description 
of these things are uniquely determined by the observational situation. The 
view here sees some level of interpretation being given non-inferentially; 
specifically, the meaning of observational terms is determined by the 
observational situation. „Descriptions of the observational situation‟ seems to 
mean for Feyerabend something like: „constitutes the justification for the 
holding of a certain statement about a state of affairs‟. This will be an important 
point of difference later, because the importance of experience as a category in 
the philosophy of science, can be held without the joint claim about 
determinations of meanings or descriptions. 
 Feyerabend attacks the principle of phenomenological meaning with force. 
The whole idea, he rightly declares, amounts to a reductio ad absurdum. In 
order for an observer of a phenomenon to determine whether or not an 
experience „fits‟ (adequately) an observation sentence which describes it, he 
would need to „attend to‟ not only the experience and the sentence but also the 
relation between them - and, in order to determine whether this was adequate, 
he would need to experience further relations between the two terms to ensure 
their adequacy. An infinite regress would be the inevitable result.  
 Feyerabend concludes that in such circumstances, „the conditions of adequate 
report which we are considering at this moment are such that no observer will 
ever be able to say anything.‟326 This is clearly a „patently absurd‟327 position. 
And he points out that it would mean also that we would have to be parochial 
about what experiences we select as our „proper‟ ground for the meaning of our 
utterances, and what experiences we selectively omit from such considerations. 
Any number of „attendant‟ experiences can be said to be built into the relations 
of phenomenological adequacy; it is simply insupportable to suggest that one 
can rule out as insignificant some over others without grounds for doing so. 
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And it is no good simply to appeal to the „brute fact‟ of some experiences over 
others, for this accomplishes little. Echoing strains of Wittgenstein, Feyerabend 
says:  
It is no good repeating, „but I experience p‟, for the question discussed is 
not what is experienced, but whether what is experienced is described 
adequately. And we have shown that this question cannot be answered by 
appealing to the relation of phenomenological adequacy.328  
The issue here is how the relation of phenomenological adequacy can account 
for the descriptions of a sentence in reference to an experience. If a regress in 
the etiological circumstances of experiences and observational terms can be 
shown as a consequence of this sort of foundationalism, then a proponent of the 
principle of phenomenological meaning cannot, at least, appeal to that. But are 
there other options open? As Couvalis notes,329 a relation of phenomenological 
adequacy between sentence „S‟ and experience „P‟ may be given an account in 
terms of intentions. „S‟ describes „P‟ would then be a matter of explaining how 
a speaker (or hearer) gets the intention, when „S‟ is uttered in response to „P‟. 
But again, either the intention must be seen to be phenomenologically adequate 
to the term (and hence, regress), or the intention must simply be possessed 
somehow by the relevant parties when „S‟ is uttered. But even if an intention 
could be possessed in this manner, how would it help? Surely the whole point of 
the principle of phenomenological meaning is to account for how meaning 
describes phenomenological situations (experiences)? Language users must be 
sure of this descriptive relation and the adequacy of the term used. If not, then 
there is no basis for saying that the meaning of an observational term is 
(logically) given by experiential circumstances. Couvalis concludes by 
asserting: 
 „S‟ describes „P‟ as an observational term, implies that there must be 
some experience of which this „describes‟ is a phenomenologically 
adequate description. But: ... we are not aware of any such experiences 
when we think that some term describes something. All we are aware of 
that is relevant is that term and the thing that it denotes. There is thus no 
empirical evidence of the existence of such experiences [sic.] This means 
that „describes‟ cannot be an observational term and „S‟ describes „P‟ 
cannot be an observational sentence.330  
The point here, of course, is that if it can be shown that experiences cannot give 
the meaning of observational terms, then it becomes doubtful whether 
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experiences actually contribute anything at all to a subject‟s using a sentence to 
describe some experience. Of interest are only the observational term used and 
the thing it denotes. And if this is the case, then it becomes clear that a relation 
of phenomenological adequacy does not secure the interpretation of 
observational terms and for such an account we need to look elsewhere.  
 Another related way in which Feyerabend or his defenders could have 
laboured the point here would be to point out that the principle of 
phenomenological meaning is actually circular in its implication: in order to 
give an account of some phenomenon p in our experience (say, the colour red), 
we would need to use the word „red‟ (and the concept „red‟). But then no 
account for the experience of the colour red could be given, because we needed 
the word „red‟ to describe it. This brings out the point that Feyerabend wants to 
make: for with both the principle of pragmatic meaning and the principle of 
phenomenological meaning shown to be deficient, the claim is that, for an 
adequate account of the meaning of observational terms, we must turn to the 
imposition of „high-level‟ theories and concepts. Alan Chalmers has 
highlighted this move in outlining a problem with the inductivist theory of 
knowledge: 
From all the perceptual experiences of an observer arising from the sense 
of sight, a certain set of them (those corresponding to the perceptual 
experiences arising from sightings of red objects) will have something in 
common. The observer, by inspection of the set, is somehow able to 
discern the common element in these perceptions, and come to 
understand this common element as redness. In this way, the concept 
„red‟ is arrived at through observation. This account contains a serious 
flaw. It assumes that from all the infinity of perceptual experiences 
undergone by an observer, the set of perceptual experiences arising from 
the viewing of red things is somehow available for inspection. But that set 
does not select itself. What is the criterion according to which some 
perceptual experiences are included in the set and others excluded? The 
criterion, of course, is that only perceptions of red objects are included in 
the set. The account presupposes the very concept, redness, the 
acquisition of which it is meant to explain. It is not an adequate defence of 
the inductivist position to point out that parents and teachers select a set 
of red objects when teaching children to understand the concept „red‟, for 
we are interested in how the concept first acquired its meaning. The claim 
that the concept „red‟ is delivered from experience and from nothing else 
is false.331  
Both of these objections hinge upon the same point: we cannot give an account 
                                                 
331 A.H. Chalmers, What is this Thing Called Science? pp. 29-30. Italics mine. 
  
 216 
of the meaning of experiential terms such as „red‟ without presupposing the 
meaning of the high-level concept and hence a relation with what it is supposed 
to „match‟ when we use it. Feyerabend‟s point would then follow that the 
positivist assertion of the stability thesis is false. For him, „positivism sooner or 
later leads to subjectivism.‟ 332  But, on reasoning such as he has given, 
observational terms do depend on the status of theoretical knowledge, and 
(following Couvalis‟s point) all that we actually seem to be aware of that is 
relevant in an observational situation is the term used and the thing denoted, not 
the experience. It is such considerations which lead Feyerabend to say: 
„Phenomena [experiences] cannot determine meaning, although the fact that we 
have adopted a certain interpretation may (psychologically) determine the 
phenomena.‟333 It also leads him to consider the possibility that a „natural 
science without sensory elements ... is neither absurd nor contradictory.‟334  
9.5 The overkill of the inferentialist’s argument 
It must be possible to imagine a natural science without sensory elements, 
and ... indicate how such a science is going to work.335 
There seems to be a great danger of concluding too much here about the 
consequences of Feyerabend‟s argument. This would be easy to do because 
Feyerabend is systematically ambiguous on the matter of what his rejection of 
the above arguments is supposed to demonstrate. Is all we are aware of in an 
„observational situation‟ the term and the thing the term denotes or represents? 
Can we therefore have a „science without experience‟? Maybe not: maybe we 
also have observational experiences with certain sensational properties which 
do not themselves denote or represent, and such „sensory elements‟ may be 
important in the way we do science. As pointed out in Chapter 5, Christopher 
Peacocke, among others, has argued convincingly that there is more to 
experiential contents than its „representational content.‟ The latter is expressed 
in terms denoting the specifications of the „observational situation‟ of objects 
and their representational features in the world; the sensational properties, he 
claims, cannot be so specified. On Peacocke‟s view, there are certain 
non-representational, „sensational‟ properties of experiences, such as when a 
tree visually represented as the same physical height as another tree in the 
observational situation nonetheless seems to take up more of the visual field in 
some interesting qualitative, but non-representational sense. Something well 
worth considering here is that such low-level contents, though less important to 
doing science than the contents that can be captured representationally or 
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propositionally, may yet feature in ordinary, everyday scientific activity. In 
short, Feyerabend‟s claim that we can have a science without sensory elements 
may be false. 
 The point here is this: one might agree wholeheartedly that whatever the 
relation between observational terms and observational experiences, it is a 
relation which does not fix meanings or high-level descriptions. As Feyerabend 
argues, it may be merely a pragmatic matter what sentences are asserted in 
certain circumstances.336 But though experiences might not fix meanings, does 
this warrant the seemingly stronger claim that „we are not aware of any such 
experiences‟ etc., when we are using observational terms (or even when we are 
not: for instance, infants and animals)? Couvalis, for one, comes very close to 
saying in the above passage that because the principle of phenomenological 
meaning does not guarantee a descriptive link between meanings and 
experiences, that therefore no sense can be made of the notion of observational 
experiences in or outside the context of asserting and describing or responding 
to a certain representative situation. As shall be shown below, Feyerabend also 
seems to say this. But this claim should be seriously reconsidered. It is my 
contention that where in places Feyerabend seems to be arguing simply (and 
importantly) that experiences are not adequate to fulfilling a contentful role in 
the determination of the meaning of observational terms (instead, theoretical 
descriptions of observational experiences in theories are adequate to this role, 
in Feyerabend‟s view), he also seems to be arguing in places that there is no 
room in such a context for contentful observational experiences which are not 
themselves theory dependent. Hence, remarks of this kind, in his preface and 
elsewhere, seem to be either slips between these alternatives, or a positive 
equivocation of the latter, more radical, claim: 
 [O]bservations (observational terms) are not merely theory laden, (the 
position of Hanson, Hesse and others), but fully theoretical (observation 
statements have no „observational core‟).337 
The only difference between a blind person and a seeing person consists 
in the fact that the first one uses a different part of the theory (or some of 
the consequences of the theory) as his observation language.338 
                                                 
336 Feyerabend‟s „pragmatic‟ analysis of endorsing languages is the view that „appropriate 
situations‟ (s) are presented to classes of human beings (C) in a circumstance such that certain 
atomic sentences (a) of a set (A) will necessitate the event „such that every C when presented 
with a in s will run through a series of states and operations which terminates either in the 
acceptance of a or in its rejection by the C chosen.‟ Thus, we can that a subject has the ability to 
distinguish between situations when it can produce a specific reaction r whenever s is present, 
and does not produce r when s is absent. Feyerabend, op. cit., pp. 18-19.  
337 Ibid., p. x. 
338 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions and not before 
them, and that an experience without theories is just as incomprehensible 
as (allegedly) a theory without experience: eliminate part of the 
theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is 
completely disorientated, incapable of carrying out the simplest action.339 
From such comments it is clear that there are two agendas here. The claim that 
experiences arise together with theories and have no observational core, and the 
assertion that the blind are deficient only in respect of using a different part of a 
theory, are quite different claims from the attack on the positivist account of 
how observational terms get their meanings. It seems that Feyerabend might be 
guilty of confusing two issues: the issue of the inferential nature of 
observational language and the issue of the inferential nature of observational 
experience. Feyerabend seems to be implicitly committed to the latter while 
being explicitly committed to the former.  
 This sort of slippery slope from the theory dependence of observational terms 
to the theory dependence of observational experience has a long history. Such 
passages as those given above make Feyerabend a defender of the inferentialist 
proposal. Such claims can also be seen to feature, innocently, in the claims of 
Hanson, Sellars and Churchland, among others. But the implications of this 
sleight of hand are profound. One may well wonder at the consequences the 
above claims might have for animals and infants and their experiences. If one 
assumes the common sense view that such creatures have no theories, then it is 
hard to know what to make of the suggestion, for it does not seems plausible 
that a theoryless dog lacks experiences of some primitive kind because it is 
theoryless. The counterintuitive consequences of any commitment to an 
inferentialist account of content for animal experiences were discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
 To rebel against such a view seems natural: one could insist, in contrast to the 
muddle of the first quotation, that there is quite a firm distinction between 
„observational terms‟ and „observations‟ (one, properly, has a semantic content, 
the other need not - not all aspects of experiential content, in other words, are 
propositional linguistic). A distinction can thus be made between inferential 
descriptions of observations as opposed to non-inferential experiences of 
certain low-level sensations. (Animals and infants would thus, on this view, be 
experiencing organisms despite being theoretically in vacuo.) Similarly, one 
could insist, in contrast to the second quotation, that there is more to the 
experience of a sighted person than that of a blind person which does not have 
anything to do with theories and meanings (something instead which has a good 
deal to do with sensory, non-representational features like that of what has been 
called non-inferential „aspects‟ of experiential content, such as the primitive 
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experiences of colours, visual field enlargements, and so on). And similarly for 
the third quotation. A dog which ex hypothesi has no theories or descriptions 
would thus not be „disorientated‟ etc., because it lacked these hypostatised 
features. Throughout this book, the case has been presented for a distinction 
between the high-level aspects of content and low-level (non-descriptive and 
non-representational) aspects.  
 But there is a more direct point here. One could hold a number of things in 
response to Feyerabend‟s replies to the threat of positivism, because there are 
essentially two issues being articulated: one revolving around meanings (and 
their determinations) and one revolving around experiences. Feyerabend 
assumes that „the observational situation determines (causally) the acceptance 
or rejection of a sentence‟340 as being an entirely physical/pragmatic event, and 
such observations are always subject to the additional act of theoretical 
interpretation and thereby, given meaning. But, as these are unargued 
assumptions, 341  one is, at least, open to assert the contrary view: that 
Feyerabend‟s emphasis on high-level interpretation is too inferentialist to be a 
fully accurate account of experiences, and that something in the initial 
„observational situation‟ itself in fact provides some primitive level of 
organisation (albeit an organisation which is non-semantic). If anything like 
what has been suggested regarding the sensory content of experience is true, 
then it would seem that this could constitute a case against Feyerabend. One 
might claim, in other words, that Feyerabend‟s treatment of the issues of 
experience and theoretical interpretation jointly is an arbitrary and misleading 
view, and that asserting the one need not imply the other. There still might be a 
sense in which a level of content view, along the lines of the continuum theory, 
may make more sense as a response to both positivism and the inferentialist 
proposal. This is the line that will be taken later on.  
 If one could hold this, then one could simultaneously agree with Feyerabend, 
and reject any positivist account which tries to give an account of the meaning 
of observational terms (call it: „Feyerabend‟s overt thesis‟), while also holding 
that there is an important sense in which experiences are non-theoretical and 
descriptions and meanings do not fully capture their content (and so reject the 
import of what I shall call „Feyerabend‟s covert thesis‟). It is, after all, not 
obvious that Feyerabend is confining his remarks to the former overt claim, 
even though it would appear that they can be held separately and we can affirm 
the one and not the other.  
 This confusion may arise from an error in what positivism is supposed to 
mean as a philosophical doctrine, and what the observational-theoretical 
distinction in philosophy is supposed to achieve. Feyerabend clearly thinks that 
the latter is all about different aspects of language, and how language is given 
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341 See „An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience.‟ op. cit. 
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meaning in the context of science, and the relevance of the notions of prediction 
and explanation.342 But clearly, the T-O distinction is also primarily about the 
differences between the ontological categories of observational experiences 
and scientific theories, though the distinction slides very easily between these 
two concerns. It is suggested here that, like the inferentialist proposal generally, 
Feyerabend is guilty of conflating these two issues.  
 As for positivism, although this may traditionally be said to be a 
philosophical position which attempted to derive everything from a foundation 
of experience (as mentioned, Feyerabend thinks that positivism „sooner or later 
leads to subjectivism‟), it does not seem to me that holding that experience is a 
central and important category means that one thereby accepts the idea that 
experiences fix the meanings of observational terms, or that this important 
sense of experience is itself foundational. One could, in other words, agree that 
the sensational contents of certain non-inferential, low-level experiences do not 
give the meaning of theoretical terms, and thus agree with Feyerabend‟s overt 
thesis and his rejection of the principles of pragmatic and phenomenological 
meaning, while also holding that there are contents which are associated with 
the sensational aspect of such experiences, which are actually not descriptive 
(like that of a language), and thus disagree with Feyerabend‟s covert thesis. 
And one could hold all this and still not be a positivist.  
 In such a case, it would be debatable if one were adhering to any form of 
known positivism; though if it was a variation of positivism, it is demonstrably 
not the form that Feyerabend attacks. Feyerabend‟s arguments merely touch the 
view that positivism fixes the meaning of observational terms. All his 
arguments seem to have shown is that phenomenological situations do not 
determine meaning. However, there may be a way of agreeing with this claim 
and still keeping a sense in which experience is an important category in both 
the fixation of perceptual content and the practice of science (at least in the way 
we do it).343 And one might be able to do this without being a „positivist‟ in the 
sense Feyerabend is attacking the doctrine. Perhaps the issue at stake here might 
be a mere semantic point about what we mean by „positivism‟, but it is possible 
that this revised form is not a form of positivism at all. 
 Thus, there are two discernible and distinguishable claims that arise out of 
Feyerabend‟s attack on positivism: (1) sensational experiences do not give the 
meaning of observational terms; and (2) such experiences do not have any 
„observational core‟, but are instead, fully theoretical. The latter claim, is a 
                                                 
342 The introductory remarks to „An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience‟ is 
enough to demonstrate this: „Within science a rough distinction is drawn between theory and 
observation. This distinction can best be explained by formulating the conditions which a 
language must satisfy in order to be acceptable as a means of describing the results of 
observation and experiment.‟ ibid., pp. 17-18. 
343 It may not be an important feature in a society of extra-terrestrials who „do‟ science but who 
are not constructed just as we are, with our sense organs, etc.  
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broader notion, and as an inferentialist response would certainly be congruent 
with Feyerabend‟s later relativist views on the philosophy of science, but it also 
fits in with his remarks in „Science without Experience‟ where he asserts that: 
„sensation can be eliminated from the process of understanding‟ (in particular, 
natural science)344 and - more explicitly - his hopeful claim: „It must be possible 
to imagine a natural science without sensory elements.‟345  
 Such remarks seem to indicate that Feyerabend thinks not only that it is 
possible to do science without using experience (because observational data do 
not fix interpretations) but also that science should be conceived without 
sensory elements at all - i.e., sensations do not exist outside of the 
interpretations (the meanings) that are given in theoretical situations. This latter 
claim is clearly inferentialist in the sense that used here, and is much more 
radical than the former (anti-positivist) claim.  
 But the covert thesis rests uneasily in an important sense here, as, for the most 
part, Feyerabend only seems to be arguing for the former, weaker claim. What 
is Feyerabend‟s position? It is this subtle ambiguity that will concern us later, 
for I want to affirm the lesser claim and deny the stronger claim; so we will need 
to find out exactly where Feyerabend stands in order to decide whether to 
jettison his general approach. As we shall see, with appropriate modifications, 
we will not have to. But with such modifications, we will once again be forced 
to turn from the inferentialist proposal Feyerabend seems to be adopting, to a 
more subtle and elaborated account along the lines of the continuum account. 
9.6 Forcing Feyerabend out in the open 
Some speculation: the rejection of the principle of pragmatic meaning and the 
principle of phenomenological meaning has more significance than might 
initially be thought, if one looks at the import of Feyerabend‟s general 
theoretical strategy developed in Against Method and elsewhere. In fact, their 
rejection would seem to bottom out rather easily into the well-known and 
radical consequences which Feyerabend takes to be characteristic of the 
scientific enterprise. For if we can‟t make sense of the interpretation of our 
theoretical languages as being determined by either experience or the practical 
conditions of their assertability (and if we have no other obvious alternatives), 
                                                 
344 He imagines a situation in which a computer without experience could assess the results of 
empirical measurements: „To start with [experience] does not need to enter the process of test: 
we can put a theory into a computer, provide the computer with suitable instruments directed by 
him (her, it) so that the relevant measurements are made which return to the computer, leading 
there to an evaluation of the theory. The computer can give a simple yes-no response from 
which a scientist may learn whether or not a theory has been confirmed without having in any 
way participated in the test (i.e. without having been subjected to some relevant experience).‟ 
Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 132-4. 
345 Loc. cit. 
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then it seems that we have no good reason to think that such interpretations can 
be given good account. They become, as a result, little more than our 
„prejudices‟ which influence our „general ideas about things and their 
properties.‟346  On Feyerabend‟s well known relativist views, the whole of 
science which relies on such theoretic terms, becomes a manifestly political 
exercise: an institution devoted to dogmatically enforcing beliefs prejudicial to 
one interested party or another. There is no objective component to what 
science describes; it is all a matter of the political success of theories and the 
rhetorical skill of their adherents, and any theory (regardless of how absurd it is) 
will do the trick if it is promulgated with enough flair and charisma to captivate 
the masses. Moreover, if we take on board with this, the view that theoretical 
interpretations of observation languages do not, in effect, persist for very long 
and the historical observation that one theoretical interpretation can, and often 
does, effectively replace another, we might be inclined to reverse the order of 
dependence here, and see theoretical considerations being of more importance 
than experiences garnered from our observation reports. Instead of seeing 
theoretical developments as coming from experience, we might see experiences 
as coming from the inferential basis of interpretative theories. This is, it seems 
to me, the quintessential line running through most of Feyerabend‟s works. 
 Needless to say, this sort of argument shows a dramatic shift from the overt 
thesis to the implied covert thesis, and close corroboration of this is needed in 
order to attribute this view to Feyerabend. Feyerabend‟s position may be more 
subtle than this; the views mentioned here may even constitute different stages 
of his thought. But it is a move which is not unwarranted in his case, and it is 
behind some of his marginal comments in „Toward a Realistic Interpretation of 
Experience‟ such as his approving citation of Bohr‟s remarks: „no content can 
be grasped without form‟347; and „any experience makes its appearance within 
the framework of our customary points of view and forms of perception.‟348 
And his claim (against Bohr) that „the invention of new conceptual schemes 
need not be psychologically impossible‟ and „abstract pictures of the world 
(metaphysical or otherwise) may be turned into alternative interpretations.‟349 
These points, Feyerabend believes, are demonstrated by the rejection he makes 
of the principle of pragmatic meaning, and rest well with his strong relativist 
views argued elsewhere.  
 Reading these passages along with the claim made earlier - that natural 
science should be conceived without sensory elements (only interpretations) - it 
                                                 
346 Ibid., p. 29. 
347 In: P. A. Schilpp (ed) Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, p. 240, cited in Feyerabend, 
ibid., p. 22. 
348 Neils Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, p.1; Cited in Feyerabend, Loc. 
cit. 
349 Feyerabend, ibid., p. 24. 
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is clear what Feyerabend‟s overall vision is: it seems that we are justified in 
saying that the most consistent way to interpret Feyerabend‟s view is in terms of 
the covert thesis: experiences (and science specifically) has no observational 
core and is, instead, fully theoretical. So, although Feyerabend‟s covert thesis is 
demonstrably different from his overt thesis, we can take him to be holding the 
stronger covert claim. If we took him to be making the weaker claim only, then 
we would have the matter of consistency with earlier works as an issue, and the 
throw-away remarks mentioned would have to be read in an entirely different 
way. Not much hangs on these expository points, however, so no attempt shall 
be made to justify them. It shall simply be assumed that Feyerabend‟s 
articulation of the stability thesis, that positivists (allegedly) hold, should read: 
experiences do not depend on the status of theoretical knowledge, as it is this 
more radical view that is on balance more consistent with his views. (And 
Feyerabend‟s view, of course, is that this thesis should be rejected). This issue 
will be returned to after a discussion of the (original) „overt‟ thesis: that 
interpretation does depend on the status of theoretical knowledge. 
9.7 Further arguments for the overt thesis: mediating situations  
Feyerabend asks us to consider a very basic case of where experience is seen to 
be fundamental to the interpretation of theoretical terms. He uses the example 
of „everyday language‟ within scientific practices. On the positivist view of the 
language of such experiences, we should see such common-speak (say, about 
chairs and tables), as „fairly insensitive towards changes in theoretical 
“superstructure.”‟350 But thinking more clearly about it, Feyerabend argues, it is 
not at all obvious that there is anything theoretically „insensitive‟ about even 
such a „basic‟ and well-entrenched observation language: 
 [T]erms which at some time were regarded as observational elements of 
„everyday language‟ (such as the term „devil‟) are no longer regarded as 
such. Other terms, such as „potential‟, „velocity‟, etc., have been included 
in the observational part of everyday language, and may have assumed a 
new use. ... [This] may well be due to the fact that the people using these 
particular sections are not interested in science and do not know its 
results; after all, theories as such cannot influence linguistic habits. What 
can influence those habits is the adoption of theories by certain people.351 
So, „everyday language‟ and its perceived „stability‟ may be a case of a 
community failing to adopt a new theoretical standard, but instead, remaining 
„fixated‟ at an old one which may, for all practical purposes, be good enough for 
the job. By strength of reasoning, the well-entrenched common „experiences‟ 
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we have, might, as a consequence, be simply a case of laziness in adopting 
theoretical attitudes. The implication in Feyerabend‟s work is that „experiences‟ 
might cut about as much ice as some ontologically redundant theoretical term in 
an archaic language, which has garnered its meaning from practical situations 
and common contexts and which still works well enough to prompt its 
occasional use. Neither are necessary or particularly interesting; they are just 
„there‟, as it were, in the system.  
 This implication of Feyerabend‟s work has considerable similarity with the 
inferential impetus behind the eliminative materialism of Paul Churchland and, 
with necessary caution, the views of Wilfred Sellars, as will be seen in later 
chapters. It is suggested, of course, that both positions are, to an important 
degree, misguided in emphasis. High-level considerations do not, on my view, 
determine all experiential features of interest.  
 Another line of attack Feyerabend makes upon experience within the context 
of the philosophy of science and, particularly, the justification of the meaning 
of theoretical terms, is in his article „On the Interpretation of Scientific 
Theories.‟352 Here he turns to the problem of „mediating situations‟ and the 
various attempts to dodge the issue. „Mediating situations‟ refer to such things 
as the physiological state of organisms when making perceptual judgements; 
their moods or states of health, drunkenness and so on, and other factors 
„causally independent‟ from a given relation of an observer with an observed 
object, such as lighting conditions and obstacles. These things are important in 
his analysis of how meanings are given to languages, as the situations do not fit 
into any clear characterisation of how theoretical terms get their meaning from 
observational situations. Hence, they provide more ammunition for Feyerabend 
against the positivist threat. Feyerabend considers the influence of the 
mediating situations involved in observing bright dots through a telescope as a 
problem for the positivist account: 
[T]he mediating situation consists in the optical properties of the planets, 
the properties of the light which is reflected by them, the properties of the 
atmosphere of the earth ... telescopes and so on. ... the interpretation of 
sentences containing the terms to be explicated will depend upon the 
interpretation of other sentences referring to the states of affairs which are 
in no causal relation whatever to the state of affairs referred to by the 
former. For example, the interpretation („the meaning‟) of „the mass of 
the sun‟ will partly depend upon the interpretation of „refractive index of 
the atmosphere of the earth‟.353  
The problem here is this: it is difficult to see how a positivist account, which 
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admits only a basis of observational experience in the interpretation of 
theoretical terms, can avoid saying that these essentially causally independent 
situations, like „the refractive index of the atmosphere of the earth‟, are 
involved crucially in the „meaning‟ of a simple observation claim such as 
„planet x is in such and such position‟. (Less obliquely, more dramatically: how 
a T-statement about the curdling of milk in a churner can avoid having, as part 
of its meaning, something about the earth‟s rotation, etc.) Positivists, it seems, 
cannot rule out anything which is causally unconnected as having something to 
do with the meaning of such a term, and if they can‟t rule out anything, it fails as 
a position to make a distinction between what is semantically relevant and what 
is semantically irrelevant to the meaning of T-terms. Positivism, of the type 
Feyerabend is criticising, will have to get this consequence out of its way, if it is 
to get anywhere. The question is: how can the positivist give an account of the 
meaning of theoretical terms by experience, and avoid the bearing of causally 
unconnected mediating situations on them? (We can see, incidentally, the 
reason for Feyerabend‟s preference for a backdrop of theory here: the 
suggestion is that mediating situations would be selectively omitted from a 
descriptive account of how the appropriate terms get their meaning by the 
endorsing of the appropriate aspects of background theoretical assumptions, 
whereas, such situations would be a substantial encumbrance on the positivist 
account). 
 Feyerabend discusses three attempts at avoiding this consequence: (1) 
denying that mediating situations exist, (2) eliminating mediating situations, 
and (3) „devising semantical rules which make the interpretation of the 
theoretical terms dependent on the interpretation of the observational terms 
only.‟354  The first two „solutions‟ are disreputable and Feyerabend rightly 
rejects them. On the first he says that, „it completely disregards the existential 
character of general scientific theories‟355 by which he presumably means that 
such mediating conditions are crucial to the development and the nature of 
scientific theories. The second he rules out on grounds that we have already 
seen: to eliminate mediating situations is to tie theoretical terms directly to 
observation terms, which sets up a regress of further mediating through the 
problem of trying to justify the terms observationally. His rejection of the third 
is more subtle. The third method amounts to trying to get the meaning of 
theoretical terms from the meaning of observation terms which include (as the 
O-terms come from „observation‟) the multifarious mediating relations. But 
this raises the same problem again: namely, how can we account for a 
difference between what is semantically relevant to theoretical terms and what 
isn‟t? Feyerabend‟s argument turns on the predicate „Ax‟ on which he says: 
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 [W]e may safely assume that „Ax‟ means something different in „If a 
colourblind man inspects x and sees grey, then Ax‟ and in „If a man with 
perfect coloursight inspects x and sees grey, then Ax‟, and yet the method 
discussed at the present moment does not allow us to explain this 
difference by pointing to a difference in the observational terms 
employed.356 
How then do we account for the difference in the interpretation of such terms 
without dropping the principle that they do not possess a meaning independent 
from experience?357 If such terms do not possess a meaning independent from 
experience, we need an account which explains why there is a difference here, 
and if they do possess a meaning independent from experience, then a fortiori 
they are not derived from experience. And perhaps experience, after all, is 
actually derived from theoretical inference in the manner the inferentialist 
account specifies. 
Problems for Feyerabend’s account 
9.8 Positivism and the continuum account 
We would be playing into Feyerabend‟s rich, clever and complicated argument 
here to assume too much at this point and make the jump that he asks of us. The 
move from the rejection of positivist approaches of how terms get their 
meanings to the assimilation of experience to theoretical content is a jump in 
reasoning, and it seems likely that there are, as already mentioned, two issues 
here: (i) the issue of how terms get their meanings; and (ii) the issue of whether 
experiential content is entirely inferentially specified by high-level theory. 
These issues are conflated in Feyerabend‟s argument, and need to be teased 
apart.  
 But to grant what is surely a legitimate manoeuvre here: it is hard to see how 
an account which is strictly positivist and observationally based could furnish 
an account of the subtle distinction in the semantics of theoretical terms - the 
burgeoning weight of mediating conditions seems to see to that. But just 
because, for reasons that he mentions, observations are complicated, and 
positivists cannot rule out what is semantically relevant and irrelevant to the 
language, it surely does not follow that experience cannot provide us with some 
limits to what theoretical creations are possible, or that experience comes from a 
theoretical background. This clearly seems too swift a move to make. Does 
Feyerabend in fact make this move? Admittedly not in such explicit terms, but 
he comes dangerously close to saying precisely this. In the final analysis, it 
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must be attributed to his views, if not his pen. In Science in a Free Society, he 
talks about „how often the world changes because of a change in theory.‟358 
This view seems the more consistent with his position stated elsewhere. It shall 
be assumed hereafter that this is in fact his position, and that this radical view 
issues from uncritically accepting the confusions of the inferentialist account of 
experience mentioned in the earlier parts of this book. 
 There is a major problem which arises when these claims are disentangled. 
Feyerabend can‟t have them together, and the differences between them are 
crucial. Moreover, there are good reasons simply not to accept the stronger 
claim. As stated throughout this book, but in Chapters 5 and 8 particularly, there 
is an important sense in which aspects of experiential content are not captured 
by high-level influences at all. As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, J. 
A. Fodor and Philip Cam have convincingly argued for some degree of isolation 
of observational experiences from mechanisms of inference, theories, concepts 
and so on. If this modular hypothesis is in any way reasonable, and if one is to 
assume that animal and infant experiences constitute importantly lower-order 
informational givens, then Feyerabend‟s arguments clearly would not apply to 
such cases. Indeed, the questions Feyerabend raises do not even bear on them. 
For what both the evidence and common-sense suggest in such cases is that the 
content of such experiences is importantly insulated from high-level theory, 
propositional content and concepts. The case for low-level aspects of 
experiential content has been presented throughout this book. If the argument is 
valid, then Feyerabend‟s claim that „experience arises together with theoretical 
assumptions and not before them‟ clearly needs to be modified. The 
modification would amount to being something like: some experiential content 
arises together with theoretical assumptions; other „aspects‟ of experience do 
not, though they may be concurrent with them. This might be, nonetheless, 
enough of a modification to the original claim to strip the inferentialist 
emphasis from Feyerabend‟s account. 
 But let us evaluate this situation again. Feyerabend is surely right about one 
thing: a project which is committed to the „stability thesis‟ (that interpretations 
do not depend upon theoretical knowledge in any way, shape or form) cannot 
give an account of itself (i.e., its own language) without assuming that what its 
own language describes is true. And if the language is stable and 
well-connected with observation (and if neither the pragmatics of discourse (the 
principle of pragmatic meaning) nor the „brute‟ nature of sensations (the 
principle of phenomenological meaning) can rescue any justification of 
meaning for it) then it stands and falls on its own merits. Historically, at least, 
positivism in its most general form has been seen to have very little merit at all. 
 The position is that the meaning of terms cannot be given in experience, as 
positivists say they can, and by implication the stability thesis is false. But we 
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can avoid the implication of all these arguments and objections by simply 
dropping the requirement that experience fixes meanings (and we can subscribe 
to Feyerabend‟s overt thesis, but not the covert thesis). We can take what has 
been called sensational experiences (low-level content) to have no (or little) 
descriptive, semantic or representational basis, but to have some degree of 
sensational content which theory ladenness does not capture. This move would 
preserve both Feyerabend‟s attack on the positivist account of how 
observational terms get their meaning, and the argument for low-level insulated 
aspects of experiential content which is crucial to the continuum theory. Once 
again, however, we would be aiming not to legitimate one kind of view of the 
importance of experience, but dispensing with the whole positivist/inferentialist 
dichotomy. 
 To raise the points of difference here again: it has been said that something 
important may be left from the attacks on positivism, if one simply holds that 
experience at the sensation level is importantly non-inferential, even though 
this may not be enough to guarantee the meaning of expressions in language. 
There may even be a legitimate continuum in the way in which observational 
experiences are penetrated by theories and higher-level concepts. At the 
extremes of the low-level sensational aspects of experiential content there may 
be no such interference, while at the higher inferential level we may speak of a 
descriptive, representational content, and there may be all sorts of complex 
graduations in between. The situation is plausibly not as simple as a fully 
inferentialist account such as Feyerabend‟s makes out. The continuum theory 
allows for much more in the way of degrees of influence in this regard. 
 To give credit where due, Feyerabend may be right in asserting that 
experiential content is importantly descriptive/theoretical at this second level 
mentioned. But how does the full dichotomy rest with Feyerabend‟s analysis? 
This is unclear because Feyerabend seems systematically ambiguous as to what 
his argument was supposed to demonstrate. There is a good deal of textual 
evidence for this claim. For instance, Feyerabend himself seems unwilling at 
times to take his own strongly inferentialist claims too seriously. He says that: 
„sensations can be eliminated from the process of understanding (though they 
may continue to accompany it, just as a headache may accompany deep 
thought).‟ And he makes the rather muted remark that: „natural science without 
experience is conceivable ‟ which suggests that is all it may be. And also, he 
claims: „I am not asserting that the natural sciences as we know them ... could 
be freed from sensation entirely ... the point is made that sensations are not 
necessary for the business of science and that they occur for practical reasons 
only‟.359 But at other times he is clear about the implications of the covert thesis 
and enthusiastically supports it. He tells us that experience enters science at 
three points: of test, assimilation of results of test, and understanding of 
                                                 
359 Feyerabend, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 133-135. 
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theories. 360  At each of these points, according to Feyerabend, experience, 
though sufficient, is not necessary for science to occur (a computer with a 
suitable theoretical basis and instruments could make the appropriate 
judgements about data in respect of certain theoretical input). And even in a 
small child in the act of interpreting stimuli, he tells us, we can „imagine that 
this interpretative apparatus acts without being accompanied by sensations (as 
do reflexes and all well-learned movements such as typing).‟361 The upshot in 
these cases is that experiences are not necessary because they do not contribute 
to our understanding, and as they do not contribute to our understanding, 
ceteris paribus, they have no non-theoretical (and hence, no useful) content.362  
 There are several issues here: if Feyerabend is claiming that we need not 
experience things in order to apply theories, he is right, but the point seems 
trivial: theories can be applied (conceivably) by a computer as he suggests, as it 
were, „passively‟. But as we have stipulated the requirements here ex hypothesi, 
we have not gained much territory. We have certainly not demonstrated that the 
world is like this. (An imagined world, in which moral values were excluded 
from moral action, is not a demonstration that the world is devoid of such 
values). The stronger claim is whether a person without theoretical knowledge 
can be conceived of as having experiences. In one of his clearest statements of 
what I have called his covert thesis, Feyerabend tells us that this is 
„incomprehensible‟: 
 [E]xperience arrives together with theoretical assumptions, not before 
them, and that an experience without theories is just as incomprehensible 
as is (allegedly) a theory without experience: eliminate part of the 
theoretical knowledge and of a sensing subject and you have a person 
who is completely disorientated, incapable of carrying out the simplest 
action. Eliminate further knowledge and his sensory world (his 
„observation language‟) will start disintegrating; even colours and other 
simple sensations will disappear until he is in a stage even more primitive 
                                                 
360 Ibid., p. 132. 
361 Ibid., p. 133. 
362 Fodor has recently agreed with the view that there can be a „science without experience‟, but 
argues that this does not, in effect, compromise his „cognitive encapsularity‟ claim. See his: 
„The Dogma that didn‟t Bark (A Fragment of a Naturalized Epistemology)‟. For Fodor, the data 
that constrains science „doesn‟t have to be perceptual‟ (ibid., p. 219). „Providing support for 
making observations is just one tactic among many that scientists can use to achieve cognitive 
management‟ loc. cit. This is a reasonable claim in itself: scientists can obtain useful 
information in all sorts of (non-perceptual) ways. But this kind of claim is a far cry from the 
covert thesis of Feyerabend for whom „experiences arise together with theoretical assumptions 
and not before them.‟ If one annexes the idea of a science without experience to this sort of 
view, it is clear Feyerabend is aiming not to explore the different ways of achieving „cognitive 
management,‟ but to suggest that perceptual information is redundant. 
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than a small child.363 
This is plainly begging some big questions. If we remove the analysis from 
persons, and apply it to animals, it seems patently false. We do not ordinarily 
think of dogs as having „theoretical assumptions‟ or an „observation language.‟ 
(Though one would need, of course, to distinguish what sense of content - 
propositional linguistic, theoretically informational, etc. - is being claimed 
here). Yet it seems philosophical foolishness, and a legacy of the rationalist 
tradition, to suppose that they are somehow experientially deficient because of 
this (this would be to ignore Armstrong‟s important point about the continuum 
mentioned in Chapter 1). The claim is, in any case, certainly not a 
demonstration of the asymmetrical nature of the dependencies which he avows. 
Feyerabend has no case for claiming that the hapless child from whom theories 
are being deviously removed is an unfortunate in possession of a crumbling 
sphere of sense. Indeed, it is hard to see how this can be maintained beyond 
mere assertion. And it is important for Feyerabend to argue for this strongly, 
for, if what has been suggested here can be maintained (viz., about experience at 
one level being importantly low-level and having a pre-theoretical structure or 
content - relatively independent from features of high-level inference; and other 
levels having some degrees of representational, propositional content, etc.), 
then it would seem that one could easily hold the opposite thesis equally 
fervently: that it was simply a fact of selection that organisms evolved to 
experience the world sensationally and non-inferentially prior to their ability to 
acquire high-level theoretical knowledge. On this rival view of content, 
selection enabled organisms to discriminate low-level phenomenological 
similarities and differences, etc., which are immune from theory, simply by 
virtue of being organic, biologically and evolutionarily primed creatures.364 
 This point has been stressed before in another context. Here, it can only be 
gestured the general direction in which the analysis should go. When arguing 
against the objection that low-level sensational features might be epistemically 
idle and epiphenomenally irrelevant, the point was made that conscious 
experiential states do have an important selective utility: the reason an organism 
has „felt‟ aspects of their experiences - looks and seemings - is to achieve a 
                                                 
363 Feyerabend, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 133. 
364 Nowhere have I claimed this is a necessary condition of having experiences. Feyerabend, 
Dennett and Putnam are probably right insofar as conscious experiences are not necessary for 
carrying out actions. The world might (logically) have been occupied by unconscious automata, 
operating with far more dexterity and skill than we do. But I think that Fodor‟s claim that some 
philosophical worries are merely „baroque‟ applies to such cases. The fact that philosophy has 
to deal with is that the world does, at minimum, have at least one species of conscious creature 
that we can be sure about, perhaps more. It would be a development of the view that I have 
given to trace the influence of Descartes‟ inferentialist treatment of animals as non-sentient 
creatures to the present day functionalist‟s conception of man in the same vein.  
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number of important tasks. (1) They help to personalise the experience; to 
localise it to an experiential centre from which action can be appropriately 
directed (the experience of pain is obviously one such case). (2) They are also 
useful for directing oneself to action - driving a car when something happens 
(say to the engine) enables consciousness to causally activate a new set of 
mechanical procedures, which direct one to make appropriate alterations and 
adjustments to one‟s „programmed‟ pattern of behaviour (slowing down, 
stopping, etc). (3) Finally, the possibility of being inferentially misguided about 
the content of the experiences we project and identify gives rise to the need for 
another (selectively sanctioned) way of discriminating between stimuli that 
could be dangerous or harmful stimuli.  
 The value of, and the problems associated with, such a proposal cannot be 
investigated here. However, a simple point can be made. Feyerabend‟s 
assertion that, without theory, a „sensing subject‟ would not be able to make any 
sense out of its environmental cues at all is at best, unsupported; at worst, it runs 
contrary to views which hold that not all observable features of interest are 
determined by the inferential end of the experiential continuum. There is clearly 
more than one story that can be told here. With such thought experiments, 
Feyerabend thus not only begs the question in his own favour, he ignores the 
possibility that a more subtle account relating experience and content might in 
fact be true. This is clearly an inadequate basis on which to support an 
inferentialist account of experience within the philosophy of science.  
 Moreover, the examples offered in support of the covert thesis hardly provide 
unambiguous supports for his views. What sense, for example, are we to make 
of Feyerabend‟s neonate who does not possess a „stable perceptual world‟ but 
(apparently) „passes through perceptual stages which are only loosely 
connected with each other.‟365 Feyerabend tells us that these stages „embody all 
the theoretical knowledge achieved at the time,‟ but he does not explain how 
they do, without introducing the possibility of the child experiencing 
something, and even that can be taken two ways. In saying that the child „reacts 
correctly to signals, interprets them correctly‟ as experiences, he is introducing 
the very low-level content - the experience- his covert thesis is suggesting we 
operate without. The very act of passing through various discriminatory stages 
suggests that infants might already be able to make some contentful sense of 
their surroundings - lack of high-level inference notwithstanding. Feyerabend 
asserts that „the means of interpretation‟366 in the sense of a theoretical base, 
does the job here, but it is certainly not clear how it does, if by „means of 
interpretation‟ he means some kind of „high-level‟ capacity. Since the example 
admits of contrary interpretations, one could easily and equally claim that being 
able to react correctly to signals and interpret them correctly, at least in terms of 
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low-level similarities and differences in one‟s experience, is a precondition of 
being able to theorise anything about them at all (at least in the organic world 
we live in). And, as we have seen, there seems to be an important sense that 
certain already pre-interpreted sensational givens are „modularised‟ from such 
influences - and colours seem to be one such case - so this is not necessarily a 
good example for Feyerabend‟s thesis. It is not obvious to me that a person 
could fail to be aware of some aspect of his senses in the scenario that 
Feyerabend provides for us. And it is important for Feyerabend to show this 
unambiguously if his claim is to succeed. For if the person is aware of his 
diminution of faculties (acutely or not) in the very primitive manner in which 
we may be aware of look-beliefs (viz., as registrations of low-level information 
which fall short of being fully-fledged beliefs), then there is some sense in 
which that person‟s experiences are not dependent upon theoretical knowledge. 
It is suggested here that the example that Feyerabend raises may not, after all, 
support his case, and may actually constitute ammunition for an opposing view. 
 In the scenario outlined, we are asked to imagine the sensations of the 
theoryless person as having the characteristics of an observation language, but 
if „aspects‟ of sensations can be contentful without that content being 
language-like, then the person might not be totally „disorientated‟ and still have 
experiences in some important sense. This would seem to be the case with 
theoryless animals, which, on Feyerabend‟s view, would have to be 
incompetent in their motor-tasks because they do not have theories, though it is 
not obvious how this could be true. (Of course, if one assumes at the outset that 
all experiential content is propositional linguistic etc., then removal of this 
would occasion an inability of the person to understand a language, and much 
else besides. But this is merely begging the question that the only kind of 
content is of this character, which is what is in question.) The upshot here is that 
if Feyerabend cannot provide us with a good reason for thinking that the person 
did not have this access to some aspect of his own sensations while they shrank 
from him as his theories were being removed, he would be admitting what he is 
trying to reject.367 In view of such ambiguities, there might be a  better way of 
looking at the relation between experience and high-level interpretation.  
9.9 Positivism and low-level content 
The theoretical-observational distinction, like the analytic-synthetic distinction, 
is a malleable one; it serves theorists with a number of possibilities, depending 
upon their initial persuasions. Feyerabend wants to run the theoretical and 
                                                 
367 Of course, this is not to say that a person can‟t be made „incapable‟ by the removal of part of 
the brain by surgery: what Feyerabend needs to support his case, however, is an instance of 
where the removal of theories in a person causes this response. As we shall similarly see with 
Churchland‟s inferentialist analysis, the onus is on Feyerabend to prove his point here, and the 
case in question does not allow him to do this.  
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observational terms together and thence claim that the limits of our experience 
are the limits of the theoretical language with which we are capable of 
describing or expressing such experiences. As he says, „experience arises 
together with theoretical assumptions and not before them.‟368 (In the passage 
just quoted, the elimination of the knowledge of theoretical terms amounted to 
the elimination of not just observation terms, but the whole „sensory world.‟) 
From this point, however, it is a short move to considering the possibility of a 
science without experience at all and the logical consequences of such a 
situation (the dependence of sensations on an inferential background). 
Feyerabend does not, however, consider the possibility of a non sequitur here. 
Clearly, the argument requires more support to make it stronger if it is to be 
maintained at all. For it doesn‟t seem to me to follow from the collapsing of the 
observational and theoretical terms and the theory dependence of observation 
doctrine, that the „experienced world‟ is thus limited by them. Maybe there is a 
case for thinking that, in Feyerabend (and in the inferential proposal generally) 
the T-O distinction is run together too much and that there is a crucial sense in 
which not all experiences are theory dependent after all, even though we may 
claim, along with Feyerabend, that positivism does not hold up to his criticisms. 
It is suggested that these claims can be held jointly with no friction. If this can 
be done, then Feyerabend‟s overt thesis is entirely compatible with the 
continuum account, given necessary revisions.  
 Feyerabend assumes, in the covert thesis, that his critique of positivism is a 
critique of all experience-based approaches, because he tacitly assumes that all 
such approaches take on board the (revised) stability thesis - the idea that 
experiences do not depend upon theoretical knowledge. The suggestion being 
made is that this does not follow. It certainly does not follow from a rejection of 
the (original) stability thesis (interpretations do not depend on the status of 
theoretical knowledge) and positivism, that one also rejects experience as a 
fundamental category - even if one rejects the positivists‟ version of it. The 
sense in which experience is an important category here might just be more 
oblique: it might be a low-level primordial category. Positivism, in any case, 
holds an empirical hypothesis: that experience is a true source and foundation 
(testing ground) of knowledge.369 Theoretical terms are either extensionally 
reducible, intensionally reducible or definable in such terms.370 And it holds, 
hence, that interpretations of experience do not depend upon theoretical terms. 
If this is what positivism means, then Feyerabend has mounted an adequate 
criticism of it. Most theorists, including Feyerabend, take there to be entailment 
relations between such claims, but there is no reason to suppose that they cannot 
be held separately, and for that matter, no reason that one cannot hold that the 
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category of „experience‟ is crucial in other ways than those mentioned; for 
instance, without any entailment to foundationalism. What „positivism‟ means 
or does not mean is actually open-ended.  
 Feyerabend attacks these conventional definitions en bloc, and he is probably 
right to do so in the case of positivism in the traditional sense. But there is the 
lingering question of whether we need to hold them together; for if we do not, 
then there is a case for being suspicious of whether Feyerabend actually gives 
us a „science without experience‟ and whether he, in fact, succeeds in his claim 
that experience comes from theories. Conflating all experience-based 
approaches with the stability thesis has given Feyerabend the focus for his 
attack; what is suggested here is that his enemy need not be so conspicuous as 
this. Indeed he may have no enemy at all, if we can support some sense of 
low-level contentful experience without ascribing to positivism. It may even be 
possible to hold both that experience is fundamental in the sense that it is prior 
to high-level interpretation (not all interpretations are theory dependent, but nor 
is experience necessarily the „testing ground‟)371and that theoretical terms are 
crucial to knowledge. My claim is that Feyerabend has not rejected another 
possibility: that experiences come individuated and pre-interpreted as low-level 
sensational contents, and are subsequently re-interpreted in the light of our 
current theoretical knowledge at another (higher) level of processing. If one 
assumes the continuum account that has been presented in this book, these may 
be two quite separate senses in which „experience‟ is important. In the one 
sense, experience is a low-level informational given to which categories like 
„meaning‟, „inference‟ and „theory‟ do not apply in any attenuated sense; in the 
other, it is a category penetrated through and through by such mechanisms. But 
Feyerabend does not make this distinction, so all „experience-based‟ programs 
are thus positivist. However, like Sellars, Churchland and others, I claim that 
Feyerabend has tried to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and that we need 
to get it back.372  
 We can go some way towards mounting a defence of this claim by returning 
to the problem of mediating terms, and trying to answer Feyerabend‟s 
difficulty: how to account for the difference in the interpretation of theoretical 
terms without dropping the principle that theoretical terms do not possess an 
independent meaning. We can suggest a response to this difficulty in a similar 
                                                 
371 Ibid., p. 132. 
372 Drawing on Campbell (1985) and Fodor (1984; 1988), Mortensen and Nerlich describe this 
low level sensory information as „the honest check on high-level theory‟ because „its causes are 
(mostly) outside the central control of our postulational mechanisms.‟ They also claim 
(plausibly) that: „In holding that concepts are thoroughly sensory and that the explanation of 
experience is a primary role of correct theory, one is not saying either that theoretical concepts 
are „analysable‟ into non-verbal propositional attitudes [inferentialism] or that experience can 
never be overthrown by theory [positivism].‟ C. Mortensen and G. Nerlich, Aspects of 
Metaphysics. (The interpolations are mine.) 
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way to Feyerabend, that by abandoning the stability thesis and asserting that the 
theoretical terms „Ax‟, in both scenarios, do possess an independent meaning, 
whilst hitching to this a caveat: that in rejecting the proposal that interpretations 
do not depend on the status of theoretical knowledge, we do not thereby assert 
that they depend fully upon theoretical knowledge, and that we allow that 
theoretical terms possess an independent meaning without thereby allowing 
them a transempirical status. Allowing the latter is suggestive of relativism. For 
if meanings had nothing to do whatever with certain experiences, (only 
inference) then the cascade of Feyerabend‟s relativism would flow.373 But we 
must also hold likewise, that the meaning of such terms is „not dependent upon 
observation and nothing else‟374, for this would be to raise the positivist spectre. 
If we avoid the extremes, we come to another possibility: that experience, at one 
level, provides the structured possibility of observation, and that the role of 
theories, at another level, is to fit this content within pre-existing inferential 
patterns of meaning (theoretical knowledge).  
 By „structured possibility of observation‟, I am not putting forward a new 
principle of phenomenological adequacy, that experience fixes meanings. It is 
not being claimed that this provides us with the interpretation of observational 
and theoretical terms, but just that observation does not come entirely free of 
interpretation: i.e., it does not come non-interpreted, only pre-interpreted. 
Applying „red‟ to a red experience is possible only if red is phenomenologically 
individuated and distinct from other colours as a sensational experience of some 
informationally contentful kind. (By contrast, in arguing against the principle 
of phenomenological adequacy, Feyerabend argued that it did not provide 
experiential terms with an interpretation (meaning); Feyerabend may be right 
here. In making these revisions, we can then say that theoretical terms differ in 
their interpretation, not by matching adequately „phenomenologically‟ nor by 
being trans-empirical (theoretical), but by being interpreted (respectively) with 
or without the input of certain low-level contentful sensations (certain „looks‟): 
thus, a blind person saying „Ax‟ and a coloursight person saying „Ax‟, then, 
differ in the intuitively plausible respect that the latter person, but not the 
former, is equipped inter alia with certain sensational experiences by which his 
theoretical interpretations are informed. But what this does not need to mean is 
that high-level semantic interpretation is given by experience. That is, one can 
carve the observation-theory threshold a little closer to experience than to 
theory without being accused of being a positivist. And, for the reasons 
mentioned earlier regarding the overkill of the inferentialist proposal, this 
                                                 
373 It would flow if one leaves aside cases of internalism without relativism as adumbrated by 
Putnam, or an otherwise fully theoretical account along the lines of Hesse in The Structure of 
Scientific Inference. The point here is only a matter of textual consistency: Feyerabend is led to 
relativism in throwing out the [experiential] baby with the [positivist] bathwater. 
374 Feyerabend, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 39. 
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seems at least a reasonable approach to the issue. In this version, a dog could 
still have contentful observational experiences without having to say, theorise 
or infer anything. And a blind man would be different from his sighted 
counterpart in a qualitative sense, without simply being possessed of „a 
different part of [a] theory.‟375  
 Moreover, what sensations informing inference might mean is that in the kind 
of world we live in (and for the kind of evolved beings we are), certain 
qualitative features of experience must be assumed in order for theory to be 
applied. And a blind person could not, strictly speaking, apply colour theory 
(except in some metaphorical sense) because of this deficit. The heart of the 
matter is that, though sensations are not necessary for the interpretation of 
theories and the semantics of observational terms, it is not the case that 
arguments for the inferentialist account explain such experiences away by a 
heavy-handed emphasis on theory-dependence. A blind man could certainly use 
colour theory,376 but in the actual world we live in, there is still a considerable 
difference in terms of the „richness‟ such a theory has for him, compared to a 
colour-sighted person (for the one, the colour has certain low-level „look‟-like 
aspects; for the other it does not). And although this difference is not entirely in 
the proximal stimulations received, it is not entirely and exclusively in the 
theory that each has either, because such non-semantic content is needed (in an 
important sense peculiar to our evolution-primed world) to account for the 
respective richness of the respective semantic contents.377 Such an analysis, of 
course, presupposes that experiential content is seen as occurring at a number of 
distinct levels of greater and lesser degrees of sophistication, but this is the view 
I hope to have established for serious consideration by the end of this book.  
 If this seems unsatisfactory, then we should consider Feyerabend‟s 
alternative. For it seems that Feyerabend is in no better position than the 
positivist view he was attacking. Feyerabend‟s view is that theoretical terms 
which characterise such experiences as colours actually get their content, (as 
well as their meaning), not from experience, but from the fact that we have 
adopted a certain interpretation of a theory: 
Thesis I: the interpretation of an observation language is determined by 
the theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as 
soon as those theories change.378 
It would seem that we haven‟t progressed very far from the pitfalls of 
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means that without the „aspect‟ features, the meaning will be rather less contentful than that of 
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378 Feyerabend, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 31. 
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positivism and the stability thesis here if the covert claim is supposed to run 
parallel to the overt claim. For, in taking on board the idea that theories provide 
the determinations of all contents, as well as of all meanings (overt thesis) and 
that the contents of observational experiences are likewise hitched to such 
interpretations, (covert thesis), Feyerabend assumes the model (the metaphysic) 
of which he stands in defence. In other words, one cannot give an independent 
justification of such a proposal without assuming the very interpretations 
which, he says, supposedly stand for experience. The initial argument against 
the positivist given earlier was that this could not be answered outside the 
ontology of positivism itself. However, it would seem that this complaint could 
go just as well for Feyerabend‟s own argument. Query: how are such inferences 
justified outside the claims of the inferentialist account? If Feyerabend‟s 
justification is that his approach is the only approach to the positivist alternative 
considered, then this claim is false, because another has been suggested in this 
book: contentful low-level experiences and meaningful inferences may be 
justified by quite separate criteria, and, in fact, may constitute quite 
distinguishable aspects of experiential content occurring along a non-exclusive 
continuum.  
 Of course, I am doing exactly the same thing here: assuming the model I am 
defending; not offering an independent justification for what has been taken as 
pre-structured low-level experience and its non-inferentiality at certain levels 
on the content continuum. And here, perhaps, it becomes a matter of which 
model is preferred. But the problem here is not one of justifying languages and 
interpretation, as it is for Feyerabend. Feyerabend‟s aim is to refute the claim 
that the interpreted meaning of a term is given in experience, and his analysis 
leans on not only the flaws of the empirical hypothesis, which he takes all 
experience-based accounts to assume, but also (jointly) the doctrine of the 
theory dependence of observation. For observations to depend upon theories, as 
Feyerabend seems to claim, it seems we need to give an account of the 
meanings of the terms of these theories, if we are to give an account of what 
these theories assert (what experiences are possible). In this way, Feyerabend is 
committed to having to justify the interpretation of such languages, as is the 
positivist. The difference between them is that one holds that as experience 
comes from theories, so does the „meaning‟ of experience also come from 
theories; the other holds that theories come from experiences, but gives no 
adequate account of how terms of those theories get their meaning. This is the 
weakness that Feyerabend attacks. But again: the terms of his attack commit 
him to having to justify the meaning of observational terms in his own 
(inferentialist) account. My proposal is in no such bind, for throughout this 
book limits have been placed on the theory dependence of observation. It is 
suggested that high-level features such as theory influence experiential content 
occur by degrees, and that there are very primitive levels where inference does 
not apply. The position defended, therefore, can claim that high-level 
  
 238 
interpretation goes on at a level which is different by degrees to the level at 
which an organism (such as an animal or infant) can have certain contentful 
experiences. The problem of justifying the use of observational terms thus does 
not arise on the continuum account.  
 Of course, this sort of argument is plausible only on the assumption that the 
continuum theory is plausible: that there are several distinguishable senses of 
experiential content, and that only one kind of content is, strictly speaking, 
high-level and semantic/theoretical; another kind of content has aspects which 
are not. Not much is gained from this argument if it has not been demonstrated 
that the thesis is worth considering on other grounds. But, as shown, none of 
Feyerabend‟s arguments are in any way deciders for the fully inferentialist line 
on experiential content, so there are still some reasons to hold other, contrary, 
views.  
9.10 Conclusion  
Feyerabend‟s account of experience was designed to legitimate (in his words): 
„the big step forward when the Aristotelian idea of the reliability of our 
everyday experience was given up and was replaced with an empiricism of a 
more subtle kind ... and [later] by rearranging our observational world in 
conformance with theoretical assumptions.‟379 What has been presented in this 
chapter is an empiricism of a subtler kind again. On my view, Feyerabend may 
be able to have an empiricism without positivism, but it may not mean that he 
can thereby have a science without experience.  
 With the theory dependence of observation doctrine rendered suspect, we are 
no longer committed to the assumptions of Feyerabend‟s thesis, viz., to give an 
account of the meaning of terms designating experience. There is no 
requirement, as the continuum view claims that nothing of interest follows from 
the meanings of experiential terms vis-á-vis low-level experiential content. The 
problem is thus, not one of justifying languages, but to give an account of 
experience, which it is suggested, comes already with low-level sensational 
content, i.e., pre-interpreted to some extent. My point in this chapter is simply 
to suggest that Feyerabend runs too far with the ball in his rejection of 
positivism. Outlawing positivism is not the same thing as outlawing experience.
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10. Sellars’s Myth 
The phrase „the given‟ as a piece of 
professional-epistemological-shoptalk carries a substantial theoretical 
commitment, and one can deny that there are „data‟ or that anything is, in 
this sense, given without flying in the face of reason.380  
Outlining Sellars’s thesis 
10.1 Introduction 
This part of the book will be in three chapters, two of them dealing with 
important arguments in support of the inferentialist proposal. In this chapter, 
Wilfred Sellars‟s rejection of the sense-data theory of perception will be 
assessed. It will be argued that his inferentialist views are of no consequence for 
the alternative view developed in this book. Chapter 11 will look at an attempt 
to eliminate low-level content by way of criticising the theory of „folk 
psychology‟ while also assessing the claim that perception is „plastic‟ and 
suggestible to high-level influences. Chapter 12 will look at the viability of 
property dualism in the context of the alternative account proposed.  
10.2 Sense-data and low-level awarenesses 
A major contribution to the issue of whether experiential content is influenced 
by high-level considerations is the theory of sense-data, a theory designed to 
legitimate objects of appearance. This view, which had support from the 
philosophers Russell and Price, among others, was in opposition to the view 
that objects were directly perceived. One did not experience objects directly, as 
the objects of one‟s experience could be non-veridical (such as when „seeing‟ a 
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stick as bent when it was partially submerged in water). These particulars 
constituted perceptual information non-inferentially acquired and known 
(„givens‟) which were essential to any perceptual act. (In veridical perception, 
the datum and the object happened to coincide).  
 Important distinctions have already been made in respect of low-level and 
fully inferential content. The central claim was that low-level experience is 
something distinct from perceptual judgements involving an inferential 
background of high-level features. As it stands, such a claim may seem similar 
to the views of philosophers sympathetic to the theory of sense-data. However, 
I want here to distinguish the continuum theory from the sense-data view to 
which it seems a close cousin. In this chapter, I shall outline where the 
continuum account stands on the complex question of perceptual „givens‟.  
 Sellars claims that all „givens‟ (like sense-data) cannot be non-inferential 
particulars, as the sense datum theorists suggest. Rather, they must be 
subsumed and classified under independent concepts which are acquired by 
high-level concept formation, involving learning and background knowledge. 
In Sellars‟s view, the experience expressed by the proposition „The stick seems 
bent‟ must take the form x seems ø, where ø is a concept of some sort, and to say 
that x seems ø (to make such a perceptual judgement) we must have acquired 
this knowledge inferentially. According to Sellars‟s, the idea of a 
non-inferentially known sense datum is a „myth‟. The point to be disagreed with 
here is the extrapolation from this rejection of sense-data to all non-inferential 
„givens‟ in experience. It shall be claimed instead that some givens actually 
escape his argument. 
 While I agree with Sellars that a non-inferentially known sense datum is an 
absurdity, it shall be argued that not all „givens‟ are equivalent to the idea of a 
„sense datum‟. Another sort of given could be a low-level awareness or - what I 
have called - a sensational „aspect‟ of content. This, typically, could be 
acquired non-inferentially without being known non-inferentially in any 
„high-level‟ sense (it may be known in some sense, yet not as propositional 
knowledge). The assumption that Sellars makes is that all givens, to be known, 
have to be subsumed under independent concepts of the propositional form x is 
ø; but it is not clear why all experiential awarenesses need to be so subsumed. 
An ability to be aware of sensational features of experiences may constitute an 
experiential given, even without the requirement of subsumption under 
particular high-level concepts which capture certain descriptively specifiable 
features. My claim shall be that Sellars has actually confused a number of issues 
in his argument: he has conflated the notion of sense-data with all experiential 
givens; he has mistakenly applied high-level epistemic features as 
characteristics of the given in general; and he has assumed an overtly 
propositional linguistic view of knowledge acquisition. Further, he has tacitly 
assumed a dichotomous treatment of the inferential/non-inferential distinction. 
All these points are misapplied in the case of low-level content.  
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 Thus, I shall argue that Sellars‟s refutation of the notion of a sense-datum is 
misapplied for some forms of the given. The exclusive pairs: 
„inferential-non-inferential‟ and „epistemic-non-epistemic‟ applied to 
sensational givens, or „aspects‟ of experiential content, is something of a 
category mistake because although an experiential aspect might be 
non-inferentially acquired it need not be non-inferentially known, and such an 
awareness can be informationally epistemic in some sense without necessarily 
being heavily inferential. The categories inferential/non-inferential are 
misleading in the sense that they suggest that content is either in one or other 
category (epistemic and inferential or non-epistemic and non-inferential). 
However, consistent with the continuum account, low-level awarenesses can be 
informational without being propositional linguistic (hence, there is room for 
non-propositional knowledge which is not fully inferential); and an awareness 
can have inferential aspects without being fully epistemic in any high-level 
sense (hence, there is room for informational content which involves some 
inferential connections but which is not necessarily known as such). Sellars has 
committed the mistake of being too simplistic in the application of such 
categories, and so there is still a sense in which content can be „given‟ without 
falling prey to his arguments.  
10.3 Two strategies on sense-data  
Sellars claims that there are two important strategies that one can take once one 
has admitted the category of sense-data as a view on the nature of experiential 
content. One can say either that the sense datum of an object constitutes an 
adequate enough account of what our experience of an object consists in, and 
hence, an analysis of experience becomes an analysis of the nature of 
sense-data; or, one can claim that the central requirement for an account of 
experience is that the sense datum is a component of any relation between 
subject and object, and that this relation is unanalysable.  
 Sellars submits that the first tendency is a mistake of a piece with the 
naturalistic fallacy381 but he also claims that both positions have a seriously 
flawed basis in the reasoning behind them, namely, that the givenness of ø is „a 
fact which presupposes no learning, no forming of associations, no setting up of 
stimulus-response connections.‟382 By this sort of stipulation, Sellars has in 
mind the necessary inferential connections that must go along with the sensing 
of sense-data. However, it shall be claimed in this chapter that Sellars‟s 
arguments against sense-data do not rule out an important sense in which 
experience is „given‟.  
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10.4 Sense-data and unanalysability  
The general response made against the idea that a sense datum does or should 
presuppose concept formation, stimulus-response connections, and the like, is 
an a priori one: the sensing of sense contents is supposed to be something akin 
to being conscious. It is not a faculty which is cultivated or formed under social 
conditions in response to goal-directed needs. The sensing of something being 
red, say, or the sensing of a pain, is fundamentally a deliverance not an 
acquisition: even if „the ability to know that a person is now at a certain time, 
feeling a pain, is acquired and does presuppose a (complicated) process of 
concept formation,‟383 the very idea that one can be in pain or see red does not. 
Having to undergo training to „see red‟ or to „have a pain‟ seems as absurd as 
having to undergo an educational process to be a featherless biped. 
 This is not a good argument in anyone‟s book and Sellars rightly rejects it. 
For one thing, it begs the question in favour of the unanalysability of sense 
contents: precisely what is at issue. Even a sense datum theorist needs to 
explain why sense-data are unanalysable in terms of their being primitive or 
non-inferential (otherwise there would be no plausible grounds on which to 
admit them). Also, as Sellars notes, if we were to take the strategy that 
sense-data are unacquired, then we would be clearly precluded from offering an 
analysis of the proposition that x senses a sense content, which presupposes 
acquired abilities. That is, we must take as a priori too, that one can make such 
claims as that one is sensing a sense content. But any claim about any state of 
affairs, in Sellars‟s view, is of the form x is ø, which involves subsumption 
under high-level propositional content, and hence, inference. If sense datum 
theorists want to claim that one is sensing sense-data, it means that they are 
already presupposing acquired high-level concepts. To say that sense contents 
are unacquired in spite of this would mean that we cannot even claim that we 
know that any sense content we allegedly sense is the way that it appears to us. 
We cannot do this because we have already assumed that the knowledge of such 
things is unacquired; and if unacquired, then strictly speaking they are not 
known, because they cannot be subsumed under concepts like x is ø. But the 
ability to say x is ø is, according to Sellars, already constitutive of concepts, 
learning and inference, and so must be all forms of the given. The initial 
argument against the idea of non-inferentially known sense-data is, then, that 
the view commits a clear pragmatic contradiction. This argument requires 
expansion.  
10.5 The problem of ‘givenness’ 
The problem of the „givenness‟ of experience, whether it be cast in terms of 
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sense-data or not, is a problem of what exactly is supposed to be given, and 
what epistemic weight we are to allow it to have. We have seen on Sellars‟s 
view that the two possibilities for this doctrine are that our epistemic and 
experiential claims about the world can be analysed in terms of „the given‟ or, 
more broadly, that the framework of givenness constitutes an inextricable part 
of the relation in experiential acts. The next step Sellars takes is to show that in 
either of these forms „the given‟ collapses into a choice between either the 
failure of sense-data to provide a logical basis for the existence of knowledge, 
or sense-data as „particularised items of experience‟. The argument runs as 
follows: Any account of sense-data comes against the act-particular dichotomy 
- if sense-data are incorporated in a relation between subject and object, one can 
easily give an account of knowledge in such terms. An epistemic situation 
would occur when the act of sensing the features of an object and the object 
itself happen to coincide. This assumes that the act, in this case, includes the 
fact that the object is there, and that it is the object under consideration, and so 
on. On the other hand, if sense-data can only be properly described as particular 
sensations, i.e., an expanse of colour, a particular shape, a particular sound, etc., 
it is not clear how we can get full-blooded knowledge from such input. It seems 
that keeping the notion that sense-data can be analysed in terms of features of 
particulars qua particulars, proscribes having knowledge that the event 
occurred. The options appear to be: 
 (a) It is particulars which are sensed. Sensing is not knowing. The 
existence of sense-data does not logically imply the existence of 
knowledge, or 
(b) Sensing is a form of knowing. It is facts rather than particulars which 
are sensed.384  
Sellars says of this that: 
 [T]he fact that a sense content was sensed would be a non-epistemic 
fact about the sense content. Yet it would be hasty to conclude that this 
alternative precludes any logical connection between the sensing of 
sense contents and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For 
even if the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the 
existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might well be true 
... even though the sensing of a red sense content were not itself a 
cognitive fact and did not imply the possession of non-inferential 
knowledge. [T]he second alternative [implies the] existence of 
non-inferential knowledge for the simple reason that it would be this 
knowledge. But, once again, it would be the facts rather than particulars 
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which are sensed.385 
There may be some confusion about the terms here. Non-inferential knowledge 
is, in Sellarsian terms, direct knowledge of matters of fact of the form x is ø; 
inferential knowledge is knowledge obtained indirectly from other sources 
(e.g., background knowledge) of the form x because ø. „Particulars‟ and „facts‟ 
refer, respectively, to unique primitives to which knowledge is analysable 
(colours, expanses of light, shapes), but which are not themselves knowledge, 
while facts are acts of knowledge which cannot be so analysed („The current 
British Monarch has been a Queen since 1953‟).  
 The point here is that if one believes that non-inferential particulars are 
sensed, then this is a non-epistemic fact which is unique and to which 
knowledge can and must be analysed (the sense-data theory). But knowledge of 
facts (inferential or non-inferential) on this view is not logically implied by the 
non-epistemic fact of particulars being sensed (even though, asymmetrically, 
the non-inferential knowledge of matters of fact may imply that particulars 
were sensed). Sellars‟s claim is that if one believes that sensing is a sensing of 
facts, then although knowledge can be derived from this view (it is knowledge) 
there would be no room for particulars, whereas, if one believes that sensing is a 
sensing of particulars, there is no logical entailment towards knowledge 
(inferential or non-inferential). The options appear to be mutually exclusive. 
But clearly, Sellars argues, one must have knowledge if only to say that one 
knows one non-inferentially senses particulars, so particulars cannot be 
non-epistemic; knowledge must be involved somehow. The task of Sellars is to 
show that for this reason the account of sense-data leads ultimately to a 
rejection of the notion that something is sensed. Moreover, rejecting sense-data, 
in Sellars‟s view, is supposed to go some way to rejecting „the entire framework 
of givenness.‟386  
 Sellars‟s point is that there is a serious confusion in the options among 
sense-data theorists, with the result that they often „seek to have [their] cake and 
eat it,‟387 often opting for a philosophically jumbled account of sensing as both 
particular and act. This is probably a legitimate criticism of the sense-data 
account. However, the extent to which this raises a difficulty for givenness in 
general (the arguments against sense-data apply to a particular form of „the 
given‟) is the extent to which one takes on board Sellars‟s point that one can 
regard any experience as being a datum, only insofar that this implies that we, 
thereby, know some fact about it (namely, that it is a datum of a certain 
propositionally and descriptively specifiable sort). It shall later be indicated that 
this is an implausible assumption - for the reason that certain „givens‟ may be 
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insulated and inaccessible to complete penetration by high-level conceptual 
knowledge, and do not face the requirement of being non-inferentially known 
in this way, even if they may be non-inferentially acquired. If, however, one 
admits this point, in the case of sense-data being given, then it follows clearly 
that there is an implication relation between the notions of something‟s being a 
sense datum and our having some sort of knowledge of it. And, as Sellars makes 
clear, leaning too heavily on one or other feature of sense-data as particular, or 
sense-data in the epistemic act of sensing, means that one „sever[s] the logical 
connection‟ between them.388 
 Of course, there is normally meant to be some sort of logical connection 
between sensing sense contents and having knowledge on the sense datum 
account. However, to be an adequate account of knowledge in any full sense, 
the notion of „givens‟ must bridge the particular-knowledge gap just mentioned. 
But sensings are usually understood as foundational givens and hence are 
non-epistemic on the usual story. The argument thus poses a problem for the 
sense-data theory. The point is that the sense-data theorist is caught both ways 
when it comes to the relationship between sensing and knowing: if they take 
this relationship to be unanalysable, then they break the supposed logical 
connection between them (sensings are thereby seen as non-epistemic 
particulars and knowings are seen as epistemic facts). On the other hand, if they 
choose to analyse sensings in terms of knowings, then sensings turn out (at best) 
to be non-inferential knowings and hence, they break the connection once more 
- full-blooded knowledge must once again be seen as distinct from sensings. We 
are thus left to wonder how sensings can possibly lead to or constitute 
full-blooded knowledge, if „knowings‟ are facts and „sensings‟ are particulars.  
 Clearly there must be more to sensing than the sense-data theorist allows. 
Because sensing particulars does not guarantee the sensing of facts, it is quite 
unclear how perception is supposed to yield acquired inferential abilities like 
propositional knowledge, learning, concept formation and so on. Sellars‟s 
suggestion, following from this argument, is that we abandon the notion of 
non-inferential givens entirely.  
 Sellars‟s view is that „x senses a sense content ... presupposes acquired 
abilities‟389 even if only to give an account of it as such. If we did not have any 
acquired abilities of learning, high-level concept formation, background 
knowledge, etc., it is hard to see how we could even say that x senses a sense 
content. It is from this basis that Sellars attempts to offer a rejection not only of 
the category of sense-data in epistemology, but also all possible forms of „the 
given.‟  
 The rest of Sellars‟s argument follows from the assumption that experience 
presupposes acquired abilities. Much of the argument in response will be 
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drawing upon the idea that it is consistent to suppose that we can have a sense 
content in some low-level sense, without thereby being able to capture the 
content of such an experience in terms of learning, knowledge, descriptive 
concepts, etc., despite Sellars‟s claim that these things are presupposed in every 
instance of the given. My claim is that low-level experience may still be 
contentful and yet not be captured in such terms. Thus, even though I shall be 
agreeing to some extent with his rejection of the myth of sense-data, I shall 
disagree with his claims about the „given‟. The point in this section has been 
that, according to Sellars, the notion of sense-data is a muddle of two ideas: data 
as particulars which are not known, and data as items of knowledge which are 
not sensed non-inferentially.  
10.6 How sense-data sever the logical connection between sensing and 
knowing  
The upshot for Sellars is that the „Classical Sense Datum‟ theories face an 
inconsistent triad if they choose to sever the connection between knowledge 
and having sense contents. The alleged triad, and Sellars‟s comments, follow: 
A. x senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows that s is 
red. 
B. The ability to sense contents is unacquired. 
C. The ability to know facts of the form x is ø is acquired. 
A and B together entail not-C; B and C entail not-A; A and C entail not-B. 
[W]hich one of them will [the sense datum theorist] choose to abandon? 
(1) He can abandon A, in which case the sensing of sense contents 
becomes a non-cognitive fact ... which may be ... a logically necessary 
condition, of non-inferential knowledge, but a fact ... which cannot 
constitute this knowledge. 
(2) He can abandon B, [which cuts off] the concept of a sense datum from 
... ordinary talk about sensations, feelings, after-images, tickles and 
itches, etc. 
(3) But to abandon C is to do violence to the predominantly nominalist 
proclivities of the empiricist tradition.390  
This is all endorsement of the same critical point. The important part is found in 
premise A: namely, that one is committed to the view that the sensing of sense 
contents implies the knowledge of such a content in so far as it is a sense 
content, and that abandoning this apparently leads to the view of sense as a 
„non-cognitive fact.‟ (It is a non-cognitive fact because it is known, allegedly, 
non-inferentially.) The consequence is that full-blooded knowledge can never 
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be constituted on this non-cognitive basis, and that one must uphold this 
premise as one must uphold the rest. Hence, the inconsistent triad. 
 Sellars‟s point is simply that none of the above options are available to the 
sense-data theorist. The only remotely plausible way of escaping the 
inconsistent triad is to abandon premise A. But this leads to the undesirable 
conclusion that robs the sense-data theorist of one his central reasons for 
employing the notion of non-inferential givens in the first place - viz., to 
account for the foundation of knowledge. And, as Sellars stresses, since 
sense-data are particulars they cannot do that job - what is needed in accounting 
for knowledge is an account of facts. (And, importantly, for Sellars the sense of 
„knowledge‟ that is of interest here is that which is captured by the propositional 
linguistic and representational features of an experience): 
For what is known, even in non-inferential knowledge, is facts rather than 
particulars, items of the form something’s being thus-and-so or 
something’s standing in a certain relation to something else. ... [T]he 
sensing of sense contents cannot constitute knowledge, inferential or 
non-inferential; ... [so] what light does the concept of sense datum throw 
on the „foundations of empirical knowledge‟?391  
What is explicit here is that Sellars takes „knowledge‟ to be constituted by 
high-level criteria. On this view, no sense can be made of the notion of 
particulars constituting knowledge since, by definition, particulars do not aid in 
the recognition of the propositional linguistic or representational content of an 
experience. (Particulars, like „bent‟ sense-data, cannot stand in relation to other 
objects and cannot have a tokened form in one‟s language like a bent stick can.) 
And, Sellars reasons, since such a characterisation is required for an 
understanding of cognitive facts, there is forever an unbridgeable gulf between 
„sensing‟ and „knowing‟ on the terms of the sense-data theory.  
 This treatment of premise A does not altogether fit with the passage quoted 
earlier.392 For previously, we saw that Sellars claimed that though a red sense 
content (say) were not itself a cognitive fact, it might still imply a connection 
between such a content and knowledge of sorts, if only because the „converse‟ 
relation may hold: i.e., the knowledge of a certain physical object being red may 
logically imply the non-inferential sensing of a red sense content. This is, in 
Sellars‟s view, a consequence of the sense datum position: even though 
particulars being sensed does not imply knowledge, it would, he says, „be hasty 
to conclude‟ the impossibility of the „converse relation‟ from knowledge to the 
non-inferential sensing of sense contents.393 
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 There seems to be a tension between these two claims. Sellars seems clearly 
aware that the „converse relation‟ can guarantee knowledge in some sense, but 
it does not seem to influence his conviction that aims at upholding that one 
cannot abandon premise A without severing the knowledge and sensing of 
sense contents relation. But surely there is room here to abandon A and install 
the converse relation in its place. It does seem plausible that even if sensing 
sense contents does not itself constitute knowledge, „aspects‟ of such 
experiencings may still feature as an important part of content in some 
low-level, yet informational sense. And it might be this low-level information 
that guarantees that one does sense something and that some content is thereby 
given non-inferentially.  
 This would be possible, for instance, if the either/or requirement of 
inference/non-inference - epistemic/non-epistemic were dropped and a 
graduationist thesis were put in its place. A graduationist view would suggest 
that the whole idea of knowledge in the context of experience should be seen in 
terms of varying degrees of informational content available to perceptual 
systems. Some of the content might be best described in terms of propositional 
linguistic knowledge and some might be best captured in representational terms 
or simply in sensational terms (i.e., as low-level informational awarenesses). 
Some content (recalling the complexity thesis) might need to be captured 
utilising a number of different levels of specification. Thus, the converse 
relation between sensing and knowing (that Sellars mentions as a possible 
option above) might well hold in the sense that the awareness experienced when 
undergoing sensational aspects might yield content which, though 
informational, is not propositional knowledge (and hence, is not a „cognitive 
fact‟ in Sellars sense). But this content might still be epistemic content of some 
low-level informational kind (though not high-level propositional kind). Hence, 
a low-level non-propositional knowledge of sorts may guarantee that a certain 
sense content is given non-inferentially. By this means, the problem of the 
inconsistent triad would be overcome: premise A could be interpreted in terms 
of the converse relation Sellars mentions. On this interpretation, the sensing of 
sense contents certainly does not constitute high-level knowledge, however 
certain low-level seeings are still epistemically informational and thus 
guarantee that something contentful is actually sensed. This would, of course, 
mean that the kind of content acquired would not be sophisticated propositional 
knowledge. But it may be enough to secure a kind of non-foundational „given‟. 
Abandoning sense-data need not mean that one thereby abandons low-level 
content. 
 The upshot of the claims above is that they avoid Sellars‟s argument that the 
given is either a particular and hence not known (in the high-level sense of 
„known‟), or inferentially known (and hence, not „given‟). On this view, the 
non-propositional information received might guarantee that something is 
given which is so low-level that it does not constitute the epistemic knowledge 
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that Sellars says is heavily inferential.  
 There is an advantage to this way of thinking. On this possible rival view, 
non-inferential sense contents of an informational nature might well feed into 
the knowledge of facts to some degree, though not themselves amounting to 
either knowledge or facts in any high-level propositional sense. Yet this content 
might still be present in what would normally be full-blown epistemic 
judgements. (This recalls the continuum thesis and the asymmetry thesis - at 
one level there is low-level content, at the other high-level content and while 
one level might contain the other, this inclusion need not be symmetrical). So 
Sellars might be right in his claim that low-level givens cannot constitute 
knowledge, yet wrong in thinking that because they cannot they must therefore 
be non-epistemic (hence, „particulars‟ in his sense). Of course he may still be 
right in thinking that the sense-data theory cannot overcome his objections. 
Further, this sort of view might fit well with what is being considered recently 
as an important new direction in cognitive science - a move away from a highly 
language-driven account of informational content to include informational 
content of a non-propositional kind.394 It would also fit in well with modularity 
theory since the kind of content in question seems to be informationally local 
and - to some degree - distinct from high-level cognitive processes.  
 The point for now is that Sellars seems to assume in the above argument that 
knowledge is exclusively an ability to make propositional linguistic or 
representational judgements (as we shall see, his sense of cognition is the ability 
to endorse statements to the effect that „something is thus and so‟). However, it 
should be clear from the points raised in this book that there is a sense in which 
perception involves a number of different levels of cognitive organisation. This 
would be possible, for instance, if it were admitted that there are several levels 
of differentially sophisticated content available to perceiving organisms - a 
possibility on the continuum view of experiential content, but not on any other. 
Sellars does not consider this possibility however, and since abandoning 
premise A leads only to perception as a „non-cognitive fact‟ (and since he does 
not really consider the other propositions [B&C] as being any sort of option) he 
proposes a diagnosis of the dilemma:  
It [seems that] sense datum [are] a mongrel resulting from a cross 
breeding of two ideas: (1) The idea that there are ... sensations of red ... 
which can occur ... without any prior process of learning or concept 
formation; and without which it would in some sense be impossible to 
see, for example, that the facing surface of a physical object is red ... (2) 
The idea that there are ... non-inferential knowings that certain items are 
                                                 
394 See: W. Bechtel and A. Abrahamsen, „Beyond the Exclusively Propositional Era‟, 
Epistemology and Cognition, pp. 121-151.  
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[red which] are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge.395  
The „mongrel‟ is an endorsement of the two elements: sense as particulars and 
sense as the „fact‟ of knowing itself. The rest of Sellars‟s argument is an attack 
upon the very idea that there is anything of substance in any joint claim which 
would legitimise an explanation of experiential content in terms of sense datum 
without the use of prior concepts. This, to Sellars, is the rotten core of the Myth. 
10.7 The Central Claim  
Before turning to further exposition of the argument we should return again to 
proposition A: x senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows 
that s is red. For Sellars, holding this is not just a logical entailment needed to 
guarantee knowledge (to be rejected only on pain of making sensing 
„non-cognitive‟), but it is also a matter of being consistent: rejecting it would 
mean that one would be „precluded from offering an analysis of x senses a sense 
content ‟ itself.396 This may not seem all that clear. The argument for this is that 
if the entailment relation between sensing and knowing is „severed‟ and if we 
deny the proposition that x senses red sense content s entails that x 
non-inferentially knows that s is red, then we are denying that x senses red 
sense content s is acquired knowledge. And since x senses a red sense content 
presupposes acquired abilities just in being able to articulate such a statement 
(so the argument runs), we cannot even sensibly give an account of x senses a 
red sense content s if we drop premise A. Result, an impasse: we cannot 
legitimise by argument the notion of an unacquired sense content as we are 
denying the grounds by which we give an analysis of that sense content. Hence, 
Sellars argues: 
It follows that he could analyse x senses red sense content s as x 
non-inferentially knows that s is red only if he [admits] that the ability to 
have such non-inferential knowledge as that, for example, a red sense 
content is red, is itself unacquired. [However] most empirically minded 
philosophers are strongly inclined to think that all classificatory 
consciousness, all knowledge that something is thus and so, or in 
logicians‟ jargon, all subsumption of particulars under universals, 
involves learning, concept formation, even the use of symbols.397  
Sellars betrays his biases here, and no clear reason is given at this point, for 
accepting the „strong inclinations‟ of „empirically minded philosophers‟ over 
the inclinations of any other sort of philosophers. It is also clear, if it were not 
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397 Loc. cit.  
  
 251 
earlier, that Sellars‟s inclinations regarding knowledge, concepts, learning and 
so on are exclusively „high-level‟ in my sense, with a tendency to (symbolic) 
inferential linguisticism (Note the emphasis here on „classificatory 
consciousness‟). What he seems to mean by capturing the content of an 
experience is to capture the propositional linguistic content and perhaps the 
representational content also (the phrase „something is thus and so‟ is 
ambiguous in this regard). As we shall see later, he certainly thinks that content 
is, in some critical sense, propositional (i.e., language-like). In any case, it is 
obvious here that he places himself firmly in the tradition of thought that 
espouses the view that sensations (in whatever sense they are referred to) are 
comprehensively penetrated by such background theoretical considerations, 
high-level concept formation, language and the like. But his ensuing discussion 
is supposed to demonstrate a reason for this position. It will be claimed later 
that, in contrast to Sellars, it is not the case that being non-inferentially known 
is a logical entailment for all „givens‟, and so some givens may yet still escape 
his argument. 
10.8 Codes, languages and propositional contents  
The next step in the argument is to introduce the notion of a linguistic code to 
account for the persistence of sense datum „talk‟. The claim here is that a code 
has no logical grammar of its own, but can act as a mnemonic device which 
serves to remind us of the part certain sentences play among other sentences in 
our language. If this can be upheld, then sense datum talk becomes just the 
operation of such a code within our language, and no claim can be made for it to 
designate anything experientially significant. The sort of thing which Sellars 
has in mind here is something like this: the sense datum code is imagined to 
receive its logical grammar from its relation with the sense datum language it is 
designed to prompt; its function being not logical, but instantiational.  
 Consider a traffic light code. Three signals (or „flags‟) instantiate two states 
of the traffic: a state of rest (red flag) and a state of motion (green flag). (The 
amber/red combination functions as a transition signal between the one and the 
other). It would be a mistake to suppose that there was a logical relation 
between the signals and the motion or stasis they give rise to, or even the 
„datum‟ they supposedly generate in observers. The proposition: Red traffic 
lights present red sense-data does not logically entail any sort of sense datum or 
any particular state of the traffic. What it does entail is that certain other 
sentences are logically valid inferences from it. A sentence like this is a flag 
code for a more specific sentence such as The traffic light looks red to someone, 
from which it follows that Something looks red to somebody etc. These can be 
linked (eventually) to other conventional sentences such as Red traffic lights 
mean that traffic should stop or remain stationary, from which whole 
syllogisms could be formed which direct appropriate action. But this is at the 
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level of sentences which one can form from such propositions. The proposition 
Red traffic lights present red sense-data, however, is a look-alike sentence, not 
a real one, as it has no logic of its own, only a logic which is „parasitical‟398 on 
the sentences which do, such as the ones indicated above. Red traffic lights 
present red sense-data has a logic insofar as it is similar in form to: Red things 
are of a certain colour, which has a logic linking it to such sentences as Certain 
colours are red, from which certain logical incongruities and inclusive relations 
can be illustrated, such as in jointly holding Certain colours are red and Certain 
colours are not red, both of which are subsets of Some things are coloured etc. 
The trouble with the original assertion, Sellars implies, is that it is itself 
alogical; it can only point to certain sentences which do not refer to a sense 
datum and which are already specific sentences embedded within a logical 
framework. One can only articulate Red traffic lights present red sense-data if, 
by it, one means The traffic light looks red to x, or some such sentence. On its 
own, it is not a sentence, but a code, a means of instantiating another sentence. 
The point of all these considerations is close to Sellars‟s lips: 
 [S]ense-datum talk neither clarifies nor explains facts of the form x looks 
ø to s or x is ø. ... One would [instead] be constantly tempted ... to treat 
sense-datum flags as ... sentences in a theory, and ... as a language which 
gets its use by co-ordinating sense-datum sentences with sentences in 
ordinary perception talk, as molecule talk gets its use by co-ordinating 
sentences about populations of molecules with talk about the pressure of 
gases on the walls of their containers.399 
The upshot of all this is that sentences which exhibit experience-talk about 
sense-data can be shown to be the „grammatical analogies‟ 400  of genuine 
sentences, which expose the real relations between subjects and objects and 
which clarify and explain this relation in a manner consonant with science, 
without employing the difficult category of „sense-data.‟ The relation between 
sense-data talk and its „demythologized‟ alternative will be something like the 
relation between a logical sentence and its code. The aim of Sellars is to show 
that nothing is gained, in fact, by explaining one‟s experience in terms of 
sense-data, if it can be shown that how things look to be amounts to how things 
really are. 
 Sellars‟s argument for this is made with the above considerations in mind and 
also by making what he calls „a simple and fundamental point‟: namely, that 
„the sense of „red‟ in which things look red is, on the face of it, the same as that 
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in which things are red.‟401 The point is, in claiming that an experience looks to 
be of a certain sort, we are, in effect, claiming more than how our experiences 
appear to us; we are also stating an assertion and endorsing the assertion for its 
propositional content. The notion of truth-conditional semantics is apposite 
here in explaining this. Sellars is suggesting that in any claim about the contents 
of our experiences we, in effect, plot the degree of statement endorsement on a 
graph of veridicality: we assess, in some sense, the degree of endorsement 
required in some given instance in which we are to make a certain claim about 
the experiences we are undergoing. Thus, „x is red‟, „x looks red‟, „x merely 
looks red‟ („it looks as though x is red‟) and „x looks red to me now‟ all express 
differently weighted endorsements as to their truth content („x is red‟ is stronger 
than „x merely looks red‟, etc). This sets out an important distinction for Sellars, 
between what would otherwise be type-cast as simply expressing or describing 
an experience, against a sentence which does more than describe or report an 
experience, but also gives and (to varying degrees) withholds what we endorse 
as the propositional content of a sentence. Moreover, the propositional content, 
as the examples are supposed to demonstrate, is not any mysterious semantic 
notion, but simply the thing or circumstances which would make a sentence 
true. 
 Sellars‟s scenario of the shopkeeper selling coloured neckties is instructive 
here. The imagined case is that „John‟ (the shopkeeper) has never looked at an 
object in „other than standard conditions‟402 until he suddenly has to cope with 
the installation of the electric light in his shop. For John, the neckties in his shop 
look to have different colours under electrical lighting than they did when he 
saw them in daylight. John eventually responds to this change in his 
experiences by learning to stifle reports about how the neckties look in the new 
conditions, and introducing a fact-stating language of how they are as opposed 
to the reporting language of how they look. (It is supposed that he is 
simultaneously instructed in matters pertaining to the effect of electrical light 
on the neckties).  
 The propositional content endorsement idea is meant to clarify and explain 
this phenomenon. Until John was able to conclude from inferring why neckties 
were coloured as they were under the new conditions, he was only able to say 
how his neckties looked. Through a number of factors (the installation of the 
light, the linguistic pressure exerted by others more adept in responding to the 
change of conditions, and by repeated exposure) he was later able to obtain a 
view of how the new environment made the colour change in a way which was 
independent of the way they looked to him and how he believed them to look: 
the new response would amount to John passing from a view of how a thing 
looks to him in his experience, to a less „difficult‟ and less contentious view of 
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what makes certain sentences about the colour of neckties true. His language, 
and the degree to which he endorsed the truth commitment of his sentences, 
would reflect this: he would fully endorse the contents of his expressions about 
the neckties under electric light as being of a certain colour, and be reluctant to 
endorse those expressions of how they look under these conditions; he would 
have learnt a new fact about the content of his experience talk, by moving from 
talking of how things look to him to a view of how things are by understanding 
the circumstances which make the sentences true. The important thing to note is 
that this propositional content is bound up with our ability to give an account of 
what we say; it is, in other words, immersed in our „logical space of reasons.‟403 
 [T]he concept of looking green, ... presupposes the concept of being 
green, and that the latter concept involves the ability to tell what colours 
objects have by looking at them - which, in turn, involves knowing in 
what circumstances to place an object if one wishes to ascertain its 
colours by looking at it ... which conditions are standard for a given mode 
of perception is ... specified by a list of conditions which exhibit the 
vagueness and open texture of ordinary discourse.404 
The claim is that we need to have a conception of what sentences it is 
appropriate to endorse in given circumstances before we can attest to the 
propositional content of a claim about our experiences. And such sentences, 
insofar as they have circumstances under which they are true, are already linked 
with the logical framework of a barrage of other claims which entail more such 
claims in a similar way as we saw „Red things are a certain colour‟ entailed 
„Certain colours are not red‟ etc. 
 It is important to see the strength and radical nature of this suggestion. For it 
is, in fact, closely connected with the further suggestion that the net difference 
between the propositional content of a claim and what the claim expresses is 
zero. There is, according to Sellars, nothing „residual‟405 in stating a claim, 
endorsing the propositional content as if the circumstances it expresses were 
true, and stating another sentence in similar conditions. Thus, if I say „I see that 
x, over there, is red‟ or „It looks to me that x, over there, is red‟ or „It looks to 
one as though there were a red object there‟, the same propositional content („x 
is red‟) is endorsed by varying amounts. Moreover, the speaker of such 
utterances must be committed to the propositional content because it is what 
would make each sentence true. If logically committed to this content and some 
endorsement of it, the question becomes whether anything is „left over‟ in this 
procedure to warrant the title of being an experience. Sellars‟s opinion on this 
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is, in one sense, clear and unambiguous, though it will later be suggested that he 
leaves a very important option open.  
 [The idea of a red sense-datum] runs up against the objection that the 
redness physical objects look to have is the same as the redness physical 
objects actually do have, ... [W]hen it is claimed that „obviously‟ physical 
objects cannot look red to one unless one is experiencing something that 
is red, is it not presumed that the redness which the something has is the 
redness which the physical objects looks to have? 406  
This is a clear attempt at refuting the sense datum theory. The options, as Sellars 
sees them, are that one must either access a high-level concept of something 
which is red, or something which is not the same as the actual object, though it 
consists in having the same properties. This seems a plausible analysis of the 
situation; and, as he says, it is hard to get very far with the second option. For it 
seems incredible how a putative entity which is not the same as the entity, but 
which „obviously‟ shares its qualities, could possibly add to any analysis of the 
propositional content of a statement about an actual object. The point is also 
rhetorical: couldn‟t we just turn the analysis a little to avoid the redundancy and 
say that a look is just a case of a seeing that, if the propositional content of the 
claim were true? If so, this way of looking at things has major ramifications for 
the whole logic of private experiential episodes. Hence, Sellars‟s previously 
quoted remark (Chapter 2) that instead of having a concept of something 
because we have noticed that thing, to have the ability to notice a thing is 
„already to have the concept of that sort of thing and cannot account for it.‟407 
 If endorsing the propositional content of a claim about the world is 
cognitively linked to such a range of assertions we might make, something 
important follows: it would seem that one must begin, not end, with a general 
high-level cognitive ability. Experiences depend on having conceptual contents 
such as that of a triangle under certain descriptively and representationally 
specifiable conditions. If this is so, then the mystery of sensing sense contents 
might be a case of „knowing one‟s way around‟ one‟s codes or descriptions, and 
being able to (properly) assert them. Any reification of what such codes 
describe would indeed be a „myth‟. And since we can never characterise in an 
intrinsic way what is meant by such situations as „Red traffic lights signal red 
sense-data‟, but only by what is logically a definite description (i.e., as the kind 
of entity which is commonly endorsed in such situations), then we could 
scarcely seem to be any better off if we instead maintained such talk „as 
notational convenience, a code, for the language in which we speak of how 
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things look and what there looks to be.‟408 Since we are no better off in reifying 
it, it seems false economy in doing so. 
 At the heart of it all this lies a thesis of psychological nominalism. 
Awarenesses, to Sellars, are not sui generis aspects of experience, nor are they 
the critical feature of mental acts. Rather, he is explicit about affirming his 
position as: 
 [T]he denial of the claim, characteristic of the realist tradition, that a 
„perception‟ or „awareness‟ ... is the root mental ingredient of mental acts 
and dispositions.409 
And again: 
 [A] view of the general type ... according to which all awarenesses of 
sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awarenesses of abstract 
entities - indeed, all awareness even of particulars - is a linguistic 
affair.410 
Moreover, as the facts which pertain to so-called „givens‟ in experiences have 
to be presupposed on his account, (and if these facts are built-in to the logic of 
what sentences it is appropriate to endorse), it seems but a redundancy to 
suppose that awarenesses themselves are needed at all. The crucial thing seems 
to be one‟s ability to use language: the syntax of asserting claims about things is 
what is important, not how things appear for us in order to assert anything about 
them. The latter, in fact, presupposes already that certain appearings are 
equivalent to the common propositional content which would make such 
assertions true.411  
 Sellars is clear about how this notion of a propositional content is to be 
understood. It is not to be treated in terms which suggest that there is any 
content in an experience which exists outside the circumstances in which the 
propositional content is being endorsed. What we nominally call „an 
experience‟, on Sellars‟s view, is just a circumstance under which we assert 
things. What we tend to assume beyond this is that there is something 
over-and-above this asserting which warrants the title „being an experience‟. 
But, according to Sellars, holding this amounts to little more than a requirement 
for verbal satisfaction: 
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The notorious „ing-ed‟ ambiguity of „experience‟ must be kept in mind 
...because the fact that x, over there, looks red to Jones would be a seeing, 
on Jones‟s part, that x, over there is red, if its propositional content were 
true, ... Certainly, the fact that something looks red to me can itself be 
experienced. But it is not itself an experiencing. ... This would give us a 
predicate by which to describe and report the experience, but we should 
... be only verbally better off than if we could only refer to this kind of 
experience as the kind which could be described as the common 
descriptive component of a seeing and a qualitative or existential 
looking.412 
It should be noted at this point that Sellars does admit what was earlier (in 
Chapter 3) called the causal order in perception. He is explicit in affirming that 
perception involves a causal (physical) process.413 Thus, in the passage above 
he allows „an experience‟ to occur in the sense that the perceiving organism is 
bombarded with proximal stimuli. What he calls the „common descriptive 
component‟ here is something similar to the representational sense of 
„propositional content‟ that (supposedly) captures the experiential situation (we 
shall soon see Sellars collapse this distinction).   
 Although Sellars admits the causal order in experiential claims, he does not 
admit the sensory order, only an epistemic order (he admits the order which 
makes „noticing‟ statements true, not the order which explains how noticings 
can have felt aspects). In the argument he presents, of course, what actually 
makes the propositional content of a sentence true is learning; specifically, 
learning the conditions that bring about the endorsement of a claim about the 
world (recall John learning the conditions under which neckties are said to have 
a certain colour). Learning and language, of course, are heavily inferential. 
 In this view of perception, the claim is that there is simply no room for 
sense-data to do any informational work. Since such objects of perception do no 
informational work they are therefore not necessary for content. And, since they 
are not necessary for content (and since they seem to be problematic for other 
reasons), there seems no good reason to admit such features. For Sellars, then, 
since no sense can be made of the notion of sense-data, no sense can be made of 
givenness in general. Givenness in general must be rejected since all givens 
presuppose that something is sensed non-inferentially. 414  Thus, the whole 
                                                 
412 Ibid., p. 154. 
413 „[T]he qualities of sense are a dimension of natural process which occurs only in connection 
with complex physical processes which ... become the complex system of particles which, in the 
current scientific image, is the central nervous system.‟ „Philosophy and the Scientific Image of 
Man‟, in SP&R, ibid., p. 37. 
414 Sellars is explicit about extending his argument to all forms of the given: „many who today 
attack “the whole idea of givenness” - and they are an increasing number - are really only 
attacking sense data. ... If, however, I begin my argument with an attack on sense-datum 
  
 258 
notion of a „given‟ in experience is an incoherent one. According to Sellars, the 
focus in understanding perception should thus be on the language of 
experience, not the content that is, allegedly, „given‟. This sort of position is 
clearly inferentialism with a meat axe.  
 Sellars brings this out in an example of three assertions where the common 
propositional content is the same and their endorsements are different. The 
three assertions are: (a) seeing that x, over there, is red; (b) it looks to one that x, 
over there, is red; and, (c) its looks to one as though there was a red object over 
there. These expressions, he claims, differ primarily in that: (a) involves an 
endorsement of the idea that x over there is red, whereas in (b) this idea is only 
partially endorsed, and in (c) not at all. He then refers to x over there is red, as 
the common propositional content of these three assertions. He also suggests 
that we call any „residue‟ of these experiences (i.e., that which is left over from 
any endorsement of the propositional content) the descriptive content. 
 A problem then arises as to how the three experiences which are suggested by 
those sentences could be identical. Can the propositional and the descriptive 
content of the experiences be identical, or not? If there is anything in 
„givenness‟ talk at all, then the experiences must be identical, if the common 
propositional content is the same because, on Sellars‟s view, we specify the 
descriptive content indirectly by implying that if the common propositional 
content were true, and if the subject knew that the circumstances were normal, 
then all these three situations would be cases of seeing that x, over there, is red. 
But the question is whether there is anything intrinsic about the character of the 
experiences that could make them identical. Sellars is inclined to reject this idea 
outright: 
 
Thus, the very nature of „looks talk‟ is such as to raise questions to which 
it gives no answer: What is the intrinsic character of the common 
descriptive content of these three experiences?415 
Sellars‟s point is that it is difficult to see how the situations can have a common 
descriptive content because, whereas in (a) the perceiver must be in the 
presence of a real object; in (b) the object need not be red; and in (c) there need 
not be an object at all.  
 The claim is that the common descriptive content collapses ultimately into 
their respective (linguistic) propositional contents (how we characterise 
experiential claims). According to Sellars, there is no important sense in which 
the representational content of an experience is to be distinguished from such a 
characterisation. What would seem to be a basis for distinguishing between 
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different senses of „proposition‟ in relation to experience thus does not arise on 
Sellars‟s account. (Sellars does not consider it appropriate to suspect other 
„residual‟ content might escape his treatment - but more on this below.)  
 We could take issue with this on grounds we have considered in previous 
chapters. The characterisation of what remains in an experiential situation after 
the propositional content is removed as descriptive content seems to favour an 
inferential analysis - precisely that which we may care to dispute (Sellars‟s 
conception of „proposition‟ is my sense of „propositional linguistic‟ judgment; 
his conception of „descriptive content‟ is my „representational‟ judgment.) As a 
first point, it is not obvious why any interesting sense in which there might be 
residual content in an experience needs be „descriptive‟ in these terms. To call 
such content in these terms seems to require that the content should capture the 
representational features of the three experiences in some way which can be 
communicated linguistically, but this seems to be a tall order for low-level 
content such as I have been considering (it seems plausible that there can be an 
intrinsic content to the three experiences despite their not capturing 
representational/descriptive features). If what has been suggested is anything 
like the situation, then qualitative sensational aspects of experiential content are 
precisely not characterised by such features at all. In short, an interesting sense 
in which contentful experiences are „given‟ might still arise in such 
circumstances. Sellars‟s argument that the only content of importance here is 
propositional is thus not a knock-down support for his own view; indeed, it 
seems to beg the question in favour of his own view (there may be „residual‟ 
content which escapes both a propositional and a descriptive characterisation).  
 It is also unclear that identical propositional contents need entail an identity 
with respect to the residual content Sellars mentions. A case was considered in 
Chapter 5 in which subjects were said to have qualitatively different 
experiences if the propositional/descriptive concepts were different, and 
qualitatively identical experiences if the concepts were the same. Sellars seems 
to be committed to this too. Since, however, this seemed less than self-evident 
earlier, the connection between Sellars‟s descriptive and propositional content 
seems spurious. In the terms used before, Tom might have the same qualitative 
aspect of his experience as that of Dick, even if his experience were not filtered 
by the relevant propositional features.  
 Empirical studies seem to bear out precisely this point. If propositional 
linguistic features were identical to the residual content (and if language 
determines perception as psychological nominalism suggests) then one would 
expect that the experience would be different if the language was different. But 
this doesn‟t seem to be true at all. The language of Dani Indians divides the 
colour spectrum into only two categories: „light‟ and „dark‟. However, in an 
experiment in which the Dani and a control group were asked to match colour 
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chips, no differences in ability were detected between the two groups.416  
 So it seems that even if propositional contents are the same, there is no 
logical entailment that, along other dimensions, experiences need be identical, 
and vice versa. Aspects of experiences may differ or may not differ independent 
of propositional content. But just because there is no entailment here, this need 
not mean there is no „additional content‟ to speak of; only that there is content 
which not captured in terms which are descriptive (or representational; or 
propositional linguistic). Thus, it is hardly surprising that Sellars‟s „residual‟ 
content neither explains, in a descriptive way, the differences between each 
perceptual situation. For one thing such content may not itself be captured by 
descriptive, representational content; for another, it may not be logically 
connected with propositional, inferential content in the manner Sellars assumes 
it is. Such assumptions have already been criticised earlier in this book.  
 For Sellars, however, the argument above is a good rhetorical move. For 
there to be anything intrinsic about such contents, it would either have to 
endorse the common propositional content, (thus, affirming his thesis), or it 
would have to be explained how it is that the content can be the same when the 
endorsed situations differ greatly. With this point taken, the beast would seem 
to be dead. Nothing can be „given‟ beyond what it is proper to assert, and what it 
is proper to assert is actually how things really are. There may, however, be 
rather less in this argument than first appears.  
Criticising Sellars’s thesis  
10.9 Robinson on Sellars 
Sellars‟s argument is ingenious and compelling. Still, some sense of „the given‟ 
which is not tied to propositional contents (and which is not a merely causal 
process) may still live despite the criticisms. In this section and beyond, 
Sellars‟s interesting and challenging position will be criticised by first turning 
to an evaluation of his arguments by William Robinson.417 I think Robinson is 
right in claiming that while Sellars‟s arguments are an effective rejection of 
certain views of the given, it is not an effective challenge argument against the 
given as such. I shall later offer a brief review of his counter arguments and 
endorse what are the salient points. For now, an evaluation of the extension of 
Sellars‟s arguments to the Given in general. 
 Robinson describes Sellars‟s critique of the given, as offering us „a series of 
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Memory for Two Languages‟. See also, Selby Hunt, „A Realist Theory of Empirical Testing: 
Resolving the Theory-Ladenness/Objectivity Debate‟, pp. 150-151.  
417William S. Robinson, „The Legend of The Given‟ in Action, Knowledge and Reality: 
Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfred Sellars. 
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overlapping dilemmas‟:418 whether the given can be said to be analysable or 
unanalysable, whether it is particulars which are given or knowledge itself, and 
whether it can be analysed in terms of epistemic criteria or non-epistemic 
criteria. The claim, for Robinson, is whether or not the dilemmas continue to 
hold for the notion of givenness in general or only for the sensing of 
„sense-data‟. Sellars assumes that attacking one species of the given is a „first 
step‟ in a general critique of the „entire framework‟.419 Robinson is concerned 
with arguing that there is an inequivalence in rejecting sense-data and rejecting 
what he calls (appropriately enough) „primordial awareness‟, which he claims, 
„might be entitled to be called a “given.”‟420 We shall have to see later if this 
claim is justified. 
 The first set of dilemmas, as we have seen, concerns how „givenness‟ is to be 
defined. There are two options: either (a) the givenness of sense contents is 
defined in terms of non-inferential knowledge of sense contents; or (b) the 
givenness of sense contents is „a basic or primitive concept of the sense-datum 
framework‟.421 (a) is refuted by Sellars on the basis that sensing would have, on 
this account, to be knowledge; the other option (b) leads to a further dichotomy: 
(c) that sensing is a „unique and unanalysable act‟ 422  or (d) sensing is 
analysable. The options of (b) and (c) conjoined are refuted by Sellars on the 
grounds that they „sever‟ the sensing sense contents implies non-inferential 
knowledge relation. If that were true, Sellars argues, then we could never have 
knowledge (though he does stipulate the possibility of a „converse‟ relation).  
 The conjunction of (b) and (d) meets further options: either (e) sensing is 
analysable in non-epistemic terms, or (f) analysable in epistemic terms. The 
conjoining of (b), (d) and (e) is refuted by Sellars on the grounds that if it were 
analysable in such terms it would make as much sense to speak of sense- 
contents as unveridical as veridical.423 („Epistemic facts cannot be analysed 
without remainder into non-epistemic facts.‟424) And the options (b), (d), (f) 
conjoined lead to an inconsistent triad: one cannot give up any of its premises 
without ruling out sense as unable to give an account of knowledge. (Though it 
has already been remarked that this is inconsistent only on the assumption that 
the sensing of sense contents entails that it is non-inferentially known, and not 
„the converse‟, that knowledge entails the sensing of sense contents). On all 
this, Robinson says: 
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We have remarked that in this [Sellars‟] discussion what is sensed is 
given. We are not, of course, at all entitled to the converse assertion. Yet 
if we regard the points we have been reviewing as applying to givenness 
in general and not only to sensing, it is not obvious at all that they do not 
continue to hold, and for the same reasons. If (c) is untenable for the 
reasons given, then so is (c'), „Something‟s being given is a unique and 
unanalysable occurrence‟. Likewise, if givenness is epistemic and 
epistemic facts cannot be analysed without remainder into non-epistemic 
facts, then (e') „givenness is analysable into non-epistemic terms‟ is no 
better off than (e). Similar conditions hold for (f') „givenness is analysable 
in epistemic terms‟. Let us suppose that Sellars would accept our 
generalised version of his argument against sense-datum theories as a 
correct outline of his strategy against the given in general. Then, the 
rejection of the given depends on the rejection of (a), (c'), (e') and (f'). 
Conversely, if as I believe, Sellars has not shown the given to be a myth, 
it must be because he has not succeeded in rejecting one of these four 
claims.425 
As mentioned earlier, Sellars does take his arguments against the sense-data 
view as arguments against the given in general. Thus, there is no real problem 
with an extension of his views to all forms of the given.  
 Robinson wants to suggest that the suspect claim in Sellars‟s argument is the 
rejection of (e'): that givenness is analysable in non-epistemic terms. He wants 
to suggest that his „primordial awareness‟ sense of the given can be so analysed. 
I would like to follow through with Robinson‟s position, as it tallies, to some 
degree, with my own. It will be remembered that the acceptance of the 
inconsistency of holding that the given is both a basic and particular event and 
analysable in non-epistemic terms turns on the acceptance of premise A of the 
triad: that we know in some non-inferential sense that (say) x is red. If this is so, 
then we can‟t deny this without making sensing „non-cognitive‟; if we affirm it, 
then we subscribe to an inconsistent triad. It will also be remembered that 
although Sellars claims that particulars can never constitute knowledge, 
because they are ex hypothesi non-epistemic in nature, there is the possibility of 
the „converse relation‟ guaranteeing knowledge in such a case („the seeing that 
a certain physical object is red might logically imply sensing a red sense 
content.‟)426 These were the two doubts expressed earlier. 
 Sellars‟s arguments about sensing sense contents can, it seems, be 
generalised to apply to the framework of the given. I shall summarise it as I 
understand it would go: if givens are particulars then they cannot constitute 
knowledge (they must be non-epistemic facts). But particulars cannot just be 
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analysed in non-epistemic terms because it has to be shown why the fact of the 
particular given simultaneously endorses the propositional content of what 
would make a statement about it true. To do this, it must be non-inferentially 
known in some way. But with non-inferentiality of the given assumed, it seems 
we would have to face the inconsistency of not being able to give an account of 
the statement which verifies the given being non-inferential, because we cannot 
do that without acceding to the ability that (supposedly non-inferential) facts of 
the form x is ø are acquired inferentially, by learning, concept formation and the 
use of symbols. And if we admit this, then it is no longer non-inferentially 
known.  
 The questions that need to be asked, and on which this all turns, are, then: 
 
 ¥: whether the given cannot fail to be analysed non-epistemically to keep the 
myth and that this view must eventually be rejected.  
 ¶: whether the given cannot fail to be seen as non-inferentially known to 
preserve the myth, but that this too must eventually be rejected. 
  
If both of these can be rejected the given might not be a myth. Another question 
is whether what is left would be worth keeping. I shall argue that it is. 
10.10 Low-level content again  
The concept of the „the given‟ for Sellars is required in order to account for two 
traditional ideas: the idea that „empirical knowledge rests on a „foundation‟ of 
non-inferential knowledge of matters of fact‟,427  and the idea that what is 
„common‟ to all instances of givenness is „the awareness of certain sorts ... of 
primordial non-problematic feature[s] of “immediate experience”‟.428 As noted 
in Chapter 1, these are largely separate issues. The first idea is the traditional 
doctrine of foundationalism; the second is the idea that certain appearances are 
„read off‟ what is perceived, in some non-problematic sense, when having 
experiences without the necessary influence of high-level features. It was 
argued in the earlier chapter that the plausible claim that experiences are fixed 
by the observational situation, in some sense, need not be conflated with the 
foundationalist doctrine. This is an important point in this connection since to 
all this, Robinson adds a definition of what „primordial‟ might mean here, to 
which, he stipulates, the notion of independence is crucial:  
An awareness is primordial if and only if there are no necessary 
conditions for its occurrence except: 
(i) conditions which follow analytically from the concept of an awareness 
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of sorts. 
(ii) having a sensation or image; and 
(iii) conditions which are also necessary conditions for having sensations 
or images. (Thus, for example, an awareness could be counted as 
primordial even if it were believed that a necessary condition of it were 
the existence of a self, provided that such a condition was also regarded as 
necessary for sensations or images).429  
What is being claimed here for low-level awarenesses is clearly to be 
distinguished from foundationalism. It is not being claimed that such 
awarenesses are the basis of empirical knowledge; nor is it claimed that 
awarenesses are incorrigible. What is being claimed is that there are contents 
which have no necessary conditions for their occurrence beyond their being 
experienced at some low-level: it has not been stressed, for instance, that 
high-level features are involved in the experience in any necessary and 
sufficient way.  
 This definition also marks a difference between low-level content and the 
concept of sense-data. For where the notion of sense datum has traditionally 
been understood as objects of immediate knowledge (we have just seen Sellars‟s 
arguments against this idea) nothing like this is explicitly assumed, or follows 
from, Robinson‟s notion of a primordial awareness.  
 Granted this definition, a question can be asked: can it be said that Sellars 
argues from the claim that the given entails x has non-inferential knowledge to 
the claim that primordial awarenesses also entails that x has non-inferential 
knowledge? The question is important because primordial awareness might be 
entitled to be called a given, and if this can be run past Sellars‟s argument and 
survive intact, then Sellars‟s argument will not work for all instances of the 
given. Robinson claims that though there is no direct discussion of primordial 
awarenesses being different from „the given‟ in its sense-data form, an 
argument for the non-inferentiality of primordial awarenesses can actually be 
constructed out of „Sellarsian principles‟430 on which an attack on Sellars‟s 
position can be made. The reconstruction argument hinges on the point that all 
primordial awarenesses, if admitted at all, must for Sellars be linguistically 
classificatory (i.e., subsumed under descriptive concepts) in a form in which it 
would be proper to assert such things as „this is f‟ (x is ø). This seems a 
reasonable claim from a Sellarsian point of view. After all, for Sellars, an 
unclassified awareness is not an awareness of anything, and hence is scarcely 
intelligible in such terms. A primordial awareness of sorts must be 
classificatory for Sellars, and being classificatory, must be non-inferentially 
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known.431  
 If this point seems weak, then one should consider the role of concepts in 
Sellarsian terms. Although the notion of a concept is far from clear, the 
important and characteristic thing about them for Sellars is their role in 
guaranteeing experiential exclusivity and independence. Concepts enable 
distinctions to be made between one experiential situation and another. The 
important thing from Sellars‟s point of view seems to be that concepts provide a 
means of distinguishing experiences which have similar common propositional 
contents (recall the three experiences earlier). Since endorsing the propositional 
content of a sentence in an experience requires an individual to distinguish 
cases where it is appropriate to endorse certain situations and not others, it 
seems plausible that an individual be pre-possessed of the relevant and 
irrelevant criteria (I take it that this is what is behind Sellars‟s remark (given in 
Chapter 2), that: „to notice [a] sort of thing is already to have a concept of that 
sort of thing and cannot account for it.‟) Thus, only if an individual could 
conceptually distinguish between its looking to one as though there was a red 
object over there from seeing that x is red, could he be prepared to distinguish 
one state from the other, and be prepared to endorse one statement and not the 
other in view of the experiential circumstances. 
 Given this, it can be asserted non-controversially that: (i) every state can be 
associated with only one property, and (ii) no two properties can be associated 
with the same state.432 In Chapter 2, „concept‟ was defined as the mode of 
presentation of a property, and one of these „modes‟ we considered to be 
descriptive (i.e., propositional) in content. It was also clear that only this mode 
possessed the above features. The point was also made, in the context of the 
continuum theory, that there are multiple levels of such concepts, some of 
which do not possess these features.  
 A crucial point here, however, is that Sellars starts out with a rather different 
assumption: namely, that all concepts are descriptively classificatory. In the 
context of this (and given the extension of Sellars‟s arguments against 
sense-data to all forms of the given), if one did assume that having a primordial 
awareness of sorts involved, and only involved, the use of descriptive concepts, 
(i.e., being classified or subsumed under them), then one can argue legitimately 
that: 
x has primordial classificatory consciousness entails x makes primordial 
use of a concept; 
x makes primordial use of a concept entails x immediately subsumes 
something under a concept; 
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x immediately subsumes something under a concept entails x has 
non-inferential knowledge; 
therefore: x has primordial classificatory consciousness entails x has 
non-inferential knowledge.433  
And the rest of Sellars arguments would follow from this point (that this view 
severs the relationship between sensing and knowing; that it presupposes 
acquired abilities etc.)  
 This might seem to be argument by stipulation; that all primordial 
awarenesses are classificatory in this descriptive way. And indeed I want to 
suggest that this is not the only way that the content of a primordial awareness 
can be thought of. But the point here is that it is hard to know what to make of a 
concept in Sellarsian terms, given what we have already seen of his 
inferentialist account, if it is not, in some way, classificatory in a linguistic 
sense - as a „something that is thus and so‟. And, if concepts are to be defined in 
this simple manner, then they can certainly support some sense of 
non-inferential knowledge, if only because to be able to classify and subsume 
something under a concept is to access something non-inferentially. Robinson‟s 
argument that Sellars actually supports this reasoning is that he „never tries to 
drive a wedge between belief based on immediate experience and knowledge 
based on immediate experience.‟434 The point here is that since Sellars does not, 
at any time, question that subsuming some sense-datum under a concept entails 
having non-inferential knowledge about it, it is a tacit admission that the same 
goes for any state at all. This very point will be a bone of contention later.  
 For Sellars, then, having primordial classificatory consciousness entails 
subsumption under a concept, and the same goes for „primordial awarenesses‟, 
if there be such things. Primordial awareness equates with having 
non-inferential, classificatory knowledge on this account. The question now 
becomes whether the use of such a low-level concept entails a concept‟s 
independence. This is important, because if it can be shown that an awareness 
can be a primordial but not an independently subsumed classificatory concept, 
then we might be able to get past Sellars‟s argument. By an independently 
subsumed concept, I have in mind an x is ø kind of relation, a relation which 
captures propositional content. As we have seen, most high-level 
epistemic/descriptive concepts are of this kind, and are the mainstay of the 
inferentialist‟s program. Sellars, of course, explicitly employs this kind of 
classificatory consciousness requirement in his argument against „all forms of 
the given‟.  
 But this is where Robinson thinks that Sellars comes unstuck, for Robinson is 
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inclined to think that the use of a concept does not necessarily imply a concept‟s 
independence. Particularly, he thinks nothing of the sort is implied by the use of 
a primordial concept. Certainly, if this implication is admitted, however, and if 
the foregoing can be said to be a reasonable re-writing of what Sellars would 
have to say, if low-level awarenesses were equal to sense-data, it would seem to 
follow through to the desired conclusion that primordial awarenesses were 
likewise non-inferentially known, and the rest of Sellars‟s argument would 
follow. But maybe there is a case for claiming that not all awarenesses are 
independently classificatory concepts in Sellars’s sense. In other words, 
perhaps not all concepts are propositional. 
 An argument for this could be constructed along the following lines: from the 
premise that an awareness is conceptually low-level, it does not follow 
necessarily that an awareness is an independent concept, and being 
independently classifiable is surely a condition of knowing a concept 
non-inferentially. This seems to leave room for a sense in which some „givens‟ 
are not epistemically subsumed in a similar manner to most other concepts (i.e., 
non-inferentially), and if epistemic non-inferentiality cannot be claimed for 
such concepts, then they would seem to slip through the net of Sellars‟s 
argument. Robinson explains:  
Does the fact that a use of a concept is primordial entail that that concept 
is independent? I am not sure. For I do not know how to rule out the 
possibility that a necessary condition of having a sensation or image of 
one sort is being able to have a sensation or images of other sorts. ... For 
example, it might be that anything that could be said to have sensations of 
red must also be capable of having a sensation of black. If so, and if we 
have primordial awarenesses of sorts simply by having sensations and 
images, then a necessary condition of a primordial use of a concept red 
would be the ability to make primordial use of the concept black; thus the 
concept red in such a case would not be independent.435 
It is clear just what Sellars would wish to say to this. He would want to say that 
concepts like „red‟ and „black‟ are tied to their propositional contents; 
conditions which make them true, and also our endorsements of them. And he 
would also hold that we possess a highly sophisticated system of concepts about 
standard conditions of observations, normal observers, etc., which condition 
what sentences we need to hold in given circumstances. But the endorsing of 
propositional contents amounts to subsuming them independently; what we are 
after, in the example considered, are cases where concepts are not 
independently subsumed. We are after cases of where simply being aware in 
some primitive manner is in some sense prior or concurrent to the subsumption 
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and use of high-level independent concepts, and not vice versa. By analogy: 
If I count the books on my shelf, I may say, as I point, „One, two, three...‟ 
These words reflect a state of mind corresponding to the properties „first 
book counted by me on this occasion, second book counted by me on this 
occasion,‟ etc. But I have not subsumed these books under concepts 
corresponding to these properties. Nor, indeed, could I have correctly 
done so until I had counted them. Even if I had said, „This is the first 
book, this is the second book...‟, this would only look like subsumption 
but would actually be counting. Of course, my counting does provide a 
ground for subsumption by myself or another, of these books under such 
concepts as „first book counted by me on this occasion.‟ But this is not to 
say that the original counting is itself a case of subsuming.436  
Robinson has an important case to put here. Sellars has not considered the sorts 
of „givens‟, the sorts of low-level perceptual contents which are quite different 
from givens which are independently-captured and linguistically-endorsed. He 
has, rather, assumed that all givens which have any epistemic/informational 
significance at all (like the particular case of sense-data) involve concepts 
which are subsumed linguistically and so, classified independently. 437  But 
reflection shows that this is implausible: in being aware of aspects of 
experience in some low-level sense, we can distinguish such features as „red‟, 
„black‟, etc., simply as patterns of qualitative similarity and difference; indeed, 
without this very low-level awareness, this discriminating ability, all subsumed 
concepts would tend to merge, be undifferentiated and homologous. (Try 
conceiving of „red‟ in a classificatory way - as „something which is thus and so‟ 
- without first noting some red aspect or other, for example. It does not seem 
necessary that such an experience be propositionally distinguishable from other 
colours - i.e., „red‟ from „blue‟, etc. However, it does seem important that there 
be some non-propositional, qualitative features that are detectable - i.e., this 
experience differs from that one etc.) The survival advantages of having such 
informational features at one‟s disposal has been pointed out in previous 
chapters.  
 Such low-level content does not seem to be subsumed under concepts in 
Sellars‟s sense. It is this very basic and primitive level of awareness, an „aspect‟ 
of experiential content, that has been outlined the preceding chapters. This kind 
of content is informational without necessarily being epistemically high-level.  
 Of course, given the complexity thesis, an experience can be epistemic in 
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Sellars‟s sense while also having low-level informational features. It is not 
being suggested here that there must be only one kind of content or the other 
(though in the case of very unsophisticated creatures there is less likely to be 
propositional linguistic content). I am saying that it is also at this low-level that 
important informational features are available. It is this low-level content that 
allows a high-level representational judgement with propositional linguistic 
content to have features which escape a fully high-level characterisation of the 
content of that experience (recall Millar‟s example of experiencing a painted 
wall - an experience which has features which escape the imposition of both the 
„concept‟ and „intrinsicality‟ principle). The point here is simply that not all 
informationally salient features of an experience are „epistemic‟ in Sellars‟s 
sense. There are clearly contents which cannot be captured in his terms.  
 There are empirical grounds for supposing that there might be informational 
features which are perceptually more primitive than contents which are 
captured propositionally. In recent studies on mental imagery, it has been noted 
that subjects can orientate pictures and letters and spatially order items in 
response to carefully worded questions. Given the speed in reaction time in 
which subjects respond to these questions, it has been argued that there must be 
a short-term quasi-pictorial image representation ability available as part of 
one‟s cognitive repertoire. It has been suggested that this ability features along 
with a more long-term representation which is more or less propositional in 
format, and that this short-term depictive visual image acts as a buffer on which 
some crucial, yet non-propositional information is processed. On this kind of 
view of cognitive processing, knowledge is understood to be represented 
uniformly, though available as „different representation formats‟438 appropriate 
to different types of information. The details of such work cannot be 
summarised here. I have argued the case for a modular theory of content in 
Chapter 8, and suggest that interesting links can probably be made with the 
empirical work here. It seems plausible that perceptual modularity and the idea 
of representation formats along different informational levels might go to 
support a single view of content. In any case, it is clear from this kind of 
speculative data that Sellars‟s emphasis on the relevance of propositional 
knowledge to the fixation of content is somewhat overstated. If there are 
pictorial buffers which deliver informationally useful features, then clearly not 
all content is subsumed independently under descriptive concepts. 
 If we can sensibly maintain that there are good reasons for rejecting Sellars‟s 
assumption about descriptively subsumed concepts, then there might be a way 
of avoiding the criticism Sellars makes about „all forms of the given‟. If this can 
be done then some „givens‟ may be seen not as features of „subsumed‟ concepts 
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in Sellars‟s sense. We may be able to think of sensational givens as being 
characterised by entirely different categories of concepts or different 
representational formats, and that while it may be sensible to speak of 
high-level content in terms which are propositional linguistic and theoretically 
informational etc., this might not be a way of capturing other kinds of content. 
Sellars‟s categories, it is suggested, are too simplistic in their application to 
„givens‟ which are informationally low-level.  
 The easiest way of appreciating this point is by utilising examples which 
have been considered in previous chapters. The notion of a „look‟-belief, for 
instance, is a case in which a content might be experienced without necessarily 
being noticed. Another instance, is the case of a experience where certain 
features are noticed and others are not (seeing a tomato without registering its 
colour, for example; seeing the third house on the left etc.) Another case might 
be when informational content is only later recalled with the aid of appropriate 
cuing stimulus (recalling a colour with the aid of paint samples, for example). 
The point here is that if Sellars‟s central argument against all forms of the given 
rely on their being epistemically subsumed under concepts such that 
„something is thus and so‟, these cases will not be captured by his analysis. For 
in the case of these low-level „givens‟, there may be content albeit not enough to 
guarantee that they are subsumed independently. The important point about 
these examples is that while they may not be instantly recognised to be „thus 
and so‟, they may still be informational: an experience would not have the 
content it does have without such low-level features. Another important point 
about them is that the low-level content of the experience may not be „known‟ 
in any high-level sense (one might not be able to say precisely what the colour 
looks like) yet one may be able to „pick out‟ the colour with the aid of a paint 
sample (equally, one may not - one might not be able to tell whether the tomato 
one experienced was ripe or not). That there can be varying levels of epistemic 
availability of such contents is, of course, central to the continuum account.  
 If the above is true, we can thus make the following criticisms of Sellars‟s 
argument: in my terms, it is implausible to take on credit the premise A, x 
senses red sense content s, entails x non-inferentially knows that s is red, and by 
an order of generality extrapolate to all instances of the given. For if it is meant 
to be a general truth about awarenesses, all „givens‟ (i.e., not just sense-data) 
that to be non-inferential, they must be known as such, then it certainly needs 
further argument: for, unlike sense-data, a low-level awareness, or a sensational 
„aspect‟ of a colour experience, for example, is not independently subsumed 
under concepts which are accessible to inferential knowledge. Rather, they 
involve very different kinds of content, distinct from the independent 
availability and use of other epistemically specifiable concepts, and this seems 
to be not a case of high-level knowledge as much as a distinct „aspect‟-like 
feature of such content, which, while epistemically informational to some 
degree, is not necessarily independently subsumable. (Similar claims could be 
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made for the kind of content while experiencing the Muller-Lyer illusion - such 
content is not „epistemic‟ in any high-level propositional sense, yet it is 
certainly informational.)  
 The following point is demonstrated by the appeal to Robinson: just as not all 
concepts are subsumed and independently capable of classification, not all 
concepts are non-inferentially known, and low-level awarenesses would seem 
to be a case in point. Low-level awarenesses are not cases like Sellars discusses, 
because not all concepts are independently subsumptive; some concepts 
amount to sensational features of subsumed concepts (such as when the ability 
to have a primordial concept like „is longer than‟, or „occupies more of the 
visual field‟ might fix epistemic concepts of particular objects occupying 
space). That is, we can consistently hold that we can be aware of certain 
low-level contents without claiming that our awareness is, itself, a case of 
descriptive and subsumed non-inferential knowledge. In Chapter 5 it was 
argued that low-level experiences are, precisely, not characterised by being 
epistemic in this propositional sense, because knowledge about what an 
experience should be like can be effectively divorced from how something 
looks. 
 The upshot of this analysis is that Sellars‟s inferentialist argument does not 
work for all instances of the given, for we can circumvent the objection that we 
are subscribing to an inconsistent triad by dropping premise A and, in fact, 
claiming that the awareness which is necessary for us to have inferential and 
non-inferential knowledge may be an aspect of experiential content (though not 
in any epistemic sense relating to knowledge, concept formation and the use of 
symbols). Similarly, we can reassess the idea that from the proposition that 
particulars can never yield knowledge, that „the given‟ can never do so, in the 
following terms: we can say that the „converse relation‟, regarding particulars 
and knowledge is, in fact, true to a certain extent. The seeing that a certain 
physical object is red does imply the sensing of a red sense content, insofar as 
we need to be primordially aware of low-level colour „aspects‟, for instance, to 
provide the grounds for the subsumption and deployment of „high-level‟ colour 
concepts. But as we have admitted that such high-level concepts about sensing 
are to be distinguished from an ability to be aware of content which is 
informationally low-level, we can avoid the slide back to sensing having to be 
some kind of non-epistemic fact in order to keep the sensing and knowing from 
the severing knife.  
 We can instead say this: the low-level sense of „the given‟ is a distinct way of 
having knowledge; it is neither a non-epistemic fact nor a non-inferentially 
known one, and though it may be acquired non-inferentially through the 
process of receiving sensory inputs, it need not be claimed that it is known as 
such by subsuming such an awareness under independent epistemic/descriptive 
concepts of the form x is ø. We cannot do that with low-level contents because 
they are simply not in the same category as epistemic contents, and are 
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non-subsumable. So Sellars‟s argument does not work with them.  
 The point is that „looks‟, „appearances‟ - low-level „aspects‟ of experiences - 
can be cognitively and epistemically bankrupt to some degree, but yet still 
„given‟. It is just that the Sellarsian requirement that all „givens‟ are impotent 
unless subsumed under high-level background knowledge does not apply to 
them. This is an issue only if one takes on board Sellars‟s polarised conception 
of the inference/non-inference debate. By contrast, if one assumes something 
like the continuum view regarding experience and content, then this kind of 
suggestion about levels of inference/non-inference does, in fact, make some 
kind of evolutionary and perceptual sense. Sellars‟s arguments against the 
given do not work on content which is informationally low-level. 
 If low-level content does not amount to being knowledge in Sellars‟s sense, 
then what kind of information do they provide? Provisionally, sensational 
experiences amount to a kind of knowing, albeit not related to 
concepts-of-knowledge as much as to low-level concepts-of-awareness. That is, 
we can „know‟, in some (very primitive, non-propositional) qualitative sense, 
that we are aware of colour hues and the length of the lines in the Muller-Lyer 
illusion, without saying that this awareness is fully „epistemic‟ in character - 
that is, epistemic in Sellars‟s sense. (Indeed, that such an awareness is not 
epistemic in some propositional or theoretically informational sense is precisely 
what is demonstrated by such experiences as the Muller-Lyer illusion).439 We 
can, however, „know‟ in some sufficiently attenuated sense here in the very 
same way as we can have a sufficiently attenuated „belief‟ awareness (in my 
terms, a „look‟-belief). Such awarenesses can, of course, occur in degrees and 
some may involve sub-descriptive, sensory inferences in sufficiently complex 
animals, in addition to having these sensational aspects.440  
 But, that there can be content which has both low-level and high-level aspects 
does not go to rule out the point that low-level content is quite different in 
character from the descriptively classificatory concepts that may be concurrent 
with them. The kind of information that low-level givens yield amounts to 
being quasi-epistemic (or „proto-epistemic‟, i.e., epistemic at a very low-level). 
This kind of graduationist view of knowledge can be rejected only if one 
already presupposes a high-level account of epistemology as Sellars‟s account 
does. The arguments and evidence adduced in this book run against such a 
                                                 
439  If it were epistemic in character there would be a problem, because in this case the 
information would conflict with the rest of our knowledge about the lines precisely because the 
information doesn‟t square with what we see. 
440 In the case of the Muller-Lyer, of course, there is also a difference of degree between this 
kind of perception and a „look‟-belief: In the case of a perceptual judgement involving concepts 
like „lines‟ these experiences seem higher up the continuum than those aspect-like experiences 
lower down. The Muller-Lyer experience is thus sub-descriptively informational. But, it also 
seems true to say that the kind of experience in the Muller-Lyer case is closer to a „look‟-belief 
than epistemically-permeated experiences of the Sherlock Holmes variety.  
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view. 
 That this conclusion must be reached in the case of knowledge seems to 
corroborate our intuitions about animals and pre-linguistic children too: for 
Fido‟s informational repertoire is not epistemic in the high-level sense that 
Sellars seems to require, even though it does seem to be qualitatively 
experiential. And similarly, mutatis mutandis, with infants. (The 
counterintuitive nature of Sellars‟s emphasis on language being the bearer of 
content was outlined in Chapter 1.) The tendency to suggest that all content has 
to be informationally high-level to be any kind of content at all is the 
exaggerated claim of the inferentialist proposal. 
 None of the points mentioned above are relevant to the particular case of 
sense-data. The sense-data theory of perception requires more of an account of 
low-level content than has been claimed for experiential „aspects‟. Such a view 
requires low-level content to be epistemically incorrigible and foundational - to 
be objects of knowledge in some sense. Sellars has mounted an important attack 
on this view. But just as not all contentful experiences are captured by 
propositional linguistic content and not all senses of „know‟ have to be 
epistemically high-level, so not all „givens‟ have to be understood in Sellars‟s 
terms. If what has been argued in previous chapters is accurate, it is also the 
case that it is inherently misleading to think of the relationship between 
experience and inferential features in exclusive terms: there might be a sense in 
which content can be understood to occur at a number of levels. This is what has 
been maintained with the continuum account.  
 If all this is true, then we can reject both ¥ and ¶ on the grounds that the 
arguments Sellars offers do not commit us to either, if we can sensibly obviate 
the impetus behind them: viz., that rejecting an account of sense-data goes most 
of the way towards getting rid of all forms of the given. The claim: Sellars may 
have expunged the notion of sense-data from philosophy; he has not done so for 
all forms of „the given‟, for some givens simply escape the terms of his 
inferentialist analysis. Sellars‟s own „myth‟ has been to assume that, for the 
purposes of his argument, all forms of the given are equivalent. I hope to have 
shown this is not true, for his argument does not work on some of them. 
10.11 Conclusion 
What‟s in a Look? If that is a question about visual experience pure and 
simple, the answer is, „more, no doubt, than meets the eye, but a lot less 
than some folks think.‟441 
Sellars‟s arguments against sense-data do not apply to the category of „the 
given‟ as such. There is a sense in which something‟s being given in experience 
                                                 
441 A.H. Millar, „What‟s in a Look?‟, p. 97. 
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as a sensational feature of content, an „aspect‟ of experience, may not be 
non-inferentially known in Sellars‟s sense even if it may be non-inferentially 
acquired. Also, because not all concepts are subsumed and independently 
classified as propositional knowledge, not all „givens‟ are high-level epistemic. 
Thus: ¥ and ¶ do not apply as characteristics of „givens‟ in general.  
 My claim in this chapter is that low-level „aspects‟ of experience clearly do 
not commit us to the sense-data theory: for such contents can be contentful 
without being items of high-level knowledge. The view that experience has 
qualitative low-level aspects is not, simultaneously, a claim about sense-data. 
So, although there may be less to a „look‟ than the sense-data theorists suggest, 
there is still more that meets the eye than simple nerve impingings. Indeed, if 
one takes on board the continuum account of content, then there must be more 
to „looks‟ than simple nerve impingings, since experiential contents are subject 
to evolutionary considerations, in greater and lesser degrees, which help to 
harness perceptual information for differentially sophisticated organisms. 
There are central evolutionary reasons why observation has to be disjoined 
from high-level content and there are phylogenetic reasons why some 
organisms have less to a „look‟ than others. The discussion of low-level 
experiential content in the context of the philosophy of mind will be developed 
in the following chapter. 
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11. Experience Eliminated? 
If we have come this far, must the journey end here? Manifestly not ... the 
long awakening is potentially endless. The human spirit will continue its 
breathtaking adventure of self-reconstruction, ... But only if we try hard 
to see new opportunities, and only if we work hard at leaving old 
frameworks behind.442  
Experience and folk psychology 
11.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a stark and extreme inferentialist view will be examined - the 
eliminative materialism of Paul Churchland. If true, Churchland‟s account casts 
doubt on the claims being presented regarding the importance of low-level 
content to experiencing organisms. It will be suggested, however, that none of 
the arguments Churchland raises necessarily support an eliminativist view and 
that a continuum view of content is not ruled out by his account.  
11.2 ‘A brave new world’: Churchland’s program  
The position that Churchland adopts is the familiar one of eliminative 
materialism. The thrust of eliminative materialism is that one‟s ontology of 
mind, mental states, feelings, desires, beliefs - above all, sensational 
experiences - form part of a common-sense „folk psychology‟; a theoretical 
position which can effectively be replaced by a more empirically useful, more 
accurate materialist theory, which derives from the findings of neurophysiology 
and the science of brain chemistry.  
 The eliminativist program that Churchland advocates rests specifically on an 
antecedent theory of inter-theoretic relations in science. Eliminativists claim 
                                                 
442 P. M. Churchland, „Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality‟, pp. 186-187. 
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that what is said to be a sensational content of experience forms part of a 
redundant theory of our time, just like luminiferous aether and phlogiston were 
redundant theoretical notions at earlier times. The quest is the elimination of 
any folk theoretical notion of a sensory content. Eliminating such a theory, in 
Churchland‟s view, amounts to nothing short of a major reconstruction of our 
conception of ourselves. We are to imagine that to be awakened as to the 
sensational content of experience is to see such content as ultimately 
theory-embedded and transformable, and so, in principle, theoretically 
redundant. What will result from adopting this perspective is the elimination of 
folk psychological concepts and attitudes from common parlance.  
 There is some support for Churchland‟s views about theory change and 
inter-theoretic replacement. History has shown that theories, previously held in 
high esteem, can be replaced, superseded or altered radically in the course of 
scientific development. Thomas Kuhn‟s views on paradigm shifts place 
emphasis not on the static character of working theories, but on the 
revolutionary nature of the whole of scientific progress. Kuhn suggested that it 
is the very nature of theories to be transitory. On his view, theoretical 
speculation begins with a phase of pre-scientific speculation and moves toward 
what he called „normal science‟ (harbouring a viable and operable research 
program) to finally, a crisis-situation where it clashes with another rival theory, 
and where one or other of the rivalling theories is eliminated in favour of its 
successor theory. This dynamic revolutionary process, to Kuhn, was the very 
essence of how theories behave. Moreover, theoretical change also changed the 
way in which we saw the world; not metaphorically, but literally: a medieval 
scientist working with one theory, and a contemporary scientist working with 
another, literally worked in different worlds. 443  Kuhn likened theories to 
perceptual gestalts. The efficacy of a theory in terms of telling us something 
about evidence, experimental results and observations was something akin to 
the interpretations inhering in the perception of a multiply ambiguous figure: it 
was possible to „switch‟ from the story told by one theory to the story told by 
another radically different theory, not by changing the nature of the evidence or 
supplying different observations, but by switching the theoretical assumptions 
by scientific revolution. This idea, that theories undergo evolutionary 
transitions, supplant one another and constitute perceptual „worlds‟ or 
„paradigms‟ for the scientists who hold them, influenced Churchland greatly.444 
Some explicit claims from Churchland serve to illustrate this influence: 
 
                                                 
443 „Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their 
research-engagement differently. Insofar as their only recourse to that world is through what 
they say and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a 
different world.‟ T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 111, vide p. 118. 
444 For Kuhn‟s claims about paradigms being like visual gestalts see ibid., pp. 111-112.  
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[T]he question of ... perceptual judgements can be seen to turn ultimately 
on the question of the virtues of the theory in whose terms the responses 
are made. [O]ne‟s perceptual judgements [should] be made ... within the 
terms of the best available world theory .... Interpretation functions ... 
derive from or reflect our current understanding of the world, ... and on 
occasion, they must be changed, sometimes radically, as our 
understanding of the world grows and changes. Theories bite the dust, 
ontologies sink into oblivion.445 
There are many issues here: theories as perceptual gestalts, 
incommensurability, the revolutionary nature of scientific progress. The central 
point is that Churchland is partly influenced by the underpinnings of the 
Kuhnian philosophy of science and the idea of theory replacement. 
Churchland‟s „interpretation functions‟ can be read with no great loss as Kuhn‟s 
„paradigms‟ as far as the main point of the passages here is concerned. Of 
course, there is an important sense in which Churchland is imbued with the 
spirit of Feyerabend‟s early work also, and others. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that Churchland‟s views have, as a foundation, the structure of 
scientific revolutions largely in the way Kuhn presented it.446  
 This Kuhnian view of theoretical replacement would seem to be a 
paradoxical foundation for Churchland. For he ultimately wants to show not 
only that neurophysiology can replace folk psychology, but also that 
neurophysiology is, in some sense, the correct or true theory about such 
matters. This suggests a certain amount of tension with the Kuhnian view of 
theoretical replacement, where theoretical change is seen as a fundamentally 
revolutionary business with no special reverence for particular theories. 
(Kuhn‟s views are standardly considered to be relativist for this reason.) 
Perhaps this is not a troublesome charge for Churchland, because all he needs to 
hold is that the theory he is advocating is a better theory than that of folk 
psychology, not a true theory. However, it certainly seems at some points that 
Churchland wants to hold the stronger claim, which is quite inconsistent with 
the usual Kuhnian view of theoretical replacement. Churchland wants to say not 
only that the folk psychological way we interpret the world is deficient in 
comparison to the neurophysiological way because the former is faulty and 
misguided and the latter is not, but also that there is some sense in which we can 
speak of one view, one set of interpretation functions, actually being right: 
 
                                                 
445 P. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, pp. 37-39. 
446 See also, P. S. Churchland‟s very Kuhnian remarks about the overthrow of the „early 
intellectual ecology‟ of contemporary science. P. S. Churchland, „Consciousness: The 
Transmutation of a Concept‟, p. 80.  
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We may be the unwitting victims of an inappropriate set of interpretation 
functions. It is an empirical question whether we are; it is an empirical 
question which is the right set of functions; and it is the job of science, 
broadly conceived, to try to tell us what they are.447  
For Churchland, the „right‟ set of functions consists of the emerging details of 
neuroscience; the wrong set of functions consists of the folk-psychological 
nature of sensory experiences. Furthermore, it is replacement that is at issue in 
the case of folk psychology and microphysics, not reduction. Reduction, for the 
eliminativist, is not enough: his view is that folk psychology is „simply too 
confused and inaccurate to win survival through intertheoretic reduction.‟448 
However, Churchland assumes a great deal in accepting the Kuhnian picture of 
theoretical transformation. It is not obvious that Kuhn is correct in the details 
about the revolutionary nature of paradigm shifts. It is still less obvious that the 
elimination of our folk psychology in favour of neurophysiology is one of them. 
I will return to this issue. 
11.3 The case for eliminativism 
By elimination, the language of our folk psychology, our common-sense 
phenomenal predicates, is systematically exchanged for detailed physical 
reports in Churchland‟s view. He offers a number of examples of the sort of 
exchanges that he has in mind. In such a proposed program of theoretical 
replacement, we would no longer make such reports as „X is red‟. We would 
instead make a report like: „X selectively reflects EM waves at 0.63x10-6m‟. 
Likewise, instead of saying: „Y is warm‟, we would say „Y has a mean 
molecular KE of 6.5x10-21Kgm2/s2‟. In such a theoretically „awakened‟ 
society, people would talk of large amplitude atmospheric compression waves 
instead of loud noises; relative concentrations of hydrogen atoms instead of the 
sour taste of a lemon. The transformation of the detailed descriptions of 
microphysics from the vague and non-specific descriptions from folk 
psychology - especially the content of one‟s experiential states - would become 
an important educational inculcation not simply within philosophy and physics 
departments, but throughout entire societies and communities: the very 
composite intellectual fabric of people at large will be radically altered. As he 
says, „the magnitude of the conceptual revolution suggested here should not be 
                                                 
447 Churchland, (1979) op. cit., p. 39. Kuhn did, of course, retract the relativist implications of 
his own account in later papers and does not deny that some theories are right and others are 
wrong (see the Postscript). It is, however, of some doubt the extent to which he succeeded in 
reconciling his earlier and later views. (I am not suggesting that this is a flaw in Churchland‟s 
views, only that this tension creates a certain amount of conflict with the Kuhnian idea of 
revolutionary theory change.)  
448 P. M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, p. 61. 
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minimised: it would be enormous.‟449  
 According to the eliminativist, these sorts of reports are not just held 
concurrently with our belief states about how things appear to us in sensations 
such as „hot‟, „red‟, „loud‟ and so on, but that such reports can actually do away 
with such states and even this way of talking. Eliminativism is just that: the 
abolition of this common-speak. The project, as he sees it, is to change the 
semantics of observational predicates by constructing a „framework of intuition 
to compete with (and I hope to supplant) the crude intuitions supplied by 
common sense.‟450  
 How can Churchland know this sort of eliminativism to be a live option? The 
proposal that our epistemology and language need to be changed, as well as our 
view of folk psychological states, seems a dogmatic and indefensible claim. 
However, Churchland‟s point is that the language that specifies qualitative 
sensational states in experience simply does not refer, and hence should not be 
used. Such states are part of a redundant folk ontology. Churchland thus moves 
from the claim that qualitative sensational states are redundant, to the claim that 
the corresponding language is featureless and eliminable. This does not seem an 
acceptable move in many ways. Taken as a broadly instructive program, this 
attitude would seem to put one‟s metaphysic (in this case one‟s theoretical 
paradigm) logically prior to one‟s epistemology. This claim, read in a very 
strong way, must be seen as relativist: if Churchland can do it on his theoretical 
paradigm, anyone can in principle do the same. The implications of a 
revolutionary overthrow of one theoretical paradigm by another might easily 
collapse into the characteristic relativist developments that Feyerabend made 
with Kuhn‟s views.451  
 This would seem to be an unacceptable consequence even for Churchland. If 
Churchland‟s only defence for this claim is the assertion that the epistemology 
of folk psychology deserves replacement by a more detailed and accurate 
neurophysiological epistemology, it would seem that this defence is open to 
anyone with a metaphysical axe to grind; so that epistemology becomes, on this 
view, the slave of metaphysics and not its arbiter. However, Churchland does 
provide more justification for this radical position. 
                                                 
449 Churchland, (1984) op. cit., p. 45. Hence, Churchland‟s claim that these perceptually 
reconstructed beings would no longer, for example, listen to the pounding surf, but instead 
listen to „atmospheric compression waves being produced as the coherent energy of the ocean 
waves is audibly redistributed in the chaotic turbulence of the shallows.‟ Churchland, (1979) 
op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
450 Ibid., p. 8. 
451  Keith Campbell claims that on Churchland‟s view, if „appearances which are out of 
harmony with theory can be discarded or ignored ... then we are ... doomed to move, rudderless, 
from one incommensurable theory to another as Feyerabend‟s philosophy would imply.‟ K. 
Campbell, „Philosophy and Common Sense‟, p. 173.  
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11.4 Churchland’s infrared cousins: argument from transposed modalities 
Churchland‟s main argument for his eliminative views takes the form of a fable: 
We are invited to conceive of a race of alien beings indistinguishable from 
ourselves in almost every particular. We are to imagine that these beings are 
unusual in respect of their being unable to make colour discriminations about 
commonly perceived objects in the way that we do, due to their being 
constructed physiologically in a different way. Their handicap, however, has 
been compensated. These beings can, instead, make middle-range temperature 
discriminations visually. 
 For example, where we say of an object that it is „hot‟, they say that it appears 
„white‟ or „looks white‟ to them and, where we say that an object is „cold‟, they 
say that it „looks black‟ to them, and so on; the basic difference being that 
temperatures are something visual to such creatures with „white‟ and „black‟ 
forming the extremes of temperature, with all graduations of grey in between. 
We are, of course, all equally linguistically competent and, except in the small 
matter that these people have no use for colour words, our languages are 
identical. The only substantial difference between us is that whereas these 
beings lack a visual sense for colour sensations and a tactile sense for 
temperature sensations, we possess these and lack the opposite. 
 What this thought experiment shows is that it is logically possible that a 
group of such beings could learn an alternative set of predicate expressions 
(„looks white‟ etc.) which they take to match with their world. But, what we 
have admitted is that how the world appears to them to be in experience has got 
nothing to do with the acquisition of expressions a being or beings may utter in 
reference to it. We cannot hold that how things appear is the crucial factor in the 
acquisition of our observational predicates, because it would mean that we 
would be in conflict with how we experience how things are, and how it may be 
logically possible to experience how things are. The thought experiment is 
cleverly designed for us to consider a situation in which „looks red‟ and „looks 
warm‟ are connected, with no basis for the preference of one expression over 
the other.  
 If this situation can be envisaged as at least a logical possibility, it has the 
following consequence, according to Churchland. It makes it difficult for us to 
claim that there is anything crucial in the observational situation above and 
beyond the inculcation of certain (logically possible) ways of speaking and 
referring in such a situation. And if this is so, then there is no observational 
basis for asserting that our expression in this context is more descriptively 
adequate than that of the aliens. It means, in other words, that we would have to 
justify why our colour terms are more appropriate to how things appear than 
their temperature terms, and this would not be easy to do. It would mean, 
certainly, that we were being „insupportably parochial‟ toward certain visual 
sensations and judgements (our own) as against others.  
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 For instance, if we succumb to a sensation-guided translation of 
observational terms, we must insist that their terms, „cold‟, „warm‟ and „hot‟ 
really mean black, grey and white respectively, rather than cold, warm and hot. 
We would have to count as false substantially all of their beliefs about such 
predicates and their observational judgements about the world they experience. 
It would mean being biased toward our own set of beliefs and biased against 
theirs when their belief set „has every virtue we can claim for our own habits of 
judgements in matters visual.‟452 
 He does, of course, have a point here. If we were to hold to a sensation-based 
foundation of the meaning of our observational predicates, we would have to 
reject the ways in which such beings have amassed the use of their temperature 
terms, along with the appropriate nature of the terms themselves, and to 
translate their terms into ours. However, in learning such terms, the beings 
would have also gained a set of general beliefs about temperature, in much the 
same way as we have gained a set of beliefs about colour, and these would be 
hard to reject on pain of stating what to them (and us) seem either absurdities or 
falsehoods. It would, for example, be very hard to be convincing when we try to 
interpret what these people are saying in terms of colours and not temperatures 
when they say things like: „snow is black‟ or „molten lava is white‟, because 
interpreted in this way, these utterances are simply false to us. Equally though, 
the situation would be the same for them when they try to interpret our vocables 
and to suggest that what we mean by colour ascriptions are really temperature 
ascriptions. Taken like this, we would be faced with the absurdity that Negroes 
(for example) are „colder‟ than Caucasians, or that „My love is a tepid rose‟ etc. 
Clearly, if these sorts of things are to be avoided, (and they have to be to 
preserve the possibility of any sensible discussion at all) then we have to 
acknowledge that their observational terms have equal footing to ours in this 
respect, and that we should translate their perceptual reports as expressing 
beliefs about perceived temperatures rather than colours, and vice versa.  
 The point is that the meaning of such terms would have to be given in 
experience in quite a different manner for them from us, and that there would be 
no credible way of making a heterophonic translation without ruling out one 
such type of description. And, if there is no undogmatic, non-parochial way of 
deciding the point here, then there would seem to be an equal chance that our 
sensation-guided translation was as systematically false as theirs. Indeed, we 
must: „be prepared to have the very same joke made of our own beliefs and 
visual capabilities with respect to black, grey and white ... we must insist that at 
least one of these two sets of beliefs is systematically false. But which? ‟453 
 The heart of the matter is that Churchland, like Sellars, wants us to do away 
with the idea that our language, our beliefs and our concept of ourselves is in 
                                                 
452 Churchland, (1979) op. cit., p. 10. 
453 Loc. cit. 
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any way based on how things appear to us; and more generally, that they have 
anything to do with what we observe, experience and „feel‟. If, as a matter of 
fact, colour perceptions can be correlated with (visual) temperature perception, 
then temperature perception is as good a perceptual basis for colours as is visual 
colour perception.454 Hence, Churchland concludes, there is no basis for a 
preference for one over another and, therefore, no basis for our experience of 
temperature being more true to how things are in comparison with their 
experience. The only honourable way of making sense of the possibility of such 
a contrived case as this (short of a parochial interpretation) is to preserve the 
legitimacy of homophonic translation. Our respective sensory modalities are 
both responding to the same stimulus (temperature) and the only difference 
between us is that we have a very different means of detecting this feature.455  
 There are a number of closely entwined themes in this conclusion which shall 
be teased apart later. The point should be made that, behind it all, Churchland is 
claiming ultimately that there is nothing more to experience than learning an 
appropriate set or stock of terms in a language which is inferentially present 
prior to any perceptual act. He is not confining his remarks simply to the 
meaning of observational predicates.  
11.5 Churchland’s calorified cousins: argument from the irrelevance of 
sensory information 
Churchland has a second important thought experiment to support his case. We 
are to imagine in this instance „an isolated society of humans whose physiology 
this time differs in no way from our own.‟456 The only distinguishing feature 
between us and them is in the terms of language used in relation to heated 
bodies. Their view is that objects contain a substance called caloric which 
explains how objects can be hot or cold, liquid, gaseous or solid. For these 
people, caloric is held in material bodies, in varying amounts, „rather in the way 
water is held in sponges. ... These people claim to perceive or observe, by 
feeling, and on occasion by looking, that material bodies contain caloric fluid at 
various pressures.‟457 
 The fiction is not altogether unfamiliar. The example is chosen because it 
illustrates how we actually thought of the property of a heated body prior to our 
present conception in terms of mean molecular kinetic energy. It is, as 
                                                 
454 This possibility is not altogether fiction: Peacocke notes that „Certain snakes have pit organs 
sensitive to infrared radiation, and information from these is built up into a map of the snakes 
infrared environment.‟ C. Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their 
Relations, op. cit., p. 90. See: E. Newman and P. Hartline, „The Infrared “Vision” of Snakes‟, 
pp. 98-107. 
455 Churchland, (1979) op. cit., pp. 11-12.  
456 Ibid., p. 16. 
457 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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Churchland informs us, „a slightly tarted up version of the now defunct theory 
of heat.‟458 The example will be familiar for another reason: it illustrates how 
observers can hold false views about the nature of the physical world (can make 
spurious „observation judgements‟)459 with respect to observable phenomena, 
and have uncritical confidence in their beliefs, and the rational acceptability of 
the content of their language expressing such beliefs. But, the important point 
for Churchland is this: to try to convince such people that the situation with 
regard to heated bodies was otherwise than what they suspected, or worse, that 
their theory about caloric was systematically false, would meet severe 
resistance even though there was no such thing as caloric. 
 Even though the caloric theory is false, we should try to appreciate its power. 
As Churchland points out, their conception of things is fairly powerful - much 
more so than our own feeble (common-sense) conception of „hot‟ and „cold‟. 
They will notice and explain common phenomena which would otherwise be 
quite mystifying: „To one who conceives of these “temperatures” as unequal 
pressures in two connected fluid reservoirs, an exchange of fluid until 
equilibrium is reached is the inevitable result.‟ Caloric theory may be false but 
it has great intuitive explanatory power. Moreover, because of its explanatory 
power, experience will tend to encourage and entrench the caloric model.460  
 The fable is very instructive according to Churchland. It demonstrates how 
intransigent theories about common sense observables can be, and how such 
theories might „misexploit‟ sensory information. It also demonstrates, 
secondarily, how inappropriate reduction is here between the rival caloric and 
corpuscular/kinetic views (the former is reducible to the latter „very grossly if at 
all.‟) But the main theme here is that the fable is not isolated to such cases. In 
fact, our current theoretical ontology with respect to judgements about 
sensations - our experiences - might be, similarly, a case of theoretical 
mismanagement. As we saw in the case of the infrared cousins, the meaning of 
common observation terms like „hot‟ and „cold‟ is determined by the cluster of 
beliefs and assumptions in which they figure. The meaning of theoretical terms 
is grasped by way of an appreciation of the theory (the set of statements) which 
introduces them. „From a purely semantic point of view then, our common 
observational framework for temperature is indistinguishable from a theoretical 
framework.‟461  By implication, our theoretical framework about sensations 
may be wrong too.  
 Enter the impetus for eliminative materialism. Sensory qualia are simply 
irrelevant to the acceptance or rejection of an observational framework; what is 
important is the theory in which such sensations figure. Bodily sensations, on 
                                                 
458 Ibid., p. 17. 
459 Ibid., p. 18. 
460 Ibid., pp. 17-20. 
461 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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this view, are customarily responded to in terms of singular judgments or 
statements; such statements are prompted by networks of beliefs informed by 
common sense. But pace the calorified cousins, common sense can be wrong 
about the detailed nature of such impingings, and pace the infrared cousins, the 
detailed content of such impingings constitutes the product of semantic and 
epistemic conceptualisation and not the data for it. Meaningful experiential 
content is fixed through belief sets and linguistic descriptions, not sensations. 
The claim is that the common sense framework, with respect to observational 
parameters like that of temperature and colour, has the character of a theory, 
and that there is every reason to think that such a theory can be systematically 
false. And as there is no discernible difference distinguishing the cases 
Churchland invents and our own, it strongly suggests that the conceptual 
foundation of our common sense folk psychology is similarly flawed. 
 The argument for this is not simply by means of elaborate analogies. 
Churchland discusses examples of common sense homilies regarding the 
heated properties of objects to make the point, and then tells us that „the 
conception of heat that they represent is empirically incoherent.‟ 462  These 
examples involve cases like the claim that a heated body, if warmer than a 
second body, and if this body is warmer than a third, will necessarily mean that 
the first body is warmer than the third. But, as Churchland notes, such a 
distributivity rule can be seen to generate „multiple inconsistencies‟, 463 
depending on the substances being heated (e.g., wood, iron and water) and the 
criterion used to determine this rule as correct. Such cases do not suggest that 
sensations are central to making adequate and meaningful observation 
judgements.  
 Elsewhere, Churchland evaluates figure-ground perceptual illusions and 
arrives at a startling conclusion: subjects responding to the familiar Necker 
Cube, Duck/Rabbit, Old/Young Woman, Vase/Faces cases will produce 
remarkably „plastic‟ responses, he tells us, and are able to voluntarily „flip back 
and forth at will between the two or more alternatives, by changing one‟s 
assumptions about the nature of the object or about the conditions of 
viewing.‟464 This goes also for subjects equipped with inverting lenses, which 
effectively reorientate the perceptual field along the dimensions of „up‟ and 
„down‟.465 The claim here is that perceptual content is neither endogenously 
specified, nor in any way incontrovertible: if a radical reorientation of one‟s 
perceptual images can be achieved in less than a week (or immediately in the 
                                                 
462 Ibid., p. 23. 
463 Ibid., p. 24. 
464 Churchland, op. cit., (1988): p 172. To take the Necker Cube: not only can it be seen in its 
standard rear/front orientations, but also as a hexagonal shape. 
465  See, H. Kottenhoff, „Situational and Personal Influences on Space Perception with 
Experimental Spectacles‟, pp. 79-97. 
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case of ambiguous perceptual figures) through learning, recoordination and 
adjustment, it begins to show that „perception is very plastic and very 
penetrable indeed.‟466 In all these cases discussed, Churchland claims they 
indicate one important fact: that the central feature in perceptual 
discriminations is a cognitive background to experience. The crucial thing is 
not that perceivers are aware of certain contentful experiences, but that one has 
an inferential perceptual framework which is suggestible by manipulation of 
the network of beliefs underpinning such a framework, in exactly the same way 
as the fictional human beings that Churchland imagines. The upshot is that the 
contentful nature of our common sensory experience is neither as fundamental 
nor as important as often supposed, and actually amounts to no more than a 
deeply faulty and misguided theory about ourselves, which, though having 
stood the test of time, should ultimately be abandoned. We, with our 
experiences, are in essentially the same position as the perceivers of caloric. 
Our observation predicates cannot be defended by a simple appeal to the 
„manifest deliverances of sense‟ and thus, therefore, „our conception of the 
world may [also] be myopic, confused or even just plain wrong.‟467  
Evaluating eliminativism 
11.6 The argument in detail 
It is important to note at this point that there are several important issues here, 
and they are systematically confused by inferential theorists. The first issue is 
that the meaning of observational terms is obtained through an inferential 
background of theory; in other words, terms are always theory-laden: the 
content of meaningful observational/perceptual statements must be grasped 
only through such an inferential background. Such familiar claims have been 
made explicitly by Churchland in some of the quotations preceding with the 
emphasis on „perceptual judgements‟ „meaningful observational terms‟ and so 
forth.  
 Another quite separate issue, however, is that the complex of one‟s 
theoretical background is completely revisable in content (the argument for this 
rests on the plausibility of the thought-experiments regarding alternative 
epistemologies and the assumption that Kuhnian type replacibility - not 
reduction - furnishes an adequate account of theoretical and conceptual 
progress). The impetus for this view, for Churchland, is eliminative 
materialism.  
 Yet another theme, again influenced mainly by Kuhn, is that perceptual 
awareness itself is a conceptual matter: that the structured basis of perceptual 
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content is a feature of the inferential background one brings to an observational 
situation. The argument for this is again, the plausibility of the perceptual world 
of the infrared and the caloric cases, and also the evident plasticity of perception 
under the suggestibility of background assumptions regarding the perceptual 
situation. Like Kuhn, Churchland thinks that perceptions are gestalt-like when 
one undergoes paradigm shifts. 
 A final (implicit) theme here is the view that bodily sensations prompt 
descriptions in linguistic terms and that such judgements are isomorphically 
equivalent in content to the sensations that prompt them, which are otherwise 
causally irrelevant in perceptual situations. This latter point is highly Sellarsian, 
and amounts to the view that there is nothing residual in the procedure of 
asserting a claim about a perceptual situation (say, x is red ) and endorsing the 
content for its truth value. This claim was treated at some length in the last 
chapter. From the preceding discussion, this will also be seen as a fairly 
self-evident aspect of Churchland‟s views. This influence would seem to be 
behind the claim that features of experience qua sensory order should drop out 
of any analysis of experience and content, and consideration should instead be 
given to the nature of the theoretical description of that experience (which may 
be misguided and eliminable).  
 The various claims above can be summarised and shown to be connected in 
the very rough-hewn argument given below (I am indebited to a paper by G.J. 
O‟Brien here).468 
1. The semantic content of observational terms and descriptions in a natural 
language presupposes background theories. (Theory dependence of observation 
language thesis - Attributable to Feyerabend. )  
2. Beyond the causal stimulus, the endorsement of the propositional/semantic 
content of an observational statement in any perceptual situation exhausts the 
significance of that situation. (Sellars’s thesis - Psychological Nominalism ) 
3. Perceptual awareness is plastic and suggestible by learning new concepts. 
Hence, it is largely a conceptual matter how perceptions influence us. (The 
Plasticity of Perception thesis ) 
4. Perceptual awareness, therefore, is importantly a linguistic and conceptual 
affair: perception involves cognitive manipulations of a linguistically mediated 
conceptual framework, which exhaust the significance of the perceptual 
situation. Perceptual awareness is theory dependent. (Amalgam of 1, 2 and 3).  
5. All theories have a limited lifetime and their content is replaceable in the 
Kuhnian manner (Churchland’s thesis. )  
6. We possess no immutable theoretical frameworks. Even the perceptual 
content of the theory of folk psychology will (eventually) be replaced by 
microphysics. (From 4 and 5) 
7. Intermediate Conclusion: There is no non-theoretical content to perceptual 
                                                 
468 G. J. O‟Brien, „Eliminative Materialism and Psychological Self-Knowledge‟, pp 50-51. 
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experience; and no content which is ineliminable or non-revisable. (From 1-6) 
8. Conclusion: Eliminative Materialism is true. (From 1-7)  
 This is not a tight argument, and it is not easy to express it in a more 
favourable way. Nonetheless, it is an influential argument, and has the desired 
overall effect for Churchland, by demonstrating that folk psychology generally, 
and experiential content specifically, are seriously flawed and inherently 
replaceable. It is clear, however, that the argument is too quick to be 
convincing. All of these claims can be treated separately and require different 
supports; it is not adequate to claim them to be more or less mutually 
supporting.  
 One can, for instance, hold that the meaning of terms and descriptions in a 
language are given via one‟s overarching theoretical views without being an 
eliminative materialist (Sellars holds to a form of constructivism, but not 
necessarily eliminativism: compare his „manifest‟ and „scientific‟ images). 
And, presumably, one can, in principle, hold that linguistic descriptions exhaust 
the content of a perceptual statement (Sellars‟s thesis) and yet not swallow full 
blown constructivism. One could also, conceivably, hold most of the above 
premises while criticising the plasticity of perception. (It seems logically 
possible to be a constructivist/eliminativist without holding that perception is 
plastic).  
 But, the thing that interests me here is that one might hold both that 
observational terms are theory dependent, and also the view that folk 
psychology is severely limited in explanatory content, without holding that 
contentful observational experiences are theory dependent, or that they are 
eliminable. Indeed, there are good reasons for endorsing precisely this view. In 
other words, the contents of sensory information may be downright misleading, 
but this is a far cry from saying that there is no discernible content to speak of. 
There may still be aspects of experiential content, in my sense, which do not 
depend on the imposition of high-level theorising. It will be pointed out later 
that none of Churchland‟s arguments rule out this alternative interpretation of 
his argument.  
 Churchland, however, thinks that these premises go together and can be 
supported jointly. The arguments above are designed to bring out the 
overwhelming attitude of eliminative materialism: that the ontology, language 
and beliefs of folk psychology are inherently flawed and deserving 
replacement. And, a particular and important feature being replaced is the 
qualitative features of experiential content.  
11.7 Assessing the argument 
A number of things can be brought out of this argument when the case of the 
fictional beings is reconsidered. Churchland certainly claims that the words that 
the beings use in reference to their experiences are strongly theory dependent. 
  288 
„Red‟, „warm‟ and „caloric‟ etc., are terms which presuppose a theoretical 
background. For the infrared beings, a colour term must be understood 
homophonically via a network of terms describing visual temperature 
discrimination. For the caloric community, common temperature terms must be 
understood as referring to the state of a non-existent substance. The meaning of 
the words used by both kinds of fictional beings is thus not connected to the 
features of the world they describe (for we experience the very same world). It 
is connected homophonically to the theory that is presupposed by the use of 
those words. Churchland affirms this point about the theoretical nature of 
meaning in these terms: 
The impossibility of ... heterophonic translation ... is just the impossibility 
of the thesis that the meaning of the common observation terms ... is 
given in sensation.469 
The meaning of a term ... is not determined by the intrinsic quality of 
whatever sensations happen to prompt its observational use, but by the 
network of assumptions/beliefs/principles in which it figures.470 
It is clear from this that terms get their meaning from one‟s theoretical 
background and not from observations/sensations. For Churchland, sensations 
occur only insofar as experiencing beings are subject to a causal order 
(proximal stimulations), but such stimulations do not provide meanings or 
interpretations. According to Churchland, the role of the senses qua proximal 
stimulations, is merely to activate the conceptual framework that has been 
brought to the perceptual situation by the perceiver.471 However, while this 
claim itself seems harmless enough, Churchland does seem to be advocating 
something stronger than this in his rejection of folk psychology; namely, that 
our existential commitments as to sensations as a sensory order also amount to 
just a theoretical set among others. The move here, note, is precisely an instance 
of the sleight of hand implicit in the inferentialist proposal of the meaning and 
theory dependence of observational terms, to the similarly embedded nature of 
observational experience which was mentioned in Chapter 3 and witnessed 
again in Feyerabend‟s and Sellars‟s work (Chapters 9 and 10). By taking on 
board all of the assumptions mentioned earlier, Churchland can easily make the 
quick and easy step from claims about the epistemic irrelevance of proximal 
stimulations to the meaning of observational terms (above) to claims such as the 
following concerning the plasticity of perception: 
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In recent centuries, most humans have learned to perceive speech not just 
auditorily but visually: we have learned to read. Some have learned to 
perceive speech by touch: they read Braille. And some of us have learned 
not just to hear music, but to see it: we have learned to sight read musical 
notation. Now neither the eyes nor the fingers were evolved for the 
instantaneous perception of those complex structures ... but their acquired 
mastery here indicates the highly sophisticated ... capacities that learning 
can produce in them. And if these capacities, why not others?472 
Here Churchland is not referring simply to the causal order which shapes our 
perceptual capacities. Nerve impingings do not change and develop or become 
transformed in any way. What he is referring to here is the transformation of 
experience qua sensory order. The kind of perceptual capacities he takes to be 
transformable are the kinds of contents that qualia theorists take to be central to 
any account of experience and content: sounds, colours, and so on - qualitative, 
contentful states. For Churchland, how we understand such sensations can be 
changed by adopting a new way of interpreting impinging data. Of course, the 
theoretical framework which he assumes will generate the non-standard 
perceptual capacities of most interest (and accuracy) is the one garnered from 
the emerging theory of microphysics. Thus, we should eventually „see‟ 
sensations in microphysical terms. The examples of trained musical perception 
or accomplishments in Braille is, for Churchland, only a shadow away from the 
people on the beach listening to their aperiodic atmospheric compression 
waves.  
 The important claim here is no longer simply that incoming sensory inputs 
are of little consequence for the meaning of observational terms, but that 
inference from theory negates any appeal to the content of our sensations as 
sensational states at all. On Churchland‟s view, in interpreting one‟s proximal 
stimulations sensory inputs can have wildly different contents (recall the 
infrared cousins). Furthermore, bearing in mind that perception is plastic, it is 
easy to believe that one can see, hear or feel things in any number of ways given 
the right theoretical framework. Bearing in mind the case of the caloric cousins, 
it is also natural to believe that what we once described as „sensations‟ actually 
referred to nothing contentful at all. It is from this kind of reasoning that 
Churchland expects that the theoretically awakened society of the future will no 
longer talk vaguely and vacuously about the sensational content of their 
                                                 
472  Churchland, (1988) op. cit., p 177. Elsewhere: „It is in fact a highly instructive and 
entertaining diversion to try to perceive the “theoretical” in the “manifest”, ... [T]here is the 
satisfaction of apprehending reality, perceptually, in ways that reflect more deeply and 
accurately the structure and content of that reality, of coming closer to the ideal of seeing it as it 
“really is”‟. (Churchland, 1979, op. cit., p. 36) And again: „[T]he example of trained musical 
perception is a straightforward existence proof for the possibility of theoretically-transformed 
perception in general.‟ (Churchland, 1988, op. cit., p. 179).  
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experiences, but will „perceive the „theoretical‟ in the „manifest‟‟ and „a new 
relational order‟ involving the processes of perception will emerge causing „an 
ontological displacement of rather jarring proportions.‟473 The important point 
is that theory change writ large will transform our observational experiences, 
not just our observational terms. The position of Churchland here is, in fact, 
very close to that of Thomas Kuhn when he queries whether, in response to 
paradigm change, scientists achieve a „transformation of vision‟ and so 
„pursued their research in different worlds.‟474 Or when Kuhn says: „something 
like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself.‟ 475  The tenor of 
Churchland‟s claims is no less literal. Churchland has moved deftly from the 
claim that language and meaning is theoretical in content to the claim that 
sensory experiences are thus constituted.  
11.8 Consequences of eliminativism  
Does Churchland really expect such a radical move will be undertaken with 
enthusiasm? Is it, to him, a project that can be implemented in practice? Even he 
expresses some reservations when he asks about the status we assign to our 
common-sense conceptual framework, „if the emerging picture of reality 
provided by modern-era science is accepted, provisionally, as true?‟ 
Churchland acknowledges that „the common-sense framework is really a 
loosely integrated patchwork of subtheories, rather than a unified monolith.‟476 
Indeed, perhaps only partial elimination may be possible. 
 Churchland‟s doubts may be read as expressing the general dilemma that no 
physical description yet seems prima facie adequate to map the power of 
generality that our common-sense picture of reality provides, and certainly this 
seems to be true. Churchland insists, however, that the view that it could not 
eventually map the generality of common sense is a misguided view also. To 
him, the popular position that our physical description must (to be a successful 
replacement) provide a theoretical analogue for the elements of our 
common-sense ontology, is a position premised on the conviction that our 
common-sense ontology needs to be reduced by some rival theory, which needs 
to retain some of the disguised features of the theory that it supplanted. But this 
strikes him as a conviction without ground. It assumes, for one thing, the idea 
that how we currently conceive of things as being in common experience is the 
way things really are, and this is precisely the sort of conviction that he takes to 
be false.  
 The more plausible and likely position is that the common-sense theoretical 
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  291 
set that we hold with such trenchancy and passion is not a theory to which all 
rival theories must bear witness, but merely ‘the theory that got their first.’ 
And, as he makes clear, „this is hardly sufficient reason to demand that all 
subsequent theories treat it as the touchstone for their own adequacy.‟ 477 
Churchland point is simply that just because certain parallels may be made 
between what the theoretical set of modern science describes, and what our 
common-sense theory tells us, it is no reason to thereby regard this as enforcing 
or validating the ontological status of the common-sense theory. Rather, the 
common-sense position (unlike the scientific paradigm) is a proper ontology on 
parochial historical grounds only, and has less to recommend it in the areas of 
empirical adequacy, prediction and explanation. The moral, for Churchland, is 
that reduction is not the means by which „large scale intellectual progress‟ is 
achieved. The means by which an „awakening‟ in our perceptual capabilities is 
ensured is by „[not assigning] to the framework of common sense a significance 
beyond what it deserves‟ 478  and opting for „large-scale‟ elimination or 
replacement instead. It would be madness to make it a constraint upon currently 
acceptable theory that it explain the „facts‟, as they may be currently conceived 
by us, he claims. By analogy: „The question of what makes the starry sphere of 
the heavens turn daily ... would never have been disposed of had we ruled out of 
court any dynamical theory that denied the motion or the existence of that 
sphere. The “facts”, as currently conceived and observed by us, ... may well 
reveal that we should vacate that starting place as hastily as possible.‟479  
 A lot more could be said about all this. There seems to be an important order 
of difference between hastily departing from our ill-conceived view of the 
„starry sphere‟, and likewise from our beliefs about the sensational aspects of 
colour and temperature experiences; the former seems a case of conceptual 
ignorance regarding the mechanisms of the universe; the latter, a fact about how 
we have evolved and are structured physically as data processing organisms.  
 Also one could plausibly argue in response to this that replacing theories 
have the same common requirements as reducing theories. A successful 
reduction requires that a theory (T-2) gives an account of the elements of a less 
sophisticated theory (T-1) in terms of bridge laws and inter-theoretic identity 
claims for the theoretical terms introduced. This requires the reducing theory 
(T-2) to simulate the explanation that (T-1) provided. A theoretical replacement 
would also seem to require this. Darwin‟s theory of evolution simulated the 
teleological explanation inherent in Lamarck‟s theory without itself being 
teleological: „selective pressures‟ in Darwin‟s theory simulated the theoretical 
efficacy of Lamarck‟s „acquired characteristics‟ while avoiding the problems 
inherent with the latter notion. Moreover, from the perspective of the successor 
                                                 
477 Ibid., p. 44.  
478 Loc. cit. 
479 Loc. cit. 
  292 
theory, one can accurately assess the efficacy of this simulation. Churchland 
may well advocate replacement rather than reduction - that neurophysiology 
replace folk psychology - but it would appear that he still owes an account of 
how the proposed replacing theory of microphysics could simulate the 
explanatory features of folk psychology while avoiding its pitfalls in terms of 
its vagueness and non-specific predictions. But how would a highly developed 
microphysics plausibly provide an adequate simulation of the general features 
of the sensational content of experiences such as we have been considering 
them? Indeed: does it even look as if it could provide such a simulation? 
 This might seem an unfair requirement, given that Churchland thinks that the 
theoretical basis of folk psychology has no explanatory features worth 
simulating. It would seem, hence, as much a requirement of Churchland to 
retain simulating characteristics of folk psychology, as it would be for modern 
geology to retain simulating characteristics of Noachian deluge theory; or 
astronomy, those of crystal sphere theory etc. In other words, there is no 
argument on such grounds unless it is already assumed that the theory to be 
reduced is seen as having useful and valuable explanatory features. And this is 
precisely the assumption that Churchland is rejecting. So, there would seem to 
be no logically compelling reason for retaining the existential commitments of 
folk psychology. (Compare Darwin, who retained the explanatory features of 
an evolutionary process, but not the Lamarckian mechanism which was of less 
explanatory value than the idea of random mutation in conjunction with natural 
selection.) 
 This is a partially adequate response, but it puts the onus on those 
sympathetic with elements of folk theory to justify their commitments, and not 
on Churchland to justify his. It amounts to putting one‟s metaphysic before 
one‟s epistemology, and - as already mentioned - it is open to take the argument 
in any direction, if this broad principle is followed. This would seem to be a 
recipe for the automatic gain-saying of opponents‟ positions for no better 
reason than it conflicts with one‟s own. This kind of justification for adopting 
such a radical position clearly will not do.  
 However, there is another reason why this attitude will not do. Since there is 
as much a consensus of opinion that folk psychology does have some useful and 
worthwhile explanatory features as those that say it does not, it is not sufficient 
just to claim that there is no need for a constraint of simulation. 480  The 
requirement of simulation is still valuable unless it can be shown that there is 
nothing worth simulating in the case in question. What is needed, therefore, 
seems to be sufficiently compelling reasons for thinking that folk theory is 
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flawed in every particular. Churchland is, after all, not trying to simply explain 
folk theory of sensational content with a (better) theory of neurophysiology, but 
is aiming at totally explaining it away. The onus is clearly on him to prove his 
point in this regard. While it is relatively easy to explain away Noachian deluge 
theory, it is less easy to do the same with the low-level aspects of experiential 
content. As argued in the previous chapters, there are actually philosophical, 
perceptual and evolutionary reasons why a sensory order is a feature of the 
experiences of complex organisms: to simply rule out such contents by fiat is a 
tall order without adequate justification. But Churchland must do this if he is to 
claim that there is no necessity to simulate the features of such experiences.481  
Criticising Churchland 
11.9 The argument 
There are several strands to Churchland‟s argument. First of all there is the 
Feyerabendian claim that the meaning of singular statements derives from 
being embedded in a theoretical belief system. Secondly, there is the Kuhnian 
claim that theoretical systems naturally change and evolve and can be 
„incommensurable‟ under any comparative criteria. Thirdly, there is Sellars‟s 
claim that the nature of our sensory states depends not on such states being 
phenomenally accessible, but on being imposed and organised from conceptual 
categories which themselves are culturally transmitted largely through 
linguistic training. As indicated, all these influences in Churchland are 
combined and held along with the conviction that the only sensible way that we 
should refer to experiential content is through the only viable paradigm 
possible: emerging microphysics. We have seen enough of such a position to 
see that it is grounded in a number of mutually supporting claims. 
 The claim that experiential content is inferential in the required sense is 
supported by the plasticity of perception, its suggestibility to background 
assumptions and the plausibility of the fictional cases requiring homophonic 
translation (the „infrared‟ case). It is also borne out by a subtle conflation of the 
theory dependence on observational terms thesis, with a similar dependence of 
observational experience. The claim that folk psychology as a theory needs 
replacing, is supported jointly by the „caloric‟ case and the underpinning of 
intertheoretic replacement as the motor of theory change. The assumption that 
these claims are jointly sufficient to legitimate radical replacement 
eliminativism of sensory content, also demands an acceptance of the Sellarsian 
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point regarding the completeness of explanation as only requiring a treatment in 
terms of language. Each of these points shall be discussed in turn. 
11.10 The plasticity of perception: ambiguous stimuli and inverting lenses 
It is not at all obvious that the plasticity of perception thesis is true. Jerry Fodor 
has mounted a convincing attack on this claim in the context of his modularity 
theory of perception and we have already seen the implications of this view for 
my own thesis in Chapter 8. Fodor‟s point was that there are some features of 
perceptual experience which are encapsulated from cognitive penetrability and 
so, decidedly non-plastic (in the sense required). As we have seen, the existence 
of informationally local perceptual sub-systems is an important support for the 
view that not all experiential content can be captured by high-level features. 
Low-level aspects of experiences such as colour hues and visual field 
enlargements do seem to escape such an analysis.  
 I support this kind of reaction to the plasticity thesis. The claim I have been 
making with the continuum account is that aspects of experiential content may 
occur in an amalgam with inferential input, and that there may be degrees of 
such cognitive penetration to the point where there are just „aspect‟-like 
features. The essential point behind my view is that though inference penetrates 
experience to a significant degree in most cases, this does not serve to rule out 
the idea that some features of experiences are not fully captured in such terms.  
 Churchland cannot afford to make concessions to any kind of encapsularity 
view of content. On the most plausible reading of his fully inferentialist account 
of experiential content, we find that he must put forward a convincing case for 
total perceptual plasticity. (Plasticity, specifically, which is malleable through 
high-level cognitive manipulations). It may, of course, be said that he is 
advocating a somewhat less extreme claim - plasticity to some degree rather 
than total plasticity. But the problem with this weaker plasticity thesis is that it 
does not fit well with Churchland‟s overall project. To carry through the 
application of his „caloric‟ and „infrared‟ cases to normal human experiences, 
subjects imbued with appropriate theory must be able to decide how things look 
on the basis of internalising a set of cognitive principles. It would not be 
enough, on his view, that there was always some theory-insulated perceptual 
content (how then would „theories bite the dust and ontologies sink into 
oblivion‟?) To draw the eliminativist‟s conclusion, and to make it compelling, 
perception must be not just suggestible to cognitive influences at certain levels, 
but penetrable through and through by them. To be able to swap one set of folk 
theoretical assumptions about one‟s perceptual world with neurophysiological 
assumptions must be because such experiences are outmoded and misleading as 
to how things „really are‟. But to „see‟ them in the radical way that Churchland 
asks us to, requires that perceptual content be shot through with theory, not just 
suggestible to it. Churchland thus has to demonstrate that perception is totally 
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plastic, not just semi-plastic. I shall call this the radical plasticity thesis (RPT). 
 The case for the RPT has been extensively discussed in the literature. Fodor 
and Churchland, particularly, have engaged in a dispute over this and it seems 
to me that Churchland loses this round easily, as indicated below. Some of 
Fodor‟s central criticisms of the RPT are adopted in the following discussion. 
 The claim that perceptual experience can be altered by „changing one‟s 
assumptions about the nature of the object or about the conditions of 
viewing‟482 is supposed to support Churchland‟s argument. The example he 
gives is the case of ambiguous perceptual illusions; the „assumptions‟ he refers 
to are supposed to be the appeal to the theoretical networks in which such 
integrations can occur. The plasticity of perception is (allegedly) demonstrated 
when a perceiver can „[learn] very quickly to make the [ambiguous] figure flip 
back and forth at will‟483 However, it is clear from Fodor‟s comments that there 
is another way of assessing such cases, and it does not necessarily support the 
RPT that Churchland avows: 
One doesn‟t get the duck rabbit (or the Necker Cube) to flip by „changing 
one‟s assumptions‟; one does it by (for example), changing one‟s fixation 
point. Believing that it‟s a duck doesn‟t help you to see it as one; wanting 
to see it as a duck doesn‟t help much either. But knowing where to fixate 
can help. Fixate there and then the flipping is automatic.  
When one becomes sophisticated about laws that govern the way things 
look, one can finagle the looks by playing the laws. In the most obvious 
cases: one squints to make things look sharper; one cups one‟s hand 
behind one‟s ear to make them sound louder, etc. It doesn‟t begin to 
follow that auditory and visual acuity are cognitively penetrable. Exactly 
similarly, one learns that one can get the figure to flip by altering one‟s 
fixation point (or, for that matter, by just waiting; eventually it will flip of 
its own accord).484  
Fodor makes the point that there is an important difference between a 
structurally ambiguous object being seen in multiple ways, and its being 
determined (cognitively) that an object can be seen in such ways. Fodor‟s point 
is that the one claim does not support the other. For the RPT to be true, the 
subject must not just be able to finagle looks but to decide how things look and, 
in principle, be able to make things look any way one wants. (Churchland, after 
all, wants us to look at things in terms of detailed microphysical descriptions.)  
 However, as Fodor notes, the examples of visual illusion that Churchland 
                                                 
482 Churchland, „Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality‟, pp. 171-172. 
483 Loc. cit. 
484 J. A. Fodor, „A Reply to Churchland‟s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality”‟, 
p. 190-191. 
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offers do nothing to support this latter claim. The RPT is not supported by 
structurally ambiguous illusions as Churchland supposes, because things 
patently cannot be seen in any way one wants. The Necker Cube never looks 
like (say) the Sydney Harbour Bridge, a bag of onions or a billiard cue, no 
matter what cognition brings to bear on perception, though on Churchland‟s 
account, there is no principled reason why any radical means of conceptual 
exploitation here would not fit the bill. After all, Churchland wants to replace 
one interpretation function with another so unlike the original that it would 
bring about a radical transformation of visual capabilities enabling those who 
made the change to „see‟ solar wavelength distributions and to „hear‟ 
soundwaves. But it is clear that even if one wanted to visually transform the 
Necker Cube into looking like a billiard cue (or anything else) one could not. 
Some perceptions are, therefore, immune from total perceptual plasticity.485  
 The importance of cognitive influences to perception seems to be 
overemphasised in Churchland‟s work; the RPT seems to be far too radical. 
That there is no demonstration of the cognitive penetration of perception (as 
opposed to well-rehearsed abilities in fixing certain appearances by squinting 
and ear-cupping etc.), suggests that there is very little here to support 
Churchland‟s case.  
 That one can decide to „finagle the looks‟ here is significant. As mentioned 
earlier, a good deal of what is relevant to the fixation of the various aspects of 
experiential content is attentiveness: one does decide to concentrate on various 
features which one notices and so one can accentuate or diminish their 
importance. The blurry „look‟ of the scratches on the window pane, or the 
lightness of the coloured hue of a painted wall, can be enhanced by degrees of 
attention-fixing and concentration. One can notice such things over that of the 
actual window or the wall being looked at. (That‟s what makes some 
experiential contents „aspect‟-like and not fully inferentially specified, on my 
view.) So an adequate account of experiential content must have, built into it, 
the component of attentiveness: „finagling the look‟ of an experience is as much 
a part of having experiences as imposing a high-level concept or theory on it, or 
seeing it represented in a different way.  
 But clearly, noticing the way something looks, or altering its appearance by 
concentrating on it, is not to decide how to see it - confusing these points seems 
to be Churchland‟s mistake. Noticing and altering features of an experience do 
not amount to deciding what to experience: it is, rather, merely a matter of 
attending to various aspects of how an experience is represented. (As Fodor 
                                                 
485 Another very different interpretation of Churchland‟s point here is not that we can see 
something in any way we want, but that we can learn to see things in terms of what our scientific 
theories tell us about them. But it is not clear that microphysics tells us anything about 
perception qua content, and secondly, this kind of interpretation seems to be in tension with the 
theory replacement doctrine (again, how could „ontologies sink into oblivion‟) if this kind of 
story were true?  
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remarks, this amounts to confusing the effect exercise has on one‟s heart rate 
with the decision to exercise having an effect on one‟s heart rate.) For fairly 
obvious reasons, however, one cannot decide how to see things. One may 
choose how to describe things (just as one can choose how to exercise) but, 
again, this does not amount to choosing how to see what one sees. So, contra 
Churchland, one cannot change how things look by deciding anything; one 
simply learns to notice certain looks by accentuating and attending to given 
features of an experience.486 
 Churchland also ignores the various ways that high-level content can 
influence experience. But cognition need not influence content in an 
all-or-nothing manner. An experience which has representational content need 
not have theoretically informational content; an experience need not be 
propositional linguistic. So even if an experience has certain inferential 
features, it need not have others. In the case in question, Churchland seems to 
assume that every kind of seeing involves the full penetration of theoretically 
informational and propositional linguistic content. But even if this is true 
(Fodor‟s argument above strongly suggests it is not) this does not enable 
Churchland to claim that content is fully captured at the higher informational 
levels. For, on my view, it simply does not follow that if an experience has one 
kind of content it need not have another kind of content as well (the complexity 
thesis). So even though one represents an experience in a certain linguistically 
familiar, theoretically informed way, it does not follow that this is the only 
feature of the experience worth considering. As we saw earlier, even in the case 
of structurally ambiguous stimuli, aspects of the „look‟ can remain the same 
even when how one cognitively represents the experience varies. 487  Even 
familiar examples of perceptual „flipping‟ then do not necessarily support 
Churchland‟s assertion of full penetration. Given a multi-level content view, 
there may be aspects of an experience that simply escape characterisation at the 
higher informed levels.  
 There is another thing of importance to note about Churchland‟s account. Not 
only can Churchland not demonstrate RPT, but he cannot even allow for look 
finagling - indeed, on Churchland‟s eliminativism, there are simply no looks to 
be finagled. There are only proximal stimulations and theories, so Churchland 
cannot even allow for cases in which how things look is distinct from how one 
cognitively represents the experience. For Churchland, then, such 
                                                 
486  A recent study on the Schroder staircase suggests that adaptive bias to one or other 
orientation of an ambiguous figures is modulated by attention. The authors stress in this paper 
that this effect „need not imply that attention can alter in a specific manner the interpretation 
assigned to an ambiguous test figure.‟ See: „Attentional Modulation of a Figural Aftereffect‟, p. 
18. 
487 Recall Peacocke‟s „wire framework‟ case given in Chapter 5. In this example, the structural 
ambiguity of the wire cube does not influence the experienced non-representational stability of 
the figure. 
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commonplace experiences like that of hue changes and blurry window 
scratches must either escape theoretical penetration to some important degree 
(which would run against RPT), or be experientially incomprehensible. But 
such low-level experiences seem real enough. It seems provisionally correct 
then to conclude then that there is something wrong with the RPT.  
 For Churchland‟s claims about full perceptual plasticity to be plausible, one 
should be able to decide the terms of ambiguous stimuli and, moreover, decide 
what figures are indeed ambiguous. Since an RPT is the means by which 
Churchland tries to secure an eliminativism of low-level content, there is only 
one way in which his story about perception must run: he must claim that not 
only can one notice the „look‟ of something, but one can decide how to see it 
(by swapping one‟s theory). Anything less would be to weaken significantly the 
plasticity thesis to a degree which would seriously compromise the applications 
that this doctrine has for Churchland‟s philosophy of mind and his rejection of 
folk psychology.  
 But, as argued, Churchland does not establish this stronger claim, and only 
the weaker claim actually seems plausible. The weakened version is that one 
can decide to attend to aspects of something which looks one way and not 
another, not that one can cognitively determine how something looks. Given the 
argument Churchland has given for this, it is clear that he has not established 
the stronger assertion and, at best, it is only the weaker claim that can 
legitimately be made here.488  
 As a first point against Churchland, he has not established full perceptual 
plasticity. He has not established that one can cognitively determine how things 
are seen - not even in the case of structurally ambiguous stimuli. This must be 
seen as an important point against the thrust of his claims about the high-level 
dependence of perceptual content. Of course, if the RPT does not go through, 
then on these grounds neither does radical replacement eliminativism. Premise 
(3) of Churchland‟s argument is far too strong. There are, however, reasons for 
taking Churchland‟s claims about the radical plasticity thesis to be not just too 
strong, but false. The fact of the matter is that not all content is plastic, despite 
Churchland‟s claims that even the most familiar perceptual features can be 
radically altered.  
 I shall take the most dramatic evidence in support of Churchland‟s thesis to 
bring out this point. Earlier, we saw that Churchland uses the example of 
inverting lenses as a case of perceptual plasticity. The case of the inverting 
lenses demonstrates that one‟s visual cues can be re-orientated in a dramatic 
way, yet the organism can adapt to this „transformation of vision‟ readily and 
                                                 
488 See Fodor: „It may be that you can resolve an ambiguous figure by deciding what to attend 
to. But (a) which figures are ambiguous is not something that you can decide; (b) nor can you 
decide what the terms of the ambiguity are; (c) nor can you decide what further psychological 
consequences ... the resolution of the ambiguity will entrain. This all sounds pretty unpenetrated 
to me‟. op. cit., p. 191. 
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quickly. Such cases seem an important support for RPT, but the attractions of 
this view for Churchland‟s cause are short-lived when the issue of image 
inversion is considered in more detail. 
 According to Fodor, there are good ecological reasons why you might expect 
plasticity of this sort. Plausibly, some degree of plasticity occurs because 
organisms have to develop and learn to coordinate their spatial and perceptual 
tasks. As they grow they must „recalibrate the perceptual/motor mechanisms 
that correlate bodily gestures with perceived spatial positions 
(paradigmatically, in the human case, the mechanisms of hand/eye 
coordination) ... Adaption to inverted (and otherwise spatially distorting) lenses 
is plausibly an extreme case of this sort of recalibration.‟ This kind of evidence 
certainly does not imply that perception is radically plastic: 
The moral of the inverting lens experiment thus seems to be: you find 
specific perceptual plasticity pretty much where you‟d expect to find it on 
specifically ecological grounds. What Churchland needs to show - and 
doesn‟t - is that you also find perceptual plasticity where you wouldn’t 
expect it on specific ecological grounds; for example, that you can 
somehow reshape the perceptual field by learning physics. Churchland 
offers, however, no examples of this. I strongly suspect that‟s because 
there aren‟t any.489  
Fodor‟s point is that there is an order of difference between plasticity of 
(certain) responses to the data of perception, and the plasticity of perception 
writ large. Churchland assumes that support for the first point is automatically 
support for the second. But Churchland has not actually presented a case for the 
second claim: all he has shown is that in some cases of image inversion, 
subjects will recalibrate their perceptual-motor responses; he has not shown 
that perception itself can be radically rearranged. In fact, the experimental 
evidence actually runs contrary to his claims even in his own example. The 
extent to which perception is malleable through artificial image alteration 
suggests instead that there are some perceptual sensitivities which are not lost 
through such manipulation. The evidence strongly suggests that perception of 
some features, such as faces, remains remarkably insensitive to image 
alteration; a finding consonant with some kind of modular view of the 
perceptual mechanisms, not a radical plasticity thesis. Despite apparent image 
                                                 
489 Ibid., pp. 193-194. Fodor cites evidence which shows why the perceptual-motor „growth‟ 
factor is very important here. Experimental data have shown that individuals which are 
„passively wheeled around but deprived of perceptual motor feed-back‟ do not adapt the image 
inversion as smoothly or quickly. (Loc. cit.) See: R. Held and J. Blossom, „Neonatal 
Deprivation and Adult Rearrangement: Complementary Techniques for Analysing Plastic 
Sensory Motor Coordinations‟, pp. 872-876. See also, C. S. Harris, „Perceptual Adaptation to 
Inverted, Reversed, and Displaced Vision,‟ pp. 419-444. 
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inversion, it seems that perception is not radically „plastic‟.490  
 It is not even clear that Churchland‟s exemplar cases of (alleged) perceptual 
malleability in learning Braille or in sight-reading music, presents a convincing 
case for radical plasticity either. It is Churchland‟s claim that just because some 
of us have learnt, in recent years, to „perceive speech by touch‟ or to „see 
music‟, it follows therefore, that learning and training can produce any sort of 
perceptual information given the right sort of inferential cues. He even suggests 
at one point that such theoretical conditioning might allow us to think of such 
familiar experiences in entirely new aesthetic terms.491 But all this is clearly a 
non sequitur, as Fodor notes (impatiently) while paraphrasing Churchland:492  
In recent years we have learned to perceive automobiles (not just 
auditorily but visually). Now the eyes were not evolved for the 
instantaneous perception of those complex structures. So doesn‟t their 
acquired mastery illustrate the highly sophisticated and supernormal 
capacities that learning can produce in perception? 
Fiddlesticks. Churchland needs, and does not have, an argument that the 
visual perceptual capacities of people who can read ... differ in any 
interesting way from the visual perceptual capacities of people who can‟t. 
... The old story is: you read (spot automobiles) by making educated 
inferences from the properties of things that your visual system was 
evolved to detect; shape, form, colour, sequence and the like.493  
                                                 
490 See: R. Kemp, C. McManus and T. Pigott, „Sensitivity to the Displacement of Facial 
Features in Negative and Inverted Images,‟ pp. 531-543. A mainstay of the argument that 
perception is penetrable by high-level beliefs and theories is the claim that efferent nerve 
„descending pathways‟ of the brain demonstrate that a higher centre can terminate in a lower 
centre, thus refuting the idea of informational encapsulation in favour of the plasticity thesis. 
Daniel Gilman has critically evaluated such a claim from a biologist‟s perspective, and has 
concluded that none of Churchland‟s examples given in support of this claim, demonstrate 
either that high-level information can be transmitted in this fashion, or that the wiring of the 
brain has any significant bearing for „a role for beliefs or theories in perception.‟ See: „The 
Neurobiology of Observation‟, pp. 496-502.  
491 „Reconceiving musical phenomena in terms of harmonic theory [does not rob] music of its 
beauty and peculiar identity. On the contrary, such a reconception opens many aesthetic doors 
that would otherwise have remained closed.‟ P. M. Churchland, „Some Reductive Strategies in 
Cognitive Neurobiology‟, p. 303. 
492 Churchland, (1988) op. cit., p 177. 
493 Fodor, „Reply‟ (1988) op. cit., pp. 194-195. On the effects of musical training, Fodor says: 
„This merely begs the question, which is whether the effects of musical training are, in fact, 
perceptual. Churchland adds that „one can just as easily learn to recognize sounds under their 
dominant frequency descriptions ...[or]...under their wavelength descriptions ... What 
Churchland has to show is, first, that perceptual capacities are altered by learning musical 
theory (as opposed to the truism that learning musical theory alters what you know about 
music;) second, that it‟s learning the theory (as opposed to listening to lots of music) that alters 
the perception; and third that perception is altered in some different way if you learn not 
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The point here is simply this: even if one can educate oneself to discriminate 
perceptual information in different ways, it does not follow that one is 
reconceiving what one discriminates by learning a new theory. Were it true, 
then illiterates would be visually incapacitated, and automobile spotting would 
constitute a different form of visual capability of people born relatively recently 
compared to those of past centuries. Clearly, such a suggestion is absurd.  
 Fodor‟s view on this matter is essentially the opposite of Churchland‟s. 
Hence, the impatience of the above reply. His claim is that learning new 
theories does not even enhance modularised perceptual content, let alone 
penetrate it. Perceptual content is, to an important degree, not at all constituted 
by such learning; fictional caloric and infrared beings notwithstanding. Instead, 
it is at some level cognitively encapsulated. The role of perception is, partly, to 
present for the organism certain domain-specific features of the environment 
which it has evolved to detect. And these features can be strikingly insensitive 
to theory change as Fodor has noted. That there are such selectively important 
features as low-level „looks‟ is one of the central claims of this book. 
 If true, this point creates a good deal of trouble for Churchland. If some 
perception is encapsulated from inferential knowledge, then Churchland cannot 
claim that low-level sensation is wholly eliminable by large-scale theory 
change. In fact, if cognitive encapsularity is true, then it is not clear how 
Churchland‟s central argument about the redundancy of sensory content can 
even get off the ground. As we have seen, his arguments for eliminativism 
involved the imaginative cases of the infrared and caloric beings. Their 
perceptual discriminations provided analogues of, and reasons for, the 
homophonic translation of one sensation vocabulary to another. But, if 
Churchland cannot establish a case for theoretical penetrability and sensory 
elimination in such fictional cases (examples trumped up especially for the 
purpose of demonstrating this point), he certainly cannot ground the 
replacement of our sensory framework with a better theory on the strength of 
such examples.  
 The case for elimination of sensory content plays on the theoretical distance 
between the perceptions of the fictional beings Churchland imagines, and an 
accurate ontology of the real world. The way of arriving at an accurate 
understanding of the way things really are, according to Churchland, is to 
replace misleading theoretical vocabularies (such as those of the infrared and 
caloric beings) with better ones. But Churchland can hardly be said to have 
argued for theoretical penetrability in these fictional cases, if he has not already 
successfully and unambiguously argued for the RPT. And, on what we have 
considered so far, he certainly has not done this. Perception, pace Fodor, may 
not be plastic but encapsulated in some sense from inferential cues (learning a 
                                                                                                                               
musical theory but acoustics. Churchland doesn‟t show any of these things - he doesn‟t even 
bother to argue for any of them - and I doubt that any of them are true.‟ loc. cit. 
  302 
new theory alters what one knows about music but not how one hears it). There 
may well be certain low-level sensory contents (of such things as Fodor 
suggests above - „shape, form, colour, sequence and the like‟), which are quite 
resilient to the „changing of one‟s assumptions‟ about objects. Even for the 
infrared and caloric beings then, homophonic translation of their sensational 
vocabulary may not capture everything about their perceptions, simply because 
perception is not plastic. And if perceptions cannot be radically transformed by 
learning new theories, then eliminative materialism loses one of its main 
supports. 
 This point is encouraged by modularity theory, where the mechanisms 
involved in perception involve encapsulated, task-specific units which operate 
relatively autonomously and which feed data into a central processing system. 
On this view, low-level perceptual content is not influenced at all by the 
changing of theoretical assumptions, and so the distal outputs of the low-level 
modules are immune to wholesale elimination. Such a view as modularity 
theory is certainly not troubled by the off-beat cases of Braille readers and 
spectral inversions that Churchland offers in support of his claims, and it is 
certainly not ruled out by the more imaginative cases of caloric/infrared 
perceivers. For one thing, the former cases are quite different from the cases 
Churchland needs to support his eliminativism - such cases are actually 
consistent with a modularity view (Churchland needs cases which demonstrate 
that a change in theory brings about these dramatic effects); for another thing, 
the plasticity of perception thesis, in its most radical form at least, may well be 
false.494 
 In this book an account has been developed which combines a modular view 
of content with evolutionary considerations. The extent to which high-level 
cognition can influence or fail to influence experience occurs differentially 
among species, and also by degrees like a continuum. Perceptual content is also 
a complex: containing multiple levels of content (linguistic propositional, 
theoretically informational, impurely sensational, etc.) Perceptual content is 
also asymmetrical: always containing low-level, impurely sensational aspects 
even when high-level, inferential input is present, absent or suspended. 
Perceptual content, on my view, is certainly influenced by high-level features 
                                                 
494 It has been pointed out to me that the RPT suffers from an even deeper problem than those 
already mentioned. Assuming the RPT to be true, Churchland cannot actually provide objective 
evidence in support of the claim. On the RPT how things look depends on one‟s theoretical 
commitments. This being so, in the event of a conflict between Churchland and Fodor about 
how something looks, it would be as equally open for Fodor to claim that according to his 
theoretical background the thing in question does not look the way Churchland says it should. 
„Thus, if Churchland‟s view is right, Fodorians should be able to provide as much evidence for 
their view as Churchland can provide for his view. This means that if Churchland‟s view is true, 
it cannot be shown to be superior to its rival. This does not, of course, show that Churchland‟s 
account is false, but it does put it out of the domain of rational discussion.‟ S. G. Couvalis, 
„Theory and Observation‟.  
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but even highly representational (and theoretically revisable) features of 
experience have sensational aspects which resist explanation in such terms. The 
fact is that perception is not „plastic‟ to top-down processing, nor is it altogether 
immune from inference. Instead, the content of low-level experiences is 
suggestible, but relatively constrained from such influences. The modularity 
response to the RPT is essentially in sympathy with this approach if one 
assumes that encapsulation occurs by degrees.  
 A question that needs to be asked in connection with the radical plasticity 
thesis is this. If the RPT is false what then can we make of the cases of 
perceptual incommensurability that Churchland discusses? In the light of the 
foregoing, we can reassess hypothetical instances where perception is claimed 
to be secondary to theory in the following terms: what such examples as the 
caloric case show is not that caloric experiences are theory dependent, but that 
caloric descriptions are - the way the caloric cousins describe their experiences 
is partly constituted by the theory that they have adopted. Descriptions, not 
experiences, are theory-laden.  
 This seems to be a reasonable claim, but it is not the kind of claim that 
Churchland wants or needs to defend. He needs to defend a far more inclusive 
doctrine. Churchland wants to claim that the relevant sense in which 
theory-ladenness influences experience is not merely at the descriptive level. 
To support his thesis, he needs language/theory informed descriptions to give 
way to experiences that are similarly influenced. But again, this does not follow 
at all. The way that we describe our astronomical data is certainly shot through 
with our theoretical cosmology. But it does not follow that all the astronomical 
data, as experienced, is itself constituted descriptively. If not, then it would not 
follow that changing of theoretical assumptions, in turn, changes this sort of 
information. Contra Churchland: one simply cannot (using contemporary 
astronomical theory) see the sun‟s rising as anything like an earth sink, despite 
affirmations for this from all (theoretical) quarters. It is even less obvious that 
the low-level contentful states of colour or heat experiences can be 
transformable or recalibrated through greater facility with EM wave 
descriptions, or sound experiences with musical or acoustical descriptions. To 
make the mistake that just because descriptions are theoretically constituted 
then so too are experiences, is to make the unjustifiable sleight of hand 
mentioned in Chapter 3.  
 The above arguments suggest that we cannot claim that theory change affects 
perception in any dramatic way. We cannot claim this because (i) perception 
may not be plastic but suggestible to high-level influences by degrees, and (ii) 
theories may ultimately only influence how experiences are described. So we 
cannot claim that one can perceive something differently by describing it 
differently. But, consistent with the continuum account, we can suggest this: 
EM wave, acoustical and caloric descriptions are imbued with appropriate 
theory, and descriptions ex hypothesi are in quite a different domain from 
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low-level content, which is not (exhaustively) imbued with theory. Churchland 
has not convincingly argued that the changing of descriptions shows that 
perceptions are plastic through and through, so we are entitled to assert this 
distinction. I have been brief on this, but it is clear that the radical plasticity of 
perception thesis has not fared well. But does the general view of a 
microphysical replacement for folk psychology succeed? In what follows, I 
suggest that it does not.  
11.11 Eliminative materialism and psychological nominalism  
Folk psychology is eliminable, claims Churchland. It is all a matter of the 
replacement of common-sense phenomenal vocables with detailed scientific 
ones. This procedure, according to Churchland, is a holistic one, replacing 
networks of theory with others better designed to meet the needs of a maturing 
neuroscience. Is there any justification for this proposal? 
 Despite Churchland‟s enthusiasm for the program he proposes, it does not 
seem that it would work even if he were correct to the letter about the 
extensional equivalence between our phenomenal vocabulary and its assumed 
replacement. For a start, it is not even true that one can report physical 
wavelengths of light reflected from object surfaces in our colour 
discriminations (and, in the same way, it is not true that one can ever relate the 
mean kinetic energy of objects with which we come in contact). The reason for 
this is that there are too many physically contingent features involved in such 
experiences to ever render them capable of being reported without sophisticated 
equipment designed expressly for the purpose of isolating the feature of 
interest, a fact that Churchland seems to overlook.  
 The real situation is this. In the case of seeing colours, a great number of 
combined wavelengths are involved in our perceptual judgements; in the case 
of reporting temperature, the kinetic energy contact with surface molecules of 
objects and the conductivity of the material in question is also relevant. To take 
colour perception as one case, Mundle reports that cone pigments in the retina 
are not responsive singularly to pick out individual wavelengths; rather, the 
mechanisms of detection of each individual colour involves differential 
absorption of a number of different wavelengths „by the one, two or three types 
of cones affected thereby.‟ 495  Of course, this complicated process can be 
detailed, and the variables involved isolated, but it is not without using external 
experimental means. An actual or possible person in a „reconstructed‟ world, 
such as Churchland imagines, could not itemise such information in singular 
empirical judgements, no matter how well versed in the relevant colour theory.  
 Such contingent processes are behind the phenomenon of visual colour 
illusion, and the phenomenal features that can be induced by, for example, the 
                                                 
495 See C.W. K. Mundle, Perception: Facts and Theories, p. 52.  
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simultaneous contrast of perceptual cues, or by artificial stimulation. An 
example might be the phenomenon of the colour white, which can be induced 
not only by a standard „white‟ object, which reflects all spectral wavelengths in 
incident light, but by the artificial stimulation of the retinal cones with only two 
specific wavelengths, which, if presented separately, make us see yellow and 
blue. The point here is that Churchland cannot ignore such contingencies, and it 
is hard to see how he can avoid them creating problems for his theory. It is not 
clear that Churchland can cogently argue for his „brave new world‟ of 
perceptually reconstructed human beings, if he cannot get past the empirical 
difficulties associated with combinations of such data. The fact is that 
perceptual content, at the physical input level, is actually an amalgam, not a 
series of features which can be itemised individually.496  
 Additionally though, as Goldman notes, a great number of gestaltist 
considerations bear in here as well. A given perceptual experience depends 
crucially on the „state of adaption ... of a subject‟s visual system, his set and 
attention, the colours of the surrounding areas and other purely subjective 
factors‟.497 This point is interesting and relevant for a number of reasons. The 
first reason concerns the aforementioned amalgam of physical stimuli occurring 
as indistinguishable inputs. Such experiences involve concurrent surrounding 
colours and lighting conditions. Another reason, however, concerns how well 
one is attending to certain features of an experience. One‟s „seeing red‟ in the 
case of responding to a traffic signal, for example, does seem to have a lot to do 
with how responsive one may be to road signals and how well one may be 
concentrating on my vehicular tasks. An adequate account of experience does 
seem to require a recognition of how purely subjective factors feature in normal 
human perceptions. 
 To take up this latter point: it seems fairly clear that one may be having one‟s 
retinal cones stimulated with all the right EM waves (in this case, approx. 
0.63x10-6m) and yet not „see red‟, or, in phenomenal terms, have the light 
                                                 
496 Ibid., p. 54. Only in underwater conditions, it is reported that subjects can see what are 
nearer the „true‟ colours of objects. (See: Helen E. Ross, Perception and Behaviour in Strange 
Environments, p. 53.) This is because the phenomenon of „apparent‟ colour is always a product 
of differential absorption of light from surrounding objects. In underwater situations, 
wavelengths of light from surrounding objects is absent, so an object will appear black. 
„Relative wavelength, rather than absolute wavelength is what matters [above the water].‟ Yet 
there are circumstances in which sensitivity exposure to one wavelength under such 
circumstances can yield an enhancement of that perceived or „apparent‟ colour. Ross reports 
that: „When a diver first opens his eyes at moderate depth in a blue sea, red objects appear a 
muddy brown: but after a minute or two the red deepens ... an underwater torch appears tinged 
with red at depth.‟ Loc. cit. It is clear that Churchland needs an account of both „apparent‟ 
colour, and colour in circumstances of relative wavelength of neighbouring objects - a tall order 
along strictly neurophysiological lines!  
497  A. H. Goldman, 'Epistemic Foundationalism and the Replacability of Observation 
Language‟, p. 143. 
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„appear red‟ to them. Yet one may be able to recall having seen a red light after 
the fact. 498 An experience of this kind does not seem to be simply a case of 
proximal data being interpreted by one‟s theoretical assumptions. On the basis 
of what we have seen of Churchland‟s argument, he must say in such a 
circumstance that an experience of this kind is merely uninterpreted stimulus - 
an experience without theory (and hence, without content ). But this seems to be 
both counterintuitive and an oversimplification of the matter. It seems more 
natural to say of a phenomenon of this kind that it is a kind of low-level 
experience; an experience which, while contentful, is not dramatically informed 
by high-level input.  
 To incorporate such less obvious, but familiar, cases of „seeing‟, Churchland 
needs to either admit the possibility of subsidiary processing units being 
involved (which register colours yet which do not necessarily allow instant 
recognition), or admit that high-level input does not fully capture content. This 
point will be important later. As shown below, the remarks Churchland makes 
seem to stipulate the necessity of highly sophisticated, language-based 
interpretative mechanisms, not a structure which allows modification at lower 
processing levels.  
 A multiple-level processing view, such as that mentioned above, is clearly 
consistent with the continuum account. Such a view would allow for 
experiences to be strongly dependent on the state of adaption of the organism 
concerned; it would allow for content to feature by degrees of conscious 
accessibility. In terms used before, one‟s „seeing red‟ might, in this case, 
amount to being an unnoticed seeing. This kind of „seeing‟, while clearly 
contentful in some very primitive sense, is not characteristically a red seeing 
despite the input of all the correct light waves on the retina, and despite being 
pre-possessed of the relevant background theory (representational and 
theoretically informational judgments about the colours of traffic signals and 
about how one should respond etc.) In such a case, the content of such an 
experience is certainly heavily inferential in many ways, but the subject is 
simply not concentrating on the feature of their experience which is in question. 
However, the subject‟s experience clearly has content in this case, as he is able 
to recall having seen the red light later when asked, but not at the time 
undergoing the experience. (This low-level content may thus be 
non-functionally epiphenomenal at the time of seeing.) This can be as true of 
seeing red traffic lights as it is of „seeing‟ ripe or unripe tomatoes (recall 
Jackson‟s example raised earlier). Against Churchland, then, such an 
experience need not be contentless - proximal stimulus minus 
socio-linguistically conditioned and theoretically-embedded belief sets - but 
simply an experience resulting from inattention; an experience minus the 
                                                 
498 Especially so in cases of people with „eidetic‟ memories. See R. Arnheim, Visual Thinking, 
pp. 102-103. 
  307 
subjective factors (noticings, attendings, etc.) that such situations seem to 
require. If this is true, then Churchland‟s stress on high-level content as 
necessary and sufficient features for experiential content is misplaced. „Seeing 
red‟ is a far more complicated notion than a simple theory-heavy account would 
have us believe, because an experience can be contentful, yet not noticed.  
 If it is implausible to think that the content of experiences can be couched in 
terms of theoretically descriptive physics, it might be better to insist that an 
additional level at which experiences are sensed is needed. Content may need to 
be seen in terms of both the causal, sensory and epistemic orders. And, if so, 
there may be some basis for thinking that perceptual content is not entirely 
inferential as Churchland claims and that there is something in the idea that 
there are aspects of experience which cannot be captured in terms of high-level 
features. Contentful, low-level experiences arising at several levels of 
complexity may well be a more accommodating view in the light of these 
criticisms.  
 Churchland‟s reply to this sort of response to his position is entirely 
predictable. What all this shows is not only how fruitless the enterprise of a 
thorough-going phenomenology of how things appear to us happens to be, but 
also how firmly entrenched we are in a long-outmoded theoretical paradigm. 
His suggestion would be to make the transition from how the colour red 
„appears‟ to individuals to thinking about the context of explanation in terms of 
physical theory (in terms of EM waves). How one should do this is to forget the 
idea that phenomenal statements are direct reports of immediate experience and 
to think of such experiences in terms of non-inferential responses to physical 
stimulation, which are causally connected to the theoretical context in which 
terms we are linguistically trained to apprehend. Goldman puts this point in 
these terms: 
Association of some observation term with some feature of a sensation is 
not only less important for determining its meaning than the relation of 
the terms to others in a conceptual system; it is also a product of the 
subject‟s indoctrination into the system or theory ... Phenomenal 
predicates cannot categorize what immediately appears, since nothing 
immediately appears. What does appear is what comes to be reported by 
[the] use of observation predicates rather than the reverse.499 
Churchland affirms the point about sensations being conceptualised in terms of 
observational predicates in these terms: „our conceptual responses to our 
sensations ... [are interpretation] functions implanted in childhood as we 
learned to think and talk about the world in the fashion of our elders.‟500 
                                                 
499 Goldman, op. cit., p. 145  
500 Churchland, (1979) op. cit., p. 39. Final italic mine. 
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 Admittedly, Churchland‟s claims and Goldman‟s reading of them are quite 
different here. Churchland talks about conceptual responses to sensations being 
under sway of theory; Goldman attributes to him the idea that sensations 
themselves are under sway of theory. But, Goldman‟s reading seems the most 
consistent statement of Churchland‟s overall position. For only if sensations 
themselves were under the sway of theory could they be eliminated wholesale. 
Mere responses being under theoretical sway doesn‟t necessarily guarantee 
eliminativism of content - which is, after all, what Churchland wants.  
 Statements like this bring out the central importance of another critical 
element in Churchland‟s position: his emphasis on language. This is an issue 
that needs to be treated in some detail as there are several possible 
interpretations of Churchland‟s commitments in this context. Language as the 
bearer of content has already been mentioned as a part of Churchland‟s 
argument which can be attributed to the influence of Sellars. However, the idea 
that high-level, linguistically-mediated conceptualisation, not phenomenal 
properties, constitutes the only explanation for the way objects appear is, I shall 
argue, an outlandish claim. Rather than being a premise in an overall argument, 
such a claim should really make any theorist reconsider the means by which he 
arrived at such a view.  
 The emphasis on language being the bearer of content is not a matter which 
can be true in some circumstances and false in others. The claim is either correct 
or hopelessly misguided. However, it should be noted here that there are two 
ways that the bearer thesis can be taken: that language occurs concurrently with 
content, or language occurs prior to content. Language being the bearer of 
content is a separate issue to whether language occurs prior to content or 
whether it is concurrent with it. There is also an asymmetry here. If the bearer 
thesis is false then it need not mean that either the priority or concurrency claim 
is false, while if either the priority or concurrency claims are false, then the 
bearer thesis is false. (If it is not the case that language arises concurrently with 
content or prior to it, it can‟t be true that language is the bearer of content.) 
 I shall call the emphasis on linguistically-mediated descriptions occurring 
prior to content, the language-priority thesis. A weaker interpretation of 
Churchland‟s views will also be considered - the possibility that language might 
arise concurrently with proximal stimulations. This will be called the 
language-concurrency thesis. My claim will be that, on either interpretation, 
Churchland‟s view does not establish that language is the bearer of experiential 
content. Both the language-priority thesis and the language-concurrency thesis 
are false, so therefore the bearer thesis is false. 
 Note that Goldman‟s statement of Churchland‟s position (above) is neutral 
on the matter of presentation of language and content, though it clearly affirms 
the bearer thesis. However, in light of the confusions outlined earlier in this 
book, the bearer claim itself could be read in two ways: that language is the 
bearer of semantic content (observational terms), or language is the bearer of 
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perceptual content (observational experience). It was the conflation of these 
very separate claims that occupied our attention in sorting out Feyerabend‟s 
commitments in Chapter 9. Churchland clearly affirms a bearer thesis of some 
form in his acknowledgment of the influence of Feyerabend, Hanson, Hesse 
and Sellars, but his remarks are ambiguous between language as a semantic 
bearer and language as a perceptual bearer.501  
 Churchland claims that his view is similar to the views of these other theorists 
„in essentials‟, but this does not help us to sort out his stand on the confusion 
mentioned. As we have already seen in detail, both Feyerabend and Sellars 
seem to conflate both agendas. Hanson‟s remarks given here are also explicitly 
about perception rather than semantic content (see also the epigraph to Chapter 
3). Churchland is, however, clearest on this matter in the following passage: 
Our current modes of conceptual exploitation are rooted, in substantial 
measure, not in the nature of our perceptual environment, nor in the 
innate features of our psychology, but rather in the structure and content 
of our common language, and in the process by which each child acquires 
the normal use of that language.502 
It shall be assumed from this that, in view of earlier material studied, 
Churchland (like his predecessors) has confused this issue and aims to support 
both claims. Language, for Churchland, is the bearer of both semantic and 
perceptual content. Now it needs to be established whether Churchland is an 
advocate of the language-priority thesis or the language-concurrency thesis.  
 This separate issue ranking language and sensations in terms of presentation 
amounts to debating whether theory-embedded descriptions of sensations occur 
prior to content or if content and description arise concurrently. Churchland 
certainly claims that language is central to making perceptual judgements; his 
commitments on the presentation issue will be looked at in the discussion 
below. The language-priority thesis would seem to be the most obvious way by 
which to secure an eliminativism of low-level content. It is clearly the most 
fitting interpretation of Churchland‟s work, given his overall eliminativist 
motivations. As noted earlier, descriptions are theoretically constituted; 
observational terms, not observational experiences, are theory-laden. It is also 
observational terms that are radically transformed by changes in theoretical 
superstructure. I have already suggested that this is a premise in Churchland‟s 
argument. If the language-priority thesis is the most accurate position that 
Churchland is defending, then he cannot afford to lose it, as it is a crucial thread 
in his overall eliminative materialism. He needs to endorse this claim to support 
the view that all content is theoretical and revisible. 
                                                 
501 See his remarks, ibid., p. 37-38.  
502 Ibid., p. 7. 
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 Churchland is not alone in wanting to affirm a language-bearer thesis. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Wilfred Sellars also holds this view: 
 [A]ll consciousness of sorts or repeatables rests on an association of 
words (e.g., „red‟) with classes of resembling particulars.503 
Of course, this can be interpreted in two ways: as a language-priority thesis or a 
language-concurrency thesis. Sellars‟s arguments for the language-bearer thesis 
have already been criticised in Chapter 10. Sellars‟s writing is not clear on the 
presentation issue.504 Churchland, however, is explicit about affirming both the 
language-bearer and the language-priority thesis: 
[T]he psychological facts of normal perception ... [are] that children 
acquire the ability to observe and describe the world in great detail before 
they acquire any significant or explicit awareness of the richness of their 
sensational life, or even of its existence.505 
It is certainly clear here that Churchland is talking about perceptual content, not 
just semantic content. It is also clear that he explicitly adopts the 
language-priority thesis. However, other remarks that Churchland makes show 
that his position on this can be interpreted differently. When he introduces his 
notion of an interpretation function in his „Argument from Measuring 
Instruments‟, for instance, it is unclear what precise relationship language has 
to content. The idea here is that our sensations are like states of measuring 
instruments such as ammeters, which „are of themselves mute, short of an 
interpretation funded by some theory‟; a theory which is mapped onto sentences 
in a language.506 
 What is really being said here? Can the states occur without an interpretation 
function, or are such states nothing without it? Perhaps the states are „mute‟ 
only when not combined with an interpretation function afterwards. If the 
earlier quotation detailing the „fact‟ that we describe the world in detail before 
we are aware of our sensations is anything to go on, then Churchland has 
language-priority in mind; however, this could easily be read as a concurrency 
                                                 
503 W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 289. 
504 Sellars seems to think that as adult humans we mistakenly and parochially transpose a 
structured sensory awareness (a „logical space‟) onto prelinguistic infants. This alone, however, 
is consistent with language-priority or language-concurrency theses. See his remarks: „[W]hen 
we picture a child ... learning his first language, we, of course, locate the language learner in a 
structured logical space in which we are at home. ... But though it is we who are familiar with 
this logical space, we run the danger, if we are not careful, of picturing the language learner as 
having ab initio some degree of awareness - “pre-analytic”, limited and fragmentary though it 
may be - of this same logical space.‟ ibid., p. 290.  
505 Churchland, (1979) op. cit., p. 39.  
506 Ibid., p. 38. 
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claim too. His position on this is, at best, ambiguous.  
 But there are other reasons to suspend belief on the more likely interpretation 
of his views on the presentation issue. Churchland does not, for instance, 
attempt to produce the „psychological facts‟ he claims support 
language-priority and, without such evidence, we are entitled not to take this 
claim on its own very seriously. Also, the claim about children acquiring the 
ability to describe the world before they are aware of the existence of their rich 
sensational life is not argued for, nor supported empirically. This offhand 
remark on its own does not add any weight to his argument as it stands. If 
Churchland is advocating a language-priority thesis, I shall argue that he should 
not be committed to it for very good reason. Yet he does seem to hold this kind 
of view in the first passage given above.  
 I have suggested that if either the priority or concurrency thesis is false, then 
the bearer thesis is false. If Churchland is advocating a priority thesis and this 
turns out to be false, then he loses his bearer thesis as well. This raises an 
important dilemma: if Churchland chooses to move away from this strongly 
nominalist position he shares with Sellars (the bearer thesis), he also moves 
away from important premises in his overall package which I outlined earlier; if 
he chooses to retain it, his nominalist position turns out to be false if the 
language-priority thesis is false. In the passage above, this seems to involve the 
imposition of language which occurs prior to content. I shall suggest in what 
follows, however, that it is very doubtful that language occurs prior to 
experience. There is a sense in which something „immediately appears‟ without 
the imposition of language. It will also be suggested that language-concurrency 
cannot be tenable given Churchland‟s overall theoretical commitments.  
 Churchland‟s claims in support of eliminative materialism are not well 
supported. The empirical work he offers in support of the plasticity thesis can 
be much debated as to what they demonstrate. His exhortation that we might be 
able to learn to internalise detailed physical descriptions (e.g., about colours) is 
simply implausible. There is no empirical work even offered in support of the 
language-priority thesis. I strongly suspect that Churchland does not attempt to 
argue for this premise because he simply assumes it to be true.  
 For fairly obvious reasons, however, the language-priority thesis simply 
cannot be true. For one thing, such a view runs up against the developmental 
and ethological facts. Specifically, the emphasis on language prior to content 
can be seriously undermined when considering comparative animal and human 
behaviour. As G. J. O‟Brien has argued, Churchland‟s variety of radical 
replacement eliminativism (or, as he calls it, „STEM‟)507 amounts to asserting a 
language-priority form of psychological nominalism: „the claim that all 
perceptual awareness is preceded by the acquisition of, and mediated through, 
                                                 
507 The strong thesis of eliminative materialism, see, G. J. O‟Brien, „Eliminative Materialism 
and Psychological Self-Knowledge‟, p. 49-70.  
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language‟ 508  But such a view, he argues, is clearly inconsistent with 
documented evidence dealing with animal behaviour. Ethological work on the 
acquisition of a self concept is one such source of evidence.  
 Gallop has suggested that the more complicated cognitive concept of „self‟ in 
primates, has pre-linguistic roots as a matter of phyletic necessity. His claim is 
that this „may have important implications for claims concerning the 
evolutionary continuity of mental experience.‟ 509  The evidence he offers 
centres upon primates using mirrors to identify marks on their faces. It tends to 
bear out that a mental concept of self is a feature of infants, apes and other 
primates from 2-3 days after birth, indicating that, like animal cognition, mental 
experience is not necessarily a reflective feature of highly-developed organisms 
equipped with a language. In Gallop‟s words: „Man may not be evolution‟s only 
experiment in self-awareness.‟ Of course, if pre-linguistic perceptual features 
are considered along with very early self-recognitional constructs, it would 
seem that the cognitive apparatus prior to inferential input must be quite rich 
indeed. As added support to this sort of evidence, O‟Brien notes that children 
learn a rudimentary self concept as early as 12 months of age, at least six 
months prior „to the first faltering use of personal pronouns in first person 
ascriptions.‟510  
 Katherine Nelson‟s studies have also found that there are several dimensions 
in which infants categorise objects before naming or describing them, and one 
of those is in respect of what she calls „perceptual properties‟ of colour, form 
and texture.511 Macnamara has provided evidence to suggest that children learn 
non-linguistic means of object recognition prior to language development, but 
he eschews „a complete body of set cognitive structures‟512 in the Kantian 
mould, arguing that the evidence supports the idea that „basic [non-linguistic] 
cognitive structures ... precede the development of corresponding linguistic 
structures.‟ 513  This qualification suggests that the cognitive structures in 
question are not part of a composite of highly intellectual categories which are 
imposed en bloc in perceptual discrimination.  
 Such developmental findings do not rest easily with Churchland‟s claims, 
and the psychological nominalist strand of his argument must be seen to be on 
shaky ground. For pre-linguistic self awareness to develop, indicates that the 
stress is misplaced on such early processing being language-governed. 
Churchland‟s language-priority theme just does not stand up to the fact of 
                                                 
508 Ibid., p. 51. 
509 G. Gallop Jr. „Self-Recognition in Primates: A Comparative Approach to the Bi-Directional 
Properties of Consciousness.‟ p. 329; See also Michael Lewis and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn: Social 
Cognition and the Acquisition of Self, passim. 
510 O‟Brien, op. cit., p. 57.  
511 K. Nelson, „Cognitive Primacy of Categorisation and its Functional Basis‟, p. 37. 
512 J. Macnamara, „Cognitive Basis of Language Learning in Infants,‟ p.11. 
513 Loc. cit. 
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awareness without language. Since it does not, the explanation of such 
phenomena must be put on concepts or structures which are of quite a different 
nature. O‟Brien affirms something like this when he says: „As a result, 
therefore, we must posit the existence of conceptual structures underlying the 
perceptual awareness of young children which are not acquired in a linguistic 
fashion.‟514 
 It seems open to assert in response to all this that the distinction between 
sensory concepts and descriptive semantic concepts, that has been discussed in 
previous chapters, might be just what is required here. What O‟Brien refers to 
as „non-linguistic conceptual structures‟ which underlie perceptual awareness, 
might be a requisite feature of having contentful experiences at certain levels. It 
certainly seems reasonable, at the very least, to insist that this nominalist 
element in Churchland‟s package should be reconsidered as being only part of a 
larger story. It is not the case that the only contentful experiences that are had 
are fixed through an inferential background of linguistically-mediated theory; 
some contents seem to be prior to such high-level conceptualisation, and may 
even constitute its conceptual and evolutionary ground. The ability to have 
contentful low-level experiences might have developed in response to 
evolutionary exigencies prior to the ability to filter those experiences with 
propositional linguistic and theoretically informational judgements. Moreover, 
this may be understood in entirely naturalist grounds as indicated in this book.  
 The argument so far, in this and previous chapters, has given some credence 
to such claims: for it has not been successfully claimed that perceptual 
experience is entirely plastic to the influence of new theory; nor is such 
experience entirely explained in terms of the physics of the perceptual situation. 
Also, it has been argued that the language-priority view does not rest well with 
the developmental and psychological facts. Further, certain features of 
perceptual awareness are missed out on when we speak of such content as 
being, in an important linguistic sense, descriptive. There is, then, room to 
move on the issue of the relation between experience and high-level content. It 
may not be a foregone conclusion that experiences are necessarily underpinned 
by mechanisms of high-level inference as Churchland makes out. 
 There are far better ways of considering the influences on experience than a 
language-priority nominalism. Empirical and developmental work goes some 
way toward supporting the limits that must be set on the importance of 
high-level inferential features to experiential content. The work of Piaget, in 
particular, shows how infants go through a series of pre-linguistic perceptual 
motor stages in which they learn by what he calls „assimilation‟ and 
„accommodation‟ to interact with and build a discriminatory model of their 
environment and to formulate an appropriate pattern of behavioural responses 
to it. In Piaget‟s work, there is no question that at primitive cognitive stages 
                                                 
514 G. J. O‟Brien, op. cit., p. 59. 
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there is a world being perceived in subjectively contentful form, prior to the 
imposition of sophisticated forms of language-governed, „abstract‟, 
formal-operational reasoning. Infants interact with the world they experience 
and organise it in fairly complex ways at later operational levels of 
development, but the kind of interaction is not initially - on Piaget‟s view - 
inferential in any linguistic-propositional, or theoretically informational sense. 
The type of perceptual consistencies and predictabilities that we, as infants, 
build out of the world we become assimilated to, is imposed back on the world 
as anticipatory conceptual invariants later in cognitive stage development, but 
those invariants are not - at least in the early stages - language governed. 
Indeed, the early stages of development initially consist of awarenesses far 
more basic than even the perception of object permanence or size constancy 
(some of the more rudimentary perceptual integrations on Piaget‟s account).  
 In Piaget‟s theory this developmental process also happens incrementally and 
by degrees - we don‟t become sophisticated, theoretically discerning, 
language-using creatures instantly. It would not be hard at all to see this kind of 
developmental view, in terms of degrees of increasing inferential perplexity; 
degrees which include low-level content. It is not suggested here that this kind 
of view is established by a Piagetian kind of account. The point here is simply a 
matter of inference to the best explanation: if Piaget is right with his 
developmental view of cognitive competence, then this seems to make 
Churchland‟s claim above about language-priority far less appealing: 
This entire process [Piaget‟s developmental phases] becomes 
unintelligible if we ... deny perception prior to the acquisition of beliefs 
and concepts. For it is through interaction with the perceived environment 
that these early perceptual concepts develop.515  
This developmental work would be made even more unintelligible, of course, if 
perception is denied prior to the acquisition of language. (Consider animal and 
infant perception as an extreme reductio of this view.)516  
 There is other evidence to suggest that the language-priority emphasis in 
Churchland‟s work is misplaced. Goldman cites evidence suggestive of the 
informationally sensitive nature of perception at various levels not involving 
language. He includes, for consideration, face recognition studies (which 
demonstrate the ability of non-verbal physiognomic cognitions) and studies on 
congenitally deaf patients who show remarkable perceptual, conceptual and 
cognitive acuity with no verbal training whatsoever. Any one of these studies is 
                                                 
515 Ibid., p. 146. 
516 Churchland is aware of the dangers in adopting the language-priority thesis, making it 
unclear again the extent to which he is actually committed to this view. See, for instance, his 
remarks about language playing no role in the cognitive activities of other animals. Churchland, 
(1979) op. cit., p. 137. 
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enough to demonstrate that sophisticated, language-governed high-level 
reasoning is not necessary and sufficient for content. With these and other 
matters considered, the language-priority attitude which is behind Churchland‟s 
eliminativism of low-level experiences must be seen as a very doubtful claim 
indeed. Contrary to Churchland, some kind of content which is not 
language-like actually seems to precede language.517 
 Churchland need not, of course, fall for the trap of saying that language is 
prior to content. He can certainly stress the importance of language without 
making it central to his concerns. Since the language-priority thesis seems such 
an outlandish claim, possible weaker interpretations of his views will be 
considered below.  
 Churchland might claim instead that pre-linguistic content (in the form of 
proximal stimulations) occurs in addition to those sets of theory-embedded 
concepts which are transmitted through language. Language imposition might 
arise concurrently with such inputs, not prior to them. If so, then he would not 
be committed to denying content prior to language acquisition. This seems to be 
Churchland‟s claim in certain passages. At some points he seems to stress that 
sensational promptings actually instigate a judgmental response which is 
already brought to bear on that perceptual situation: 
In the case of perceptual judgements, what the senses do is cause the 
perceiver to activate some specific representation from the antecedent 
system of possible representations ... from the conceptual framework - 
that has been brought to the perceptual situation by the perceiver.518 
On this view, perceivers bring to the epistemic situation networks of theoretical 
responses (in the form of sentences) which are then prompted into activation by 
certain stimuli. This, presumably, is what allows Churchland to claim that the 
key to an adequate theory of content is to focus not on the sensory states, but on 
the system of representation that such states bring about. For, on his view, some 
such systems are simply better than others.519  
 I have one main concern with this interpretation. Even if non-linguistic 
                                                 
517 For further experimental work in fundamental conflict with the language-priority thesis, 
see: J. Piaget, The Origin of Intelligence in Children; E. Gibson, Principles of Perceptual 
Learning and Development, pp. 64-73, 154-60; S. Cary, „A Case Study: Face Recognition‟, in 
E. Walker, Explorations in the Biology of Language, pp. 175-201; H. Furth, Deafness and 
Learning. See also work demonstrating that some kind of pre-linguistic content is necessary for 
later language acquisition: E. H. Rosch, „Natural Categories‟, pp. 328-350; M. J. Angelin, 
Word, Object and Conceptual Development; J. Bruner and V. Sherwood, „Thought, Language 
and Interaction in Infancy‟, in J. P. Forgas (ed.) Social Cognition: Perspectives on Everyday 
Understanding. 
518 P. M. Churchland, (1988) op. cit., p. 185. 
519 Hence his claim: „A perceptual judgement, therefore, can be no better, though it can be 
worse, than the system of representation in which it is constituted.‟ loc. cit. 
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content may arise concurrently with language-governed theory-imposition, this 
interpretation does not carry Churchland‟s eliminativism, unless language 
exhausts experiential content. To claim a concurrency thesis, and not a priority 
thesis, and still retain an eliminative materialism, Churchland must claim that 
the only content of significance is the theoretically-imbued linguistic content. 
Otherwise, he would clearly be denying premise (2) of his argument that was 
influenced by Sellars: the endorsement of the propositional/semantic content of 
an observational statement leaves no experiential residue (the bearer thesis). To 
suggest otherwise, Churchland would be committed to rejecting the claim that 
linguistic propositional judgments are the bearers of content. But, as mentioned 
elsewhere, Churchland seems to want this premise as well: 
The meaning of the relevant observational terms, has nothing to do with 
the intrinsic qualitative identity of whatever sensation happens to their 
non-inferential application in singular empirical judgements. Rather, 
their position in semantic space appears to be determined by the networks 
of sentences containing them, accepted by the speakers who use them.520  
Taken together with the claim that the only legitimate way of securing the 
matching of observational vocables in response to sensory promptings is by 
homophonic translation, this means not only that terms get their meaning from a 
network of surrounding sentences, but judgements about observational data are 
also dependent on that theoretical network. So a child‟s use of, say, „white‟ in 
response to the familiar kind of sensation, provides that term with no semantic 
identity. It acquires that identity by its role in a network of beliefs and 
inferences: „Depending on what that acquired network happens to be, that terms 
could come to mean white or hot ... or an infinity of other things.‟521  
 So, whether a language-priority or a concurrency thesis is true, the important 
thing that must remain on his view of experiential content is language as it 
features in networks of statements (theory), not sensations. However, if all this 
is true, and if language exhausts both meaning and sensations, then how can 
Churchland allow for content which is non-linguistic?  
 What is at issue here is whether Churchland can claim a 
language-concurrency thesis. If he can, then he might be able to allow for cases 
in which content seems to arise without language. However, it is unclear if 
Churchland can have his eliminative materialism of low-level content if he 
denies premise (2). If he does this, he clearly precludes the possibility of 
holding premise (4). (Whether (2) is interpreted along language-priority or 
concurrency lines or not, once denied it also denies that perceptual awareness 
                                                 
520 P. M. Churchland, (1979) op. cit., p. 11. Italics mine. 
521 Ibid., p. 14. Elimination of sensations, of course, is secured here by homophonic translation 
of vocables precisely because the content of such vocables have nothing to do with sensations.  
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consists of linguistic-conceptual content.) But crucially, since the replaceability 
thesis depends on linguistically-mediated paradigm shifts in the alterations of 
perceptual gestalts („the propriety of anyone‟s perceptual judgments [turns] 
ultimately on the question of the virtues of the theory in whose terms the 
responses are made‟)522 this seems hardly a way of guaranteeing (6) and (7). So 
in avoiding the language-priority thesis, the concurrency thesis simply leaves 
eliminative materialism out of reach! This would certainly be an unwelcome 
consequence for Churchland. For Churchland, then, the language-concurrency 
thesis clearly cannot be maintained if language does not exhaust content. 
Otherwise, eliminative materialism would not be an option. However, if 
language exhausts content, then Churchland cannot have content which is 
non-linguistic - he cannot evade the objection earlier that there is more to 
content than that which is captured in terms of language. 
 We can understand, perhaps, how Churchland arrives at this situation. Not 
only does he explicitly assert the language-bearer thesis, he also systematically 
conflates the semantic-bearer thesis with the perceptual-bearer thesis. The 
semantic-bearer thesis is not enough to guarantee him replacement of 
sensational content (it only gives him replacement of one language with 
another). However, conflating the two enables Churchland to gain elimination 
of sensations along with homophonic translation (because sensations are 
claimed to have „nothing to do‟ with observational terms). So, since 
Churchland‟s eliminativism relies on language replacement, he must be 
committed (even on a language-concurrency thesis) to language exhausting 
content. However, this leaves us wondering what service proximal stimulations 
could possibly provide, if they have no content outside language. And, it leaves 
us wondering what to make of the cases of content already mentioned that 
clearly seem to precede language acquisition.  
 This seems to leave Churchland in a paradoxical situation: he needs to show, 
on the concurrency view, how proximal stimulations can feature in the 
networks of linguistically-mediated perceptual judgements the meaning of 
which is fixed into theories. If such judgements had nothing to do with proximal 
promptings, and if radical replacement eliminativism is true and networks of 
sentences do determine semantic space, then there must be no content outside 
language. (A consequence which reinforces again premise (2)). Alternatively, 
the only other way of keeping a concurrency thesis of this form, might be to 
deny (4) and uphold (2) and to suggest that the proximal inputs in question are 
not necessary for content. This, however, risks making such stimulations 
redundant to experiences - an outcome, surely, which is inconsistent with any 
robust materialism. 
 It is concluded from this that Churchland‟s premises are mutually supporting; 
to remove one is to remove the entire deck. Churchland must either have a 
                                                 
522 Ibid., p. 37. 
  318 
language-priority thesis (which runs against psychological evidence of content 
occurring before language) or a concurrency view (which loses his 
eliminativism and his materialism). Since the concurrency thesis leads to a 
position inconsistent with his overall strategy, the former position is clearly the 
only tenable one for Churchland. But this leads to the reconsideration of the 
arguments raised before in relation to this view. Denying premise (2), the 
Sellarsian premise of his argument, casts doubt on the premise that all content is 
transformed by linguistically-structured, theoretical networks. On the other 
hand, upholding the latter with premise (4) requires that (2) is true, and hence 
that all (significant) content is semantically prior - this again reinforces the 
language-ladenness proposal. But if the language-priority thesis is the more 
accurate position, this too seems implausible because some kind of content 
actually precedes language. 
 Churchland cannot lose any of these premises without abandoning his overall 
argument. But, because the argument stipulates the necessity of language to 
occur prior to perceptual structure, this must lead us, ultimately, to abandon 
Churchland‟s language-bearer thesis. We must abandon it because the 
language-priority thesis is simply implausible, and the language-concurrency 
thesis is simply unable to guarantee eliminativism. Since both the priority and 
concurrency theses are false in this context, the bearer thesis is false. 
 Perhaps Churchland is after an even more subtle kind of account, however. 
Perhaps neither of the above interpretations is what he is after. There is a third 
possibility that requires consideration. Perhaps the sort of position he has in 
mind is more along the lines of some kind of Kantian account: experiences are 
conceptually structured at a high level (partly involving language) while 
proximal inputs simply furnish the formless raw materials for this „top down‟ 
manipulation. The task of the materialist is to get the most accurate set of 
interpretation functions to do the job. The relationship between sensing and 
conceptualising with language, on this view, is just an important part of a 
critical overall structuring function that cognition performs on meaningless 
sensory inputs. If we disregard some of the earlier comments made about the 
essential involvement of language in this process this reading has some support. 
Some of Churchland‟s remarks sound very much like he is advocating some 
kind of progressive Kantianism: 
 [D]iscriminatory conceptual responses to ... first-level [sensory] states, 
... are themselves elements in a higher order of activity upon which there 
are constraints such as consistency and coherence ... [this] has its end, ... 
in maximising the variety and sheer amount of (putative) information 
winnowed from the flux of sensory states ... It seeks and continues to seek 
information in what confronts a perceiver initially as just so much 
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noise.523  
The trouble with this kind of interpretation is that some of Churchland‟s claims 
about sensations and language-priority are in some tension with such an 
approach. In any case, my views in relation to a Kantian account of content 
have already been dealt with in Chapter 6. If the most favourable reading of 
Churchland‟s views are along these lines, then they remain subject to the 
criticisms already made of traditional Kantianism.  
 Are there any other possibilities Churchland might adopt here? G. J. O‟Brien 
notes that Churchland actually considers making language a „a relatively 
peripheral phenomenon‟ 524  in connection with perceptual experience - a 
position altogether inconsistent with his earlier affirmations of psychological 
nominalism. The evidence for this outright repudiation of his earlier views can 
be found in a passage dealing with language in relation to the cognitive 
capabilities of our intellectual processes in general. (It occurs along with an 
apology.) 
To the extent that there is a specifically „linguistic‟ mode of intellectual 
activity then, it is constituted and sustained by a more fundamental mode 
of intellectual activity .... It may appear to some readers that the position 
here taken - on the relatively peripheral role that linguistic structures will 
play in fundamental epistemology - is inconsistent with the ... role 
ascribed to language as the bearer and shaper of cognitive/perceptual 
categories.525 
Churchland‟s means of reconciling these inconsistent themes takes the form of 
relegating language as a high-level integration mechanism engaged in 
exchanging information at or towards the top of our information-processing 
hierarchies.526 Such a mechanism would integrate „at a very high level of 
abstraction‟ inputs or „state configurations‟ derived from the various sensory 
modalities. By suggesting that it be employed only at this level is, „quite 
consistent with the fact that its use must be acquired, sustained and 
administered by more fundamental information-processing systems of a 
non-linguistic kind.‟527 So, on this statement of his views, not only is language 
only one means of understanding content, but there is also said to be more 
„fundamental modes of intellectual activity‟ which underpin the linguistic 
mode.  
 Such a manoeuvre may be quite consistent with a materialist account of 
                                                 
523 Ibid., p. 42. 
524 G. J. O‟Brien, op. cit., p. 63. 
525 P. M. Churchland, op. cit., pp. 135-137. 
526 Ibid., p. 139. 
527 Loc. cit.  
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cognition. For that matter, it is quite consistent with a continuum account of 
content as well! However, it is flatly inconsistent with the language-priority 
thesis, the concurrency thesis, the bearer thesis and, ultimately, eliminative 
materialism. The reason for the inconsistency with psychological nominalism is 
obvious. (An admission of non-linguistic information-processing is enough to 
guarantee conflict with his earlier views.) The reason for the inconsistency with 
eliminative materialism is similar to the remark made earlier in response to the 
rejection of premises (2) and (4) of his argument: Churchland cannot afford to 
lose the thesis that language is central to content because 
linguistically-mediated concepts happen to be the raw materials for theoretical 
replacement - the nub of Churchland‟s elimination of experience! O‟Brien 
affirms this point in these terms: 
 [I]n abandoning psychological nominalism in favour of more 
fundamental information-processing systems of a non-linguistic kind, 
[Churchland] require[s] an argument ... which indicates that these 
systems result in our perception being just as theory-laden - and just as 
revisable - as was the case in the traditional formulation of STEM [the 
strong thesis of eliminative materialism] utilising as it did a 
representational system based on natural language. For without such an 
argument, their endorsement of STEM is clearly undercut by their 
abandonment of its traditional argumentative support.528  
Churchland does not provide a satisfactory response to this challenge (see 
O‟Brien for further criticisms). This omission is symptomatic of a failure in his 
overall theoretical approach.  
 We have seen cause to reject the inferentialist stress on high-level features 
such as language now on two counts: it does not fit in with the 
empirical/developmental facts, and it is not sound to apply such linguistic 
constraints to all forms of „awareness‟ or all „givens‟. (The Sellars chapter 
earlier placed constraints on this tendency too.) It seems hardly appropriate to 
accept such a thesis now in the context of eliminative materialism. We can thus 
discount Churchland‟s claims above as being insufficient to establish 
psychological nominalism. And, because of the centrality of this doctrine to his 
overall views, without this support radical replacement eliminativism is also on 
doubtful ground. 
 Thus, Churchland is certainly wrong if he goes beyond the idea that we 
conceptually organise our sensations, to the idea that there are no sensations 
without first the acquisition of beliefs and concepts through a facility with 
(conceptually imbued) language. Such an idea, moreover, should not influence 
us into thinking that we can collapse the distinction between low-level content 
                                                 
528 G. J. O‟Brien, op. cit., p. 64. 
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and high-level descriptions of content.  
 None of these counter claims, however, should be taken as suggesting that 
there is nothing high-level conceptual or nothing linguistic involved in the 
processes by which we respond to experiences. This would carry things too far, 
and I have stressed that I am not antagonistic to some degree of inferential 
influence. It is certainly the case that beliefs about „how things appear‟ are 
linked crucially with the concepts we acquire and the epistemic and linguistic 
patterns that we accrue because of this. The point here is just that both 
Churchland and Sellars seem to have the emphasis all wrong. They take all 
experiential content to be constituted by inference at an extremely sophisticated 
level; specifically, at the level of language and theory. Contentful sensations, in 
their view, disappear either as proximal stimulations or linguistically-imbued 
descriptions. But we can avoid making the sensational experiences inferential 
and a „linguistic affair‟, by dropping the idea that the only interesting thing 
about experiences is the epistemic order - the theoretical/linguistic (high-level) 
content that informs experiences. We can stress equally the kinds of content 
which do not seem to be captured in such terms, and take such content as 
informational and ineliminable aspects of experiences. We can stress the 
sensory order. To do so would be to take the continuum account seriously. To 
claim that no such low-level content exists would be to commit all perceptual 
experience to be, likewise, inferential, as Churchland, Sellars and others argue. 
But, as we have seen, this is highly problematic not least because contentful 
low-level experiences seem to occur as well as high-level mechanisms and 
sometimes concurrently with them as experiential amalgams (the complexity 
thesis). Such contents may even constitute an important part in the evolutionary 
development and realisation of „selfhood‟. Goldman seems to be at least 
allowing for low-level content to occur when he criticises eliminative 
materialism in these terms: 
An object‟s appearing F then, where F is some basic phenomenal 
property is a non-conceptual, non-epistemic, but psychological fact that 
enters into the development of perceptual concepts without determining 
any concepts in itself. If this non-epistemic fact is a necessary condition 
for forming concepts, rather than the product of acquiring them, then the 
replaceability thesis becomes far less plausible.529 
For reasons mentioned earlier in the book, I cannot agree with all of this. I do 
not think that an aspect-like way in which a thing appears should be understood 
as being non-conceptual or non-epistemic, even though it may not be 
characterised exclusively in high-level epistemic terms. A non-concept is surely 
idle in facilitating epistemic concepts, as well as anything else. To suggest that 
                                                 
529 A. Goldman, op. cit., p. 147. 
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the problem with a strongly inferentialist account is to be resolved by allowing 
low-level content to be non-conceptual and non-epistemic is simply to reinforce 
the inferentialist-non-inferentialist dichotomy. It is to admit foundational, 
incorrigible sense-data. This return to equally doubtful theoretical ground is a 
consequence that needs to be avoided as much inferentialism.  
 By contrast, even sensational aspects of experiences must have „look‟-beliefs 
and being belief-like, they must be informational in some attenuated, low-level 
sense. The account developed in this book is an attempt to preserve the sense in 
which experiential content can be said to be conceptually fixed at some levels 
without implying high-level features. (The view also preserves the involvement 
of low-level features in various degrees of complexity). The distinction 
between „sensory‟ concepts and „descriptive‟ concepts and „look‟ beliefs and 
„inferential‟ beliefs and the graduations between them was made in this 
connection. Though we might disagree with Goldman‟s claim about the 
non-conceptual and the non-epistemic, we can agree with that some prior 
perceptual properties might enter into the development of low-level perceptual 
experiences (such as in Piaget‟s infants) without being exhaustively determined 
inferentially.  
 Is there anything worth keeping of Churchland‟s argument for eliminative 
materialism? Clearly, there is. Churchland is right in claiming that by a certain 
amount of training and concept acquisition and, thereby, reorientation to the 
world, one can come to experience things that one had not been previously 
aware. This is an acceptable and agreeable claim. But it does not follow from 
this that this gives the process of descriptive concept acquisition informational 
priority. As we have seen, Churchland‟s arguments have not given decisive 
reasons for rejecting (eliminating) a multi-level view of experiential content. 
The sorts of „purely optical‟ contents which may, in fact, be resilient to 
theoretical suggestions are the same sorts of perceptual contents which exhibit 
implasticity, non-inferentiality, and a non-representative nature. Churchland 
may be wrong in thinking that this aspect of folk psychology is eliminable. 
 Low-level content does not seem to be eliminable or fully captured by 
high-level influences. Goldman‟s argument to the contrary seems to me to be 
far more cogent. As he notes: „If there were no awareness prior to the 
acquisition of such concepts, it is difficult to see how [high-level concepts] 
could ever be acquired.‟ And again: „one cannot be trained to be conscious ex 
nihilo.‟ (p. 148.) One may feel, at this point, just like Wittgenstein „uttering 
inarticulate sounds‟ if Churchland‟s suggestions were true, for it is difficult, in 
the terms of his account, to see how and why consciousness itself could have 
arisen, if the central factors for observational experience were simply training, 
education and an inferential background of theory. Evolution itself clearly does 
not seem to facilitate such jumps in cognitive competence. On the terms of the 
inferentialist proposal, the naked ape might well have been a language-using 
beast, but not one that is conscious of his sensations. But things simply did not 
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turn out that way. Because things didn‟t turn out that way would seem to 
indicate that, for essentially evolutionary reasons, some sort of low-level, 
sensational experiences may have come before the imposition of various 
high-level features. The sensory order would seem to precede the epistemic 
order in terms of informational priority. 
 Churchland does not separate and distinguish the various elements of 
high-level inference nor set limits on their application. Obviously, animals do 
not have very sophisticated concepts or theories, and they don‟t have language; 
however they do have qualitative low-level experiences in some sense. 
Similarly, we do too when we experience colour hues and visual field 
enlargements and other low-level contentful states. Churchland risks 
over-emphasising the use of high-level influences on experiences, such as the 
inculcation of theories and language. And he thereby gives himself no room to 
move away from the counterintuitive implications of the inferentialist 
proposal.530  
 Of course, none of the points raised above constitute refutations of 
Churchland‟s views. However, it is suggested that neither the eliminative nor 
nominalist strand in Churchland‟s argument necessarily supports his 
eliminative materialism. 
11.12 Churchland’s cousins revisited  
To return to Churchland‟s example of the perceptual reports of alien beings, it 
seems clear where the mistake lies. The mistake is the same as that of the 
inferentialist proposal generally. Adopting the inferentialist proposal holus 
bolus amounts to thesis overkill. His analysis of one of his own thought 
experiments was that because one had to look at the visual claims of the 
(infrared) aliens expressing temperature reports (rather than colour reports) it 
follows that the alleged „phenomenal properties‟ given in such claims no longer 
seem to feature in such discourse, except in the form of the semantics of 
implicative and mutually reinforcing sentences within a theory of some sort, 
and can really drop out of the analysis entirely.  
 But Churchland‟s conclusion certainly begs the important issue. 
Homophonic translation does not guarantee the redundancy of low-level, 
sensational contents, even in the case of the fictional caloric and infrared cases. 
(This is especially so if the RPT and psychological nominalism fail on 
independent grounds.) That one can trade off one kind of sentence with another 
                                                 
530  Keith Campbell‟s legitimation of a „mild enough regulatory role‟ for observational 
experience is apposite here: „A modest philosophy of common sense is content to affirm that, as 
things have so far developed, there is no theory with sufficient authority to discredit the bulk of 
observational common sense judgements, there does not seem to be any likelihood that such a 
revolutionary development is just around the corner.‟ K. Campbell, „Philosophy and Common 
Sense‟, p. 173.  
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for certain experiences, does not say either that there are no such experiences or 
even that they are theoretically penetrable. Query: what precisely do the 
thought experiments establish?  
 What the examples suggest is that the way one describes one‟s experiences 
depends crucially upon the kind of theory that one holds. If one was brought up 
in a caloric society, one would describe heat experiences in terms of caloric 
descriptions. But what Churchland wants to show from such examples, is that 
the theory one learns changes the experiences one is having. This inculcation of 
theory gives enough principled reasons for the elimination of the „folk 
psychology‟ of sensational experiences. But to this end, the cases offered do not 
unambiguously corroborate such a view, as Fodor observes: 
The theory neutrality of perception isn‟t about the impact of one‟s beliefs 
upon how one describes one‟s experiences; it‟s about the impact of one‟s 
beliefs upon one‟s experiences. ... The thought experiment about caloric 
shows that some of the ways that we describe our experiences change 
with changes in theory.... but what Churchland needs is that all of the 
ways we describe our experiences are (in principle) theory sensitive. In 
effect, he needs to argue that there can be no theory-neutral observation 
vocabulary even if there is theory neutral observation.531 
There is something of a faux pas here. At one point, Fodor is saying that 
descriptions have nothing to do with the theory neutral nature of experience; at 
another point he describes the problem in terms of whether or not the ways we 
describe our experiences are theory sensitive. Of course, one can hold either of 
these claims depending on how one places the stress on the problem, and how 
one understands the theory/observation distinction: Fodor seems to oscillate 
here between taking the neutrality thesis to be a legitimation of positivism; 
later, he takes it to be a refutation of inferentialism. (On the one hand, the 
neutral nature of experiential content is not of a descriptive kind at all; on the 
other, it is not entirely sensitive to descriptions). However, knowing Fodor‟s 
emphasis in other papers,532 we can rule out positivism as being the focus, and 
see the point being about sensitivity to descriptive content.  
 But there is a further point here: these wildly different claims are thus only on 
the assumption that inference/non-inference are exclusive and discrete 
possibilities; and, as argued with the continuum account, there is no a priori 
reason why this should be true. One can have experiential content without 
having positivism, and one can have degrees of inferential penetration without 
inferentialism. So the two options above are not as exclusive as the above 
criticism makes out.  
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532 J. A. Fodor, „The Dogma that didn‟t Bark (A Fragment of a Naturalized Epistemology)‟.  
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 Peacocke provides a more detailed and telling criticism of Churchland‟s 
examples which brings out a different point. What the infrared case establishes, 
at best, is that the homophonic mapping of the vocabularies is an appropriate 
means of preserving a certain kind of content in translation. This sort of claim in 
itself does not say much, for we are able to disagree about the notion of 
„content‟ and importantly whether there is a sense in which one can speak of a 
critical, but yet non-translatable content. The issue is strategic: it is one thing to 
establish translation at one level, and quite another to claim that all aspects of 
informational content are thus preserved homophonically. One could argue that 
Churchland has established the former, but not the latter. Quite consistent with 
the imagined case, it could be claimed that there are features of perceptual 
content which simply cannot be translated in such a manner, because there are 
aspects of experience which are, in my terms, sensational and non-descriptive. 
This, precisely, is how a continuum account might reinterpret the point at issue. 
Churchland argues that the word „hot‟ applied by ... beings on the basis of 
their visual experiences, should be given a homophonic translation into 
our language. I agree with this conclusion, but would offer a different 
reason for it. Homophonic translation is correct here because when we 
cannot in translation preserve both mode of presentation and property 
presented, it is more important for communication and understanding to 
preserve the latter. (Ideal translation would preserve both). On this 
position, one can consistently hold that in Churchland‟s example, 
homophonic translation is correct, while also holding (a) that types of 
experience still help to determine the mode of presentation of a property, 
and (b) that any given physical property presented to us in one way may 
be presented to other beings in some other way.533  
For „types of experience‟ here, read: impurely sensational content. It is 
suggested that such content is immune to Churchland‟s inferentialist approach. 
The argument here is: Churchland‟s story about homophonic translation does 
not unambiguously support the conclusion he wants to support; ergo it does not 
necessarily help his cause. That there may not even be such thing as an ideal 
translation of the content at issue here is of no moment. In what has been argued 
elsewhere, all this should be hardly surprising. If there are broadly two different 
kinds of content to experience, and only one kind can be adequately captured 
and expressed in terms of descriptions, „that‟ clauses, inferential content, 
theory, etc., then it would be a rather remarkable feat to translate all content 
required in a straight „homophonic‟ shift. As argued, however, if there are 
aspects of experiences which constitute distinct features of experiential content, 
there may not be a way to express such features in terms which would be 
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required simply to preserve high-level communication. I thus take the point that 
Peacocke makes as both a rejection of the way Churchland has interpreted the 
cases in question and as a pillar in support of my own view. Churchland has not 
established that all content is captured by descriptions which can be translated 
from one being to another; he has, at best, established that the best way of 
preserving descriptive content in this case is to preserve it homophonically. 
However, my interest here is not what can be preserved homophonically, but 
what can’t be so preserved.  
 If we take the arguments mustered earlier as carrying any weight, it is clear 
that Churchland has not demonstrated that all descriptions are inferentially 
labile, let alone that all observational experiences are so sensitive. To suggest 
that the caloric case advanced could be extended very easily from a useful 
fiction to a case of fact, is just to beg the issue that descriptive content can be 
conflated with sensational content, which should instead be kept separate. This 
is, of course, to beg the question in the other direction, but this has not been 
done without argument. The point is that even if the caloric case could be 
extended to us, it would not show anything useful about the content of 
experience at very low-levels, because we can preserve communication by 
homophonic translation without translating all of the content of interest. 
Low-level, sensational content may well be left untranslated. And, as argued in 
previous chapters, there is a sense in which low-level, impurely sensational 
content does exist and constitutes an important and valuable feature of 
experiences.  
 Churchland‟s caloric and infrared cases do not unambiguously support his 
claims. Indeed, the way we view the alien reports gives us reason to react one 
way or the other to Churchland‟s scenario. If we take sensational contents to be 
post hoc to detailed inferential descriptions of proximal impingings, then we 
would react as Churchland does to such a story. On this view, epistemology is 
the slave of metaphysics and not its arbiter. So, experiential content is 
secondary or comprehensible only in terms of theory and we have to learn the 
theory to describe the experience. If, however, we take there to be a distinction 
between low-level content and its descriptive articulations, then we come to a 
different conclusion: the descriptions presuppose non-descriptive contents, and 
that such contents may be experienced in various ways by certain beings 
physiologically equipped to have such experiences. No justice can be done 
describing the content of such experiences, because the contents of inference 
and sensation occur at a number of interestingly distinct levels. Even if we are 
asked to imagine that homophonic translation is to be preserved in this case, the 
inferentialist view gains no ground: for what constitutes the criterion for 
asserting and describing is not ex hypothesi what constitutes the ground for 
having certain qualitative experiences on my view. (Of course, the usual 
proviso here is that, on the continuum theory, there may be a multitude of 
different degrees in which high-level features and low-level aspects may 
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intersect.)  
 If this can be granted then it would seem that the import of the cases 
Churchland offers only creates problems for sensational experiences if one 
assumes the inferentialist proposal. If one assumes a continuum account then 
they are idle threats. No satisfaction can be had from pursuing this line of 
approach for either party. Churchland‟s fictional examples clearly do not rule 
out a continuum account of content. 
11.13 Theory change: eliminativism reconsidered 
The is another line of criticism that needs to be made on Churchland‟s views. 
This is the one that mentioned with respect to his adoption of Kuhn‟s idea of 
paradigm shifts as a vindication of radical replacement eliminativism. It was 
suggested that Churchland has, in embracing a Kuhnian picture of 
inter-theoretic relations, assumed the very model of which he stands in defence. 
This claim will now be elaborated. The argument will be that Churchland‟s 
understanding of the Kuhnian thesis that he has adopted is oversimplified, and 
that is really no defence of his position at all. 
 It is not surprising that eliminative materialists look to Kuhn‟s book, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, to support their own suspicions about 
certain theories. The emphasis that Kuhn places on the role of revolutionary 
change, and (in particular) incommensurability, seems very much at the heart of 
the eliminativist‟s program. It is precisely these sorts of considerations that 
justify any form of theoretical eliminativism whatever. If one is to substantiate 
the claim that the ontological commitments of folk psychology must eventually 
give way to a superior theory, one must hold a certain view of inter-theoretic 
relations that embraces theoretical incommensurability, and one must hold that 
the career of theories is an evolutionary process whereby one theory naturally 
gives way to another. One cannot, it seems, be an eliminative materialist unless 
one has favoured one or other of these assumptions. (Of course, one can say that 
these processes sometimes go on, and that certain cases fit this model, but this 
would amount to a significantly weaker thesis than that offered by Churchland. 
It would certainly not be enough to bring folk psychology under such 
suspicion.)  
 In a paper by Robert McCauley, the point is also taken that this elimination 
process can be often quite radical and can extend beyond the simple matter of 
which theory is better (and which needs to be eliminated) along the lines of 
certain criteria; in fact, the elimination process often gives rise to a whole new 
range of data with which theories can be concerned, and which guide further 
research. McCauley notes:  
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The upheaval that follows ... theory replacement is comprehensive, often 
overthrowing the entire research tradition associated with the older theory 
- including its accompanying problems, methods and ontology. Attending 
the new theory is a new research programme whose specifics emerge as 
the theory develops - generating, in its turn, new problems, new research 
projects and even new facts.534  
Such is the flavour of Feyerabend‟s philosophy of science, and, in effect, 
Churchland‟s philosophy of mind. The „new facts‟ in the eliminative 
materialist‟s program are the data emerging from microphysics. However, it is 
not obvious that the arguments for Churchland‟s eliminativism successfully 
exclude the possibility of alternative accounts. As has been claimed, an 
inferentialist response is in error in respect of conflating descriptive features 
with sensational features: where the former is a feature of high-level features 
such as theories, the latter is not. It thus does not seem to me to be sufficient (or 
feasible) to eliminate sensational features of experience by overemphasising the 
importance of the epistemic order. Several reasons have already been given for 
rejecting some of the themes underpinning this proposal.  
 Churchland does not pretend that the relation between the theories he has 
chosen to look at is in any way contiguous; as we have seen earlier he shows 
that he holds some minor reservations about how exactly the replacement is 
going to occur between the experiential commitments of common-sense 
psychology and microphysics and he adds that it is unlikely to occur in any 
unified way, but in a way which overlaps and meets parts of common-sense 
psychology, while discarding others. This seems to indicate that Churchland‟s 
thesis (by his own admission) must be tempered moderately.535  
 It is clear also, however, that by making this sort of claim, Churchland has a 
motive: he is trying to account for the rather obvious fact that theories differ in 
the degree to which they are related and are replaced; in many cases, the process 
here can be straightforward and continuous, but in other cases, relations 
between rivalling theories make the eliminative procedure difficult to instigate 
or observe. Certainly, even a brief survey of the history of theoretical advances 
in science reveals that this is something that Churchland must acknowledge, if 
his thesis is going to have any bite at all.536 Churchland seems to assume that the 
                                                 
534 R. N. McCauley, 'Intertheoretic Relations and the Future of Psychology', p. 81.  
535 „We must be prepared to count reducibility as a matter of degree. Like translation, which 
may be faithful or lame, reduction may be smooth, bumpy or anywhere in between.‟ 
Churchland, (1979), op. cit., p. 84 
536 A good example of theories where this continuous process was easy to observe was between 
the Lamarckian and the Darwinian theories of evolution. An example of a discontinuous 
relation between theories is that of Aether theory and Relativity. In the first case, the reason the 
transformation between theories was relatively continuous and problem free, was probably 
because the translation of the terms and predictions therein were „smooth‟ and the superiority of 
  329 
Kuhnian account of intertheoretic relations needs no modification; however, 
there are reasons to take a more subtle account seriously.  
 Robert McCauley makes some interesting additions to the usual Kuhnian 
scheme of things. What he suggests is that all the talk that Churchland makes 
about inter-theoretic relations and theoretical replacement, is deficient by two 
considerations: it neglects to include both the notions of levels of analysis and 
temporality in theory comparison.  
 Though we are usually willing to acknowledge levels of analysis in science 
(we are reasonably willing to uphold the idea that the universe is organised into 
discrete parts which can be individually studied), it is also true that we tend to 
forget this when we read Kuhn. We tend, instead, to think that in a uni-level 
context, certain theories (say, theories of physics), naturally evolve, change and 
supplant one another. But we forget that this sort of prediction occurs and 
makes sense only at a single level of analysis over time. This does nothing, 
McCauley notes, to clear up those relations between theories which occur at a 
different level of analysis at the same time. McCauley adopts the terms intra 
level, successional and diachronic to describe the former theoretical relations, 
and inter level or synchronic to refer to the second type of intertheoretical 
context, suggesting that there is good reason to include this broader schema to 
account for the diversity of actual theoretical relationships.  
 Good examples of each abound in the history of science and reflect the 
complexity of the situation, with theories lying anywhere along a continuum 
within each category, and in some cases overlapping into other categories. The 
relation between biochemistry and genetics in the 1950s and (earlier) the 
relation between the Freudian and behaviourist theories of psychopathology 
illustrate the need for an inter level category, as here the theories in question 
differ contextually along functional and structural lines. But although this 
shows examples of different levels of analysis occurring at the same time, there 
is also a need for intra level contexts as well, where theories of the same level of 
analysis occur over time. A good example of this latter type of context is not 
hard to find, as it is usually this type of context that is advanced by Kuhnian and 
post-Kuhnian theorists (like Churchland) to vindicate one or other form of 
eliminativism or abolitionism. The case of the relations between Aristotelian 
                                                                                                                               
the one theory could be assessed on the basis of criteria common to both. (The transition from 
Lamarckian to Darwinian theory was strictly a matter of partial replacement; retaining the 
process of evolution, but changing the mechanism). This was not, however, the case with the 
(incommensurable?) relations between the theories of the second type. Here, a major 
transformation in thinking was required a) just to understand the predictions and claims of 
Relativity over its rival; and b) to see how it offered a more cogent explanation of the physical 
problems at the time. Additionally, the adoption of bold new concepts (such as the Mass/Energy 
and the Space-Time equations), the stability of other concepts (the constancy of the speed of 
light) and the abandonment of others (absolute simultaneity) were necessary conditions of 
seeing how the new theory offered a replacement at all.  
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and Newtonian physics, or Newtonian and Relativistic physics are good cases 
in point, as these examples show where theories supplant, correct and 
eventually eliminate (to a greater or lesser extent) one another in the course of a 
development of a given theoretical level of analysis.  
 McCauley‟s point, however, is that while this does go on, there is a „shallow‟ 
and a „deep‟ end to both inter and intra level contexts which are often 
overlooked, and which depend on the amount of explanatory mapping between 
rival theories. In many cases of intra level contexts for instance, it may not be 
sensible to speak of an elimination of one theory by another (some argue this 
with regard to Newtonian and Relativistic mechanics) but instead of a 
redundancy of parts of certain theories by others. This process may occur 
gradually and inconsequentially, if there happens to be a high degree of 
explanatory mapping between theories, or (at the other end of the spectrum) a 
radical replacement process may go on if one or other theory fails to generate 
any similarity in its predictions at all, and in this case a new paradigm may be 
born.  
 On the other hand, within the category of inter level contexts (different levels 
at the same time), substantial explanatory overlap between two theories will not 
generate elimination or replacement in any degree, but an accommodation of 
one with the other to give a more useful overall picture of some given 
phenomenon with different levels of analysis. (As is the case with theories such 
as chemistry and sub-atomic physics or biochemistry and cell biology, etc.) 
Here it is not sensible to speak of one eliminating the other, but, instead, how 
they are to be linked in order that a full and complete description of something 
can be given.  
 This situation compares unfavourably to an instance of two (or more) inter 
level theories with little explanatory overlap (high incommensurability) which 
are inherently ontologically discontinuous to start with. These sorts of 
theoretical contexts are vastly different from the type of contexts that 
Churchland was trying to describe. His thesis presents a confusion of both 
levels. According to McCauley, the mistake Churchland has made has been to 
take the relation between inter level (like intra level) contexts as providing 
necessary and sufficient reasons for theory elimination and change. But 
although this is reasonable to grant in the case of theories which concern 
themselves with the same level of analysis over time, it is unwarrantable to 
expect the same treatment with theories which deal with different levels of 
analysis at the same time as the case between „objective‟ microphysics and 
„subjective‟ psychology illustrates. The error in this case would be to conflate 
two different types of theoretical contexts and to treat them as one, and so, to 
obfuscate the complexities and dynamics of theory choice. 
 If it can be argued that levels of analysis can feature in an important 
characterisation of explanations generally, then elimination should only 
proceed, strictly speaking, when the theoretical cases are examples of intra 
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level contexts with high incommensurability. However, it may turn out that 
features of folk psychological explanations are not in this category and exhibit 
explanatory utility at a different level than microphysical explanations. The 
thing to note in this revised schema is that: „the relation of psychology and 
neuroscience is one (as Churchland has emphasised) between theories. The 
crucial point, however, is that these theories operate at different levels of 
analysis.‟537 If it is plausible to suppose that one can have different theories and 
take them as accommodating explanations to some phenomena, not as rivals, 
then Churchland‟s eliminativism need not work for every aspect of 
common-sense folk psychology (only for parts of it). Furthermore, if 
Churchland‟s arguments for perceptual plasticity, psychological nominalism 
and the theory dependence of content do not work on independent grounds, 
there is a good chance that low-level content constitutes a part of folk 
psychological lore that simply escapes elimination for these reasons.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the various assumptions that underpin Churchland‟s eliminative 
materialism have been considered. It was argued that none of these assumptions 
necessarily support an eliminative view of content and that other approaches to 
this matter are worth considering. This brings us full circle to the continuum 
account. Aspects of experiential content - in particular, subjective phenomenal 
features - may well stand alongside theories and inferential descriptions of 
experiences without explanatory dissonance or incoherence. The various 
aspects of perceptual experience may well have evolved as an organism‟s 
functional way of adapting to certain features which are central to its survival. 
In the next chapter it will be argued that a property dualist account of the mind 
should be taken seriously. 
                                                 
537 McCauley op. cit., p.196. 
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12. Experience and 
Subjectivity 
Experience is not the sole foundation of our knowledge of the world, but a 
place must be found for it as part of the world, however different that 
world may be from the way it is depicted in experience.538  
Introducing dual-aspect theory 
 
12.1 Introduction 
Experiential content has been looked at so far in relation to perceptual, 
cognitive and evolutionary considerations. The position offered in this book is 
an account that allows for interestingly distinct levels of experience along a 
content continuum. In this chapter, low-level contents will be looked at in terms 
of an issue in the philosophy of mind - the subjective qualities of mental states 
or „qualia‟. Here, the case for taking a „dual-aspect‟ theory of the mind will be 
considered. Nagel‟s property dualist views will first be outlined and serious 
problems with them will be exposed. However, it shall be argued that a 
plausible account of Nagel‟s position can be given which stands in support of 
the claims made in this book. The position arrived at will thus stand in support 
of a revised account of Nagel‟s views and a continuum theory of content. 
12.2 The subjective and the objective 
Nagel‟s main concern is with a very traditional polarity; specifically: „how to 
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combine perspectives of a particular person inside the world with an objective 
view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint.‟539 It is the traditional 
distinction between the subjective and the objective that is at issue and the aim 
is to reconcile the two views so as to make a close-knit metaphysical position. 
These views occur in his work on a number of levels in relation to a number of 
philosophical problems. However, the subject/object dichotomy is the common 
thread linking each of the problems.  
 Nagel‟s aims are most obvious in his famous essay „What is it like to be a 
Bat?‟540 where he is concerned with not just the subject/object distinction, but 
also the traditional problem of consciousness, which he defines as what it is like 
to be a particular organism. To be a „conscious‟ human being is to know 
(subjectively) what it is like to be a human being. To be a bat is to be conscious 
of the subjective features of whatever bats are conscious of. Consciousness is 
inextricably tied to this feature of knowing what it is like to be a particular 
organism. This feature of consciousness is also described as having a particular 
subjective point of view.  
 Nagel argues that this definition brings to light a long overlooked 
assumption: it would seem that any theory of consciousness, be it dualism, 
materialism or functionalism, must, by necessity, know what it is like in some 
sense to be conscious, in order to be able to subsume or reduce the phenomenon 
of consciousness under its explanatory paradigm; it must, in other words, have 
some gauge of comparison. A reductionist theory of consciousness, for 
example, must have an idea of what it is that needs to be reduced or else the 
theory will not work (nor, indeed, will it make sense even to speak of a 
„reduction‟). As he puts it:  
 [W]ithout some idea of what the subjective character of experience is, we 
cannot know what is required of physicalist theories - any reductionist 
program has to be based on an analysis of what it is to be reduced.541 
We must thus treat consciousness as a phenomenon, and not be dismissive of 
radical new solutions in trying to explain its complex nature - certainly we 
should not jump on the eliminative materialists‟ bandwagon too soon. We may 
be reductionists in our theoretical outlook, but reduction does not entail 
elimination for precisely the reason that Nagel mentions.  
 He is hard-lined on this „ineliminable‟ aspect of subjectivity for several 
reasons. It seems to him that if one begins at the outset to embrace a theoretical 
stance which assumes that mental states are objective (and can be explained by 
some advanced neurophysiology), then although one may be playing the right 
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540 Thomas Nagel, „What is it like to be a Bat?‟, Rpt.in Mortal Questions.  
541 Nagel, op. cit., p. 167. 
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cards as far as an objective understanding of mind goes, one has nonetheless 
omitted from consideration something crucial: that is, what mental states are 
like for the creature that is having them. Experiences as experienced, he states, 
are ultimately nothing over and above the subjective experience of them, and 
although an experience may have objective aspects to it, it is not the same thing 
as what one is experiencing subjectively. The issue of bat experiences, of 
course, is invoked to highlight the issue dramatically: for how is any objective 
account of such an organism to compare with the radical distinctness of how 
bats and humans actually experience things? Even though one may be able to 
develop a very complex objective neurophysiological understanding of both 
human and bat sensory modalities (and understand precisely how each works), 
one still could not imagine what it is like to experience things as a bat 
experiences them and (presumably) vice versa. The difference here is thus one 
of subjective points of view, which seems, on the face of it, irreducible to an 
understanding of objective physiology. Further, the matter is not simply 
whether or not we (with our sensory modalities) can sufficiently imagine how a 
bat may experience things; rather, the question is what it is like for the bat itself 
to experience things. It would seem from this that there is an epistemic divide 
between objective and subjective points of view, because such viewpoints 
amount to being qualitatively distinct in some important sense. The two 
viewpoints are not reconcilable in any conventional way - they amount to being 
ineliminable and irreducible features of the world.  
 Does such an analysis beg the question? If this was Nagel‟s only justification 
for his position, then it would. But Nagel does present some arguments which 
will be explored later. First, there are a number of things that Nagel is not 
committing himself to which need pointing out here. A few caveats are in order, 
before a more critical discussion of the issue: 
 Caveat 1: First of all, Nagel is not abandoning objectivism as a philosophical 
proposal: he is, instead, amending it. He says: „I want not to abandon the idea of 
objectivity entirely, but rather to suggest that the physical is not its only 
interpretation.‟542 Elsewhere, he refers to the „bleached-out physical conception 
of objectivity‟ which „encounters difficulties if it is put forward as the method 
for seeking a complete understanding of reality.‟543 It is clear that Nagel is 
claiming rather less than that objectivism is false, and rather more than that only 
some sort of subjectivism can be true.  
 Caveat 2: What Nagel is suggesting with his subjective/objective distinction 
is what he calls the „dual-aspectivity‟ of mind; a conception of the problem in 
terms of two distinct features. He is not advocating a dualistic position like that 
of Descartes, nor is he suggesting that there need be anything mystical about 
subjective points of view, that no new way of thinking can hope to uncover. 
                                                 
542 Ibid., p. 17. 
543 Ibid., p. 15. Italics mine. 
  
 335 
Nagel nowhere claims that because mental states, points of view, etc., 
seemingly cannot be explained by any physiological reduction, that there has to 
be something non-physical or ethereal about them. In fact, he rebukes this 
interpretation entirely by claiming that even if we conclude that mental events 
are not simply physical events, „it does not follow that we can explain their 
place in the universe by summoning up a type of substance whose sole function 
is to provide them with a medium.‟544 
 Something non-physical, without mass, energy or spatial dimensions, would 
make it no easier at all to explain the subjective features of mental content - it 
would, in fact, make the explanation that much more puzzling. Substance 
dualism is an implausible thesis. But just as Nagel does not want to embrace 
dualism of this kind, he does not want to embrace an explanatory physicalism or 
reductionism either. Physical things can be in states which, according to Nagel, 
„cannot, because of their subjective character, be reduced to physical terms.‟545 
 Caveat 3: If Nagel is not a dualist in the Cartesian sense, it should also be 
noted he is no „idealist‟ either. Idealism, for Nagel, rests upon a mistake as 
serious as that of physicalist positions. Both assume that one particular point of 
view and one privileged strategy is the strategy for an understanding of what is 
real about ourselves and the world around us - an outlook which is quite against 
the dual-aspect line that he advocates. Where objectivist positions try to tell us 
that the only true way of understanding is a „view from nowhere‟; a view 
beyond experiential subjectivism to things as they really are, Idealism (pace 
Berkeley) tries to tell us that those things are, in effect, an illusion, and have 
being only insofar as they are integral parts of subjectivity as mind-constituted 
„ideas.‟ But Nagel sees problems with both these approaches and expounds 
neither. Both, in his view, assume that one „aspect‟ alone will do the job of 
explaining all there is to explain: idealism, to Berkeley, does more than give an 
account of ideas (it in fact tells us that ideas are all there can be), while 
objectivism, to the physicalist, attempts more than an explanation of „physical‟ 
phenomena, (it tells us that all there can be are objectively understood physical 
things and processes).546 However, it is simply false that nothing exists other 
than subjective „ideas‟ or physical states - the only problem is that neither 
position is willing to admit that both do, and that their positions fail to embrace 
them. Idealism gives us no way of obtaining an ontology of how things are 
independent of „personal experiential perspectives‟ and leads to scepticism and 
solipsism; objectivism gives no account of how a „centreless‟ world can 
accommodate subjective points of view. Either way one is faced with 
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546 This is why Nagel refers to physicalism at one stage as a form of idealism; in his words: „An 
Idealism of restricted objectivity‟. op. cit., (1986), p. 26. 
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difficulties which seem to suggest that both approaches are in error.547  
 Nagel‟s position, then, is not sympathetic to substance dualism; nor is it 
sympathetic to objectivism and idealism because all of these positions, in his 
view, collapse the distinction between what each takes to be important 
ontologically, and what is ultimately real. The contrary suggestion is to 
acknowledge that both physical things (seen and felt objectively) and mental 
states (seen and felt subjectively) are real, and what this amounts to is neither a 
dualism of the kind that a Cartesian would embrace nor an idealism that 
Berkeley would affirm. The result, for Nagel, is the admission that both the 
mental and the physical are features of the world in some sense. Hence 
„dual-aspect‟ theory.  
 Caveat 4: Nagel is not suggesting that subjectivity is a private, 
incommunicable affair. Nagel is quite happy to agree, for instance, with the 
points made by the later Wittgenstein about public criteria that any language 
must fulfil. A „private‟ language is certainly no language at all, and it makes no 
sense to say that one has privileged access to one‟s points of view or subjective 
experiences via such a language. So, Nagel is not on about languages, public or 
private, in his philosophy, and his position does not at all broach Wittgenstein‟s 
central arguments. Moreover, he says explicitly that: „Mental concepts do not 
refer to logically private objects of awareness.‟548 It is clear, then, that the claim 
about the subjective nature of experience is not, simultaneously, a claim about 
incorrigibility, or privacy for that matter. Despite these points of clarification, it 
is still hard to see what the upshot of this line of thought is in precise terms. This 
is brought out more clearly in another central text.  
12.3 The ‘View from Nowhere’  
Nagel‟s emphasis in The View from Nowhere is to develop the idea that there 
are irreducible differences between subjective and objective conceptions of 
self, as suggested previously, but this time through exploring the progressive 
development of what he calls „objective‟ understanding throughout history. 
This he sees in terms of the following stages. Firstly, an objective outlook 
begins by seeing perception as caused by the action of the things upon us (and 
not vice versa, or by a contribution of the two). Secondly, the „true nature‟ of 
such things becomes separable from our perception of them and can thereby be 
capable of independent manipulation and analysis. Finally, the secondary 
qualities belonging to our perception of such things (as they appear to us in 
experience) can then be made to „drop out of‟ the analysis, and the underlying 
primary qualities (the properties such things are thought to possess 
intrinsically) can be comprehended in their own terms. He is here dealing very 
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much with the career of science, which he is calling an analysis of „objective 
understanding.‟ The process of „detaching oneself farther and farther from the 
human viewpoint‟ is a symptom of the long tradition of the method of scientific 
„objective understanding‟ as it has come to be known to us historically.549  
 Nagel acknowledges, without hesitation or regret, that such an understanding 
has proved, both epistemologically and heuristically, „extremely fruitful.‟ He 
notes that „understanding of the physical world has expanded enormously with 
the aid of theories and explanations that use concepts not tied specifically to the 
specifically human perceptual viewpoint.‟550 This „detached understanding‟ is 
the critical feature of any objective world view, and it stands in dramatic relief 
to what he has referred to as the „subjective.‟ For only the former can be 
expressed in mathematical terms and can be empirically corroborated, whereas 
the latter seems immune from any analysis at all. The claim here, however, is 
that though such an understanding has been extremely fruitful, giving us an 
unparalleled mastery of nature, it does not seem capable of extension beyond its 
objective domain. And since it does not do this, it seems, on Nagel‟s view, to be 
a less embracing, less exhaustive way of viewing the world than it purports to 
be. He suggests at several points that such a strategy is inherently limited, and, 
as a consequence, it should not surprise us if objectivity itself is essentially 
incomplete.551 Thus, ... „[any] attempt to give a complete account of the world 
in objective terms detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false 
reductions or to outright denial that certain patently real phenomena exist at 
all.‟552 
 The point is that an „objective‟, theoretical understanding is seriously flawed 
when it comes to trying to illuminate the nature of felt, qualitative experiences. 
However, such experiential contents are „patently real phenomena‟ even if they 
cannot be understood in terms of a scientific, objective understanding, but only 
„from the inside‟. Nagel withdraws from an „objective‟ type of analysis of 
human subjectivity because he assumes that it is in principle unable to handle 
the weight of what is the province of sentient human experience. Just as bat 
experiences and bat physiology are quite different things if one is to be true to 
either, so all the pursuit of an „objective understanding‟ is ever likely to yield is 
a diluted comprehension of the difference between such conceptions. Thus the 
possibility of „explaining‟ philosophical problems by detaching ourselves 
farther and farther from our subjective points of view and moving towards an 
objective view, a „view from nowhere‟, is a long-standing trap according to 
Nagel. What are his arguments for this view? 
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12.4 The arguments (dilemmas of dual aspectivity) 
Nagel has some weak arguments to support the view that an objective 
understanding is inadequate, and one such argument is designed to show that 
any solely objective view is actually self-defeating. What he notes is that even 
an objective view itself requires a mental activity in order that such a 
conception can be formed, and in so far as it does this, an objective view is 
never wholly objective. Deciding to look at a thing objectively is a mental 
action, a subjective decision-making, and so an objective understanding always 
admits of a subjective realm even if it refuses to acknowledge it. (I take it that 
this is what is behind the remark: „The subjectivity of consciousness is an 
irreducible feature of reality - without which we couldn‟t do physics or 
anything else - and it must occupy as fundamental a place in any credible world 
view as matter, energy, space, time, and numbers.‟)553 Though this is far from a 
knock-down argument against reductionism, Nagel hopes it at least points out a 
certain pragmatic contradiction in the aims of any mono-aspect ontology. More 
than this, though, the claim is that the success of the strategy of „detached 
understanding‟ has influenced our thinking so that now we see things only in 
terms of whether or not they can be understood through the rigorous application 
of the objective strategy. However, perhaps this outlook is a Utopian dream as 
misguided in principle as Frege‟s program with formal languages or Kant‟s 
program with speculative metaphysics. He is emphatic on this point:  
We flee the subjective under the pressure of an assumption that 
everything must be something not to any point of view but in itself. To 
grasp this by detaching more and more of our own point of view, is the 
unreachable ideal to which the pursuit of objectivity aims.554 
Any shift to greater objectivity - that is, less attachment to a specific view 
point - does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it 
takes us farther away from it.555  
Nowhere does Nagel refuse to acknowledge the importance of the „objectivist‟ 
spirit qua scientific thinking and practice - on the contrary, he says of it that it is 
„the only way to expand our knowledge of what is beyond the way [things] 
appear to us.‟556 But he does not wish to ignore or pay scant regard to how 
things appear to us and to our subjective viewpoint either. Clearly, such a move 
does not seem to follow either logically or intuitively from the usefulness of 
objectivist practices, and when it is pointed out in such terms (stripped of the 
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influence of the success of the physical sciences), it seems unreasonable to 
suppose that it ever could. Putting it another way: the falsity of Cartesian 
dualism does not entail the truth of objectivist physicalism; and, neither does 
the truth of objectivism entail the falsity of all forms of dualism. It is not 
inconceivable that a kind of dualism of properties could be true, despite the 
legitimacy of the „point of view‟ of physicalism being acknowledged, and 
despite the rejection of substance dualism being upheld. Nagel‟s view trades on 
this very real hiatus between these familiar conceptions.  
 By his own admission, his position here is short on argument and long on 
„wild speculation.‟ However, the concern of combining what he takes to be the 
irreducible subjective point of view with an objective point of view, ultimately, 
does not get off the ground. He concludes (unhelpfully) that nothing fruitful can 
be said about how to make this amalgamation at the present time. This is a 
devastating anti-climax to the grandiose vision that he engages us to imagine.557 
The problem, as he sees it, is how to gain for ourselves some sort of „general 
concept of experience,‟558 an „expanded understanding,‟559 which encompasses 
all points of view and which reduces none; but how to go about this, Nagel 
simply tells us, is beyond our comprehension at our current level of awareness, 
and only time will tell if this awareness is ever possible. It is, then, a futuristic 
solution on which Nagel‟s case rests: we will have to wait until philosophy 
develops more (and, correspondingly, we can understand ourselves better), 
before that solution is forthcoming. To facilitate this, philosophers should work 
towards trying to dismantle the types of understanding which fail to 
acknowledge things as basic as subjective experience and to develop deeper 
ways of understanding which admit them, but essentially this is complementary 
to the task rather than decisive for it. The main thing is to wait for a natural 
evolutionary change in how we see ourselves and the world around us, a change 
which will come of its own design, and to which we will be receptive when it 
does. There is plenty of textual evidence that this is the sort of thing he has in 
mind: what he appears to mean, is that, optimally, we need to move toward 
some sort of „generalised objectivity‟, not a particular (physicalist) version of it. 
And, just as it is hard now to understand concepts of reality which will be 
developed five centuries hence, so it is hard now to imagine now what such a 
„general concept of experience‟ would be like. But this shouldn‟t rule out the 
idea unless we are already unwilling to „set the limits of objectivity‟ beyond our 
own ordinary viewpoint.560  
 Nagel claims that this is the kind of project which is needed for understanding 
                                                 
557 He forewarns us of this early:„What I have to say about these questions is not unified 
enough to deserve that title‟. Ibid., (1986) p. 3. 
558 Ibid., p. 21. 
559 Ibid., p. 19. 
560 Ibid., p. 22. 
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the relation between mind and body. He argues that any correct theory of the 
relation between mind and body requires „a new understanding of the 
phenomena now thought of as physical.‟561 
 The main justification that Nagel gives for these kinds of claims is very thin: 
it appears to be that, although we are currently enmeshed in an objectivist way 
of thinking, we would never wish to deny that it couldn‟t be extended beyond 
its current domain. The history of science has shown that it is quite natural for 
paradigms to point to, and encompass, things to which they currently do not 
apply, and we have come to understand ourselves and the things around us 
better as a result. (As he puts it: „Only a dogmatic verificationist would deny the 
possibility of forming objective conceptions beyond our current capacity to 
apply them.‟)562 This is a legitimate claim, of course. The philosophy of science 
has been instructive in that the way in which any successful scientific paradigm 
works is to remain open to future developments; if it does not (and to a certain 
extent all such paradigms have a limited lifetime) then it will sooner or later 
have to bear the weight of a recalcitrant observation, and be eventually 
supplanted by a more worthy theoretical successor. Here, however, Nagel is 
suggesting that because this is generally true of scientific paradigms, it is also 
true of paradigms like „objectivity‟, and that, like other paradigms of thought, 
this too can be extended beyond its current application into areas which it 
hitherto failed to acknowledge. In other words, because scientific paradigms of 
thought shift and change, then it is a logical progression for a shift to take place 
beyond the paradigm of objectivity itself. The claim is that this paradigm will 
eventually break down into something wider when we eventually realise its 
shortcomings. The hope is that this process will include the subjective, and will 
breakdown the distinction between first and third person ascriptions regarding 
points of view. The new way of thinking would presumably be a deeper 
experiential objectivity than we currently possess, and of which we at the 
moment have absolutely no conception at all.  
 Nagel‟s approach here is very unconventional. There are many other ways 
philosophers have tried to bridge the subjective/objective divide which do not 
rely on such an evolutionary development of thought. The following are some 
of the more usual possibilities. One direction in which a dual aspectivity might 
be maintained at some level is in the tradition of epiphenomenalism - a view 
which stresses that each mental kind possesses, in addition to its „appearance‟ 
properties, underlying physical causes, which alone are causally efficacious, 
and which can be discovered empirically. Another kind would be a property 
dualism (of my own preference), which allows causal interaction from mental 
kinds to physical properties as well. (The sui generis distinctness of low-level 
sensational content has been argued for in this book as has the idea that such 
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contents have an important causal role.) However, there are also other possible 
options available here. Materialist accounts also offer a way of bridging the 
subjective and objective realms. One such solution, along the lines of 
Davidson‟s anomalous monism, insists on a dualism in the sense that each 
mental event satisfying a mental property also satisfies at least one physical 
property token (though it is not nomologically nor conceptually reducible to it). 
A more robust variant, central state materialism, closes the gap by arguing for a 
strict definitional reduction of mental concepts to physical explanations by 
means of physical laws. Other less usual options argue that the mental and 
physical are both products of some third property of which they are distinct 
aspects as both heat and pressure of a gas are the products of the movement of 
its molecules).563  
 The first two options above are conventional property dualist accounts which 
claim that the mental is sui generis real, in some sense (though they disagree on 
the extent of the causal powers involved). The third and fourth kinds mentioned 
are strict materialist options: one an explanatory dualism which merely stresses 
the theoretical autonomy of mental descriptions (while insisting that the 
nomological connections between „mental‟ and „physical‟ can only be realised 
at physical levels of description); the other allowing the mental only in 
„conceptual‟ terms while insisting on explanatory/theoretical reduction (i.e., the 
mental has no existential import at all). The final views mentioned are 
dual-aspect theories in a somewhat less conventional, and more unclear, sense. 
Nagel will have to offer reasons to distinguish his view from these more 
orthodox positions, if he intends his own view to be genuinely different. We 
shall see later that Nagel‟s views and my own are closely linked.  
 A problem arises here when some of these options are considered. It is the 
difficulty of getting at whether Nagel is after an expanded conception of the 
mental and physical, or whether he is after an expanded ontology of the two. 
The options above offer quite different views on this question, and when 
compared to them even briefly, Nagel‟s position seems confused: for it appears 
he does not make it obvious that he sides with any of these alternatives, and yet 
he seems to employ and conflate all forms to some extent in developing his own 
view, never clearly distinguishing between them. He seems, in his 
metaphysically lighter moments, to want to identify mental and physical 
properties in a way which some future ontology will recognise, while somehow 
retaining their distinctness as conceptions in some sense. But, in his heavier 
moments, he acknowledges that all the orthodox relations between physical and 
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mental properties do not exhaust the possibility that there might be a stronger 
ontological distinctness between the two kinds of features. His remarks about 
bat experiences, for instance, seem to suggest this stronger claim. It is never 
obvious, in other words, the extent to which he sides with any standard form of 
bridging the gap between the mental and physical and to what degree he 
succeeds in articulating his own: 
Is [Nagel] identifying each human self with the human brain or is he 
identifying the property of being a self with the property of having a brain 
of the same physical kind as the human? ... In some places Nagel appears 
to commit himself to the stronger thesis... But [this] undermines his own 
insistence on the irreducibility of mental phenomena; for natural kind 
concepts precisely do admit of reduction to concepts specifying the 
empirical essence of the kind. Pains would be C-fibre stimulation in the 
way that heat is molecular motion. What it is like to be a bat might turn 
out to be a neural configuration. And so mental objectivity would be 
reducible to physical objectivity after all. The only way to block this 
result is to deny that mental kinds could be identical with physical kinds, 
... [which] allows for a duality of „aspects‟ only in the sense that the 
conceptions are distinct; but this is not enough to frustrate physical 
reduction.564 
The sense in which „conceptions‟ is being used here, clearly concurs with such 
views as central state materialism, where mental descriptions can be reduced to 
physical descriptions by means of laws of psychophysical correspondence. 
Here, „conceptions‟ means „ways of understanding and theorising/explaining 
the mental.‟ Central state materialists certainly think that the mental is distinct 
in this sense. Anomalous monists, by contrast, would allow for a reduction at 
the physical level but disallow strict psychophysical laws (claiming that mental 
descriptions nonetheless presuppose strict nomological connections). Of course 
property dualists, who regard the mental as a sui generis realm, would not 
regard this distinction of conceptions to be essential. In this view, features of 
„the mental‟ are not simply at matter of theorising/explaining; it is more than 
conceptual difference - it is a difference in content.  
 The issue is important, and some of Nagel‟s claims clearly do indicate an 
ambivalence on this matter. A selection of examples will give the flavour of 
some of the quite different positions suggested here, and how he vacillates on 
them: 
 
                                                 
564 C. McGinn, „The View from Nowhere‟, (Review) in Mind, 96 (1987): p. 266. 
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[D]ual aspect theory is committed to ... the picture of appearances as part 
of reality... The mind is after all a biological product. When the cat hears 
the doorbell, there must be something going on, literally in his head, not 
just in its furry little mind.565 
The subjective features of conscious mental processes ... cannot be 
captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the 
physical world.566 
[T]he mental properties would be at least supervenient on the physical - a 
particular type of physical process being a sufficient but not inevitably a 
necessary condition of a particular type of mental process.567 
[A]ccording to dual aspect theory both the mental and the physical 
properties of a mental event are essential properties of it - properties 
which it could not lack ... Presumably something similar would have to be 
true if mental processes had physical properties. ... Both must be essential 
components of a more fundamental essence.568 
Some of these passages admit merely a distinction in conceptions as being the 
crucial thing and the claim about supervenience seems, oddly, to make 
substantial concessions to a type-type identity theory, a position which Nagel 
completely eschews elsewhere. The theme of a distinction between 
conceptions, however, is consistent with most accounts of the mental and 
physical (as mentioned, even central state materialism allows for a distinction 
between „conceptions‟). However, it is clear that while in places Nagel seems to 
suggest a dualism of conceptions, elsewhere he suggests something quite 
different. In other places he refers to essential properties which are products of 
brain functioning, suggesting that some kind of property dualism is what he is 
after. However, the last passage - with its admission of a „fundamental essence‟ 
- sounds decidedly Spinozian, and seems to admit a more basic level wherein 
„subjective‟ and „objective‟ might feature as distinctly existing aspects of some 
„deeper‟ reality. These last points suggest more than a difference in 
conceptions, they suggest a difference in ontology. It certainly does not help in 
getting a grip on Nagel‟s position when he slips between alternatives so readily, 
and particularly when the options would seem to be inconsistent with each 
another.  
 Moreover, adopting the view of the „expanded understanding‟ that he seems 
to advocate doesn‟t help us in forming a clear opinion on what he is after either, 
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for the notion of „understanding‟ in relation to the above views is itself 
ambiguous: does a change of understanding in Nagel‟s sense mean a change of 
ontology, or a change in conceptions? Some of his statements seems to support 
the former; some the latter. Nagel does not disentangle these questions and 
seems to assert both claims. At some points the confusions even occur in the 
same passage: 
I have distinguished between reality and objective reality, and also 
between objectivity and particular conceptions of objectivity. ... [I]f we 
admit that there are things which cannot be understood in this [latter] 
way, then other ways of understanding them must be sought. One way is 
to enrich the notion of objectivity. But ... [r]eality is not just objective 
reality. ... the truth is not to be found by travelling as far away from one‟s 
personal perspective as possible.569  
It is hard to know what Nagel means here by „reality is not just objective reality‟ 
or what he means by „enriching the notion of objectivity‟. If it is conceptions 
that are being considered here, then how does a (non-reductive) form of 
objective understanding rule out (say) a Davidsonian account of mental events 
in terms of an ontological monism combined with a theoretical and explanatory 
dualism of conceptions? If it does not rule this out, then why the rebuke about 
the „purified form of thought‟ of physicalism? The problem is that if the notion 
of the mental that is required here is only a more highly developed „form of 
understanding‟ (as opposed to a new-look view of what „the mental‟ is), then 
one can have this without compromising a physicalist ontology. But if it is a 
new-look ontology that is required, then why does Nagel not offer unambiguous 
support for this claim? The text harbours a number of possibilities. Something 
like a Spinozian view would seem to be the most suitable candidate for the 
stronger position, yet his comments are not unqualified on this. (Claims such as 
„there is more to reality than what can be accommodated by the physical 
conception of objectivity‟570 lend credence to this interpretation of his views, 
yet, there is some evidence that his position is much weaker, leaning simply on 
a development of a conceptual understanding). To deepen the mystery, Nagel‟s 
punchline is that, by taking on an „expanded understanding‟, we „come as near 
as we can to living in the light of truth.‟571 It is not clear how such claims clarify 
matters. 
 There is a subsidiary problem here. Not only is Nagel unclear about what sort 
of philosophy his „dual aspect‟ theory is, it is also the case that he is unclear 
about how the category of subjective experience is supposed to feature in it. 
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What we gain from Nagel is that experience and subjectivity are crucially 
linked and that we cannot approach a conception of this sort of experience 
„from the outside‟ as it were. But this sort of reaction to dual aspect theory is 
assisted by a number of substantial confusions with respect to what is actually 
meant in the text by subjective points of view. Norman Malcolm has highlighted 
these confusions: 
The conception is perhaps best expressed by saying that a particular 
person is a point of viewing, for the Self or I that inhabits that person. 
Nagel‟s conception deepens perplexity. One feels bombarded by 
questions such as the following: (1) If the I that normally resides were to 
move out, would TN lose consciousness? (2) Nagel says that the I that 
occupies TN „receives the experiences‟ of TN (ibid., p. 62). Does this 
mean that a single experience of TN is had twice - that in TN there are two 
experiencing subjects? Or does TN have the experiences and the I only 
apprehend it? (3) If TN is the point of view from which the Self or I 
observes and acts on the world, does not TN himself observe and act on 
the world; or do TN and the I do it in unison? One hopes that they will not 
fall into disagreement.572  
The dualism of things here (the „I‟ and „TN‟) issue from taking Nagel‟s 
ontological theme very seriously. As Malcolm implies, the consequences 
should make one want to reassess the position that made one arrive at such a 
view. But this interpretation amounts to suggesting something very close to a 
Cartesian position, which Nagel has repudiated elsewhere. It is hardly 
surprising that such questions have been asked here, given the confusions 
mentioned. Nonetheless, I am sure that this is not Nagel‟s position, though it 
certainly needs to be made more clear what the focus of his interest is, if it is not 
this one.  
 The query here is urgent, for there is at least one fallacious move arising from 
Nagel‟s whole treatment of points of view. The problem is that the 
identification of the „subjective‟ with what can be thought about by using 
concepts (when standing to the world in a certain way and not another) can be 
read without the commitment to an „expanded understanding‟ that he seems to 
want us to consider. We might say that Nagel, in fact, makes a question-begging 
jump here from a way of conceiving such a perspective to a claim about the 
perspective itself. This, as Peacocke notes, amounts to a sense/reference slip: 
A greater or lesser degree of objectivity has in the first instance to do with 
ways of conceiving of the world. It is a further step to suppose that 
differences in modes of conception correspond to differences in reality, a 
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step corresponding to the difference between sense and reference .... 
When he writes „The fact that mental states are not physical states 
because they can‟t be objectively described in the way that physical states 
can‟ (p. 29) there is a jump: from modes of description to the things 
described.573  
Peacocke does qualify this objection by suggesting that differences in 
objectivity of conception may correspond to differences in the reality thought 
about, if additional arguments could be offered for this difference in reality. 
„The sense/reference gap would be bridged, for example, if it could be 
established that some state or object characterised at the relatively subjective 
level is a state or object which could not be thought about with concepts of the 
more objective level.‟574 
 These points will be taken up later. It will be argued that there is a way of 
joining a continuum account of experiential content with a Nagelian view of 
mind. For now, the criticism is that Nagel does not build this bridge between the 
subjective and objective, and so leaves his thesis open to other interpretations 
weaker than the position he seems, in places, to be maintaining. Some of the 
familiar options one might take on this have been indicated: notably, anomalous 
monism, central state materialism. It is crucially important that Nagel 
distinguish his position from these others, as his claims about the irreducible 
difference between subjective and objective perspectives (e.g., about bats) 
simply do not hold with some of these other views of mind-body relations (e.g., 
anomalous monism). However, if there can be a way of showing that the 
subjective and the objective can be understood as being at two exclusive and 
distinct levels, then dual-aspect theory may still be a tenable position, even if 
some of Nagel‟s arguments for it are not. Moreover, it might be a position 
which can rest with a physicalism of substance, yet disavow a physicalism as a 
fully explanatory thesis. A more coherent account of Nagel‟s position will later 
be suggested which avoids the confusions mentioned.  
 We need to get a grip on the most consistent position put forward in Nagel‟s 
writing. Perhaps a place to start would be to see how Nagel repudiates the more 
orthodox possibilities. An important argument which goes some way to 
rejecting the more familiar views above can be found in „What is it like to be a 
Bat?‟, when he claims that „the subjective character of experience is not 
captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the 
mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence.‟575 
 This „absent qualia‟ argument is an old objection which has been well 
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rehearsed in the literature. Jackson has raised a similar kind of argument which 
brings out the problem.576 He asks us to imagine a brilliant scientist called Mary 
who ex hypothesi knows all there is to know about the physics and physiology 
of colour perception, but who has continually lived in the confines of a 
colourless room. In this example, a reductive understanding of colours in terms 
of light waves and retinal stimulations is insufficient to capture essential 
qualitative features of colour experiences - demonstrating that any view of 
content which „misses out‟ on such features is essentially misguided.  
 Both of these arguments may be said not to work, and for standard reasons: it 
begs the question in favour of the thesis being defended. Janet Levin, in her 
paper, „Could Love be like a Heatwave?‟ argues that there is an „equivocation‟ 
in such examples, and claims that they presuppose that „knowledge‟ in such 
circumstances involves a practical task, „in Nagel‟s case, the ability to 
imaginatively project oneself into another point of view.‟ But the problem is 
that this doesn‟t show that one‟s theoretical knowledge is deficient. Levin 
explains by suggesting that „although sufficient experiences of the sort had by 
bats may be required for knowing what it is like to be one, it does not follow that 
this experience is the only source of any theoretical knowledge about bats.‟ 
Hence:  
 [T]hough Mary may not know what it is like to see colours without 
actually having seen them, it does not follow that she is missing any 
theoretical knowledge about colours or colour experience. Thus it does 
not follow that there are facts about experiences that no objective theory 
can describe.577  
The problem with this suggestion is that Levin trades on an ambiguity in the 
phrase „theoretical knowledge‟. For her, observational knowledge itself is 
„theoretical‟ in her sense, as is knowledge that (as opposed to knowledge how). 
The ambiguity in the phrase allows Levin to assert that Mary is not missing 
anything. But clearly she is missing certain kinds of „theoretical knowledge‟ (in 
Levin‟s sense); namely, the kinds of experiences that bats have. By trading on 
this ambiguity, Levin does seem to concede substantial ground to Nagel and 
Jackson. There may be no theoretical facts missing from the physicalist 
account, even though there are certain aspects of the sensational experience, or 
certain observational facts, which are. But this kind of reply allows us to see 
Nagel‟s claims in an important light. Nagel might be able to have a dual 
aspectivity of the „subjective‟ as experienced as against the „objective‟ as 
described by theory. Dual-aspect theory may be read as the thesis that certain 
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facts about subjective experiencings cannot be captured in terms of theoretical 
descriptions.  
 Nagel never explicitly words his views in precisely this way, but at base, it 
does seem to be his central point. If this is so, then distinctions between Nagel‟s 
position and some of the more orthodox kinds of dualist and materialist 
accounts mentioned earlier can be made. The difference between his position 
and others would come down simply to a matter of emphasis. What makes the 
„subjective‟ and the „objective‟ genuinely distinct in Nagel‟s view is that one, 
but not the other, can be captured in terms of the objective descriptions offered 
by science. The „objective‟ mode of description reveals certain facts or truths 
because it offers certain „perspective-less‟ truths; whereas the „subjective‟ 
mode of experiencing can offer certain „perspectival‟ truths - truths as 
experienced „from the inside‟ by perceivers. This stress, combined with his 
insistence on the „speculative synthesis‟ of subjective and objective 
perspectives, helps distinguish Nagel‟s account easily from that of the other 
accounts. In short, it is quite different from Davidson‟s account (Davidson 
claims that physical descriptions can capture the ontology of the mental). It is 
also quite different from the more traditional dual-aspect accounts offered by 
Spinoza, Russell and Strawson (who do not make the explicit distinction 
between descriptions and experiencings). And it is quite different from the 
account offered by the epiphenomenalist (who does not aim for a „speculative 
synthesis‟ as Nagel does). It is certainly different from central state materialism 
which disavows any explanatory autonomy of „the mental‟ from physical 
descriptions. Nagel‟s account seems to be closer to a property dualism of my 
own variety - where certain contents of one‟s perspectival experiences contain 
aspects which escape being captured at higher informational levels. 
 If this kind of understanding of Nagel‟s property dualist account can be 
maintained, it may be enough to get past Peacocke‟s point that to make the 
sense-reference jump, one needs to show that a state characterised at the 
subjective level cannot be thought about with concepts of another level. It may 
simply happen to be the case that the nature of objective descriptions of 
contentful experiences cannot capture experiences as had by perceivers. As will 
be shown later, this is one way of reading Nagel‟s philosophy of mind. It is a 
helpful reading too, as it enables some connections to be made between a 
continuum theory of experiential content and a dualist account of mind. It will 
later be pointed out that a continuum account of content actually coheres with 
Nagel‟s thought and provides reasons why his account might be true.  
 There is a need to develop this kind of account of Nagel‟s philosophy. The 
remarks Nagel makes in justification of his position are notoriously unclear and 
ambiguous. He neither attempts to offer a coherent account of the nature of 
mind nor distinguish his views from more traditional accounts, as attempted 
above. Moreover, his treatment of the „expanded understanding‟ required to 
integrate the subjective and objective perspectives often amounts to little more 
  
 349 
than vague, metaphysical flag-waving. There are no immediately engaging 
reasons offered for suggesting that a non-reductive „expanded understanding‟ is 
required, so here he really gains no ground on the physicalist/reductionist. As 
for the claim about transcending objectivity, this also amounts to serious 
question-begging on Nagel‟s part: it does not seem to me that because we 
expect scientific theories to break down and be replaced, it necessarily follows 
that the physicalist conception of objectivity needs to be replaced with the sort 
of experiential schema that he proposes. Clearly, he needs to offer more cogent 
reasons for us to accept this claim. However, there is more plausible support for 
a dual aspect view in his treatment of the problem of realism, which will now be 
outlined briefly. This will integrate the suggestions mentioned earlier and 
enable us to make far more sense of how his „speculative synthesis‟ features in 
his philosophy of mind.  
12.5 Limits of understanding 
Nagel describes realism as a thesis which is not about the kinds of things we 
know, but about „how far our thoughts can reach.‟578 He also tries to defend the 
view that in some very strong realist sense „the world extends beyond the reach 
of our minds.‟ Idealism is juxtaposed to this as the view that what there is, is 
what we can think about or conceive of, or what we or our descendants could 
come to be able to think about or conceive of; the view that there is something 
we could not think about or conceive of makes no sense.579 Nagel claims that 
more orthodox forms of realism and idealism depend on this more general 
dichotomy. 
 Nagel tries to present a case for realism in this specified sense. He argues 
that, if it is possible that certain forms of human beings can „constitutionally 
lack the capacity‟580 to conceive of some things which we can conceive of (like 
blind people or congenitally permanent nine-year-olds), it is equally possible 
that we could be constitutionally limited in comparison to higher order 
capacities. Moreover, it is not necessary that such capacities be realised in 
certain creatures, just as it would not be necessary for us to exist for the 
congenital nine-year-olds to have genuine limitations in what they could 
conceive and understand. Nagel pushes the point further, and tries to imagine a 
congenitally permanent nine-year-old philosopher with an interest in the issue 
of realism wondering if there were real things of which he/she was incapable of 
understanding. The point being, of course, that if this sort of being can be 
sensibly said to suppose a real world which is beyond the reach of his/her 
conceptual powers, it is equally reasonable that we could do the same. We could 
                                                 
578 Nagel, op. cit., (1986) p. 90. 
579 Loc. cit.  
580 Loc. cit. 
  
 350 
have an articulable realism of things which we could not, in principle, 
understand. And we could both be right about it in an important sense, even 
though we could not conceive the kind of things in question. 
 Despite the artificiality of this example, it has a lot of force. Unless we are 
prepared to rule out a realism of what we cannot understand on the basis of that 
which we can understand, we must be prepared to admit this kind of realism as 
a possibility. And the only basis on which we can rule it out, it seems, is by 
some sort of translatability argument: it is only possible to conceive of things if 
they are at least translatable into our language, current concepts and 
descriptions; something which we could not even in principle understand 
cannot be said to be „real‟ because to conceive of it we would have to, in some 
sense, formulate it in terms and concepts we could understand, in order to speak 
of it. Nagel‟s argument anticipates this kind of objection: 
Suppose Realist Junior (speculates) [about] beings, with capacities that 
the nine-year-olds lack, who could understand aspects of reality that are 
inaccessible to them, .... it seems very artificial to deny that someone in 
this position could believe something we know to be not only significant 
but true: that there are concepts usable by other types of minds, ... but 
which cannot be translated into his language or any other language that he 
can understand. Wouldn‟t a nine-year old Davidson who arose among 
them be wrong?581 
The burden of denying that we could consider a reality which lies beyond our 
understanding seems to rest with those who say it is unintelligible. And, as 
Nagel points out, limitation of translatability seems to be a lame argument. The 
analogy with a lower being seems to have a familiar ring about it - though Nagel 
is quick to point out that just because reality can be extended here and does not 
have a „built-in limitation,‟ does not mean that anything corresponds to our 
conception of what this reality is like - only that we have no reason to believe 
that nothing does, and every reason (by analogy) to think that something 
could.582  
 The procedure of specifying the legitimacy of conceptions beyond our 
understanding should seem familiar: Nagel tells us it is precisely the sort of 
procedure which is considered legitimate in disciplines like physics, so it 
should not be considered odd: „[It ]... exemplif[ies]... a theoretical step that is 
commonplace elsewhere. We can form the idea of phenomena that we do not 
know how to detect. Once the conception of a new physical particle is formed, 
defined in terms of a set of properties, those properties may then allow 
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experiments to be devised which will permit its detection.‟583 The important 
point for conceptions of realism is this: if Nagel is right, then there could be a 
real world in some robust sense which is beyond our theoretical 
comprehension, but which we can be right about in the same sense that a 
congenitally permanent nine-year-old philosopher can be right about the world 
beyond him or her. And if this sort of realism can be a legitimate realism, then it 
means that we need to take issue with much of Kantian and post-Kantian 
metaphysics which claims that we cannot form conceptions beyond our 
capacities to understand them.  
 Nagel does just that by agreeing with Strawson („in denying that we know 
things only as they appear to us‟), but also agreeing with Kant („in holding that 
how things are in themselves transcends all possible appearances or human 
conceptions‟). According to Nagel, our knowledge of the world is partly 
knowledge of the world as it is in itself, and partly knowledge of how things 
appear to us. However, there is no identity relation here. Our knowledge 
„includes things of which we cannot and never could conceive, no matter how 
far the human understanding is expanded.‟584 
 Of course, thinking about things that we cannot fully understand or conceive 
of amounts, in part, to thinking about things we cannot describe in the 
theoretical and conceptual terms available to us. Again, Nagel can be read here 
as claiming that some phenomena just cannot be understood in ways which can 
be captured by (current) theoretical descriptions. As he points out though, this 
does not mean that such phenomena do not exist, for there just may be things (or 
properties of things) which we cannot know about in this way „no matter how 
far the human understanding is expanded.‟ However, even though there may be 
some things that we just cannot conceive of in this way, it still makes sense to 
talk about such things, and it still might be plausible that such things (however 
imperfectly conceived) might constitute the actual nature of the world. The 
anecdote about the nine-year-old realist underlines this point.  
 This view, of course, coheres with Nagel‟s treatment of the problem of mind 
argued for earlier. In his view, the „subjective‟ nature of the mental just cannot 
be understood in terms which we use to describe „objective‟ physical states. In 
some important sense, the contentful nature of the subjective seems to escape 
such an analysis. Similar to the realism example, however, it might even be 
possible for a „wider‟ conception of subjectivity and objectivity to be possible, 
wherein the „subjective‟ features along with the objective descriptions, but we 
constitutionally lack the capacity to conceive of such a possibility. The dual 
aspects of the „subjective‟ and „objective‟, that he has been considering, might 
ideally occur „by combining into some conception of a single world those 
features of reality that are revealed to different perspectives at different levels 
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of subjectivity and objectivity.‟585 But, because of our imperfect conceptual 
grasp on the world, this composite-type analysis may forever be beyond our 
understanding: 
 [W]e must ... admit that the world probably reaches beyond our capacity 
to understand it, ... and this admission ... can be expressed only in general 
concepts whose extension is not limited to what we could in principle 
know about.586  
We might call this kind of claim Nagel‟s speculative integrationism. This could 
be defined as the thesis that speculative higher order views, which we currently 
cannot understand, can assist in reconciling philosophical problems. This is an 
important, though often overlooked, part of Nagel‟s thought. It provides a way 
of clearly distinguishing Nagel‟s philosophical outlook from more traditional 
views. His „intellectual optimism‟ for this kind of approach rests on the 
plausibility of cases such as the nine-year-old realist forming coherent higher 
order views about the kind of world that exists which he or she could neither 
understand nor describe. The implicit point is that this kind of strategy might 
well be useful in the consideration of other matters as well.  
 When this sort of analysis is couched specifically in terms of points of view 
and we reconsider the initial problem of Nagel‟s unclear relationship between 
the subjective and the objective, it would make sense then to have the following 
picture: dual aspect theory, according to Nagel, specifies an irreducible 
difference between two kinds of ways of looking at the world - ways in which 
we can describe and understand, and ways in which are simply experienced and 
„felt‟ and which cannot be fully captured by descriptions. Such an 
understanding of Nagel‟s philosophy also makes coherent sense of his remarks 
about bat experiences. For Nagel, the ways in which we may describe and 
understand bats „objectively‟ do not capture the kinds of unique sensations that 
bats experience „subjectively‟. Since this reading of Nagel seems to fit with so 
much of his writing (about bat experiences, about the issue of realism, about the 
subjective/objective dichotomy), I shall take this to be the substance of his 
philosophy of mind. We can avoid the confusions mentioned earlier by making 
his argument hinge on the difference between describing and experiencing. 
Nagel‟s account is certainly a property dualist account, but it differs from other 
such positions because of the stress that he places on precisely this point. But 
Nagel is a property dualist with another important difference. Unlike other 
property dualist accounts, Nagel allows for the possibility that the intrinsic 
nature of the subjective and objective can be combined somehow in some 
„higher order‟ view, which transcends such personal experiential perspectives 
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and objective descriptions.  
 This reading of his views has implications. Importantly, it means that Nagel‟s 
philosophy of mind is an ontological thesis, not merely a conceptual one. His 
claim is that what is ontologically salient does not simply amount to the kinds of 
things that one can understand - what exists is not just tied to a certain way of 
conceiving and describing. A physicalist approach to explaining what exists is 
certainly one useful manner of understanding - it is an understanding that is 
preoccupied with describing the world in „objective‟ terms. But Nagel makes 
two points here: firstly, that not all ways of explaining what exists are of this 
kind. There are some ways of understanding which amount to a non-descriptive 
grasp of some state of affairs which makes sense speculatively (as in the „realist 
junior‟ example). Secondly, some features of the world cannot be understood 
just by being described; they cannot exist in any other way than as subjective 
experiencings, so properties of subjective experiencings must escape an 
objective analysis. Despite the evident confusions with respect to Nagel‟s way 
of understanding the subjective and objective divide, a consistent position can 
be assumed from all this. Let us contrast it briefly with Davidson‟s account.  
 Davidson claims that descriptions at the mental level are descriptions of 
events that can also be described and explained at the physical level, even if 
there may be no tight nomological/conceptual ties between the two 
descriptions. Nagel, contrariwise, assumes that the appropriate terms of any 
translation here are beyond our (current) explanatory devices. This amounts to 
saying that there should be no compromise on what the terms of the explanation 
are when it comes to the nature of the mental. Nagel‟s move is to accept that the 
only substances in the world are physical, whilst denying that „physical‟ 
provides an adequate and complete explanation of the mental, as it is 
experienced. Moreover, he seems to suggest that until one has a correct and 
adequate vocabulary to harness subjective experiencings and objective 
descriptions, it is deflationary to suggest one to which the two are (ultimately) 
reducible. It is then best to treat them as sui generis aspects of reality.  
 In the scenario scouted earlier, Davidson Junior was wrong to insist that there 
was only a „real world‟ which could be couched in conceptual terms he could 
understand. Realist Junior was right to speculate on a different conception of 
„real world‟ even though he couldn‟t describe it. The example shows just how 
there can be a truth of the matter about the kind of things in the world, without 
the necessity that we might be geared to knowing what this truth is. The point 
seems to be that some truths, even closer to home, are the perspectival truths 
arising out of the actual experiencings derived from subjective points of view, 
which we have no adequate physical explanation for, and which cannot be 
captured in descriptive physical terms.  
 This should be read as an interpretation of Nagel‟s dual-aspect theory. It is a 
way of understanding several themes in his writing: his emphasis on the radical 
distinctness of sensory and objective conceptions, his speculative 
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integrationism and his rejection of orthodox accounts of the mind. The way in 
which Nagel articulates his position is sometimes quite unclear. However, the 
interpretation above seems to amount to the most plausible and coherent 
account of his views.  
 As stated earlier, other traditional accounts of the mind can‟t be like his 
account, or else Nagel would have to agree with them. And, on my reading, 
there does seem to be a difference in views here: anomalous monism (to take 
one) is a conservative thesis: it tries to canvass „understanding‟ in terms already 
appreciated for their heuristic and explanatory value; namely, the concepts and 
descriptions of the physical sciences. This account leaves room for a conceptual 
dualism, but not an ontological dualism, because on this view, there is no more 
in an account of experience than that described by science. Central state 
materialism, to take another example, is an even bleaker view: it, likewise, tries 
to canvass understanding itself in wholly „objective‟ terms; terms which can be 
identified and described in their physical details. This view regards even 
concepts as being physical in nature too, so although there is room here for a 
conceptual distinction between the mental and the physical, the kinds of things 
that mental concepts describe are just physical things. On this view, the 
„mental‟ collapses into being descriptions of contingently identifiable brain 
states.  
 Such „descriptive‟ accounts are, of course, a very common way of treating 
the mind-body problem. Indeed, it has been the exclusive preoccupation of 
physicalist philosophers with „objective‟ features generally, that allows them to 
treat conscious experience in terms of mental descriptions and, therefore, as 
alternative descriptions of physical (objective) events. This has been a 
self-justifying business, and something of a tradition. Setting adequacy 
requirements for accounts of mind-body relations to fulfil these kinds of 
„objective‟ understandings is to isolate the terms of the inquiry in advance. On 
such criteria, only theories which admit that the „mental‟ can be objectively 
described are considered worthy theoretical positions. So, seeing the mental in 
terms of descriptions spawns many different ways in which such descriptions 
can be made: behavioural, functional, conceptual, type-nomological, 
token-nomological and so on. Hence, the multitudinous varieties of materialism 
and the reason why the philosophy of mind is dominated by so many of these 
positions. Instances of such descriptive materialist accounts are, of course, just 
versions of the „objective‟ strategy which, Nagel claims, has allowed secondary 
qualities to „drop out of‟ the analysis of the world. It is this vicious cycle in the 
philosophy of mind that he sees himself as breaking.  
 But a materialist account of mind of any kind might be a tall order if Nagel is 
right about the ontological distance involved here: it might be wrong to base an 
(ultimate) account of things in terms of wholly objective descriptive 
understandings, even if it is acknowledged and agreed upon by all concerned 
that all there is a physical world. Davidson‟s conservative position only takes as 
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serious explanations those conceptions which can be physically described; 
Nagel‟s position is more agnostic. According to Nagel, however, it may be 
premature to speak in terms exclusively physical according to our current 
conception of „physical‟. His claim is that the content of subjective 
experiencings needs to be considered, along with physically describable 
contents, as serious features of the physical world. And the conception of the 
mind that would do this successfully, would no longer capture only features of 
the world which can be described; it would also capture the „felt‟ contents of 
subjective experiences. As far as I can see neither Davidson, nor any other 
dual-aspect view advanced actually claims as much, so Nagel‟s view is 
genuinely different.  
 If this interpretation can be attributed to Nagel‟s writing in view of the 
confusions mentioned earlier, then we can now say this: the program of 
combining these „perspectives‟ is difficult, not just because of a conceptual 
difference between them, but because the content of such orders is of an entirely 
different ontological character. This seems entirely consonant with Nagel‟s 
dual-aspect theory in how it has been interpreted here. This point will be 
developed later in relation to the concerns of this book. Before this, however, 
another crucial feature of Nagel‟s work needs to be addressed. 
12.6 Expanding objectivity 
Nagel aims to include the subjective and the objective in an „expanded form of 
objectivity‟. But there is an ambiguity in this idea which should be noted. On 
the one hand, Nagel is aiming for a new position in which the traditional forms 
of „objective‟ and „subjective‟ can be seen in terms of a higher-order view; a 
view sufficiently „far out‟ from one‟s perspectival centre to make sense of both 
polarities in terms of a „new‟ conception containing „mutually irreducible 
essential properties.‟587 Such a view is expressed as a kind of „objectivity‟ in 
Nagel‟s work. This kind of objectivity is stressed as part of his program to 
transcend the objectivist ontologies which limit us. At one point, for instance, 
he suggests we should work at „form[ing] a new conception that includes a 
more detached understanding of ourselves, of the world, and of the interaction 
between them....[where] objectivity allows us to transcend our particular 
viewpoint and develop an expanded consciousness that takes in the world more 
fully.‟588 This kind of objectivity features again when he says: „to acquire a 
more objective understanding of some aspect of life or the world, we step back 
from our initial view of it and form a new conception which has that view and 
its relation to the world as its object.‟589 
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 On the other hand, there is also the emphasis on objectification, which 
suggests that the viewpoints are not features of such an understanding:  
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less 
on the specifics of the individual‟s make-up and position in the world, or 
on the character of the particular type of creature that he is. The wider the 
range of subjective types to which a form of understanding is accessible - 
the less it depends on specific subjective capacities - the more objective it 
is.590  
These claims are antagonistic. They assert two forms of objectification: an 
„Absolute‟ objectification in which „a great deal is left behind in the process, 
since at every stage we separate into a category called “appearance” something 
which earlier was conceived as part of “reality”‟ and a „Hegelian-like‟ 
objectification where „nothing is left behind in the new analysis ... every aspect 
... is retained, though maybe somewhat altered, in each of its successors.‟591 
However, Nagel does intimate that the dimensions of the „subjective‟ and 
„objective‟ should actually be plotted on a continuum: 
 [T]he distinction between more subjective and more objective views is 
really a matter of degree, ... We may think of reality as a set of concentric 
spheres, progressively revealed as we detach gradually from the 
contingencies of the self.592  
The general aim here is to make use of objectivity as a broader notion than „the 
physical‟, and opting for an expanded form of it. The specific aim is to seek a 
„method of understanding‟ to make sense of subjective experiences without 
compromising their distinctness. The suggestion here is to treat „objectivity‟ as 
a contextually relative notion: what is properly „objective‟ depends on the 
fixation point of belief; and one can either ride roughshod over the localised 
perspectives with the „Absolute‟ conception of „objective‟, or accommodate 
them with the „Hegelian‟ version. Following from the imagined case of the 
nine-year-old philosopher, of course, it is legitimate to fix one‟s belief about 
subjective and objective points of view in terms of an „expanded understanding‟ 
about both, even if one is conceptually distant from such an understanding. It is 
to allow the fixation point of belief to transcend both standpoints. Nagel 
articulates this point with reference to a fictional being actually capable of such 
leaps of imagination claiming that a „being of total imaginative flexibility could 
project himself directly into every possible subjective point of view, and would 
not need such an objective method to think about the full range of possible inner 
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lives.‟ However, being limited in this regard, we are invited, instead, „to think 
of ourselves from the outside - but in mental, not physical, terms .... a natural 
objective understanding of the mind along these lines would be - an 
understanding as objective as is compatible with the essential subjectivity of the 
mental.‟593 
 This kind of suggestion does not seem helpful; indeed, it seems quite 
mystifying. The fable of the nine-year-old philosopher wrestling with the 
problem of realism suggests that we might be constitutionally inept at such an 
understanding. The same seems to be the case, likewise, with the interminable 
dilemma of the subjective and the objective. But unlike the „realism‟ case, there 
is a deeper problem here: to absorb our minds as well as our bodies in such an 
understanding amounts to combining the contents of subjective sensory states 
and objective physical states simultaneously, in some unified sense, without 
explanatory reduction and without considering the sensory states only as 
descriptions. But on Nagel‟s account, the contents of the „objective‟ stance are 
geared to capture descriptions and the contents of the „subjective‟ precisely 
cannot be captured in such terms. Furthermore, the subjective perspective, 
being the localised perspective from which we view the world, is central to our 
being: we cannot project ourselves imaginatively away from it as easily as the 
nine-year-old could project himself into considering the issue of realism. Is this 
„expanded understanding‟ possible then? This is Nagel‟s challenge. What is 
clear is that whether we can „explain‟ what it is like to have certain sensational 
contents as well as we can explain certain objective, descriptive events is a real 
problem for any authentic philosophical account of the kinds of informational 
exchanges we have with the world. As the problem is expressed here, however, 
it seems unlikely that this can be achieved beyond the making of suggestive 
metaphors and assertions.  
12.7 To quale or not to quale?  
Fortunately, one can reach some positive and informative conclusions about all 
this. What one can say about Nagel‟s work is that there must be certain 
properties of low-level experiential states which are lost in a physicalist 
analysis of those states. Concentrating on „objective‟ descriptions of the world 
allows physicalist philosophers to treat the „mental‟ in (descriptive) physical 
terms. But pace Nagel, an emphasis on objective, descriptive concepts makes 
them miss out on something crucial: the nature of the experience itself, as it is 
had by the perceiver. On Nagel‟s view, there must be more to the story than 
merely „objective‟ descriptions of the world, because the subjective perspective 
presupposes experiencings of sorts. And experiences qua experiences are sui 
generis distinct features of the world, and particular features of human beings as 
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data-processing organisms. To say this commits us to the view that the way the 
world is structured at one level of „objective‟ inquiry is very different from how 
experience is structured at another level of „subjective‟ inquiry. And, because 
there are differences in how this occurs, there must be a corresponding 
distinction in the ontological nature of the informationally complex, perceiving 
and inquiring human being, which seems to carry on at both levels. The human 
being escapes being scientifically described - just as much as he is captured by 
such descriptions. So he is both a scientific and trans -scientific creature.  
 Earlier we have seen Peacocke stipulating that if it can be shown that 
concepts of one level of „subjectivity‟ cannot be thought about using the 
concepts or descriptions of the higher „objective‟ level, then we can make an 
ontological claim of interest. On the argument of this book, and on Nagel‟s 
view of the nature of mind, it seems that we can show this. As argued, there is a 
divide between the lower and higher level of man-in-the-world in respect of the 
contentful structure of experience and the contentful nature of descriptions. The 
content that is employed in inferential integrations of experience cannot be 
translated onto the low-level sensory integrations. The „inferential‟ is sui 
generis to aspects of experience which are low-level sensational.  
 This is close to what has been argued throughout this book. It is a view 
which, to some extent, both supports and receives support from Nagel‟s 
philosophy. On my view, and Nagel‟s, one can say that there are qualia: „felt‟ 
properties of experiences which are ineliminable. There are felt properties of 
experiences because experiences cannot be captured in high-level conceptual 
terms by „objective‟ descriptions. There are sui generis properties of such 
experiences because not all conceptual content can be accounted for in 
descriptive or inferential terms.  
 However, in saying this, unorthodox reasons are appealed to which are not 
available on Nagel‟s analysis. The claim made in this book is that it is plausible 
that low-level sensational features occur if experiential content is organised, for 
essentially evolutionary reasons, at a number of different perceptual levels. 
This point is consistent with the claims made regarding animal and infant 
experience: low-level similarities and differences, „aspects‟ of content, must be 
felt properties of experiences, for there is little else for some organisms to go on. 
This is not to say, however, that descriptive concepts do not feature in 
subjective perspectives at all. Experience itself, though always perspectival and 
subjective, may be more-or-less theoretically (objectively) informed, even if it 
cannot be fully captured in such terms. It is to this multi-level kind of view of 
content that the continuum account applies.594  
 The reason why there might be „felt‟ aspects of experiences has only been 
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dealt with briefly in this book. The continuum account sees mental content 
being usefully informed by contentful experiential qualia because such features 
do seem to have a selective advantage. It is important for organisms, which do 
not have well-developed descriptive capacities, to have experiential states of 
some kind, and these also assist in transmitting some features of perceptual 
information fast. It is not implausible to think that sensational content might 
have some survival value over and above that of being the principal means of 
informational exchange with the „objective‟ world. Further, conscious sensory 
states are efficacious in bringing about what might be called „laying down 
procedures‟ - while undergoing some mechanical routine, conscious awareness 
of some external disruption can bring an organism to undergo new action 
patterns or aversive behaviours. If elimination of low-level sensational features 
of experience was not satisfactorily achieved by those philosophers discussed 
in the previous chapters, then a continuum account along the lines being 
sketched, or a dual-aspect view along the lines Nagel is suggesting, may be a 
more plausible story. The dual-aspect theory of the mind is essentially 
compatible with a continuum account of content.  
 There is a rider to be added to this. Nagel‟s subjective/objective distinction is 
not to be equated exactly with my distinction between low-level and high-level 
content. This is a mismatch. Even Nagel‟s „subjective‟ stance encompasses 
theory-loaded (but perspectival) explanations. The „I‟ in Nagel‟s subjective 
point of view is itself theoretically informed to some extent. The precise point, 
for my thesis, is that Nagel‟s subjective stance also encompasses low-level, 
contentful, non-descriptive grasping of a sensational nature. It has been the aim 
of this work to suggest that this level is an essential part of contentful 
experiences. Moreover, it is this level of contentful, non-inferential grasping 
that, in my view, enables both theorised subjectivity and scientific objectivity in 
creatures like us.  
 In the final analysis, is Nagel‟s „dual-aspect‟ position plausible? I think that 
with the above clarifications it is. It, at least, requires a serious audience. To 
suggest that there are two discernible contents to how we integrate features of 
the world informationally seems to me an entirely respectable view (The claim 
here is that there are, in fact, several non-exclusive contents). To suggest further 
that such a problem ultimately might have a solution which is forever beyond 
our comprehension is, admittedly, an obscure notion, though the criticism that it 
is obscure or inadequately argued does not in itself show that the suggestion is 
wrong. The matter of a speculative integrationist account deserves further 
investigation than can be attempted here. 
12.8 Some objections  
Dual-aspect theory faces standard objections which prevent it being considered 
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as a reputable theory of mind and content. This is the place to briefly mention 
some of those objections. 
 The panpsychism objection: The problem here is that if one allows certain 
physical entities to have mind-like properties then there‟s no reason not to allow 
all physical entities (e.g., rocks and other inanimate objects) to have such 
properties. And, the idea of all entities having mind-like properties is 
implausible. 
 I agree that panpsychism is implausible. But I would deny that a property 
dualist account of the kind I am espousing necessarily leads to it. All that has 
been claimed is that certain contents can‟t be captured in high-level terms. It 
hasn’t been claimed that low-level contents are an ubiquitous feature of the 
world, as panpsychism does. Moreover, the account given here provides for 
low-level contents only where evolutionary sophistication allows it, and this is 
an empirical matter to be borne out (or refuted) in individual cases. Property 
dualism might entail the logical possibility of panpsychism, but there is clearly 
no evidence for panpsychism being true. It is fairly clear that rocks etc., do not 
exhibit low-level contents. As it is not self-evident, nor a entailment of my 
view, I shall not discuss it. My point is only that we need a more subtle 
explanatory focus on the matter of low-level content - and a property dualist 
account best provides this for most experiential amalgams. This is not to say, of 
course, that there mightn‟t be a better theory of mind and content down the track 
(this much is acknowledged by Nagel himself). 
 The non-sequitur objection: It has been pointed out to me (by Chris 
Mortensen) that though it is right to point out that contents need not necessarily 
be linguistic, it need not follow that any state involved in the informational 
process can avoid being a propositional attitude. And, if this is the case, then 
„property dualism is no threat since qualia disappear in favour of [such] 
contents ...[and while] any propositional attitude will have aspects which are 
non propositional, it will need a further argument to show there are mental or 
qualia-like ... That some aspects of mentality are non-verbal doesn‟t entail 
dualism, in other words.‟595  
 I agree that property dualism is not entailed by the existence of 
non-propositional contents. But, in fairness, it hasn‟t been claimed that there is 
an entailment relation here. I‟ve only claimed that if low-level contents can‟t be 
captured in high-level terms, that the property dualists‟ position is at least 
plausible. This is quite a different matter from claiming an entailment. On 
Mortensen‟s first point, I am not persuaded that qualia „disappear‟ in favour of 
non-verbal propositional attitudes - though this requires arguments that cannot 
be attempted here (it seems to me that the whole problem of qualia is precisely 
that they escape any sort of characterisation, and not just of the propositional 
                                                 
595 Chris Mortenson, pers. comm. See also his: „Mental Images and Neurophysiology‟ in 
Computers, Brains and Minds: Essays in Cognitive Science, passim. 
  
 361 
variety). In any case, what can it mean to say that propositional attitudes can 
have aspects which are non-propositional? A plausible account of 
non-propositional aspects which are simultaneously not quale-like is called for 
here.  
 Nor does it seem obvious that propositions always occur in all experiences. It 
doesn‟t seem clear in some of the several species of „look‟-belief given in 
chapter 4, for instance, that propositional attitudes occur in each case. Seeing, 
for example, „the third house on the left‟ seems to have propositional content, 
for sure. But in recalling the third house on the left from an experience in which 
the third house on the left was not initially noticed, what are we to say? How is 
this kind of content to count as a full-blown propositional attitude? A 
proto-attitude maybe - but this suggestion hardly seems better than keeping 
qualia at the one end of the continuum; unless, of course, a story could be told 
about attitudes which are simultaneously not quale-like. It is hard not to think 
that the notion of a propositional attitude is being made to bear a heavy load 
here. 
 Mortensen wants to tell a story in which „qualia are contained by 
propositional attitude operators‟ in some way. Non-verbal beliefs leave qualia 
„semantically bracketed and ontically sanitised‟ in his view. Though this is  
consistent with a robust materialism it doesn‟t get us (ontologically speaking) 
much further than opting for a dualism which is sympathetic to speculative 
integration with some future materialist theory (as Nagel argues). Unless, of 
course, the way in which quale can be so contained is told in such detail that 
rules out the dualist account by fiat. And, as far as I know, no such story is yet 
available. In any case, the idea that propositional attitudes might have aspects 
which are non-propositional seems to me to be a substantial enough concession 
to get from any propositionalist; certainly enough, I think, to make property 
dualism at this point an equally plausible story.  
 I am certainly not persuaded - as Mortensen is - that unsophisticated 
organisms can best be described as have „propositional attitudes in some 
attenuated sense‟ rather than experiences. If it‟s hard to admit low-level 
experiences in very unsophisticated organisms, it‟s surely harder to admit that 
they have propositional attitudes - unless by it we mean something very 
different from Brentano-like high-level beliefs, intentions, wantings, and so on. 
And, if one means something very different then I don‟t how it helps to call 
them „propositional attitudes‟ rather than experiences - unless it is to save some 
kind of tacitly-held inferentialism. Contents might well be proposition-like 
some way up the continuum as I have admitted, but admitting this is a far cry 
from admitting that there are propositions all the way through, which is what I 
deny.  
 The ‘failure of closure’ objection: Frank Jackson has pointed out that my 
account does not allow the possibility that the physical world might be causally 
closed. If some contents can‟t be captured in the high-level terms of the 
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physical sciences then dualism must entail a failure of explanatory closure.  
 Property dualism may entail a failure of closure if a dualist account on its own 
was the only game in town. But I haven‟t claimed that it is the only game. I have 
argued for a story which provides for a number of levels of explanatory 
influence. Again, the continuum suggestion provides for sui generis, not 
causally inexplicable contents, and the mechanisms of such contents mostly 
have features which are explicable in a causal sense: on one level, low-level 
features are quite explicable in evolutionary terms (one would expect such 
contents if they help to tell a selective story). On another level, such contents 
are quite explicable in terms of a modular view of perception (one would expect 
processing to occur at different levels). Both of these levels of influence are part 
of a larger story which is entirely causal. If a partly causally closed account of 
certain aspects of low-level content can be obtained, then I can‟t be said to be 
denying closure. True, not all aspects of content might admit of closure so 
easily, but that‟s not necessarily a philosophical problem. The role of a property 
dualist theory, instead, might be to provide a conceptual framework in which it 
might make sense to say that such contents are legitimate features of the world. 
As a metaphysical story, perhaps that‟s all we can expect from it. (After all, 
whoever expects a single theory of anything - even a straight physical theory - 
to provide full explanatory closure?) A perfectly legitimate line to take here is 
to insist that mental contents are themselves causes and to stress the rather old 
view that some kind of interactionist story is true. This should not, of course, be 
seen as an interaction between „ghostly substances‟ and the physical, but an 
interaction between the physical states of organisms of certain evolutionary 
complexity and properties of those states which can‟t be captured in high-level 
terms. That a story of this kind is yet to be told in a fully satisfactory way is not 
necessarily an indication of a failure of explanatory closure, only an indication 
of a failure of current explanatory closure. In principle at least, closure is 
possible if we get our theoretical understanding right. The „failure of closure‟ 
objection, I conclude, is not a serious one.  
12.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter some of the problems with Nagel‟s „dual-aspect‟ theory of the 
mental and the physical have been outlined. Despite my reservations regarding 
Nagel‟s account, it is suggested that his theory can be read in a way which 
legitimises and reinforces the continuum view of experiential content. The 
continuum account also offers some reasons why a dual-aspect view of mind 
might be true. The dualist account is that „objective‟ descriptions of 
experiences, in physical terms, do not capture the sense in which some 
experiences have low-level, non-descriptive „aspects‟ which are subjectively 
felt. So there must be a sense in which any wholly physicalist view of 
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experiencing organisms is inadequate. The reason why this might be true is that 
mental content, as much as any other feature of the world, is a property and a 
product of complex evolving systems. 
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13. Experiencing the ‘Manifest’ Image 
To deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or 
understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance.596 
There is a long-standing dilemma in philosophy concerning the nature of man, 
perhaps best summed up by Sellars: 
 
The philosopher is confronted not by one complex many-dimensional 
picture, the unity of which, such that it is, he must come to appreciate; but by 
two pictures of essentially the same order of complexity, each of which 
purports to be a complete picture of man-in-the-world, and which, after 
separate scrutiny, he must fuse into one vision.597 
The view put forward here is bewildering at first blush. How can a view of 
man-in-the-world which incorporates the vocabulary and ontology of feelings, 
beliefs, desires, sensory quale, be „stereoscoped‟ along with a view of man as an 
essentially physiological creature, explicable entirely by means of the ontology 
of the empirical sciences? The task would seem hopeless unless one is prepared 
to reify one view at the expense of the other. Yet this is not what the statement 
of the problem asks us to consider. It engages us to consider somehow 
combining the two without allowing either to be „overwhelmed in the 
synthesis.‟ Yet, it is not clear how this can be done without compromising the 
appeal and integrity of each.  
 I have been concerned with two orders of complexity of man‟s nature in this 
book. The issue examined has, to some extent, run parallel to the conflict 
between these two views of man. The issue has been whether or not a full and 
adequate account of experience and content can be given along high-level lines, 
employing the familiar categories of high-level concepts, theory and 
                                                 
596 T. Nagel, „What is it like to be a Bat?‟ in Mortal Questions, pp. 170-171. 
597 Wilfred Sellars, „Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man‟, in Science, Perception and 
Reality, p. 19. For the following quotations, see pp. 5-37. 
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background knowledge. Against the direction of eliminativism, reductionism 
and inferentialist accounts generally, it has been claimed that it cannot. It was 
argued that the dichotomy between experience being dependent in any 
necessary and sufficient way on such high-level conceptions (the inferentialist 
proposal) and experience arising via non-inferential action on the senses (the 
observational account) needed to be overcome by a more subtle and enriched 
view. 
 The alternative account presented incorporated a continuum thesis: there are 
several levels of content including varying degrees to which high-level 
influences can be present in experience. It also incorporated a complexity 
thesis: experience is best understood in terms of an amalgam of content, both 
high- and low-level, which can be simultaneously present in every experiential 
complex. Finally, it also incorporated an asymmetry thesis: that while there are 
more or less degrees of sensational content in every high-level experience, there 
are no high-level features in very low-level experiences. The claim has been 
that the continuum account is a better account of perception, and that high-level 
features alone will not capture experiential content - in fact, inferentialism is 
false even for sophisticated experiences, though it does isolate some important 
and necessary elements in high-level perception.  
 An attempt to fuse the two views of man-in-the-world, of course, is an 
enterprise of a somewhat different kind. The interest here is in combining the 
deliverances of sense with the explanation of the sensory world offered by 
science in terms of neurophysiological events. However, the treatments overlap 
here to some extent: both approaches suggest accounts which emphasise the 
nature of high-level descriptions over the contentful nature of sensations. The 
neurophysiological approach tries to canvass the relation between one view and 
the other in terms of available or potentially available empirical conceptions. 
Some philosophers even attempt to effect a reconciliation between the two 
kinds of images by compromising the level of sensation with the level of 
neurophysiological description. 
 Similarly, the inferentialist proposal turns to available descriptive features - 
representational states, concepts, background knowledge, propositions or 
theories - to account for the nature of perception. It likewise tries to canvas the 
relation between experience and content in terms of sophisticated „high-level‟ 
conceptions. The emphasis on high-level cognitive factors in my case thus 
parallels the emphasis on complex empirical realisations, as determined by 
science, in Sellars‟s case. Any attempt to combine the two kinds of content - the 
descriptive and the sensory - is thus of intrinsic interest. I want to consider, in 
concluding, just how the two views of experiential content might be „focussed 
into one vision‟, just like Sellars‟s two views of man-in-the-world.  
 When the problem of the two views of man was originally expressed in terms 
of a clash of two „images‟, it was not intended to refer to the traditional 
dualism-materialism polemic. Here, the question is whether man can be 
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understood in terms of a special substance or set of substances, in addition to 
how he is characterised by science. The two images did not refer to an 
essentially „naive‟ (as opposed to a „sophisticated‟) way of thinking about 
human beings. Rather, they referred to different ways in which human beings 
have evolved intellectually. The human beings‟ view of themselves was 
conceived to be prompted by certain historical forces and it had developed and 
evolved with those circumstances to bring about a functional way of looking at 
the world. Sellars‟s terms for these ways of relating to the world are the 
„manifest‟ and „scientific‟ images. The essential dualism „is not that between 
mind and body as distinct substances but radically different ways in which the 
human individual is related to the world.‟ Each of these „images‟ was seen to 
have historical roots: the „manifest‟ image evolved as man came to „recognise 
or encounter himself‟ as a person, not merely as an object - specifically, a 
person enmeshed in a network of rights and duties. This originated essentially 
as pre-scientific speculation; firstly, about man against nature; then about man 
against man, and finally man against community. It was in these stages that an 
„irreducibly new‟ level of conscious awareness about himself developed from 
his organic nature: a move characterised by essentially „correlational‟ 
procedures, drawing upon introspectible and perceptual knowledge of himself 
and the world around him. By contrast, the „scientific‟ image evolved as our 
„postulational‟ capacities developed; where we came to explain phenomena of 
the world by assuming, and then describing, imperceptible mechanisms 
underlying the physical and chemical nature of certain entities. 
Chronologically, of course, the manifest image is the most ancient while the 
scientific image is of relatively recent origin. Each „image‟ has central 
importance for our nature, yet both are idealisations in something like the sense 
that a frictionless body or an ideal gas is an idealisation.  
 What came to be well appreciated by philosophers, of course, was that for the 
purposes of explanation, the scientific image was the best image to go by; while 
for the purposes of seeing oneself as a consciousness - a person - living in a 
world of rights and duties, the manifest image was essential. To be a person, 
one needed to be seen in terms of rehearsing intentions - it was not sufficient to 
be described in terms of a scientific specimen. Likewise, as a consciousness, 
one was related to the world in a way which was very different from how one 
was related to the world as an object of scientific discovery. While both images 
are important to the development of human beings‟ understanding of 
themselves, one image constituted a „conceptual framework of persons‟; the 
other, a „symbolic tool.‟ However, it was recognised equally that these images 
needed to be conjoined in some way, if people were to fully understand their 
complex nature. And, since both images seemed equally important and 
essential to human functioning - each did purport to be a complete picture of 
man-in-the-world - they needed to be somehow kept as compatible accounts. 
The manifest image needed not to be simply reconciled with the scientific 
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image, but joined to it. Both images on their own were essentially incomplete. 
Sellars himself did not attempt to do this joining; he merely ventured to point 
out that the „dualism of the manifest image and the scientific image of 
man-in-the-world‟ was a dualism which could be ultimately „transcended‟, 
even if only in thought.  
 Sellars may well be right in the historical details about the origins of the 
manifest image and the scientific image. He may also be right that the essential 
dualism of the „manifest‟ and the „scientific‟ can be transcended in something 
like the way he suggests. But the dilemma of how to go about joining the two is 
not just a matter of fusing different images, even if „only in thought‟. The issue 
is how the levels of explanatory analysis articulated by those very different 
views can fit together. And here, the project traditionally strikes a snag. No 
scientific „image‟ has succeeded in explaining - using only the „postulational‟ 
vocabulary of science - what it is like for an organism to have certain qualitative 
sensations; to have „felt‟ aspects to its experiences. This is certainly part of the 
„essential tension‟ which any account of man must face. And it is really the 
point of most conflict in the clash of the images. This point of conflict has been 
the central concern of this book.  
 Materialist responses to the conflict between the images generally suggest 
that „the scientific image is not yet complete‟ and that „when the chips are all 
down‟ the manifest and the scientific conception of both sensations and 
conceptual thinking would fit into a „synoptic view as parallel processes‟. On 
most contemporary accounts of this problem, the former would be seen and 
understood as occurring only in connection with complex physical processes 
which, in essence, is the scientific image. However, most philosophers 
(eliminativists excluded) opt for the „primacy‟ of the scientific image in the 
restricted sense, which also allowed for the person to be seen in terms of 
membership of a „community‟ and in the business of rehearsing intentions. Few 
philosophers want to rule out the conceptual importance of the manifest image 
for day-to-day life, though they certainly hold that the manifest image would be 
understood in the more familiar empirical conceptions which the „scientific‟ 
image will, eventually, describe in detail.  
 Yet we have seen in this book reasons for doubting the optimism of this entire 
approach. We have seen that some aspects of man-in-the-world cannot be fully 
captured by high-level factors. More specifically, they cannot be fully captured 
just by being described. The having of qualitative sensations is also not merely 
a matter of an „image‟ of man looked at „synoptically‟, or otherwise; it is a 
feature of certain experiences with an evolutionary function which stands in 
need of explanation. Moreover, we have seen that there is a case for claiming 
that a framework of sensory content is a requirement for any adequate view of 
the nature of perception. Low-level aspects, we saw, cannot be ruled out of an 
account of experience and content. Any attempt to suggest that the scientific 
image is more primary than the manifest image has to contend with the problem 
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that some features of man-in-the-world simply escape a full and complete 
scientific characterisation.  
 At this point any similarities between the clash of the images and the 
concerns in this book disappear. Any characterisation of the issue treated in 
terms of rival „images‟ is misleading - it suggests that it is just a matter of 
combining, at a theoretical level, what is essentially a conceptual outlook on the 
nature of man which has developed over time. However, as argued, the content 
of experiences is not merely part of a conceptual outlook understood by way of 
a certain theory; it is, in other words, no mere „idealisation.‟ It is essentially a 
difference in the way we go about processing the world at different levels. If 
what has been argued in this book is plausible, then one of those levels cannot, 
by its nature, be captured in descriptive terms. So, saying that the „manifest‟ is, 
at bottom, what the „scientific‟ will eventually describe is fundamentally to 
presuppose that such content will eventually be captured by descriptions. And 
this is to invoke the terms of the inferentialist proposal which has here been 
called in question. If successful in this project, then philosophers‟ claims for the 
scientific over the manifest cannot be achieved, and another way of joining the 
descriptive and the sensational must be sought. This new way must take the 
sensory aspects of the „manifest‟ as being genuinely contentful - and, at some 
level, non-descriptive and non-reducible. To see the problem in this way makes 
joining the two features harder, but perhaps makes for a more authentic account 
of man-in-the-world. On the view presented here, the contentful nature of the 
sensory stands in as much need of an account as the empirical nature of the 
descriptive. 
 The low-level/high-level dichotomy - the distinction between sensational and 
inferential content - does not in any way correspond to the distinction between 
the „manifest‟ and the „scientific‟ images. I have not intended to claim here that 
it does. The scientific image is not the same thing as a perception informed by 
high-level reasoning. Even my key example of high-level reasoning - Sherlock 
Holmes‟s experience of the cigar-band near Jones‟s body - is framed in terms of 
the manifest image; in fact, the manifest image is wholly constructed from 
ordinary (i.e., scientifically unsophisticated) perceptions. The scientific image, 
by contrast, is a world view derived from scientific experimentation: it is not 
usually a conceptual element in experience (except, perhaps, that of scientists in 
laboratories). It does not describe a world of experience, but a world as 
understood in terms of scientific theory, postulates of theory and entities 
corresponding with the results of experimentation (electrons, quarks and so on). 
The scientific image is thus not equivalent to inferentialism in perceptual 
content, nor is the manifest image equivalent to sensational content (though it 
often describes such content in terms of that image). The claim here is certainly 
not to forge a connection between the two images of man-in-the-world and the 
two levels of perceptual content. 
 The important point - and the reason for making this comparison - is that 
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there is a connection between how philosophers traditionally try to resolve the 
problem of the two images and how the inferentialist proposal treats the issue of 
experiential content. The inferentialist proposal, we saw, tries to capture 
experiential content in high-level terms - it suggests that high-level influences 
are either necessary for experiences, or are necessary and sufficient for them. 
On any inferentialist view, there is no contentful experiential content outside 
the imposition of high-level categories. On this view, the nature of the sensory 
ends up being fully captured in terms of the descriptive facilities common to the 
various features of high-level inference.  
 How philosophers customarily treat the problem of the two images is 
explicitly part of this tradition. Their way of overcoming the dichotomy of the 
manifest and the scientific images is to capture the one image with the 
descriptions of the other. The content of the manifest image does not escape the 
explanatory mechanisms of the scientific image because it can actually be 
described by them „when the chips are all down.‟ So most materialist 
philosophers make the same sort of mistake as that made by inferentialists, 
namely, that experience can somehow be fully captured by descriptions.  
 This way of resolving the dilemma arising between the manifest and the 
scientific is not uncommon. The inferentialist myth is pervasive in the treatment 
of many philosophical problems, as I have tried to show. Sellars‟s attempt to 
capture the sensory or the manifest in terms of what can be described by science 
is specifically a first step in the program of reductionistic physicalism (i.e., the 
exclusive primacy of the „scientific image‟ over that of the „manifest image‟). 
This program consists firstly in the reduction of experience/perceptions to 
concepts and beliefs, and then the reduction of those concepts and beliefs to 
actual physical events, a manoeuvrer common to many materialist 
philosophers. This book has tried to attack the first step of this program, making 
less plausible the claim that the descriptions of the scientific image can fully 
capture the contentful nature of experiences. My view - essentially in sympathy 
with Nagel‟s - is that the explanatory primacy of the scientific image in the 
context of experience and content is overstated.  
 While this is a reason for rejecting the inferentialist myth, this book does not 
take a stand on the specific dichotomy between the manifest image and the 
scientific image. I have not attempted a fusing of the images in this sense, nor 
do I attempt to connect this problem with the problem of experience. The 
continuum account is, at best, a metaphor for a new way of thinking about 
experience and content; it does not bear the weight of a new theory of 
man-in-the-world, although implications may carry over for it. Even if my 
rejection of the inferentialist proposal were false, the „essential tension‟ 
between a world of conscious experiences and a world of whirling, colourless 
particles would remain. This problem remains despite placing stumbling blocks 
in the path of the inferentialist. Nagel‟s „subjective‟ and „objective‟ bind is 
basically Sellars‟s „manifest‟ and „scientific‟ tension, not to mention 
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Eddington‟s „two tables‟ problem revisited. No solution is offered for this 
dilemma.  
 However, it has been argued that the inferentialist proposal is false. It has also 
been suggested that the first stage in a physicalist-type reduction of experiential 
content will not work any more than it will for the fusing of the „manifest‟ and 
the „scientific‟ images - both presuppose that content can be captured by 
high-level descriptions, theory, and so on. But I have attempted more than just a 
negative critique: I have also tried to replace the standard views with a more 
subtle account.  
 In concluding, it remains to say a few words about what the alternative 
account amounts to in the broadest sense. As shown, admitting the „aspect‟-like 
features of experiences along with the descriptive, conceptual level is a matter 
of incorporating into the world features about ourselves as sophisticated 
data-processing organisms. It is to admit certain ways in which we structure the 
world perceptually; it is to admit levels of contentful experiencings along with 
levels of descriptions and theorisings. Certain aspects of experiential content, 
on this view, have „look‟-like features - and these are as much a part of our 
experiences as the representational, propositional and theory-embedded 
features which may be expressed and described in high-level scientific terms. 
 The alternative account presented in this book tries to „fuse‟ the various 
contents of experience into one vision. A fusion is needed between the two 
levels because both kinds of content are ways in which we do go about 
processing the world as experiencing organisms. A single vision is also needed 
because the failure to give an account of low-level content often leads to 
misleading and impoverished philosophies. Failure to recognise „the sensory‟ 
leads to what Nagel describes as „outright denial that certain patently real 
phenomena exist at all,‟598 and, hence, to the legitimation of various forms of 
reductionisms, eliminativisms and physicalist accounts, which confuse the 
having of an experience with the describing of it.  
 It seems highly likely that an entirely naturalist account can be given of 
sensational content, however. Any concern that a repudiation of inferentialism 
in the context of experience will legitimate various sense data theories, 
relativisms and positivist accounts is unwarranted. The view adumbrated in this 
book insists that an adequate account of experience must include sensational 
features as contentful experiences for basically evolutionary reasons. Such 
features have a distinct informational function which enables „something that it 
is like‟ for creatures to have certain experiences. And this function both 
personalises the experience and makes it available for later, more detailed 
processing. By way of reconciling the competing intuitions to keep such 
content, I opted for a property dualist account of man, along with a view of the 
evolution of perceptual systems which enables some aspects of experiences to 
                                                 
598 T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 7. 
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be felt, rather than just described or conceptualised in high-level terms. 
Unavoidably, this position has required a rejection of the views which stress 
only high-level, descriptive conceptualisation as an explanation of felt 
experience, just as it has required a rejection of the strict formulation of the 
theory dependence of observation thesis. Ruling out such hardened 
philosophical precedents has meant that I have had to abandon „inferentialist‟ 
accounts along the lines of Churchland, Sellars, Feyerabend and Armstrong, as 
well as the emphasis behind much of contemporary rationalist thought. It has 
also required that I make substantial modifications to the orthodox 
interpretation of Kant‟s epistemology. The aim has been to arrive at an account 
of experience and content which incorporates the idea that experiences admit of 
inferential features as well as „optical‟ or felt features. There are, on my view, 
several important levels of perceptual analysis worth considering, and they 
constitute sui generis aspects of content.  
 In sum, the position argued for in this book carries over naturally to an 
account of man. For if low-level experiencings are admitted along with the 
„postulational‟ and „descriptive‟ vocabulary of science, then there is forever 
more to the nature of man than the descriptive scientific image that 
philosophers discuss. There is also more than what is simply „manifest‟. The 
nature of man, just like the nature of his experiences, is multi-faceted. The 
approach given here suggests that a certain view of man must be the end result 
of any adequate account of experiential content. Like the two images of 
man-in-the-world, it is very much in sympathy with the project of uniting the 
postulational and correlational vocabularies. Unlike this issue, however, it aims 
not just to reconcile what is described by science and what is sensed by man, but 
to reconsider the way in which we look at the relationship between 
„descriptions‟ and „sensings‟ as they arise in the context of experience and 
content.
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